Pleasure and pain as wisdoms goads; forced love of ones own being; seeming evils that serve the world
For other things are driven to their proper work by two goads of His wisdom — namely pleasure and pain — from which arise desire and fear, grief and indignation. All things somehow sense their own being and love it; but they sense and love exterior things insofar as they sense themselves changed and affected by them. Hence if they are affected well toward their own conservation, they delight; if badly toward destruction, they hate and grieve.
Next, all things seem affected partly by force, partly spontaneously — that is, by pain and love — with necessity always going before. For to love ones own being belongs to each because it does not know a better: as a dog loves being a dog, and wood loves being wood, since they know their own being as best and are ignorant that other things are better. They are forced to that ignorance by the limitation of their being, and therefore forced also to love this one thing, not to love simply. Hence human beings who from religion or reason are persuaded that another life and being suit them after this one despise the present life, afflict themselves, and long to be dissolved and to be with God. Love of life therefore seems somehow forced, since whatever we do while ignorant of the better we do in part by force. Hence also Seneca in the Tragedy: O how sweet an evil added to mortals — the dread love of life.
We are forced also to love exterior things — food, clothing, labors, and all by which we are somehow preserved in ourselves or in others. We are forced also to regard things good in themselves as evil to us — fire because it burns us, the serpent because it bites, hemlock because it poisons — although in themselves and toward the world and toward like things they are all most excellent and most beautiful.
Latin
Caeterae enim res aguntur ad proprium opus duobus eius sapientiae stimulis, voluptate scilicet et dolore, e quibus suboritur desiderium et metus, moeror et indignatio. Omnia autem quodammodo sentiunt proprium esse et amant; exteriora vero sentiunt et amant, in quantum sentiunt se ab illis immutari et affici. Unde si afficiuntur bene ad sui conservationem, delectantur; si male ad destructionem, oderunt et dolent. Deinde omnia videntur affici partim coacte, partim sponte, id est dolore et amore, semper praeeunte necessitate. Amare enim suum esse convenit unicuique ex eo quod non novit melius, ut canis amat se esse canem, et lignum tanquam lignum, quoniam proprium esse ut optimum noverunt, alia vero meliora esse ignorant; coguntur vero ignorare ex limitatione sui esse ac proinde coguntur et amare hoc unum, non autem amare simpliciter. Unde homines, qui aliam vitam et esse et sibi convenire post hanc ex religione vel ratione persuasum sibi habent, praesentem vitam spernunt, sese macerant et cupiunt dissolvi et esse cum Deo. Amor igitur vitae videtur quodammodo coactus, siquidem quicquid ignorantes melius facimus, ex parte coacte facimus. Unde et Seneca in Tragoedia: O quam mortalibus dulce malum additum, vitae dirus amor. Exteriora quoque cogimur amare, nempe cibum, vestem, labores et omnia quibus aliqualiter in nobis vel in aliis servamur. Cogimur quoque respectare res bonas in se tanquam nobis malas, ut ignem quia nos urit, et serpentem quia nos mordet, cicutam quia nos venenat: cum tamen in se et ad mundum et ad consimiles res omnes optimae sint et pulcherrimae.