Some exclude all natural necessity and require deliberation, distinguishing the voluntary from the free
Some, however, think that exemption from compulsion and from being settled by matter or sense is not enough for human actions to be free. In their view freedom also rules out every kind of natural necessity, even one that does not come from matter or sense.
Nor do they think it enough for a free action that a man act on reason's judgement in any way at all. The judgement must be the conclusion of some deliberation and weighing. Only those things are done freely by us, then, about which we can take counsel and deliberate.
Now there are some acts of our will to which it is fixed by nature and about which no one ever deliberates, such as the act by which we want to be happy and do not want to be miserable. They do not hold that the will is free in these. Nor do they think it acts as a free cause in the impulses that rise in it suddenly from some violent disturbance before our mind can collect itself and begin to deliberate.
That is why they distinguish the free from the voluntary and hold that the voluntary is the wider class, since not everything voluntary is free.
Latin
XII. Sed sunt qui ad libertatem actionum humanarum putant non sufficere immunitatem a coactione, & a necessitate determinationis a materia vel a sensu; sed libertatem illam praeterea excludere necessitatem quamlibet naturalem, etiamsi a materia, vel a sensu non oriatur. Nec etiam, ut actio libera sit, satis esse existimant, ut homo quovis modo ex judicio rationis agat; ad hoc etiam requiri tale judicium quod sit conclusio cujusdam deliberationis, & consultationis; adeoque illa solum libere a nobis fieri, de quibus consultare & deliberare licet. Ac proinde cum sint quidam voluntatis nostrae actus ad quos per naturam determinata est, & circa quos nemo unquam consultat atque deliberat, qualis est actus ille quo beati esse volumus, & nolumus esse miseri, circa hos voluntatem liberam esse non sentiunt: nec etiam ad modum causae liberae se habere, respectu motuum illorum qui in voluntate subito excitantur, ex perturbatione aliqua vehementi, priusquam mens nostra seipsam colligere potuerit, & deliberationem aliquam instituere. Unde est quod distinguunt inter liberum & voluntarium, & statuunt voluntarium latius patere quam liberum: cum voluntarium omne liberum non sit.