Strang and Alexander More likewise distinguish free choice broadly and strictly taken
This is the teaching of John Strang, Doctor of Sacred Theology and principal professor at the Academy of Glasgow, in his treatise On the Will and Actions of God concerning Sin (book 3, chapter 14). After setting out and developing what we have described, he says he does not deny that the term free choice is rightly used in that strict sense, though in another and wider sense he maintains that all the will's acts are free.
The famous Alexander More draws the same kind of distinction in his On Grace and Free Choice (disputation 1, thesis 28). He offers two definitions, one of free choice in the wider sense and one of free choice in the strict sense.
In the first sense he describes free choice as "the endowment most proper to an intelligent nature, by which it wills or shuns nothing except what it has understood to be good or evil." In the second, it is "the will as it chooses means set before it by the intellect after deliberation."
Latin
XXIV. Haec est doctrina Johannis Strangii, S. S. Theologiae Doctoris & Professoris primarii in Academia Glasguensi, Tractatu de voluntate & actionibus Dei circa peccatum, lib. 3. cap. 14. Ubi postquam haec quae diximus exposuit & latius diduxit, dicit se non negare vocem liberi arbitrii stricto illo sensu recte usurpari, quanquam in alio & latiori sensu affirmet omnes voluntatis actiones esse liberas. Et simili quoque modo liberum arbitrium distinguit Celeberrimus Alexander Morus, De Gratia & libero Arbitrio Disp. 1. Thesi 28. Ubi duas proponit definitiones, unam liberi arbitrii latius accepti, alteram vero liberi arbitrii stricte sumpti. Juxta priorem notionem liberum arbitrium ab ipso describitur, Dos intelligentis naturae maxime propria qua nihil vult, aut aversatur, nisi quod esse bonum, aut malum intellexit. Juxta vero posteriorem, voluntas quatenus media post consultationem ab intellectu monstrata eligit.