Replies to the first and second objections: Hebrew wise for just; theorems ordered to practice; the doable in itself or in another
13. We reply to the first. First, it is not yet clear whether those places treat of sacred theology as a discipline methodically shaped and arranged — which is the question here — and so a doubt is proved by an equally doubtful thing. Second, even if we liberally grant that these and other sayings of Scripture alleged for this matter treat of sacred theology as such, they still do not prove it non-practical but theoretical, or at least partly theoretical and partly practical — which is what those who differ from us separately desire. For those places more carefully inspected show a Hebraism by which wise is frequently used in Scripture for the prudent and the just, because he is described almost everywhere from just actions. So also the whole book of Proverbs uses the word wisdom everywhere. From chapter 10 verse 11 the most learned Thomas Cartwright says on this place that he who is here called wise appears to be called just, so that he who, justified by faith, does not cultivate righteousness is not truly to be counted wise.
Yet in truth, even if some documents in theology, considered in themselves and by themselves, are theorems of things proposed to be known: still, when related and weighed, as is fair, to their whole as parts of theology and to its last end, all are theorems of manners or practical monuments — for they are handed down not only to be known or contemplated, but to be referred to the worship of God and the salvation of man. Hence by a notable theoretical science of God and divine things hypocrites and the ungodly are made no better or happier. Truly Justin Martyr: our religion consists not in words but in deeds. If that respect is neglected and set aside, no practical discipline at all will be given, because there is no practice that does not include some knowledge.
14. In the first syllogism we distinguish the major. For the object of a practical discipline is the doable, either in itself and its nature, or in another which, though distinct from the object, is so joined to it that the object is known and the discipline treated for its sake. Minor is not true. For although God in himself and his nature is not the doable, yet the simply first and necessary end, and the justification of his name, for which he is proposed to be known in theology, is the doable. John Duns Scotus (on the Sentences book 1 question 4) asserts that even these theological propositions — God is triune; the Father begets the Son; the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit — are practical, because they virtually include the knowledge of the rightness of love tending to the three persons of the Deity, none excluded. As for divine things, some are from God alone, as the works of creation and redemption; others principally from God and secondarily, in a certain respect, also from man, insofar as human actions also concur toward them — as faith, justification, sanctification, and the whole worship of God. The former are referred to the doable in the way God is; the latter are such in themselves and their nature.
Latin
13. Nos respondemus ad primum, primo, nondum liquere, an illa loca de sacra Theologia, ut disciplina methodice conformata ac disposita, de qua quaestio hic est, agant, atque ita dubium per aeque dubium probari. Secundo, si liberaliter concedamus, haec et alia dicta scripturae, quae in hanc rem allegantur, de sacra theologia, ut tali, agere; tamen is haud efficiunt non practicam, sed theoreticam, aut saltem partim theoreticam partim practicam, quorum alterutrum, qui a nobis seorsim sentiunt, obtinere cupiunt. Nam ipsa illa loca accuratius inspecta Hebraismum ostendunt, quo sapiens pro prudente et justo in scripturis frequentatur, quia is e justis actionibus fere ubique describitur. Sic et totus liber proverbiorum voce sapientia passim utitur. Ex cap. 10.v.11. inquit doctissimus Thomas Cartwrightus in hunc locum, apparet, eum justum appellari, qui hic appellatur sapiens, ut pro sapiente vere habendus non sit, qui fide justificatus justitiam non colit. Verum enimvero utramque hoc ad quidem nonnulla documenta in Theologia, quae in se ac per se quidem considerata, sint theoremata rerum, quae iis cognoscendae proponuntur: at, ut aequum est, ad suum totum tanquam partes theologiae, et ad hujus ultimum finem relata et aestimata, omnia esse theoremata morum sive practica monumenta, quippe quae traduntur, non ut sciantur solummodo aut contemplentur, sed ut ad cultum Dei et salutem hominis referantur, unde et insigni Dei rerumque divinarum scientia theoretica nihilo meliores aut beatiores redduntur hypocritae et impii. Vere enim Justinus Martyr: religionis nostrae non in verbis, sed in factis. Quo respectu neglecto et insuper habito nulla prorsus disciplina practica dabitur, quia nulla praxis est, quae non includat aliquam notitiam. 14. Distinguimus in primo syllogismo majorem. Nam objectum disciplinae practicae est τὸ πρακτόν, vel in se et natura sua, vel in alio, quod etsi distinctum est ab objecto, tamen ita ei conjungitur, ut propter id objectum cognoscatur et disciplina tractetur. Cum hac vero distinctione minor vera non est. Nam etsi Deus in se et natura sua non sit τὸ πρακτόν, tamen finis simpliciter primus et necessarius, et justificatio nominis ejus, propter quam in theologia cognoscendus proponitur, est τὸ πρακτόν. Johannes Duns Scotus in 1. Sent. q.4. ubi et has propositiones theologicas, Deus est trinus, Pater generat Filium, Pater et Filius spirant Spiritum sanctum, asserit esse practicas: quia includunt virtualiter notitiam rectitudinis dilectionis in tres Deitatis personas, nulla exclusa, tendentis. Quod vero ad res divinas, vel sint a solo Deo, ut opera creationis et redemptionis, vel principaliter a Deo, et secundario certoque respectu, ab homine quoque, quatenus hominis actiones etiam ad eas concurrunt, ut fides, justificatio, sanctificatio, totusque Dei cultus. Priores ad τὸ πρακτόν eum in modum referuntur, quo Deus: posteriores vero in se et natura sua sunt talia.