To Florus 5.41
You therefore seek a necessity behind something that cannot exist if it is subject to necessity. If a cause older than the movement itself is assigned to this free movement of the mind, active without compulsion from its origin, the will is not produced at all: it is removed. The very name ‘will’ means nothing other than that the movement does not owe its occurrence to matter. Therefore, when you ask where the will arose, seeking something older than the will itself, you seek not its beginning but its destruction. It cannot be understood to exist if it is attributed either to darkness or to nothing. Nor can that be called will which can exist only as a movement of the mind under no compulsion. If someone compels it, there is indeed a movement, but no will. The will’s force is completed by the definition’s second part: ‘under no compulsion.’ If will is nothing other than a movement of the mind under no compulsion, it is entirely wrong to ask the origin of a thing whose defining condition perishes if something precedes it. Weigh, then, what you ask: ‘Whence could the evil will itself, like an evil tree, arise in the first human being?’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.28.48). In asking this you confess that will came about through an origin. But will is a movement of the mind under no compulsion. All natural causes compel what follows to exist. If will is compelled by preceding causes, it immediately ceases to be will: by receiving such an origin, it loses its defining condition.
Latin
Quaeritis ergo necessitatem rei, quae esse non potest si patitur necessitatem. Huic motui animi libero, sine coactu originis inquieto, si causa ipso motu detur antiquior, non gignitur omnino, sed tollitur. Nomen enim ipsum voluntatis nullam vim habet alteram, quam non debere materiae quod movetur. Cum ergo unde orta sit voluntas, ipsa voluntate quaeris antiquius; non exordium eius, sed exitium requiris; omnino enim non intellegitur esse, si aut tenebris deputetur, aut nihilo; nec potest dici iam voluntas, quae subsistere non potest, nisi in motu animi, cogente nullo. Si ergo cogat aliquis, est quidem motus; sed non est voluntas, cuius vim illa definitionis pars secunda complevit, id est, nullo cogente. Si ergo voluntas nihil est aliud, quam motus animi, cogente nullo; male prorsus quaeritur origo rei, cuius conditio, si praevenitur, interit. Expende ergo quid sit quod roges: Unde, inquis, ipsa voluntas mala quasi arbor mala in primo homine potuit exoriri? [n80] , qui confiteris voluntatem de origine contigisse. Voluntas enim motus est animi, cogente nullo. Naturalia cuncta cogunt esse quod sequitur: voluntas autem si praecedentibus causis cogatur, voluntas esse mox desinit, et perdit conditionem, si accepit originem.
About this text
Julian’s six preserved books to Florus, quoted section by section in Augustine’s unfinished reply. Augustine’s refutations are omitted. Latin of Julian’s words is on each section.
Julian’s own books do not survive as a separate manuscript. English follows his words as Augustine quotes them in the Unfinished Work Against Julian. Augustine’s replies are omitted. We do not restore a Julian text independent of Augustine.
Witnesses
- Copy-text Augustine, Unfinished Work Against Julian (Latin · Julian’s words as quoted, Books 1–6)
- Checked print Augustinus.it Latin of the Unfinished Work (Latin · Same work)
- Checked print Migne PL 45 (Latin · Hard cases)
This is an AI-assisted study translation. Source fidelity and completeness have not been independently certified. Open Latin on each section (or the Latin source witness link) for the source text. This is not a complete critical edition.