Some distinguish free choice broadly taken (intellectual spontaneity) from free choice strictly taken
Among the learned men who seem to confuse the free and the voluntary, some point out that freedom of the will, or free choice, is taken in two ways, a broad one and a strict one.
Freedom of the will in general, or in the broad sense, is for them nothing but to hekousion noetikon, intellectual spontaneity, that is, spontaneity led by the light or judgement of the intellect. This general freedom of the will properly consists in the will's having mastery over its act to the extent that it can never be forced. Instead it moves or restrains itself, acts or refrains, as it pleases, for some definite reason, consideration or judgement.
Latin
XXI. Caeterum inter Doctos illos viros qui liberum & voluntarium confundere videntur, nonnulli sunt qui monent libertatem voluntatis, sive liberum Arbitrium duplici modo sumi, late, scilicet, & stricte. Libertas voluntatis in genere, sive late sumpta, juxta ipsos, nihil aliud est quam τὸ ἑκούσιον νοητικόν, spontaneum intellectuale, id est, spontaneum praeeunte intellectus lumine, vel judicio. Adeoque in hoc proprie consistit generalis ista voluntatis libertas, quod voluntas hactenus Dominium sui actus habeat, ut nequaquam cogi possit, sed pro libito, ex certa ratione, consideratione, aut judicio, sese moveat, & cohibeat, agat, aut non agat.