Boethius: fate as disposition inhering in mobile things
Therefore fate, as Boethius teaches in book 4 of the Consolation of Philosophy, is an immobile disposition inhering in mobile things, through which providence binds each thing to its orders. It does not follow that all things happen necessarily, but that it is necessary that some effects happen necessarily, others freely, others contingently, according as God prepared causes for them — whose proper work is to give being, while others use being once given unto necessity or contingency.
With respect to heaven inevitable fate is not given, but with respect to the most universal cause, whose order he calls providence and not fate, to which it pertains to make every being as it is. So fate of ordering wisdom prepares the passage to harmony, which is the great influx of divine love — of which the thirty-third chapter.
Latin
Ergo fatum, ut Boethius docet libro 4 de consolatione philosophiae, est rebus mobilibus inhaerens immobilis dispositio, per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. Non sequitur quod omnia eveniant necessario, sed esse necessarium quod effectus eveniant alii necessario, alii libere, alii contingenter, prout illis praeparavit causas Deus, cuius proprium est dare esse, aliarum vero est uti esse dato ad necessitatem vel contingentiam. Respectu caeli non datur fatum inevitabile, sed respectu causae universalissimae, cuius ordinem vocat providentiam et non fatum, ad quam pertinet facere omne ens sicuti est. Sic fatum sapientiae ordinantis praeparat transitum ad harmoniam, quae est magnus divini amoris influxus — de quo caput tricesimum tertium.