Thanksgiving Address to Origen · §11 · Gregory Thaumaturgus

He taught virtue by deeds before words

Origen alone persuaded Gregory to study moral philosophy, teaching virtue by his own life before his words.

He was the first and the only one who urged me, by his own character, to study even the philosophy of the Greeks, and who persuaded me to listen to teaching on morals and to bear with it. As far as the other philosophers were concerned I would not have been persuaded (I confess it again), wrongly, I grant, and very nearly to my misfortune. Not that I had met many at first, only a few who claimed to teach; but all of them stopped philosophy short at words. This man was the first who urged me to philosophy by words as well, but his deeds had come before his urging in words. He did not merely recite rehearsed phrases; he did not even think it right to speak unless he did so with a sincere mind that would strive to carry out what it said. He tried instead to show himself the kind of man his teaching describes as one who will live well; and he set before us, I wanted to say, a pattern of the wise man. But since my speech promised from the start the truth and not ornament, I do not yet call him a pattern of the wise man, though I should like to say it, and it would be true; but I leave this aside for now. Not, then, an exact pattern, but a man who longs earnestly to make himself like one, straining with all zeal and eagerness, if I may say so, even beyond human power. He also wished to shape us and others into such people, with mastery and knowledge not of arguments about the impulses but of the impulses themselves. He led us both to deeds and to words, and in our very study he brought us no small share of each virtue, perhaps even the whole of it, had we had room to take it in.

He compelled us, if I may put it so, to act justly, through the soul’s doing of its own work, which he persuaded us to take up. He drew us away from the busy meddling of ordinary life and from the noise of the marketplace, and roused us to look into ourselves and truly to do our own work. Some of the ancient philosophers too have said that this is acting justly and this the true justice, calling it ‘doing one’s own’; and, I think, it is the more effective path to blessedness, both for themselves and for those who come to them, if indeed it belongs to this virtue to give what is deserved and to give each their own. For what else could belong to the soul as its own? And what does it deserve so much as to care for itself, not looking outward, not busy with others’ affairs, not (to put it briefly) wronging itself with the worst injustice, but turned inward toward itself, restoring itself to itself and acting justly? In this way he taught us to do justice, by compulsion, if I may say so.

No less did he teach us prudence: for the soul to dwell with itself, and for us to want and to try to know ourselves. This is the finest work of philosophy, ascribed even to the most oracular of the demons as an all-wise command: ‘Know yourself.’ The ancients rightly say that this is truly the work of prudence, and that this is divine prudence, being truly the same virtue in God and in man: the soul practices seeing itself as in a mirror, and, if it should become worthy of this fellowship, beholds the divine mind reflected within itself, and traces out a hidden path to this deification. Following on this, he taught us self-control and courage. Self-control means keeping this prudence safe, the soul knowing itself, if that should ever be its lot; for self-control, again, is just this: prudence kept sound. Courage means holding fast in everything to the practices described, not falling away from them either willingly or under any compulsion, but guarding them and keeping a firm hold on what has been said; and this virtue, he said, is a kind of savior and guardian of teachings.

Greek

Οὗτός με πρῶτος καὶ μόνος καὶ τὴν Ἑλλήνων φιλοσοφίαν φιλοσοφεῖν προὐτρέψατο, τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ἰδίοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ τοῦ περὶ ἠθῶν ἀκοῦσαι καὶ ἀνασχέσθαι λόγους πείσας, οὐκ ἂν πεισθέντα, ὅσον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσόφοις (πάλιν ὁμολογῶ), οὐκ ὀρθῶς μέν, δυστυχῶς δέ, μικροῦ δεῖν ἡμῖν. οὐμενοῦν· οὐδὲ πλείοσιν ἐνέτυχον τὸ πρῶτον, ὀλίγοις δέ τισι τοῖς διδάσκειν ἐπαγγελλομένοις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ πᾶσι μέχρι ῥημάτων τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν στήσασιν. οὗτος δέ με πρῶτος καὶ τοῖς λόγοις φιλοσοφεῖν προὐτρέψατο, τοῖς ἔργοις φθάσας τὴν διὰ λόγων προτροπήν· οὐκ ἀπαγγέλλων μόνον ῥήματα μεμελετημένα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ λέγειν ἀξιῶν, εἰ μὴ σὺν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ πρᾶξαι τὰ εἰρημένα ἀγωνιουμένῃ τοῦτο ποιοῖ· ἢ τοιοῦτον ἑαυτὸν παρασχέσθαι πειρώμενος, οἷον τοῖς λόγοις διέξεισι τὸν καλῶς βιωσόμενον· καὶ παράδειγμα μέν, ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ἐκθέμενος σοφοῦ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἀλήθειαν ἡμῖν, οὐ κομψείαν ἐπηγγείλατο ὁ λόγος ἄνωθεν, παράδειγμα μὲν αὐτὸν σοφοῦ οὐδέπω λέγω, καίτοι γε εἰπεῖν ἐθέλων εἶναί τε ἀληθές· ἀλλὰ ἐῶ νῦν τοῦτο. οὐ παράδειγμα τοίνυν ἀκριβές, ἐξομοιοῦν δὲ καὶ ἄγαν ἐθέλοντα, σπουδῇ πάσῃ καὶ προθυμίᾳ βιαζόμενον, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπων δύναμιν· καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ ἑτέρους τοιούτους πλάττειν, οὐ λόγων ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ ἐπιστήμονας τῶν περὶ ὁρμῶν, τῶν δὲ ὁρμῶν αὐτῶν· ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄγων, καὶ οὐ μικρὰν μοῖραν ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ σύμπασαν, εἴπερ ἐχωρήσαμεν, ἐπιφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ θεωρίᾳ. δικαιοπραγεῖν μὲν καὶ ἀναγκάζων, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, διὰ τὴν ἰδιοπραγίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἣ προσθέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἔπεισεν· ἀπάγων μὲν τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον πολυπραγμοσύνης, καὶ τοῦ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ὀχληροῦ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ περισκοπεῖν ἐπάρας, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ὄντως πράττειν. τοῦτο δὲ εἶναι τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν δικαιοσύνην τήν γε ἀληθῆ, καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων φιλοσόφων τινὲς εἰρήκασι, τὴν ἰδιοπραγίαν λέγοντες, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀνυσιμώτερον πρὸς μακαριότητα ἑαυτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς προσιοῦσιν· εἴπερ γέ ἐστι τῆσδε τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἑκάστοις. τί γὰρ ἂν ἴδιον εἴη ψυχῆς ἕτερον; τί δὲ οὕτως ἄξιον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἑαυτῆς, οὐκ ἔξω βλέπουσαν, οὐδ' ἀλλοτριοπραγοῦσαν, οὐδὲ (συνελόντα εἰπεῖν) ἀδικοῦσαν ἑαυτὴν τὴν χειρίστην ἀδικίαν, ἀλλ' ἔνδον πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀπεστραμμένην, αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ ἀποδιδοῦσαν καὶ δικαιοπραγοῦσαν; οὕτως μὲν δίκαια πράττειν, εἰ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀναγκάζων ἐπαίδευε. φρονεῖν δὲ πάλιν οὐχ ἧττον, τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν εἶναι, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς γινώσκειν ἐθέλειν τε καὶ πειρᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἄριστον φιλοσοφίας ἔργον, ὃ δὴ καὶ δαιμόνων τῷ μαντικωτάτῳ ἀνατίθεται ὡς πάνσοφον πρόσταγμα, τό, Γνῶθι σαυτόν. τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὄντως ἔργον φρονήσεως, καὶ ταύτην εἶναι τὴν θείαν φρόνησιν, καλῶς τοῖς παλαιοῖς λέγεται· τὴν αὐτὴν ὄντως οὖσαν Θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετήν· αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἑαυτὴν ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ὁρᾶν μελετώσης, καὶ τὸν θεῖον νοῦν, εἰ ἀξία γένοιτο τῆς κοινωνίας τῆσδε, ἐν αὐτῇ κατοπτριζομένης, ὁδόν τε ἀπόρρητόν τινα ταύτης ἀποθεώσεως ἐξιχνευομένης. ἀκολούθως δὲ καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀνδρίζεσθαι· σωφρονεῖν μέν, διασωζομένους τὴν φρόνησιν τήνδε, τῆς ψυχῆς ἑαυτὴν γινωσκούσης, εἴ ποτε αὐτῇ τοῦτο γένοιτο· ταύτην γὰρ εἶναι πάλιν τὴν σωφροσύνην, σώαν τινὰ φρόνησιν οὖσαν· ἀνδρίζεσθαι δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐμμένοντας ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἐπιτηδεύσεσι, καὶ οὐκ ἀποπίπτοντας οὔθ' ἑκουσίως, οὔθ' ὑπό τινος ἀνάγκης, φυλάσσοντας δὲ καὶ ἐγκρατεῖς τῶν εἰρημένων· καὶ ταύτην εἶναι, σώτειράν τινα καὶ φύλακα δογμάτων οὖσαν, τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην.

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