On the Soul, to Tatian · §2 · Gregory Thaumaturgus

How the soul can be known: by what it does

Gregory sets out how the soul can be known: things of sense are known by the senses, but things of the understanding are known from what they do, so the soul is known from its effects.

All things are either known by the senses or grasped by the understanding. Of these, the things that fall under the senses are shown well enough by the senses themselves, for as soon as a sense is brought to bear on a thing, it presents to us the image and form of the object before it. But things grasped by the understanding are perceived not from themselves but from their actions and effects. Since the soul, then, cannot be known from itself, it may rightly be known from its effects.

Latin

Res quaecunque, aut sensu cognoscuntur, aut intelligentia comprehenduntur: Ex quibus quidem, quae sub sensum cadunt, ipso sensu satis demonstrantur: nam simulatque ille admotus fuerit, subiectae rei imaginem ac speciem nobis repraesentat. Quae vero intelligentia comprehenduntur, non ipsa ex se, sed ex ipsarum actionibus atque effectis percipiuntur. Quapropter cum Anima ex seipsa cognosci nequeat, ex ipsius effectis merito cognosci poterit.

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Gregory Thaumaturgus, On the Soul, to Tatian: a fresh English translation of the whole short treatise. Arguing from reason alone, without Scripture proofs, it shows that the soul is known by its effects, exists, is a substance, is not a body, is simple, is immortal and shares in reason. Scholars dispute whether Gregory wrote it.

Gregory Thaumaturgus (c. 213–c. 270) wrote this treatise to his friend Tatian. Gregory was bishop of Neocaesarea in Pontus and had studied with Origen in Caesarea in Palestine. Tatian asked him to send a discourse and disputation on the soul, and Gregory complied promptly, trusting in Tatian's goodwill toward him.

Tatian did not need the work for his own assurance, since he was already instructed in the divine Scriptures and traditions. He wanted it for confuting people who refuse to believe the Scriptures and who use clever speech to circumvent and deceive those unaccustomed to such debate. Gregory therefore agreed to write using only human reasoning and common notions, not scriptural testimonies.

The treatise follows the customary order of inquiry for such subjects. Gregory first proposes the criterion by which the soul can be grasped according to nature, then shows by what arguments its existence is demonstrated. He examines whether the soul is substance or accident, body or incorporeal, simple or composite, mortal or immortal, and finally whether it is rational. For proofs he uses only common notions by which assent is usually obtained for evident things, choosing the reasonings most effective for demonstrating each point. He then carries out this plan: the soul is known from what it does; it exists, since it moves the body and gives it life; it is a substance, not a body; it is simple; it is immortal; and it is rational.

Printed text used

Translated from Opera omnia, Greek and Latin (Paris: Sonnius, Morel and Cramoisy, 1622), page images (Latin column (Greek damaged))
Also checked Archive DjVu machine-read text (Latin/Greek mixed machine-read text)
Translated from Latin preface (Latin)

Where the prints differ

Preface — Long-s and column joins expanded from the Latin face; sense checked against the inquiry program that follows.

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