Theological Theses · §1778 · Louis Le Blanc de Beaulieu

The third view is too timid in not claiming freedom from all necessity in the proper sense

Further, the third opinion seems overly timid in not daring to claim that human actions are free from every necessity in the proper sense. Its fear, of course, is that this would take something away from the unchangeableness of God's decrees, the efficacy of his grace, or the will's being settled by the judgement of practical reason.

But to keep the efficacy of providence and divine grace, the force and unchangeableness of God's decrees, and the mind's rights over the will, there is no need to subject man's free choice to any necessity in the proper sense. The most learned men among the Reformed show this, and we hope, God willing, to show it with them.

Latin

XXVI. Praeterea videtur in eo justo timidior tertia sententia quod non audet libertatem actionum humanarum ab omni necessitate proprie dicta vindicare: ne scilicet, in eo quicquam praejudicetur decretorum divinorum immutabilitati, & efficaciae gratiae divinae, aut determinationi voluntatis per judicium rationis practicae. Nam ut providentiae & gratiae divinae sua constet efficacia, & decretis Divinis sua vis & immutabilitas, adeoque etiam sua menti in voluntatem jura, non necesse est liberum hominis arbitrium ulli proprie dictae necessitati subjicere, ut ostendunt viri inter Reformatos Doctissimi, & nos quoque cum illis, si Deus dederit, ostensuros speramus.

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