Yet Estius calls it simply supernatural: from original righteousness and the earthy body; Baius rightly condemned
But Estius teaches that in another respect this same immortality was supernatural to man. Partly because of righteousness, on which the body's good constitution, and so immortality itself, depended. "That righteousness," he says, "was supernatural, inasmuch as through it the soul was subject to God and clung to him as its supernatural good and end. As long as that subjection lasted, the soul had a certain supernatural power by which it could keep the body from all corruption." And partly because of the body, that is, the matter from which man was made. Since that matter was earthy, it held in itself no cause of immortality, but rather of mortality.
"So although the first man," he says, "had in his very nature some cause of immortality, it was not a full and complete one. On the contrary, if in thought we set his supernatural gifts aside and consider only what was natural in him, he was mortal, so that he would have had to die. For he was made of contraries, and the dissolution of the compound necessarily follows from their conflict in the end. In this way, then, immortality was supernatural to the first man.
"But the supernatural is properly opposed not to what is called natural in the first, second or third of the senses just listed, but only to what is natural in the fourth sense. In that sense the first man's immortality cannot be called simply natural, because, as we said, natural causes alone were not enough to give it to him. So the immortality of unfallen man should be called supernatural, absolutely speaking, rather than natural.
"That is why the Apostolic See rightly condemned the proposition that the first man's immortality was not a gift of grace but a natural condition, especially if it means that immortality was so owed to human nature that God could not have created it mortal. That is clearly utterly false."
Latin
XVIII. Caeterum docet alia ratione eandem immortalitatem homini fuisse supernaturalem: partim quidem ratione justitiae, a qua bona illa corporis constitutio, & ex consequenti immortalitas ipsa dependebat. Erat enim, inquit, illa justitia supernaturalis, quatenus per eam anima Deo subjiciebatur, & adhaerebat, ut bono ac fini suo supernaturali. Qua subjectione durante, inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturalis, per quam poterat corpus, ab omni corruptione praeservare. Partim ratione corporis, sive materiae ex qua homo factus est. Quae cum terrena fuerit, causam in se immortalitatis non habebat, sed potius mortalitatis. Quamvis igitur, inquit, primus homo in ipsa natura causam quandam habuerit immortalitatis, non tamen plenam & totalem. Quin potius si dona supernaturalia cogitatione ab eo separemus, & sola in eo consideremus naturalia, mortalis erat, ita ut necesse esset eum mori. Erat enim compositus ex contrariis, quorum pugnam necessario tandem consequitur ipsius compositi corruptio. Juxta hunc igitur modum immortalitas erat primo homini supernaturalis. Quoniam autem supernaturale proprie non opponitur ei quod primo, secundo, vel tertio modo naturale dicitur ex modis jam enumeratis, sed ei tantum quod quarto modo: secundum quem tamen non potest immortalitas primo homini dici simpliciter naturalis; quia ad eam homini praestandam solae causae naturales, uti diximus, non sufficiebant; idcirco potius absolute supernaturalis dici debet immortalitas homini integro, quam naturalis. Unde propositio illa qua dicitur immortalitatem primi hominis non fuisse gratiae beneficium, sed naturalem conditionem, merito a sede Apostolica improbata est: maxime si sensus ejus sit immortalitatem ita esse debitam naturae humanae, ut Deus non potuerit eam creare mortalem. Hoc enim constat esse falsissimum.