On the Soul, to Tatian · §8 · Gregory Thaumaturgus

That the soul is rational

Three arguments close the treatise by showing that the soul shares in reason: it discovered the useful arts, the senses alone cannot judge things truly, and the soul plans within itself before it acts.

Further, that our soul shares in reason can be shown by many arguments. First, from the fact that the soul itself discovered the arts that are useful to our life. For no one would say that they were found at random or by some chance, since no one could show that they are idle or useless to life. If, then, the arts contribute to the benefit of life; and useful things are also praiseworthy; and praiseworthy things are gained by reason; and the arts themselves are discoveries of the soul: then our soul shares in reason.

Next, it is also shown that our soul is endowed with reason from the fact that our senses are not sufficient for grasping things. For we cannot come to know things by the mere application of the senses. And that we do not wish to stop at the senses is plain at once from this: unless reason helps them, the senses cannot tell apart and distinguish things that are equal in shape and alike in color but different in nature. Since, then, the senses without reason bring false images and forms of things before us, we must consider whether things can truly be grasped or not. If they can be grasped, we have another power besides the senses, and a higher one, by which we may come to know them. But if they are not grasped, we shall not be able to reach even those things that are seen otherwise than they are. That things are perceived by us is clear, if from nothing else, from the fact that we put them fittingly to our uses and turn them again into whatever we wish. So if we have shown that things can be grasped, and this cannot be done by the senses without reason, since they set false notions before us, then it will surely be the mind that distinguishes and judges all things by reason and knows things as they truly are. And the mind is the part of the soul adorned and enlightened with reason. The soul, therefore, shares in reason.

Finally, it is shown from the fact that we do nothing that we have not first sketched out and defined for ourselves; and this is nothing other than the dignity of the soul. For knowledge of things does not come to it from outside; rather, it adorns things, as it were, with its own designs and conceptions, and so it first paints and sketches a thing within itself, so that it may afterward bring it out into the open. The dignity of the soul, moreover, is nothing other than doing all things by reason, and by this it also differs from the senses. It has now been shown, therefore, that the soul is endowed with reason.

Latin

Quod porro anima nostra rationis sit particeps, multis argumentis ostendi potest: ac primum quidem, ex eo, quod artes vitae nostrae utiles ipsa adinvenerit. Neque enim eas temere, aut casu aliquo repertas esse, quis dixerit: cum nec otiosas, nec vitae inutiles easdem esse, queat demonstrare. Si igitur artes ad vitae utilitatem conferunt; et quae sunt utilia, etiam laudabilia sunt; laudabilia vero ratione comparentur; animae vero inventa, ipsae sint artes: Anima igitur nostra, rationis est particeps. Deinde ex eo, quod sensus nostri ad res comprehendendas non sunt sufficientes, etiam animam nostram ratione praeditam esse demonstratur. Neque enim sola sensus applicatione, valemus ad res cognoscendas pervenire. At quia nec in hisce volumus inhaerere, id protinus inde constat, quod sensus, nisi ratione adiuventur, ea, quae figura sunt aequalia, et colore similia, natura tamen differentia, internoscere atque discernere nequeant. Quapropter, cum sensus ratione destituti, falsas nobis rerum imagines ac species inducant; reputandum nobis est, res comprehendi ne revera queant, necne: et si quidem comprehendi possunt, alia nobis praeter sensus vis est, eaque praestantior, qua ad earum cognitionem pervenire liceat. Quod si non comprehenduntur; ne illa quidem assequi poterimus, quae aliter quam sunt, conspiciuntur. Res porro a nobis percipi, vel ex eo patet, quod eas convenienter ad usus nostros adhibemus, et rursus in quodcunque volumus, convertimus. Quare si res comprehendi posse, a nobis demonstratum est; idque a sensibus ratione destitutis effici nequeat, quippe qui falsas nobis opiniones repraesentant; mens sane erit, quae ratione cuncta distinguit atque diiudicat, et res ut revera sunt, cognoscit: mens autem est Animae pars ratione decorata ac illustrata. Est ergo Anima rationis particeps. Postremo, quia nihil agimus, quod non prius nobis ipsi descripserimus atque definierimus: id autem nihil aliud est, quam animae dignitas: quippe cui non extrinsecus advenit rerum cognitio, sed ipsa tanquam suis commentis ac sensis res ornat. et ideo in seipsa rem ante depingit atque describit, ut sic eam postea in medium proferat. Animae porro dignitas, nihil aliud est, quam ratione omnia facere, qua quidem etiam a sensibus differt. Animam igitur ratione praeditam esse, iam demonstratum est.

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Gregory Thaumaturgus, On the Soul, to Tatian: a fresh English translation of the whole short treatise. Arguing from reason alone, without Scripture proofs, it shows that the soul is known by its effects, exists, is a substance, is not a body, is simple, is immortal and shares in reason. Scholars dispute whether Gregory wrote it.

Gregory Thaumaturgus (c. 213–c. 270) wrote this treatise to his friend Tatian. Gregory was bishop of Neocaesarea in Pontus and had studied with Origen in Caesarea in Palestine. Tatian asked him to send a discourse and disputation on the soul, and Gregory complied promptly, trusting in Tatian's goodwill toward him.

Tatian did not need the work for his own assurance, since he was already instructed in the divine Scriptures and traditions. He wanted it for confuting people who refuse to believe the Scriptures and who use clever speech to circumvent and deceive those unaccustomed to such debate. Gregory therefore agreed to write using only human reasoning and common notions, not scriptural testimonies.

The treatise follows the customary order of inquiry for such subjects. Gregory first proposes the criterion by which the soul can be grasped according to nature, then shows by what arguments its existence is demonstrated. He examines whether the soul is substance or accident, body or incorporeal, simple or composite, mortal or immortal, and finally whether it is rational. For proofs he uses only common notions by which assent is usually obtained for evident things, choosing the reasonings most effective for demonstrating each point. He then carries out this plan: the soul is known from what it does; it exists, since it moves the body and gives it life; it is a substance, not a body; it is simple; it is immortal; and it is rational.

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Translated from Opera omnia, Greek and Latin (Paris: Sonnius, Morel and Cramoisy, 1622), page images (Latin column (Greek damaged))
Also checked Archive DjVu machine-read text (Latin/Greek mixed machine-read text)
Translated from Latin preface (Latin)

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Preface — Long-s and column joins expanded from the Latin face; sense checked against the inquiry program that follows.

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