To Florus 6.11
The alliance between you and the Manichaeans plainly endures: they by open profession and you by argument maintain that even the first human’s nature was evil. All this is full of absurdities and lies. Passing over the legions of saints, let us take the first example of righteousness after Adam’s sin: Abel’s wonderful holiness proves it. Born from sinners, he showed through the actual exercise of virtue that he did not lack the power to live well (Genesis 4:4; Hebrews 11:4). Yet, leaving these examples aside, it is useful to press the pronouncements of the party teaching inherited sin.
What do you suppose the free will you acknowledge was given to the first humans was like? Surely it meant they could change their minds: do evil or withdraw from evil, abandon or keep justice. There would therefore have been no will to sin unless the capacity to will came first. You say that after they began using their own will—that is, a movement of mind compelled by no one—they lost free will. What could be imagined more insane?
To state your argument’s force precisely: you say that what was given only for the sake of willing perished because of willing. Sin is simply an evil will. Freedom was given solely to permit the will to arise, not to compel it. Yet you say this freedom lost its condition through an act of will, so it is believed to have died through the very thing that alone proves it alive. An evil will is therefore not freedom’s fruit, but evidence of freedom. Freedom is simply the capacity for good and evil, provided they are voluntary. How, then, could it perish through the very thing for which it is shown to have been instituted, when an evil will and a good will are not freedom’s destruction but its witnesses?
The distance between proper functions and destructive crises is therefore the distance between your opinion and the meaning of free will, whose destruction you think was supplied by its own grounds for praise. What new or unforeseen thing happened when humanity sinned, to overthrow God’s arrangements? A being was made who could sin and not sin. When he sinned, he did what he ought not to have done, but what he nevertheless could do. How, then, would he lose that capacity, instituted precisely so that he could will something and could refuse what he willed (Genesis 4:4) (Hebrews 11:4)?
Latin
Durat nempe inter vos Manichaeosque foedus, ut illi professione, vos argumentatione, primi quoque hominis naturam asseratis malam fuisse; quod licet totum ineptiarum mendaciorumque plenum esse (ut praetermissis sanctorum legionibus, primum post peccatum Adae iustitia arripiamus exemplum), Abelis sanctitate mirabili comprobatur, qui de peccatoribus natus, bene vivendi se non caruisse virtute, effectu quoque ipsius virtutis ostendit; verumtamen his praeteritis iuvat sententias Traducianae nationis urgere. Quale igitur autumas fuisse arbitrium liberum, quod collatum primis hominibus confiteris? Certe ut possent animi alternare motus, et vel facere malum, vel recedere a malo, vel deserere vel servare iustitiam. Voluntas ergo peccandi non fuisset, nisi volendi possibilitas anteisset. Hoc postquam uti coeperunt propria voluntate, id est motu animi cogente nullo, tu dicis liberum arbitrium perdidisse; quo quid potest furiosius cogitari? Ut enim vis argumenti tui expressa teneatur, dicis eam rem periisse propter voluntatem, quae data non est nisi propter voluntatem; peccatum quippe nihil est aliud quam voluntas mala; libertas autem ad hoc solum data est, ut voluntatem non cogeret, sed permitteret exoriri; hanc autem tu libertatem conditionem suam dicis voluntatis opere perdidisse, ut per hoc interiisse credatur, per quod solum probatur vigere. Voluntas ergo mala non quidem fructus, sed testimonium libertatis est. Libertas autem nihil est aliud quam possibilitas boni malique, sed voluntarii. Qui ergo fieri potuit ut per hoc interiret, per quod proditur instituta, cum mala voluntas et bona voluntas non exitia sint, sed praeconia libertatis? Ac per hoc quantum distat inter officia atque discrimina, tantum inter opinionem tuam et rationem arbitrii liberi, cui excidium putas de suis laudibus comparatum. Quid ergo novum, quid insperatum delinquente homine accidit, per quod Dei instituta corruerent? Factus est qui peccare et non peccare posset; cum peccavit, fecit quod non debuit quidem, sed potuit tamen; per quid igitur facultatem illam perderet, quae ad hoc fuerat instituta, ut posset velle, posset nolle quod voluit.
About this text
Julian’s six preserved books to Florus, quoted section by section in Augustine’s unfinished reply. Augustine’s refutations are omitted. Latin of Julian’s words is on each section.
Julian’s own books do not survive as a separate manuscript. English follows his words as Augustine quotes them in the Unfinished Work Against Julian. Augustine’s replies are omitted. We do not restore a Julian text independent of Augustine.
Witnesses
- Copy-text Augustine, Unfinished Work Against Julian (Latin · Julian’s words as quoted, Books 1–6)
- Checked print Augustinus.it Latin of the Unfinished Work (Latin · Same work)
- Checked print Migne PL 45 (Latin · Hard cases)
This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.