To Florus 3.188
It remains to examine your statement which, promising to reduce it to one expression, you gathered up briefly—and, it must be admitted, rather cleverly: ‘If human nature were evil, it should not be generated; if it had no evil, it should not be regenerated. To sum up both in one word: if human nature were evil, it ought not to be saved; if no evil were within it, it would not need to be saved’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36).
Here you must not be cheated of praise for your intelligence. From your standpoint it could not have been said better. Yet the nature of things prevents even precise cunning from accomplishing anything. It is altogether hard for you to kick against the goad (Acts 26:14). Whatever you put together melts like ice when the fire of truth is brought near. Now attend to our reply. You concluded: ‘Surely if human nature were evil, it ought not to be saved.’ We agree; you spoke entirely truly. If it were evil, it ought not to be saved, because something evil by nature would neither deserve nor be capable of salvation. Why incapable? Because it could not become other than it had been made. Why undeserving? Because nothing in it would be worthy of deliverance by God’s mercy.
When we say ‘if it were’ about what certainly cannot exist, we are not giving hope that the denied possibility can occur. Rather, to destroy another opinion that arises, we commonly speak about impossible things. For example: If this or that existed, that consequence would undoubtedly follow. Since the first cannot exist, the conclusion introduced in order to remove it is denied all the more. We have already shown frequently that nothing can be evil by nature. Nevertheless, without prejudice to that settled point, we now approve the part of your statement saying, ‘If human nature were evil, it ought not to be saved.’
You located salvation in baptism and argued consistently that if the Manichaeans, who call nature evil, spoke truly, Christians would be foolish to believe baptism’s remedy should be applied to an evil nature. Thus anyone affirming that human nature is evil is forced to deny grace. This also works in reverse: anyone affirming grace praises human nature, understanding grace to have been provided for its salvation.
Latin
Superest, ut examinemus illam sententiam tuam, quam tu te ad unum sermonem revocare pollicitus breviter, ut non est negandum, et acutule collegisti: Natura humana, si malum esset, non esset generanda; si malum non haberet, non esset regeneranda; atque ut ad unum verbum utrumque concludam, natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset, si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset [n245] . In hoc loco non es a nobis ingenii tui laude fraudandus; pro tua enim prorsus dici melius ratione non potuit, sed tamen rerum natura non sinit, ut promoveat quidquam exacta calliditas. Durum tibi est omnino contra stimulum calcitrare; quidquid enim compegeris, non minus quam glacies admotae veritatis igne dissolvitur. Denique nunc quid a nobis referatur, attende. Conclusisti hoc modo: Certe natura humana si malum esset, salvanda non esset. Assentimur, prorsus verum dixisti: Si malum esset, salvanda non esset, quia res mala et naturaliter mala nec mereretur nec caperet salutem. Cur non caperet? Quia aliud quam facta erat fieri non posset; non autem mereretur, quia nihil in ea erat, quod Dei dignaretur liberare clementia. Cum autem dicimus: si esset, quod certe esse non potest, non illi spem negati conciliamus effectus, sed ad destructionem alterius opinionis, quae incidit, de rebus impossibilibus dicere solemus. Si hoc vel illud verbi gratia esset, illud sine dubio sequeretur, ut, cum illud esse non potest, etiam hoc, propter cuius amolitionem illatum fuerat, multo magis negetur. Iam igitur frequenter ostendimus malum aliquid per naturam esse non posse, sed tamen nunc sine praeiudicio istius constituti sententiae tuae partem probamus, qua dixisti: Natura humana si malum esset, salvanda non esset. Salutem in baptismate collocasti et argumentatus es consequenter, quoniam, si verum dicerent Manichaei, qui malam dicunt naturam, desiperent Christiani, qui malae naturae remedium baptismatis crederent admovendum; et ideo, qui malam confirmat hominum naturam, gratiam negare compellitur, quod ita recurrit, ut, qui gratiam confirmat, hominum laudet naturam, cuius saluti eam intellegit fuisse provisam.