On this view freedom lies in willingness, not indifference; Wendelin says the blessed praise God freely though they cannot not praise
It follows from this view that freedom properly lies in the willingness with which the will follows the intellect's judgement. It does not lie in any indifference of the will or any power for opposites, since the will's freedom can exist without these, even though in fact the will is indifferent toward many of its acts. Wendelin teaches this in the same passage.
After giving the definition quoted above, he adds: "This is enough, in general, for freedom of choice. Some add that through free choice the will by its nature stays able to choose the opposite or something else, or to hold back from acting. That does not belong to free choice in general.
"For freedom of choice also exists without indifference to either of two opposites, which they call the freedom of contrariety. So it is also freedom when the will is fixed on one of two opposites. That is how it is with the blessed: they do good freely, yet being confirmed in good they cannot do evil.
"Indeed, not even the freedom of contradiction is strictly necessary to freedom of choice. The blessed praise God freely, and yet they cannot fail to praise him."
Latin
VII. Ex hac vero sententia sequitur libertatem proprie consistere in lubentia illa, qua voluntas intellectus judicium sequitur, non vero in aliqua voluntatis indifferentia, aut potestate quadam ad opposita, sine qua consistere potest voluntatis libertas; quamvis revera voluntas ad multos suos actus indifferenter se habeat, ut docet idem Wendelinus loco modo citato. Ubi postquam tradidit jam allatam definitionem liberi arbitrii, subjungit, Hoc in genere ad arbitrii libertatem sufficit: quod enim addunt nonnulli, per arbitrium liberum voluntatem sua natura manere idoneam ad oppositum, seu diversum eligendum, vel actionem suspendendam; ad liberum arbitrium in genere non pertinet. Quia libertas arbitrii consistit quoque sine indifferentia ad utrumque oppositum, quam contrarietatis libertatem appellant. Adeoque libertas quoque est, quae ad oppositorum alterutrum determinata est: qualis in beatis, qui libere agunt bene, ita ut per confirmationem in bono non possint male agere. Imo ne contradictionis quidem libertas simpliciter ad arbitrii libertatem est necessaria: quia libere Deum laudant Beati, qui tamen non possunt non laudare.