Intermediate State

Lactantius, Divine Institutes 7.11

Lactantius · c. 250–c. 325 AD

When the times that God has fixed for death reach their completion, death itself will come to an end. Since temporal death follows temporal life, it follows necessarily that souls will rise again to everlasting life, because temporal death has received its limit. Just as the life of the soul is eternal — in it the soul takes the divine and inexpressible fruits of its own immortality — so too its death must be perpetual, a state in which it pays perpetual punishments and infinite torments for its sins. The situation therefore stands thus: those who are blessed in this bodily and earthly life will always be miserable hereafter, because they have already obtained the good things they preferred; this is the lot of those who worship gods but neglect God. But those who pursued justice in this life and were miserable, despised, and needy, often vexed by insults and injuries on account of justice itself — for virtue cannot be held in any other way — will always be blessed hereafter, so that, having already borne evils, they may also enjoy good things. This certainly befalls those who, despising earthly and fragile goods, follow the heavenly religion of God, whose goods are eternal, just like the One who bestows them. Do not the works of body and soul show that the soul is exempt from death? Because the body is itself fragile and mortal, whatever works it undertakes are equally transitory. Tullius says there is nothing worked by human hands that is not sometime reduced to ruin, either by human violence or by the sheer aging of all things. Yet we see that the works of the soul are eternal. Whoever, despising present things, have left monuments of their genius and great deeds for posterity have clearly sought an indelible name for their mind and virtue. If bodily works are mortal because the body itself is mortal, it follows that the soul proves to be immortal, because we see that its works are not mortal. In the same way, the desires of body and soul declare the one to be mortal, the other everlasting. The body desires nothing but temporal things — food, drink, clothing, rest, pleasure — and yet it cannot even desire or attain these without the soul’s assent and aid. The soul, by itself, desires many things that do not pertain to the body’s duty or fruit, and these are not fragile but eternal: the fame of virtue, the memory of a name. The soul even desires the worship of God, which consists in abstaining from desires and lusts, enduring pain, and despising death — all against the body’s inclinations. From this it is credible that the soul does not perish but is separated from the body, because the body can do nothing without the soul, while the soul can do many and great things without the body. Consider also this: things visible to the eyes and tangible to the hand, because they can suffer external force, cannot be eternal; but things that come under neither touch nor sight, whose only power, reason, and effect appear, are eternal, because they suffer no external force. If the body is mortal because it is subject to sight and touch, then the soul is immortal because it can be neither touched nor seen.

Latin

Inpletis igitur temporibus quae deus morti statuit terminabitur ipsa mors. et quia temporalem uitam temporalis mors sequitur, consequens est ut resurgant animae ad uitam perennem, quia finem mors temporalis accepit. rursus sicut uita animi sempiterna est, in qua diuinos et ineloquibiles inmortalitatis suae fructus capit, ita et mors eius perpetua sit necesse est, in qua perennes poenas et infinita tormenta pro peccatis suis pendit. ergo in ea condicione res posita est, ut qui beati sunt in hac uita corporali atque terrena, semper miseri sint futuri, quia iam bonis quae maluerunt potiti sunt, quod iis euenit qui deos adorant ac deum neglegunt, deinde qui iustitiam sequentes in hac uita miseri fuerint et contempti et inopes et ob ipsam iustitiam contumeliis et iniuriis saepe uexati, quia nec aliter uirtus teneri potest, semper beati sint futuri, ut quia mala iam pertulerunt, etiam bonis fruantur: quod iis utique contingit qui contemptis terrestribus diis et fragilibus bonis caelestem religionem dei secuntur, cuius bona sicut ipse qui tribuit sempiterna sunt. quid? opera corporis atque animi nonne indicant esse animam mortis expertem? nam corpus quia ipsum fragile est atque mortale, quaecumque opera molitur, aeque caduca sunt. nihil enim Tullius ait esse quod sit manibus humanis laboratum, quod non aliquando ad interitum redigatur uel iniuria hominum uel ipsa confectrice rerum omnium uetustate. at uero animi opera uidemus aeterna. nam quicumque contemptu praesentium studentes in memoriam monumenta ingeniorum factorumque magnorum reliquerunt, hi plane mentis ac uirtutis suae nomen indelebile quaesierunt. ergo si opera corporis ideo mortalia sunt, quia ipsum mortale est, sequitur ut anima ex eo inmortalis appareat, quia uidemus opera eius non esse mortalia. eodem modo desideria quoque corporis animique decarant alterum esse mortale, alterum sempiternum. corpus enim nihil nisi temporale desiderat id est cibum potum indumentum quietem uoluptatem, et tamen haec ipsa sine nutu et adminiculo animi nec cupere nec adsequi potest: animus autem per se multa desiderat quae ad officium fructumue corporis non redundent, eaque non fragilia, sed aeterna sunt, ut fama uirtutis, ut memoria nominis. nam cultum dei, qui constat abstinentia cupiditatum ac libidinum, patientia doloris, contemptu mortis, etiam contra corpus anima concupiscit. unde credibile est non interire animam, sed dissociari a corpore, quia corpus sine animo nihil potest, animus uero potest multa et magna sine corpore. quid quod ea quae uisibilia sunt oculis et tangibilia manu, quia externam uim pati possunt, aeterna esse non possunt, ea uero quae neque sub tactum neque sub uisum ueniunt, sed tantummodo uis eorum et ratio et effectus apparet, aeterna sunt, quia nullam uim patiuntur extrinsecus? corpus autem si ideo mortale est, quia uism pariter et tactui subiacet, ergo et anima idcirco inmortalis est, quia nec tangi potest nec uideri.

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