Commentary on Ecclesiastes · §2 · Didymus the Blind

True Goodness and Courage

little by little through observations

Having only those things, it is not possible to desire him and satisfy oneself a little; it is pointlessess. For he is not able to consume all these things. It is darkness, and his effort is in vain and his desire has become empty.

In a multitude of goodness, those eating it were increased. Appropriately, we receive goodness as pleasure; for the good things are indifferent—some concerning the soul, some concerning the body, and some concerning external things. The things concerning the soul do not raise so much pleasure as toil and sweat toward beautiful things. For the things concerning the body and the external are full and productive of pleasure. If anyone does not have much pleasure raised by them, he has a 'multitude of goodness,' which is supposed to be goodness, since even those things on which he delights seem to be good, though they are not truly and principally good. Therefore, nothing is good that does not make the possessor good. Nothing good can be with sin, but with health and strength and beauty, sin can be. No one sins with a good, but with health we sin. Therefore, health is not a good. Thus the proposition was shown by syllogism.

Does the instruction mix with the word? That is, many strive for certain teachings and are greatly delighted by them, a 'pseudonymous knowledge.' They are increasing in the multitude of this pleasure. Those eating it seem to have something; the multitude takes in... and what courage is there from it? The good things are superior to the diminishing ones. For it is the beginning of seeing with his own eyes.

We say that true courage is a disposition prepared for bearing difficult things. For virtue and judgment are with it. For it is with prudence. For it has often been said that the virtues are held together. Certainly, the one having courage has also a theoretical reason; even if he endures some things and not others, he does not endure disgrace. And he is not puffed up by being entirely unrestrained or by exhausting the weaker ones; this is of presumption. An excess of courage has often been said to be rashness. There is, then, a certain courage, not a perfected courage. Thus, here we are not concerning true courage.

Greek

····· ······· 1 148 ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ὥστε οὕτω̣ς̣ κ̣ορέννυται ἀεὶ ἔχων τὸ θεραπεῦον τ̣ο`̣ δίψος. "ὁ πί νων", φησίν, "ἐκ τοῦ ὕδ̣ατος τούτου διψήσ̣ει πάλιν". εἰ μετὰ τὸ πιεῖν διψᾷ, ο̣υ᾿̣ κορέννυται. ἀλλὰ ἄκουε πάλιν ἑτέρᾳ διανοίᾳ τοιαῦτα λεγόμενα ῥήμ̣ατα̣· ἡ σοφία φησίν· "ὁ πίνων με πάλιν διψάσει καὶ ὁ τρώγων μ̣ε πάλιν πεινάσει". τοῦτο λέγει ὅτι· ἐπειδὴ ὁ πίνων τῆς σοφίας οὐ τὸ τέλειον αὐτ̣η῀̣ς ἄφνω πίνει, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁλίγον θεωρήματα προσλαμβάν̣ει κ̣αὶ θεραπεύει τὸ προ λαβὸν δίψος, πάλιν διψήσει οὐκ αὐτ̣ῶν ἐκε̣ι´̣νων̣ ὧν ἔπιεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μετ' ἐκεῖνα, ἱ´̣ν̣' ᾖ δύναμιν ἔχον τὸ λεχθὲν παρα´̣ τινι· "ἃ μεμάθηκας, διατή ρει ταῖς μελέταις, προσλάμβανει δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις". εἰ προσλαμβά νει, κορεσθεὶς πάλιν διψᾷ, πάλιν πεινᾷ. καὶ τίς ἠγάπησεν ἐν πλήθ̣ει αὐτοῦ γένημα; καί γε τοῦτο ματαιότης. ἔστιν ὅστις ἠγ̣άπη̣σε̣ν πλῆθ̣ο̣ς γενήματος. τὸ "τὶς" ὧδε τὸν λεγόμενον παρά τισιν ι᾿̣δίως̣ ποιὸν σημαίνει, ὃν ἕτεροι ἄτομον καλοῦ σιν. ἔδει δὲ κα̣τὰ γένη̣μα τ̣ὸ τῆς διοικούσης προνοίας̣ ἐν πλήθει̣ εἶ ναι και`̣ τοῦ γενήματος, ὃ τῷ α᾿̣νθρώπῳ ἡ π̣ρόνοια παρέχει, ἐπιθυμῆσαι. ····· ··· κεν ····αρομεν········ ····· ····· ···· 149 οὐ περὶ τὸ πνεῦμα, περὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα. "ὁ σπείρων" οὖν "εἰς τ̣ὴν σάρ κα" πολλὰ σπείρει, τουτέστιν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος. ἔχομεν σάρκα, καὶ δεῖ αὐτῇ οὕτως χρᾶσθαι ὡς σαρκί, ὑπωπιάζειν αὐτήν, δουλαγωγεῖν. ὅταν δὲ προσπα´̣θωμεν τῇ σαρκί, καὶ προαίρεσιν σαρκίνην καὶ διάθεσιν κτώμεθα. ὁ εἰς τὴν σάρκα ταύτην σπείρων καρποὺς φέρειν ἀπωλεία̣ς. κατέιλεξεν τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκὸς ὁ ἀπόστολος, ὡς ἔρις καὶ φαρμακίαι καὶ αἱρέσεις καὶ ἐρισχελίαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἰσίν. ἐπερ· ο̣υ᾿̣ δὲ ἐννοῆσαι δυνάμεθα "πλῆθος δυνάμεως" ἐπαινετῶς; διὰ τὸ ματαίως τοῦτο σπουδάζεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ γένημα ἐκεῖνο μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα–"ἐσκόρπισεν, ἔδωκεν τοῖς πένησιν· ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτοῦ μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα"– εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ ἐπὶ αἱρετικῶν γνωμῶν λάβωμεν τὸ τοι οῦτο, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι ἐπαγγέλλονται "σπείρειν εἰς δικαιοσύνην", οὐ τὴν ἀληθινήν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπίπλαστον̣, τὴν δοκοῦσαν δικαιοσύνην· τοῦτο υ τὸ γ̣ένημ̣α οὖν ματαιότης ἐστίν, κἂν πολὺ δοκῇ εἶναι. λαβέ μοι τινὰ κε κτημένον πολλὰ γενήματα κατὰ τὸ ῥητόν, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκεῖνα ἔχοντα μόνα ····· ε᾿̣π̣ι̣θ̣υμη῀̣σαι αὐτ̣ὸν καὶ χορτάσαι κ̣ατ' ὀλίγον ἔξεστι̣ν, οὐκ ἔστιν ····· ····· ····· ····· ·· μάταιόν ἐστ̣ιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ´̣λ̣ο̣ν̣ ἀναλῶσαι ταῦτα δύναται. –– 150 σκοτίαν, καὶ μάταια ἐκείνου ἡ σπουδὴ καὶ ὁ πόθος κενὸς γέγονεν. ἐν πλήθει ἀγαθοσύνης ἐπληθύνθησαν οἱ ἐσθίον τες αὐτήν. καταλλήλως ἀγαθοσύνην τὴν ἡδονὴν λαμβ̣άν̣ομεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδιάφορά ἐστιν τὰ ἀγαθά–τ̣ὰ μὲν περὶ ψυχήν, τ̣α`̣ δὲ περὶ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ ἐκτός. τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν οὐ τοσοῦτον ἡδονὴν ἐγείρει, ὅσον πόνον καὶ ἱδρῶτα πρὸς τὰ κα̣λ̣ά. τὰ γὰρ περὶ σῶμα καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἡδονῆς εἰσιν πεπληρωμένα καὶ ποιητικά. ἐάν τις ο̣ὐ῀̣ν ἔχῃ τὰ ἐγείροντα πολλὴν ἡδονήν, "πλῆθος ἀγαθο σύνης" ἔχει, νομιζομένην ἀγαθοσύνην, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐφ' οἷς ἡ´̣δεται, δο κεῖ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, οὐκ ὄντα ἀληθῶς καὶ κυρίως ἀγαθά. οὐδὲν οὖν ἀγαθόν ἐστι̣ν̣, ὃ μὴ ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν τὸν ἔχοντα. οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν σὺν ἁμαρτίᾳ εἶναι δ̣ύναται, σὺν ὑγιείᾳ δὲ καὶ ἰσχύι καὶ εὐμορφίᾳ δ̣ύ ναται εἶναι ἁμαρτία. οὐδεὶς σὺν ἀγαθῷ ἁμαρτάνει, σὺν ὑγιείᾳ δὲ ἁμαρ τάνομεν. οὐκ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν ἡ ὑγιεία. ὧδε καὶ συλλογισμῷ ἐδείχθη τ̣ὸ πρό βλημ̣α. ἐπερ· μέμεικται ἡ ἀναγωγὴ τῷ ῥητῷ; τό, ὅτι πολλοὶ σπουδα´̣ζουσιν περὶ παίδευσίν τινα καὶ ἡ´̣δ̣ο̣νται πάνυ ἐπ' αὐτὴν τη`̣ν "ψευδώνυμον γνῶσιν". ἐν τῷ π̣λήθε̣ι τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύ της πλη̣θύνονται. οἱ ἐσθίοντες αὐτὴν δοκοῦσιν ἔχε̣ιν τι´̣·····η̣ν̣···· κατα λαμβάνε̣ι̣ τὸ πλῆθος ····· ····· ····· ····· ···· 151ν καὶ τί ἀνδρεία τῷ παρ' αὐτῆς –– τὰ ἀγαθὰ αἱρετώτερόν ἐστιν τ̣οῦ ἐλαττοῦντος. ὅτι ἀρχὴ τοῦ ὁρᾶν ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτοῦ. ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἡ κυρίως̣ ἀνδρεία ἕξις ἐστὶν παρασκευαστι̣κὴ τ̣οῦ γενναίως φέρειν τὰ ἐπίπονα. ἔχει γὰρ ἀρετὴν σὺν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ κρίνει̣ν. σὺν φρο νήσει γὰρ ἔστιν. πολλάκις γὰρ ἐλέχθη, ὅτι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἔχονται ἀλ̣λήλων. πάντως ὁ ἔχων ἀν δρείαν ἔχει καὶ λόγον θεωρητικόν· κἂν ποιὰ 2 ὑπομείνῃ καὶ ποιὰ μή, ἀδοξί αν οὐχ ὑπομένει. οὐ σ̣εμνύνεται δ̣ὲ ἐπὶ τῷ πάνυ ἀκολασταίνειν ἢ καταπονεῖν τοὺς ἀσθενεστέρους· ἐπιτα´̣σεως δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο. ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ἀνδρείας πολλάκις ἐλέχθη εἶναι ἡ θρασύτης. ἔστιν τις οὖν ἀνδρεία "τινός" ἀνδρεία, ο̣υ᾿̣κ ἀπολελυμ̣ε´̣νως ἀνδρεία. ὧδε οὖν οὐ περὶ τῆς κυρίως ἀνδρείας