Strang grants that strict free choice has active indifference, free of all antecedent necessity, even under divine determination
Besides the authors of the fourth opinion, John Strang admits this in the same third book, chapter 15. He denies that this is the definition of freedom in general, but grants that it fits free choice in the stricter sense, in that, whatever the prerequisites for acting, free choice keeps an active indifference that frees it from all antecedent necessity, whether that comes from divine predetermination or from the nature of the will itself and some particular state of the object (p. 698). And this stricter use of 'freedom' is the most common, and should therefore be counted the most proper.
He explains the matter this way (p. 696): "In things that concern the end, or in matters indifferent, where the intellect need not judge that they are necessarily connected with the good in general, it is true in the divided sense, of elicited and of commanded actions alike, that the will keeps the power to do this or that, or to act or not act. It keeps it not only when everything prerequisite to action is present, but also when it has been settled to act, whether by God or by itself, and while it is acting.
"In such things, then, the will stays free, and acts altogether freely, not only before it is settled and acts but also when it is settled and acts. Even while acting it keeps the faculty by which it could refrain, although on the hypothesis that it is settled or acting it cannot fail to act. Whatever is, given that it is, is necessarily, though taken simply it is a contingent thing.
"So once divine determination is granted, whether by efficacious grace or in any other way, there follows a necessity of the consequence, namely that the act of the will to which God has settled it follows infallibly. But there is no necessity of the consequent, because the act remains contingent by its nature."
Latin
XXX. Praeter authores quartae sententiae, id agnoscit Joannes Strangius in libro illo tertio jam citato cap. 15. Quanquam enim neget hanc esse definitionem libertatis in genere, fatetur tamen illam convenire libero arbitrio strictius sumpto, prout non obstantibus praerequisitis ad agendum, superest ei indifferentia activa per quam immunis est ab omni necessitate antecedente, sive ea proveniat a praedeterminatione divina, sive a natura ipsius voluntatis, & certa objecti conditione. pag. 698. Strictior autem ista libertatis acceptio maxime usitata est, & propterea censeri debet maxime propria. Rem autem istam sic explicat pag. 696. In rebus, inquit, ad finem spectantibus, aut in rebus adiaphoris, in quibus non est necesse ut intellectus judicet ea habere necessariam connexionem cum bono in communi, verum est in sensu diviso, cum de actionibus elicitis, tum Imperatis, quod voluntas non tantum positis omnibus ad actionem praerequisitis, sed etiam cum voluntas determinata est, sive a Deo, sive, a seipsa ad agendum, & cum agit, retinet potentiam ad agendum hoc, aut illud, vel ad agendum aut non agendum. Ac proinde in ejusmodi rebus voluntas, non tantum antequam determinatur & agit, sed etiam cum determinatur & agit, manet libera, & omnino libere agit, quia etiam cum agit, retinet facultatem qua possit non agere, licet ex hypothesi quod determinetur aut agat, fieri non possit ut non agat; quia quicquid est, supposito quod sit, necessario est, licet simpliciter sit res contingens. Posita itaque determinatione divina, sive per gratiam efficacem, sive quacunque alia ratione, infertur quidem necessitas consequentiae, quod infallibiliter sequatur ille actus voluntatis ad quem determinata est a Deo, sed non est necessitas consequentis, quod sua natura manet contingens.