To Florus 3.183
And that statement of yours, which I examined in my earlier work—‘Sometimes desire does not act when the mind is willing, although sometimes it acts when the mind is unwilling’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 1.7)—and your accusation of its arrogance because it stirs against the mind’s will: all this is expressed not merely in Mani’s ideas but in his words. Having criticized us for saying God makes human beings although we admit they are conceived through the pleasure of those coupling, he says: ‘Fools say what they know is generated by desire was created by God, although they couple while the mind is unwilling.’
Latin
Iam vero illud tuum, quod priore opere ventilavi, ubi dicis: Aliquando non facit libido animo volente, cum aliquando faciat et nolente [n228] , atque hanc eius superbiam, qua nolente animo commovetur, accusas, Manichaei non solum sensibus, sed etiam eloquiis explicatum est. Nam cum nos arguisset, quia diceremus a Deo fieri homines, quos seminari fateremur per coeuntium voluptatem: Stulti - inquit - dicunt a Deo esse conditum, quod certi sunt a concupiscentia gigni, cum animo nolente coeunt.