System of Sacred Theology · §3.31.3 · Ludwig Crocius

VI–VII: material and formal necessity; necessity of supposition; only God simply necessary

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VI. Material necessity is that which depends on a thing's matter as divinely determined. VII. Formal necessity is that which depends on the thing's form. Both are called by some absolute, and likewise essential, according to which a composite cannot hold itself otherwise at all. So it is necessary that humankind be a rational animal. But things that lack determined matter — as number, triangle, circle, which can be made in wood, stone, and everywhere — have necessity not from matter but from idea alone.

So humankind is necessarily endowed with flesh and bones by necessity of matter; necessarily rational by formal necessity, because form is the principle of actions and operations. And from this essential necessity arises necessity in syllogisms. Whence it follows that every necessity is from the first Necessary, as number looks to unity, and every passive power to the active.

All voluntary things are necessary by natural necessity, not violent. When we will, we necessarily will — the necessity of supposition, which arises from the thing's state, not from a condition. Do all things except God share the necessity of supposition? No necessity seems to be that is not of supposition, except the divine. For that God is most powerful, most wise, and best is necessary by absolute necessity. But that humankind is a rational animal is necessary with God's will supposed deciding to make humankind of this essence. Whence certain ancient theologians not unfitly place necessity simply in God alone, and in the rest only in a qualified sense.

Latin

VI. Necessitas materialis est, quae a rei materia divinitus determinata dependet. VII. Necessitas formalis est, quae a forma rei dependet. Utraque a nonnullis dicitur absoluta, item essentialis, secundum quam compositum omnino non potest aliter se habere. Sic necesse est hominem esse animal rationale. Quae vero res determinata materia carent, ut numerus, triangulus, circulus, qui in ligno, lapide et ubique fieri possunt, non habent a materia necessitatem, sed ab idea sola. Sic necessario est homo carne et ossibus praeditus necessitate materiae; necessario rationalis est necessitate formali, quia forma est actionum et operationum principium. Et ex hac necessitate essentiali oritur necessitas in syllogismis. Unde sequitur omnem necessitatem a primo necessario esse, sicut numerus ad unitatem, et omnis potentia passiva ad activam respicit. Voluntaria omnia necessaria sunt necessitate naturali, non violenta. Cum volumus, necessario volumus — necessitatem suppositionis, quae evenit e statu rei, non a conditione. An omnia excepto Deo necessitatem suppositionis participent? Nulla videtur esse necessitas quae non sit suppositionis, excepta divina. Deum enim esse potentissimum, sapientissimum et optimum necessarium est absoluta necessitate. Sed hominem esse animal rationale necessarium est supposita voluntate Dei decernentis facere hominem huius essentiae. Unde prisci quidam theologi non inepte in solo Deo ponunt necessitatem simpliciter; in ceteris vero secundum quid.

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