To Florus 5.56
Consequently, just as we assign sin to a free movement, so we assign nature to God the creator. Human nature is therefore God’s good work. Freedom of will—that is, the possibility either of wrongdoing or of acting rightly—is equally God’s good work. Both come to the human being from necessity; neither is the cause of evil. But those necessary things extend only this far. Will now arises within them, but not from them. They possess the capacity for will, but are not filled with it. They do not produce but receive the differences in moral desert.
Latin
Ac per hoc, ut peccatum motui libero, ita naturam Deo abscribimus conditori. Est igitur natura humana bonum opus Dei; est libertas arbitrii, id est, possibilitas vel delinquendi, vel recte faciendi, bonum aeque opus Dei. Utrumque hoc homini a necessario venit; neutra de his duabus rebus mali causa est. Sed huc usque necessaria illa venerunt; iam voluntas quidem in his exoritur, sed non de his. Capacia voluntatis sunt quippe, non plena; nec faciunt, sed accipiunt diversitatem meritorum.
About this text
Julian’s six preserved books to Florus, quoted section by section in Augustine’s unfinished reply. Augustine’s refutations are omitted. Latin of Julian’s words is on each section.
Julian’s own books do not survive as a separate manuscript. English follows his words as Augustine quotes them in the Unfinished Work Against Julian. Augustine’s replies are omitted. We do not restore a Julian text independent of Augustine.
Witnesses
- Copy-text Augustine, Unfinished Work Against Julian (Latin · Julian’s words as quoted, Books 1–6)
- Checked print Augustinus.it Latin of the Unfinished Work (Latin · Same work)
- Checked print Migne PL 45 (Latin · Hard cases)
This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.