To which faculty freedom belongs: the common Reformed view puts it formally in the will, radically in the intellect
Having set out the nature and essence of human freedom in this way, we still have to ask which of man's faculties it properly concerns and belongs to.
The more common view among the teachers of the Reformed school is that human freedom has its origin in mind and reason but is properly a disposition of the will. Man can choose among various things, embracing one now and rejecting it at another time, because he can judge things in various ways and grasp in them different aspects of good or evil. Even so, no act in man counts as free unless the will either produces it or at least commands it.
So only the will's acts are held to be free in themselves. Acts carried out through other faculties are free only to the extent that they depend on the will and happen with its consent, or at least its neglect and toleration. That is what the schools mean by saying that freedom is formally in the will alone, and in the intellect only as in its root.
Ludwig Crocius settles the matter so in the passage cited above: "The freedom ascribed to choice is properly a disposition of the will, though it has its root in the intellect and reason."
Latin
XXXVII. Porro sic exposita libertatis humanae natura atque essentia, quaerendum superest ad quam hominis facultatem proprie spectet atque pertineat. Doctorum Scholae Reformatae communior sententia est libertatem humanam originem quidem a mente & ratione ducere, sed tamen esse proprie voluntatis affectionem. Quod enim homo inter varia eligere potest, & hoc nunc amplecti, alias rejicere, inde est quod de rebus varie judicare potest, & diversas boni, malive rationes in iis apprehendere: sed tamen nullus actus liber in homine censetur, nisi qui a voluntate, vel elicitur, vel saltem imperatur. Adeoque soli voluntatis actus per se liberi esse existimantur: qui vero per facultates alias exercentur, eatenus tantum liberi sunt, quatenus a voluntate pendent, & ea vel consentiente, vel saltem negligente, & connivente fiunt. Et hoc est quod Scholae dicunt libertatem esse formaliter in sola voluntate, in intellectu vero tantum radicaliter. Sic statuit hac de re Ludovicus Crocius loco supra citato. Libertas, inquit, quae arbitrio tribuitur, proprie est affectio voluntatis, quamvis radicem suam in intellectu & ratione habeat.