Ad Florum
Translated from the Latin by Via Patrum.
Julian’s six preserved books to Florus, quoted section by section in Augustine’s unfinished reply. Augustine’s refutations are omitted. Latin of Julian’s words is on each section.
Julian of Eclanum (c. 386–c. 455) was bishop of Eclanum in southern Italy until 418, when he was deposed and exiled for refusing to condemn Pelagius. The most learned Pelagian controversialist, he pursued Augustine across a decade of pamphlet war.
None of Julian's works survives directly; what remains is preserved in the long quotations of Augustine, who answered him book by book. Reconstructed from those hostile pages, Julian emerges as a formidable defender of free will, marriage, and the goodness of creation.
Julian’s own books do not survive as a separate manuscript. English follows his words as Augustine quotes them in the Unfinished Work Against Julian. Augustine’s replies are omitted. We do not restore a Julian text independent of Augustine.
We have not yet re-checked this work against its source. We made this study translation with AI help. No scholar has yet certified it as faithful and complete. Open Latin on any section, or the Latin source link, to see the source text. It is not a critical edition.
To Florus — Book 1
1.1Although I was burdened with great distress, stirred partly by indignation and partly by pity as I looked at the condition of the churches in these times, I had not abandoned my pledge. Having made myself a debtor by promising, I meant to take care to pay that debt as well. In the books I dictated against Augustine's writings, addressed to our brother Bishop Turbantius, a man distinguished by the great brilliance of his virtues, I promised that, unless some obstacle to my studies arose, I would immediately answer all the arguments of those who, following the opinion of the Manichaeans, defended the transmission of sin by descent, that is, an evil inherent in nature. Various pressing circumstances, which cannot honestly be ignored, have kept me from that task until now.
1.2As soon as I had room to breathe, however, I intended to fulfill my promises as briefly as the subject itself would allow. But you, most blessed Father Florus, wanted me to undertake a more demanding task once again. Your holiness commands such reverence that I consider it irreligious to obey your instructions sluggishly; you therefore had little difficulty persuading me to lengthen the short route I had chosen. Give your support, then, to a work undertaken at your command. I have placed your name in it chiefly so that my pen may advance more confidently and cheerfully under the protection of so weighty an instruction. There was a sound reason for the brevity I had planned. In those four books, the truth of the catholic faith, for which and with which we incur the hatred of a world in decline, had crushed almost everything invented by the Manichaeans and spoken against us by Augustine. Armed both with unanswerable arguments and with the testimony of the sacred Law, it had left almost nothing outstanding, if only we had fair judges.
1.3I had, however, passed over some scriptural testimonies from which they suppose a case can be made against us. I had promised to explain them, to show that the ambiguous words of the Law that our enemies commonly use cannot count against a clearly established truth. They must be understood in accordance with what the clearest authorities of Holy Scripture and unanswerable reasoning establish. Anyone who thinks the divine Law can authorize something that justice cannot vindicate thereby reveals himself to be an ignorant and irreverent interpreter of that Law.
1.4For if God's Law is the source and teacher of justice, its support can uphold God's fairness; it cannot attack it. The nature of things therefore does not permit injustice to draw any support from the authority of that Scripture whose sole reason for being proclaimed was to destroy injustice through its testimonies, remedies, threats, and punishments.
1.5Nothing, then, can be done through God's Law against God, the author of the Law. This single brief argument rules out whatever those in error usually object. Nevertheless, to show how rich is the truth we believe, we also bring the light of explanation to passages of Scripture whose tangled wording has veiled their meaning. Once opened up, they may retain the dignity of their origin, rather than being cut off from their sacred ancestry as though they were illegitimate or degenerate offspring.
1.6Following my usual practice, this alone was what I still intended to do: to free those portions of the divine Law that were being insulted by the interpretations of the advocates of inherited sin. I would show that they were indeed divine by showing that they were just.
1.7But you urgently requested, or rather ordered with a father's authority, that I answer the African expositor's book, which Alypius, the household slave of his sins, recently carried to Count Valerius. That is why my reply has grown longer.
1.8For he has once again produced monuments to his ability and his faith: things exceedingly hard to understand, extremely difficult to explain, and scarcely bearable to hear without horror. Yet they are very easy to refute and to pierce through with the sharpest blows; out of respect for decency, they ought to be banished into oblivion.
1.9His first book, then, the only one published before this, accuses us of being new heretics (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 1.1). The reason is that we oppose an opinion which, like the whitewashed tomb of the Gospel, is covered outwardly with a clean surface but packed with filth and wickedness within (Matthew 23:27). Under the guise of praising baptism, it belches out the filth of the Manichaeans and sin inherent in nature, contaminating the catholic Church's sacraments, which until now have been pure.
1.10He also praises a powerful man for throwing the weight of his high position against our petitions and preventing us from obtaining a time or place for discussion. We had cried out for nothing except judges to be appointed in so great a matter, so that actions known to have been secured by misrepresentation might be corrected rather than punished after investigation. Whether the man to whom the book is addressed actually acted as wickedly as this praise declares is for him to consider. My own little work, in which I mentioned his name honorably, made plain how much better I thought of him. That book may perhaps contain falsehoods about its patron. But it faithfully reveals what its author wants: a struggle waged by savage force and blind abuse of power against reason, against faith, and against every form of holiness in conduct and doctrine.
1.11After doing this in the opening parts of the volume, he proceeded to distinguish marriage from sexual desire, as the wording of his title had promised. Throughout the rest of the work he then displayed his skill and virtue. Driven to the last extremity between denying what he had admitted and admitting what he had denied, he publicly exposed the torments of his foul conscience.
1.12I therefore answered that earlier work in four little books, with whatever ability truth supplied. I stated at the outset that I would pass over things which plainly carried no weight in support of his doctrine and which might expose me to a charge of verbosity if I pursued every weak and empty remark. Indeed, if I had been permitted to keep that rule as I should, so that admitted absurdities did not even deserve an attack, almost all his inventions would have deserved the contempt of universal silence. But things are rushing toward the worse, a sign that the world is approaching its end; folly and depravity have gained power even in God's Church. We therefore serve as ambassadors for Christ (2 Corinthians 5:20), bringing such help as we can, each according to his ability, to the defense of the catholic religion. Nor are we reluctant to commit to writing the remedies we prepare against the poisons of error.
1.13As I have said, I had expressly stated that in my first work I would neither discuss every form of argument for defending inherited sin nor repeat everything that his book contained. I would engage with the points in which he had placed the substance and strength of his doctrine. Any careful reader of both works, however prejudiced, will recognize that I faithfully made that promise. Confident in the integrity of my conscience, I now urge and challenge our enemy: if he thinks I have omitted any argument he advanced which even he judges to have some weight, let him bring it forward and convict me of fear and deceit.
1.14I explained some scriptural testimonies at greater length and others more briefly, because I promised to handle them fully in the work that would follow. Thus none of Augustine's arguments and propositions there remained without refutation, and I carried out nothing differently from what I had promised. I exposed many falsehoods, many absurdities, and many sacrileges in his inventions.
1.15We need not fear a reputation for arrogance because of this declaration. We acknowledge that truth was not defended by my ability; rather, the weakness of my ability was helped by the strength of truth.
1.16Since, then, it is established that these things were carried out just as I have said, I cannot sufficiently wonder at the man's shamelessness. In his recent work he accuses my books of falsehood, although he admits that they have not yet reached his hands (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.2). It is a dreadful thing that the habit of sinning produces a love of wrongdoing, but more dreadful still that it extinguishes shame. Although it was already clear that this comes from the practice of wickedness, our present dangers have taught us more about it than any of us could have supposed. When could I have believed that this Numidian's forehead had grown so brazen that in one work, indeed in one sentence, he would admit both that I had spoken falsely and that he had not read what I said?
1.17Writing to the man whose devotion to his books astonishes him, occupied as that man is with the hardships of military service, he reports that Alypius brought him some sheets headed: 'Passages from a book Augustine wrote, against which I have excerpted a few things from some books.' Augustine continues: 'Here I see that the person who sent these writings to Your Eminence wanted to excerpt them from books unknown to me, in order, as I suppose, to obtain a quicker reply and not postpone your urgent request. When I considered what books these might be, I supposed they were those Julian mentions in the letter he sent to Rome, a copy of which reached me at the same time. There he says: “They even say that the marriages now taking place were not instituted by God. This can be read in Augustine's book, which I have just answered in four little books.”' After these words Augustine adds in his own voice: 'I believe these passages were excerpted from those little books. It might therefore have been better for me to devote my attention to refuting and disproving the whole work he set out in four volumes, except that I too was unwilling to delay my reply, just as you did not delay sending the writings that required an answer' (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.2). Here, then, he shows perfectly clearly that he suspects those excerpts were hastily collected from my work. He does not know the complete books, yet dares to say that he could have answered them.
1.18He also mentions a letter which he says I sent to Rome, but from the words he quotes we have been unable to recognize which writing he means (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.2). I did send two letters on these questions to Zosimus, formerly bishop of that city, but that was at a time when I had not yet begun the books.
1.19Let him nevertheless use the evidence of the letter from which he learned, or invented, that I had set out a reply in four volumes against the new Manichaeans, since he disdains to be regarded as an old one. Why did he not take care to learn what objections we had made? Why did he not make an effort to know the person he was going to engage? Instead, driven by the most disgraceful frivolity, he entered a mighty contest with his eyes covered, like a blindfolded gladiator. He defends this behavior by saying that he wanted his hasty reply to imitate the haste with which his patron had sent the sheets. As though he could not most honorably have explained that he needed some time to obtain and read the published work! Among educated people it is disgraceful to fail in the seriousness writing demands and, through an unwillingness to deliberate, to attack something you do not know. Moreover, while planning to make us hated for the alleged cunning with which we had shortened the sequence of his words, he trusted excerpts that seem more likely to have been composed through his own falsehood and malice than through anyone on our side being innocently unskilled. Whatever the motive, and whoever the author, the occurrence supports us in two ways. It has revealed at once both the frivolity and the weakness of truth's enemy. He has shown that he cannot keep silent even when he ought not to speak, and that a few incomplete sentences, torn apart rather than assembled, drawn only from my first book, defeated and broke him so thoroughly that he tried to stir up the populace against us with thoroughly womanish cries. The course of our discussion will make this clear.
1.20Here too, however, as in my earlier work, I warn the reader that I will not quote all his words with exact completeness. I will quote the principal points whose destruction will crush the opinion that evil is inherent in nature.
1.21Although it is established that my first work fully achieved this, he has now selected certain things from just one of my books for refutation. As I said at the outset, he accuses me of having substantially mutilated the principal statements of his that I inserted. I will therefore show first that I did not do what he criticizes, and that he himself has repeatedly done it with the greatest shamelessness in this very work. Then I will prove that he has offered no substantial answers even to the short, broken sentences he inserts from the writings in which I attacked him. Those statements remain untouched, while he now admits things deserving condemnation more plainly than my earlier work had labored to explain them.
1.22Let us listen, then, in astonishment to what he has written against me. He says: 'He quoted these words from the book I sent you, which you know very well, and attempted to refute them: “They shout with the utmost malice that we condemn marriage and God's work, by which God creates human beings from males and females, because we say that those born from such a union inherit original sin. We do not deny that, whatever parents they are born from, they remain under the devil unless they are reborn in Christ (compare John 3:3–5)” (Titus 3:5)' (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.2). Augustine continues: 'From these words of mine he omitted the apostle's testimony that I had inserted, because he felt himself crushed by its great weight. For when I said that human beings inherit original sin, I immediately added: “Of this the apostle says, Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned” (Romans 5:12) (John 3:3–5). After omitting that testimony, as we have said, he joined together the other statements mentioned above. He knows how the hearts of faithful catholics commonly receive these apostolic words that he omitted, words so straightforward and shining with such light, which new heretics try to obscure and distort through dark and twisted interpretations. He then appended other words of mine where I said: “They do not notice that the good of marriage cannot be blamed because of the original evil inherited from it, just as the evil of adultery and fornication cannot be excused because of the natural good born from them. For just as sin, whether infants inherit it from the one source or the other, is the devil's work, so a human being, whether born from the one or the other, is God's work.” Here too he omitted what he feared catholic ears would hear. Before arriving at these words, we had said: “Because we say this, which is contained in the most ancient and firmly established rule of the catholic faith, these advocates of a new and perverse doctrine, who say that there is no sin in infants to be washed away in the bath of rebirth (compare Titus 3:5), slander us faithlessly or ignorantly, as though we condemned marriage and called God's work, the human being born from it, the devil's work” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 1.1). After these omitted words of ours come those of ours that he quoted, as written above' (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.3–4). How long will you who say these things persist in mocking the simplicity of devout hearts and uneducated ears? How far will your unbridled shamelessness flaunt itself? When you wrote this, were you not moved at all by the judgment of learned men, by reverence for the coming judgment, or by the written records themselves? Do you not see that your deceit already lies exposed, caught and held fast? Which of us do you suppose does not know what you wrote in your first and second works? I have deliberately chosen, and rightly chosen, to address you in the terms in which the eloquent consul thundered against a traitor to his country (Cicero, Against Catiline 1.1).
1.23You invent the charge that I omitted the apostle's testimony, although it cannot help you and I did not omit it. I inserted it in the same order in which you had placed it. Just as I faithfully quoted it in the first book of my work, I also explained it in the fourth, though briefly and in passing (compare Augustine, Against Julian 6.75). Nor did I omit your mention of the catholic Church, which you had made so that those you deceived would abandon the catholic faith and yet, poor wretches, rejoice in the catholic name. Although words of that sort had no argumentative force, I nevertheless presented the opening of your statement exactly as you had arranged it. Read my published books; see the faithfulness of my reply, which you accuse of fraud; and for the present admit that I am speaking the truth. As for you, blush, if your habitual conduct will allow it. Your inexcusable falsehood has now been exposed. Falsehood is always disgraceful, but becomes more disgraceful when it usurps the censor's place and reproaches another person's beauty with its own ugliness. Answer, then: how does either the Church's name or the apostle's language benefit Manichaean ideas, that you should make so inflammatory a complaint about their omission?
1.24This has always been the greatest distinction between Manichaeans and catholics, the broadest boundary separating the doctrines of the devout from those of the impious, indeed a vast barrier dividing our opinions as widely as heaven is separated from earth: we assign every sin to an evil will; they assign it to an evil nature. They pursue various errors, all flowing, as it were, from this fountainhead, and consistently arrive at sacrilege and shameful deeds. Catholics, by contrast, start from a good beginning, advance through good steps, and reach the height of religion, fortified by reason and piety. You therefore tried to establish an evil inherent in nature and appropriated the apostle's testimony for an impious purpose, though to no effect. In this very work I show that the apostle held nothing like the view you are trying to persuade us to accept. You contradict yourself: you acknowledge that he was catholic, yet suppose his words support a Manichaean.
1.25Did not Adimantus and Faustus, whom you call your teacher in the books of your Confessions, do the same thing, following the tradition of their heresy's founder (Augustine, Confessions 5.6–7, 13)? They seized and gnawed away at whatever statements were more obscure, whether from the Gospel or the apostles' letters, to defend an impious doctrine through the authority of those names. But why speak only of the Manichaeans? Every heresy fortifies its own inventions, through which it has strayed from piety and faith, with the language and statements of Scripture.
1.26Will the sacred books therefore be proved to be the authors of their errors? Or will Scripture's dignity acquit those who are perishing of their crimes?
1.27Put an end, then, to the appetite for undisciplined interpretations. Let no words be thought capable of prevailing against God's manifest justice. If they come from someone whom we are bound to revere, defend them with explanations consistent with divine fairness. If they were spoken by an author who commands no such reverence, reject them even without resolving their meaning. We are now discussing God's judgment. Of him it is written: 'God is faithful, and in him there is no injustice; the Lord God is just and holy' (Deuteronomy 32:4). And again: 'The Lord is just, and he has loved justice; his face has looked upon fairness' (Psalm 11:7; LXX Psalm 10:8). And again: 'All your judgments are fairness' (Psalm 119:172; LXX Psalm 118:172). Countless testimonies in the sacred books proclaim divine fairness. Yet no one among either the nations or the heretics has doubted it, except the Manichaeans and the advocates of inherited sin.
1.28Nature's own teaching has impressed on everyone, without exception, that God is just. It is therefore clear that anyone proved not to be just is not God. A human being can be just; God cannot be anything but just.
1.29Since he is the one true God in whom we believe and whom we worship in the Trinity, he is without doubt perfectly just in his judgment of everyone.
1.30It is therefore so impossible to prove and vindicate from his laws something known to be unjust that, if it could be done, his entire divinity would lose its worth. Only someone who could prove that the Trinity in whom we believe could be deprived of divine glory could prove that a doctrine of injustice is established by the Holy Scriptures.
1.31Since neither any sound reasoning nor piety permits that, either show that imputing a sin inherent in nature to someone is possible, or that it is just, or cease contaminating the Holy Scriptures. You suppose their statements authorize what you are compelled to admit is unjust.
1.32If you will do neither of the things we have stated, and assert that you believe in this God whose ordinances you suppose to establish injustice, recognize that you, a new Manichaean, are far worse than an old one. Your God is of the very character that the Manichaean invented for the enemy of his God.
1.33What evasions, then, what cushions of lies and absurdities, such as the prophet Ezekiel charges against unfaithful Jerusalem, will you offer me here (Ezekiel 13:18)? On these cushions womanish souls may recline, retaining the names of sacred mysteries even though they have committed open sacrilege against divinity itself. Set aside every conjuring trick and the crowds of common folk you so often summon, and show that what you try to establish through Holy Scripture is just.
1.34To prevent this discussion from extending into endless volumes, let us examine here and now the genus, species, difference, measure, and quality of the things we are discussing. More carefully still, let us ask whether they exist, where they come from, where they are found, and what recognition they deserve and from whom. In this way we will not wander long through the twists of argument, and the definite position we must hold will become clear.
1.35What is at issue, then, is the relationship of Creator and creature, that is, of God and the human being. The one judges; the other is judged. Let us therefore examine the nature of justice and of guilt. Justice, as learned people commonly define it and as we can understand it, is a virtue, the greatest of all virtues, if the Stoics will allow one to be ranked above another. It carefully performs its task of restoring to each what belongs to that person, without deceit or favoritism.
1.36Suppose Zeno does not allow justice to be called the greatest. He maintains such a close connection and unity among the virtues that, where one is present, he says all are present, and where one is absent, all are absent. True virtue, he says, is perfected by this fourfold union. Even then he will give us great help by teaching that wisdom, courage, and self-control cannot exist without justice. Ecclesiastes speaks in accordance with this truth: 'Whoever sins in one thing will lose many good things' (Ecclesiastes 9:18).
1.37This majestic virtue, which settles the account of what each person deserves, flashes forth in the works of God's image, the human soul (compare Genesis 1:26–27), according to the measure and strength of the creature. In God himself, however, the Creator of all things out of nothing, it shines eternally in a boundless, brilliant sphere. Its origin is divinity; its age is eternity, an eternity that knows neither an ending in the future nor a beginning in the past. Thus its genus, by which term I mean nothing other than its origin, is God; its species appears in the proclamation of laws and the effects of judgments (Genesis 1:26–27).
1.38We may reasonably understand its difference as the varying administration suited to different times. For example, animal sacrifices were commanded in the Old Testament. Performing them then belonged to reverence for the command; now the command to refrain from them serves the justice that gives the command just as offering them did then. Its measure or fixed limit is that it commands no one to do more than that person's strength permits, and that it does not repel mercy. Its quality is understood as that through which it tastes sweet to devout minds. Justice therefore undoubtedly exists; without it there is no divinity. If it did not exist, God would not exist. But God does exist; therefore justice unquestionably exists. It is nothing other than the virtue that embraces all things and restores to each what belongs to that person, without deceit or favoritism. Its chief dwelling is in the depths of divinity.
1.39Justice deserves testimony not only from its author but also from good and wicked people alike: it has rightly exalted the former and rightly condemned the latter. When, however, it permits mercy to be generous to those who of themselves have earned neither good nor evil, it suffers no injury. For it is itself a great part of justice that God should be merciful to his own work when nothing compels him to severity.
1.40He made them because he willed to do so; he condemns them only when he is despised. If, when he is not despised, he makes them better through consecration, he suffers no loss of justice and is adorned by the generosity of his mercy.
1.41Now that we have explained these distinctions concerning justice, let us examine the definition of sin. The writings both of philosophers and of people who were catholic supply me abundantly with what we seek. But I am afraid you will object: if I summon a senate of philosophers, you will immediately stir up shopkeepers and the whole populace against us,
1.42shouting along with women, all the dogs, and the military officers to whom your colleague Alypius recently brought eighty or more horses fattened throughout Africa,
1.43that you will never accept the judgments of the learned. You will add that the apostle said, in the sense your understanding gives it, that “God has made the wisdom of the world foolish” (1 Corinthians 1:20). You can therefore safely despise our debaters, you will say, because no authority of theirs weighs upon you.
1.44What then? I will indeed yield to you. At this point I will give up everyone whose support I could use and be content with a definition which, as evidence of a good nature, escaped from your honorable mouth after you left the secret company of the Manichaeans. In the book entitled either On Two Souls or Against Two Souls, you say: “Wait; let us first define sin. Sin is the will to commit or retain something justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain. In fact, if one is not free, it cannot even be called will; but I preferred a rougher definition to a more exacting one” (Augustine, On Two Souls 15).
1.45What shining gold in a heap of dung! What could anyone, even an orthodox believer, have said more truly or more completely? “Sin”, you say, “is the will to commit or retain something justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain” (Augustine, On Two Souls 15). Ecclesiasticus shows this: “God made the human being and left him in the hands of his own decision. He placed before him life and death, water and fire; whatever pleases him will be given to him” (Sirach 15:14, 16–17; Vulgate 15:14, 17–18). And God says through Isaiah: “If you are willing and listen to me, you will eat the good things of the land. If you are unwilling and do not listen, the sword will devour you” (Isaiah 1:19–20). And the apostle: “Come rightly to your senses, and do not sin” (1 Corinthians 15:34). And again: “Do not be deceived; God is not mocked. Whatever a person sows, that he will also reap” (Galatians 6:7–8).
1.46Will, then, is a movement of the mind that has under its own control whether it runs to the left toward wrongdoing or strives to the right toward higher things.
1.47It is, however, a movement of the mind of someone who is old enough to use rational judgment. When punishment and glory, or on the other side advantage and pleasure, are set before that person, help and, as it were, an opportunity are offered; neither alternative is imposed by necessity. This will, capable of turning either way, received the source of its capacity in free choice. But it brings the actual deed into existence from itself. There is no act of will at all before a person wills, nor can a person will before being capable also of refusing. In the case of sin, a person does not possess both capacities, willing and refusing, before acquiring the use of reason. Taken together, these points show that your definition was entirely true: “Sin is the will to retain or commit something justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain” (Augustine, On Two Souls 15).
This sin, which has been shown to be nothing but will, plainly receives its genus, that is, its very origin, from one's own desire. Its species is then found in each individual, those who are called indivisibles. Its difference lies in the variety of faults and the circumstances of times. Its measure is its very lack of measure. For if the proper measure is to serve the one you ought to serve, whoever neglects this sins by crossing the true limit. Yet one may make the subtle point that sin has a measure because no one sins beyond what he can do. For even if someone sins beyond his powers with an ineffectual will, he was still capable of that very act of willing alone. To vice we must assign a quality through which it shows the bitterness it brings, whether through disgrace or pain. Sin therefore exists; if it did not, you would not pursue your errors. It is nothing other than a will leaving the path on which it ought to remain and from which it is free not to turn aside. It arises from desire for forbidden things, and it exists nowhere except in a person who both had an evil will and could have refrained from having one.
1.48Sin deserves both the abhorrence of honorable people and lawful condemnation from the justice that is the whole subject of our present inquiry. With all the curtains drawn back, bring into the open at last the grounds on which you teach that sin is inherent in nature. Surely nothing we established above, either in praise of divine justice or in defining guilt, was false. Show, then, that these two things can hold together in infants. If there is no sin without will, no will where freedom has not developed, and no freedom where there is no ability to choose through reason, by what monstrosity is sin found in infants, who have no use of reason? They therefore have no capacity for choice and consequently no will; and once these undeniable points are granted, they have no sin whatsoever. Pressed by these massive arguments, let us see where you break out. You say: “Infants are weighed down by no sin of their own, but by another's” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 1.22).
The evil of your view is not yet clear. We suspect that you have introduced this point to arouse hostility toward some man whose injustice you wish to portray with your African rhetoric. In whose court, then, did someone else's crime burden unstained innocence? Who was that barbarous enemy, so mindless, so savage, so forgetful of God and fairness, who sentenced these infants as guilty? We certainly praise your talent; your education shows! You could not otherwise have depicted some judge, or rather tyrant, as deserving the hatred of the human race than by swearing that he spared not only no one who had committed no sin, but not even those who could not have sinned. Before a suspicious mind, a good conscience commonly labors in its own defense against the possibility that it did wrong, since it at least could have done wrong. But someone defended by the very impossibility of the act is completely cleared of the charge.
Reveal, then, who this condemner of innocents is. You answer: “God.” You have indeed struck my mind a blow. But since so great a sacrilege scarcely deserves belief, let us hesitate over what you have said. We know that this name can be applied to different beings: “There are many gods and many lords; for us, however, there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things” (1 Corinthians 8:5–6). Which God, then, are you charging with a crime? Here you, most religious priest and most learned rhetorician, breathe out something more dreadful and horrible than the valley of Amsanctus or the pit of Avernus, indeed something more criminal than the worship of idols committed in those places (compare Virgil, Aeneid 7.565).
You say: “God himself, who commends his love toward us (Romans 5:8), who loved us and did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us (Romans 8:32), judges in this way. He himself is the persecutor of newborn children. He hands infants over to eternal fires for an evil will, although he knows they could have had neither a good nor an evil will.” After this statement, so monstrous, so sacrilegious, so deadly, if we had sane judges I ought to answer with nothing but abhorrence of you. With just and commendable seriousness I would judge you unworthy of discussion. You have fled so far from religion, from education, and finally from ordinary human understanding that you consider your Lord a criminal, something scarcely any barbarian would do.
1.49The Manichaean invented and believed that the god of light fought with the prince of darkness; he added that this god's substance is held captive in this world. But he tries to excuse so great a misfortune under an appearance of piety, asserting that his god fought like a good citizen for his homeland and exposed his limbs to danger rather than lose his kingdom. You learned these things. Consider how much progress you made by abandoning them, even for a time! You say that God was not forced to undergo war but committed an unjust judgment; that he is not subject to dark enemies but to plainly evident crimes; and finally that he did not part with his own substance but violated eternal justice. I leave others to judge which of you is worse. This much is clear: you arrive at one and the same wicked opinion. The Manichaean assigns injustice to his god when he says that on the last day his god will condemn the members he himself surrendered. You too declare God miserable, because he ruins the glory that made him renowned and, by persecuting the innocence he created, loses the justice that made him supremely holy. The god your teacher invented therefore surpasses the God you introduce by just as much as defeat in battle is more excusable than defeat by vice.
1.50Away with you, then, and this God of yours from the midst of the churches! He is not the one in whom the patriarchs, prophets, and apostles believed, in whom the church of the firstborn enrolled in heaven has hoped and still hopes (Hebrews 12:23). He is not the one whom rational creatures believe to be their judge, whom the Holy Spirit declares will judge justly. No sensible person would ever have shed his blood for such a Lord. He would not deserve the affection of love that could place on anyone the burden of suffering for him. Finally, if the one you introduce existed anywhere, he would be proved a defendant, not a god: someone to be judged by my true God, not someone to judge in God's place.
Learn, then, the first foundations of faith. Our God, the God of the catholic Church, is unknown to us in his substance and likewise beyond our sight, “whom no human being has seen or can see” (1 Timothy 6:16). As he is eternal without beginning, so he is holy and just without fault: supremely powerful, supremely fair, supremely merciful, made known only by the radiance of his virtues. He is the maker of all that did not exist, the ruler of all that exists, and on the last day the examiner of all who exist, will exist, or have existed. He will shake earth, heaven, and all the elements together; he will raise the ashes and restore bodies. But everything we have named he will do for justice alone (compare Hebrews 12:26–27; John 5:28–29) (Hebrews 12:26–27; John 5:28–29).
1.51For this God of mine, whom all creation and Holy Scripture proclaim to me as I believe him to be, I said I would act more rightly if I did not consider you worthy even of a contest in books. But holy men, the confessors of our time, have assigned this task particularly to me: to examine what weight and reason your statements contain. It was therefore appropriate to show first that you do not believe in the God who has always been proclaimed in the Church of the catholics and will continue to be proclaimed wherever that Church is found, until the end.
1.52I will now go on to examine the testimonies by which you try to establish what the faith of the devout demolishes. But since I have undertaken to answer your second book, the one Alypius brought, I must answer a few more things before my discussion reaches the apostolic testimony on which you think you can chiefly rely. Otherwise the sequence of my reply would become confused. To the words I quoted above you add the following: “In what he omitted, then, he feared this point, because it addresses every heart in the catholic Church. It calls out, as it were, in a clear voice to the faith itself, handed down and firmly established from ancient times, and stirs it powerfully against them: we said that ‘they say there is no sin in infants to be washed away in the bath of rebirth (compare Titus 3:5)’ (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 1.1). Everyone hurries to the Church with infants for no other reason than that original sin, contracted through the generation of their first birth, may be cleansed through the regeneration of their second birth. Then he returns to our earlier words, which I do not know why he repeats: ‘We say that those born from such a union inherit original sin, and we do not deny that, whatever parents they are born from, they remain under the devil unless they are reborn in Christ (compare John 3:3–5)’ (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 1.1). He had quoted these words of ours a little earlier. Then he adds what we said about Christ: ‘Who did not wish to be born from that same union of the two sexes.’ But here too he omitted what I wrote: ‘So that through his grace, rescued from the power of darkness, they may be transferred into the kingdom of him who did not wish to be born from that same union of the two sexes.’ See, I beg you, what words of ours he avoided, as a complete enemy of God's grace, which came through Jesus Christ our Lord (compare John 1:17). For he knows that it is utterly wicked and impious to exclude infants from the apostle's statement about God the Father: ‘Who rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of his beloved Son’ (Colossians 1:13). That is undoubtedly why he preferred to omit those words rather than quote them” (John 1:17) (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.4–5).
Am I an enemy of God's grace, you most shameless of all men? In my first book, from which you snatched these statements away from their context so that you could chatter without reason, I condemned with a pure and complete confession that mouth of yours, dripping with the mysteries of the Manichaeans and your own (Titus 3:5) (John 3:3–5).
1.53For there I set out the following sequence of words, after saying that God is the author of heaven and earth and everything in them, and therefore also of human beings, for whose sake all things were made (compare Genesis 1:1; Exodus 20:11). I said: “I am aware that when we say these things, a report will be spread about us that we do not think Christ's grace necessary for infants. Such a statement rightly and deeply offends Christian people. If only they did not suppose us responsible for a saying that is wicked in itself! Then they would not incur guilt by believing falsehoods about their brothers, and they would show their devotion to the love of the faith. We must therefore defend this position against the assault of empty talk and sew up the mouths of our detractors with a brief confession.
We acknowledge that the grace of baptism is beneficial to every age, so completely that we pronounce an eternal anathema on all who think it unnecessary even for infants. But we believe this grace to be rich in spiritual gifts. Abundant in its many favors and worthy of reverence for its powers, it heals the different kinds of weakness and the different conditions of human beings by one power that bestows both remedies and gifts. When it is administered, it does not need to be changed to suit particular cases: it distributes its own gifts according to the capacity of those who approach. No craft itself suffers loss or gain because of the different materials it takes up to work on; remaining always the same and in the same condition, it is adorned by a variety of effects. In the same way, according to the apostle, there is ‘one faith, one baptism’ (Ephesians 4:5). These multiply and expand in their gifts, yet are not changed in the order of their mysteries.
But this grace, which washes away the stains of injustice, does not oppose justice. It does not create sins but cleanses them; it acquits the guilty, not falsely accuses the innocent. Christ, the redeemer of his own work, increases his benefits toward his image with continual generosity. Those whom he made good by creating them he makes better by renewing and adopting them” (quoted also in Augustine, Against Julian 3.8 and following). Through this grace, pardon for the guilty, spiritual illumination, adoption as God's children, citizenship in the heavenly Jerusalem, sanctification, incorporation into Christ's members, and possession of the kingdom of heaven are given to mortals. Anyone who thinks this grace should be denied to anyone deserves the abhorrence of all good people (compare Ephesians 1:5; Ephesians 2:19; Hebrews 12:22–23; 1 Corinthians 12:13) (Exodus 20:11) (Ephesians 1:5) (Hebrews 12:22–23) (1 Corinthians 12:13) (Genesis 1:1; Exodus 20:11) (Ephesians 1:5; Ephesians 2:19; Hebrews 12:22–23; 1 Corinthians 12:13).
1.54Having defended these points as far as the present passage allowed, let us return to where we left off. We will discuss this very subject more fully wherever an opportunity arises. See with what a clear confession I rejected both those who would deny baptism to infants and you who dare to stain God's justice by what you claim baptism presupposes. I testified that I hold nothing other than this: the established mysteries must be administered at absolutely every age in the same words in which they were handed down, and must not be changed to suit different cases. But the sinner becomes completely good from being evil, while the innocent person, who has no evil of his own will, becomes better from being good, that is, becomes best. Both are consecrated and pass into Christ's members (compare 1 Corinthians 12:13), but one is found in an evil life and the other in a good nature. The former corrupted by wrongdoing the innocence he received at birth. The latter, without praise or blame attaching to his will, has only what he received from God his Creator. Happier in the unpainted freshness of his earliest age, he has been unable to spoil the goodness of his simplicity. He has earned nothing through deeds but retains only what the kindness of so great a maker gave him (1 Corinthians 12:13).
1.55Thus infancy, when renewed, that is, advanced by the power of the renewing mystery, proclaims Christ's mercy. But when infancy is accused or burdened with guilt, it exposes the judge's injustice and the disgrace of his justice.
1.56The unity of the sacrament therefore does not show infancy to be guilty. Rather, a true judgment proves infancy to be nothing but innocent.
1.57The sequence of reasoning obliges me to linger over explaining the condition of infants, because it does not allow matters joined by its own law to be divided. Otherwise the loss of newborn children would be easier to bear if divine majesty itself were not endangered along with them. Clear God, then, and accuse the infant. Show that what he does is just, since he cannot be God without justice, and let any person you please undergo punishment. As things stand, however, quite apart from their sacrilege, the claims you think fit together fiercely contradict one another. You say that because idolaters, murderers of their own kin, and infants are initiated through the same mysteries, all can be proved wicked. Then you add something far more absurd: that the author of this sacrament we are discussing imputes other people's sins to the innocent. This is the contradiction I named. The nature of things does not permit God at one and the same time to be so merciful that he forgives each person who confesses that person's own sins, and so cruel that he fastens someone else's sins upon an innocent person. Grant either one and you have removed the other. If he gives pardon to the guilty, he does not falsely accuse the innocent. If he falsely accuses the innocent, he never spares the guilty.
1.58I therefore passed over nothing in your words because fear compelled me, as you say. For what could I have feared in the monuments of so refined a talent, except perhaps this alone: the horror I endure in attacking your obscenity?
1.59Hear, then, a brief reply to what you said. The hearts your speech addresses are not those of the catholic Church if they are at odds with piety and reason. They offend against both when they neither think rightly about God's fairness nor understand the wisdom and riches of the mysteries they malign. This is no faith handed down and established from ancient times, except in councils of evildoers: inspired by the devil, proclaimed by Mani, celebrated by Marcion, Faustus, Adimantus, and all their followers, and now belched out by you into Italy, to our profound grief.
1.60There is no sin in a human being if there is nothing of that person's own will or consent. Everyone with even a little sense agrees with me on this without hesitation. You, however, grant that there has been nothing of an infant's own will. It is reason, not I, that draws the conclusion: therefore there is no sin in infants. They are certainly not brought to the Church to be defamed, or rather to defame God. They are brought to praise God, whom they acknowledge as the author both of the goods of nature and of spiritual gifts.
1.61But if original sin is contracted through the generation of the first birth, it may indeed condemn marriage, which God established, but it cannot be removed from infants. For something inborn remains until the end of the being to which it has belonged from its originating causes.
1.62We therefore bring no false accusation when we say that you condemn marriage and call the human being born from it the devil's work. We neither make this charge faithlessly nor reach this conclusion ignorantly. We simply and carefully observe what your statements entail. Bodily marriage never exists without sexual union. You say that everyone born from that union belongs to the devil. You are undoubtedly declaring that marriage belongs under the demon's authority.
1.63You say that sin is inherited through the condition of nature, while claiming that this evil arose from the first human being's will. I postpone here the reply that will convict you of shameless lying. For the present issue, however, I draw this conclusion, trusting reasoned understanding: you unambiguously define nature as diabolical. For if that through which a human being is possessed by the devil exists in nature or comes through nature, then that by which the devil could claim God's image for himself indisputably belongs to the devil (compare Genesis 1:26–27). Indeed, something that is in the devil's kingdom by its very birth is not even God's image (Genesis 1:26–27).
1.64If you read my work, then, you will stop wondering why I returned to words of yours that I had quoted earlier. I had promised to prove from your writings that, caught between the impiety you had drunk in and the hatred it aroused that you feared, you had said both what catholics and what Manichaeans usually maintain. Here, then, is the sequence of words I placed next to your opening statement, which you now, with a false accuser's effrontery, have lied about my altering: “I know I have made a great promise: to prove from my opponent's words both that those who deny that human beings are God's work are rightly condemned, and that this man himself, who acknowledges them to be God's work, does nothing except establish that whatever comes from the fruitfulness of marriage is the devil's property. In this way the Manichaeans' opinion will be destroyed even by the principles of its own defense. But the whole opening of his book has made this plain. For he says that human beings born from marriage, that is, from males and females, are God's work. By this statement he overturns everything he was about to argue and agrees with us that those who dare to deny it are impious. One part is therefore already settled; it remains for me to show that he builds up what he had just attacked.” (John 3:3–5)
After saying this, I returned to the part of your opening statement where you had said: “We say that those born from such a union inherit original sin, and we do not deny that, whatever parents they are born from, they remain under the devil unless they are reborn in Christ (compare John 3:3–5) and, rescued through his grace from the power of darkness, are transferred into the kingdom of him who did not wish to be born from that same union of the two sexes” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 1.1). Why, then, do you think you can be cleared of Manichaean error because you dared to insert a statement with which you were struggling with all the powers of your mind? This does not defend your error; it testifies to your extraordinary foolishness. You imagine, like Calliphon, that your speech can bring virtue and vice, justice and injustice, into an alliance. As for the apostle's words, “Who rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of his beloved Son” (Colossians 1:13), read the fourth book of my work, and then you will learn what the Teacher of the Nations meant.
1.65I criticized, and rightly criticized, your abject and feeble inconsistency. It led you first to say that you did not condemn marriage, and then to say that human beings are transferred into the devil's legal possession because of the union of man and woman. That union plainly belongs to marriage's condition and nature; indeed, as far as our present dispute is concerned, in that alone lies the reality of marriage.
1.66You tried to make this union seem so accursed that you would have us understand that Christ chose to be born of a virgin mother, not for the splendor of the sign, but to condemn the union of the sexes (compare Matthew 1:18–23; Luke 1:34–35). What could anyone ever have said more wickedly or shamelessly than this? You distinguished two apparent kings contending for the possession of humanity, and their two kingdoms, by saying that whatever marriage produced belonged to the devil, while only what the Virgin bore belonged to God. What else does this do but represent the one who made the Virgin fruitful as utterly impoverished by the smallness of his share, and deny that he is the Creator of human beings who come from marriage? Let the careful reader retain the written acknowledgment supplied by your own words, then, and know that you, a faithful disciple of the Manichaeans and leader of the advocates of inherited sin, have condemned nothing other than the union of lawful marriage (Matthew 1:18–23) (Luke 1:34–35) (Matthew 1:18–23; Luke 1:34–35).
1.67But let us proceed to the rest. Writing about me, after the words of yours I quoted above, you add the following: “After this he quoted our statement: ‘For this shameful desire, which shameless people shamelessly praise, would not exist unless the human being had first sinned. Marriage, however, would exist even if no one had sinned, for children would be begotten without this disease.’ He quoted my words up to this point. He feared what I added: ‘This was possible in the body belonging to that life, although it cannot now take place without this disease in the body belonging to this death.’ Here too, rather than finish my statement, he chopped it off, so to speak, because he feared the apostle's testimony: ‘Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from the body of this death? God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord’ (Romans 7:24–25). For the body of this death did not exist in paradise before sin. That is why we said that in the body belonging to that life, the life that existed there, children could have been begotten without this disease, whereas in the body of this death they cannot be begotten without it” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.6).
You certainly keep to your habit, and quite consistently in this particular work: since you argue against the truth, you say nothing true. Yet scarcely enough corrections can be supplied for the countless blunders of your learning. I will therefore note briefly here that you deceive. You will understand, at least after this work, that I am unaccustomed to lying. Claim the whole possession of that vice for yourself, then, so that you may hear from the Gospel, not unjustly, that you are a liar from the beginning, like your father (John 8:44): either the one under whose dominion you say you belonged at birth, or your second, lesser father, who initiated you into those refined mysteries that cannot be named among decent people. I quoted all this in my previous work, though you pretend I omitted it. If you read near the end of my first book, you yourself will be able to acknowledge with what truth and clarity of argument it was refuted. Your statement was therefore destroyed by a strong reply in its entirety, not after being cut short.
Now listen briefly. When the apostle said, “Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from the body of this death? God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord” (Romans 7:24–25) (Psalm 32:1–2;), he was not referring to the mortality of our body, which animal flesh received through the ordering of nature, but to the habit of wrongdoing. Whoever, after Christ's incarnation, turns to the pursuit of virtue through the New Testament is freed from its guilt. There he speaks in the person of Jews who, through craving for enticements, continued to stray even after the sacred Law's prohibition. He shows that their only help in that crisis was to believe in Christ, who prescribed precautions for the future while granting forgiveness for past acts. Christ did not press the guilty by confronting them with punishment; he cherished those who ran to him in the most generous embrace. He did not crush those weighed down by terror but restored through kindness those who had amended their lives.
The speaker had already experienced this kindness himself: “This is a human saying: Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners, of whom I am the first. But I received mercy for this reason: that in me Christ Jesus might show all his patience, as an example for those who would believe in him for eternal life” (1 Timothy 1:15–16). To make you understand that this concerns a bad life, not human nature, and to prevent you from thinking that the reason for Christ's coming meant he also declared infants sinners, Paul says: “In me he showed all his patience.” God's patience is what he speaks of to the Romans: “Do you not know that God's kindness leads you to repentance? But according to your hardness and unrepentant heart you store up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath” (Romans 2:4–5). God's patience is therefore exercised when he waits a considerable time for a person's conversion. But patience cannot be displayed toward infants. If there were sins of nature which the Savior attributed to them, he would falsely be called patient but most certainly be called cruel. Yet God cannot be anything but kind and just, as is my God Jesus Christ. Paul, long a persecutor, and the others in whose person he speaks experienced his patience: they were waited for a long time, even though they were freed late. The apostle therefore condemns human lives, not human nature.
In commending this grace to the Jews, since the Law punishes the wicked and does not possess the effective mercy of baptism, in which the sins of deeds are cleansed through a brief confession, he shows that they must run to Christ and implore the help of this pardon. They must recognize that the Law threatens the wounds of conduct, while grace heals them effectively and quickly. By “body of death” he therefore meant sins, not flesh. Had he been speaking of the misery of our bodily members, which you think resulted from sin, he would more rightly have called it the death of the body rather than the body of death. To see that Scripture commonly calls sins “members”, read what this same apostle says to the Colossians: “Put to death your members that are on earth: fornication, impurity, and greed, which is the service of idols. Because of these things God's wrath comes upon the sons of unbelief. In these things you too once walked, when you lived in them” (Colossians 3:5–7). See how he calls “members” the things he identifies as sins. And in the letter to the Romans itself he speaks of the body of sin: “Our old self was crucified with him, so that the body of sin might be destroyed, so that we might no longer serve sin” (Romans 6:6).
In the same manner here he exclaimed, in the person of the Jews, as we said: “Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from the body of this death?” (Romans 7:24). That is: “Who will free me from the guilt of the sins I committed when I could have avoided them, which the Law's severity does not forgive but punishes? Who can rescue me from these members, that is, from the vices I collected by imitating wicked people, until I built up a complete body of sin? Who, I ask?” And he answered, as though prompted by the voice of the facts themselves: “God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord” (Romans 7:25). It is God's grace that credits the faithful with righteousness without works, as David says: “Blessed are those whose injustices are forgiven and whose sins are covered; blessed is the man to whom the Lord has not imputed sin” (Psalm 32:1–2; LXX Psalm 31:1–2; compare Romans 4:6–8). He who makes a human being blessed is himself blessed, through eternal justice. By that justice he forgives only a sin that he could rightly have imputed. But he could not rightly have imputed it if the person to whom it is imputed could not also have avoided it. No one, however, can avoid what belongs to nature. Therefore absolutely no one can have sin from nature's necessity. Let this brief account suffice.
1.68These matters were discussed at greater length in my first work. Yet you do not speak clearly about which death you mean when you say that its body did not exist in paradise before sin, since in the books published under Marcellinus's name you acknowledged that Adam was made mortal (Augustine, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 1.3–4). As for your addition that the business of marriage is a disease, that can be heard calmly if you say it only about your own parents. Perhaps you know of some hidden disease of your mother's, whom you recorded in the Confessions as having been called, to use the very word, a wine-tippler (Augustine, Confessions 9.18). But in the marriages of the saints and of all honorable people there is no disease whatsoever. Nor did the apostle allow a disease as a remedy when, through respect for marriage, he protected the people of the Church from the disease of fornication (compare 1 Corinthians 7:2). Near the end of my first book I show how completely that meaning wipes out both your effrontery and your doctrine. I also explained it throughout the whole body of that reply as the occasion arose (1 Corinthians 7:2).
1.69“To arrive at this mention of human misery and divine grace, the apostle had said earlier: ‘I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind and taking me captive in the law of sin’ (Romans 7:23). After these words he exclaimed: ‘Who will rescue me from the body of this death? God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord’” (Romans 7:24–25). It is indeed established that after the preceding words you quoted, the apostle added: “Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from the body of this death? God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord.” But at present we are not asking whether the apostle said this. We are asking with what belief, meaning, and reasoning he said it. By the law in his members he meant an evil habit that, through the practice of shameful deeds, rebels against holy intentions, at least in the beginning of amendment. Even learned people of this world commonly call habit a second nature.
A little earlier, addressing his readers reproachfully, he had said: “I speak in human terms because of the weakness of your flesh. Just as you presented your members to serve impurity and lawlessness leading to lawlessness, so now present your members to serve righteousness leading to sanctification” (Romans 6:19). To show that by “flesh” he figuratively meant vices, not this body whose causes lie in seed, he adds perhaps two passages later: “When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which are disclosed through the Law worked in our members to bear fruit for death” (Romans 7:5). He said, “When we were in the flesh”, as though he were not in the flesh at the time he was speaking. But whoever knows Scripture recognizes this manner of expression. Where a shared use of words creates a difficulty, therefore, apply the rule of reason, and let what seemed bent be straightened against its level.
Faustus, bishop of the Manichaeans and your teacher, relies especially on this testimony of the apostle against us. He says that by these words about a law dwelling in the members and resisting the mind's purpose, the apostle meant nothing other than an evil nature. Nothing, therefore, was less appropriate for you than to understand this passage as they explain it. Otherwise, as you follow the same twisted lines Faustus drew, you seem not to have argued a case but to have recited old lessons.
1.70To gather up what we have established: I did not deal fraudulently with your words, and you produced nothing you could cover with even a faint appearance of piety, much less prove by scriptural testimony. The apostle did not mean what you think. Nor was the condition of sexual union in paradise different from what now occurs in marriages. God has made abundantly clear that he established marriage, both by the constitution of the sexes and the character of their bodily members, and by his repeated blessing (compare Genesis 1:27–28; Genesis 9:1). Once these points are settled, it is clear that all whom you deceive deserve anger more than mercy. At your prompting they defame birth to excuse the crimes they commit by an evil will, rather than amend their conduct (Genesis 1:27–28) (Genesis 9:1) (Genesis 1:27–28; Genesis 9:1).
1.71But enough of this; I will now take up what follows. “In the body of this death, then, a body such as certainly did not exist in paradise before sin, another law in our members fights against the law of our mind. Even when we do not will it, do not consent to it, and do not offer our members for it to accomplish what it desires, it nevertheless dwells in them and troubles the mind that resists and fights back. Even if the conflict itself does not merit condemnation, because it does not carry out injustice, it is still a miserable struggle because it has no peace” (Romans 7:23) (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.6; compare Romans 7:23).
The universal testimony of humanity teaches us that the pleasure of all the senses is natural. That this pleasure and desire existed in paradise before sin is shown by the fact that desire was the route to the offense. After the fruit's beauty excited the eyes, it also stirred up the hope of a pleasant taste (Genesis 3:6). This desire sins when it fails to keep its proper measure, but when it stays within the bounds of what is allowed, it is a natural and innocent feeling. It cannot, I say, have been a fruit of sin when it is shown to have been an occasion of sin, not through its own fault but through the will's. Read my second book on this too; you will find that what we say can convince even your mind.
As for the supposedly clever distinction you made, that the law of sin is indeed in our members but involves sin only when we consent to it, while when we do not consent it merely starts a battle and inflicts misery by disturbing peace, what sensible person would not see the contradiction? If the law of sin, that is, sin and the necessity of sin, is naturally implanted in our members, what good is it not to consent to it, when one must undergo punishment simply because it exists? Or if it is indeed the law of sin but does not sin when I do not consent to it, then the human will has an immeasurable power: if the absurdity may be uttered, it forces sin itself not to sin! But we return to the fact that your statement cannot hold together. If it does not sin, it is not the law of sin. If it is the law of sin, it sins. And if it sins simply by existing, how can one resist it so that sin does not occur, when it cannot be driven away so that sin's activity may cease?
1.72Or what good is moderation in something whose very presence accuses it? See where your clever distinctions take you. First, nature sins without will, which is impossible. Second, it is sin and does not sin: the same thing both is and is not. Next, when it disturbs peace it is miserable, but is not punished for so great a crime as destroying tranquillity; when it carries out injustice, however, it merits condemnation. Yet the law of sin, just as it itself deserves torment, excuses the human will. A law that compels, is natural, and never departs certainly cannot be overcome by will; no one is guilty for what he could not avoid. But the law itself does not sin either, because it could not do anything else. God, however, counts unavoidable things as guilt, and no one compels him to commit so great an evil. Everyone else is therefore acquitted, and he alone is found guilty: with astonishing effrontery he imputes necessity to others while himself doing wrong without necessity.
Well done for your wise virtue, most noble debater! By the steps of African dialectic, to commend gifts you have overturned judgments; to pretend grace you have overthrown justice; to defame nature you have accused humanity's Creator. You have accused him in such a way that your God appears more guilty not only than some sinner but than the very law of sin. After this you most profanely insult catholic priests, saying that they deny the grace of Christ whose fairness they defend. We praise the mercy of the remedies, but maintain the justice of the laws (compare Romans 7:23) (Romans 7:23).
1.73Let us now proceed to my words, which he lifted out of the preface and proposed to attack. “I have therefore given sufficient warning that this man chose to set my words before himself for apparent refutation in such a way that in some places he interrupted statements by removing their middle, and in others shortened them by not adding their ending. I have also sufficiently shown why he did this. Now let us see what words of his he set against those of ours that he presented as he wished. For his words now follow. As the person who sent you the sheet explained, he first copied something from the preface, undoubtedly the preface to those books from which he made a few excerpts. It runs as follows: ‘The teachers of our time, most blessed brother, and the authors of the wicked revolt that is still raging, have resolved to reach the abuse and destruction of men whose holy efforts inflame them, through the ruin of the whole Church. They do not understand how much honor they have bestowed on those whose glory they have shown could not be torn down except together with the catholic religion. For if anyone says that human beings have free choice or that God is the Creator of newborn children, he is called a follower of Caelestius and Pelagius. To avoid being called heretics, people become Manichaeans. Fearing a false disgrace, they incur a real crime, like wild animals surrounded by feathers to force them into nets. Lacking reason, they are driven by an empty fear into actual destruction’” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.6–7).
I recognize my words, but you have not quoted them intact. Although the substance of our dispute does not lie in these words, because they come from a preface, let your carelessness be made plain. “Most blessed brother” is not placed there but in the very first line of the book. Again, after saying, “to reach the abuse and destruction of men whose holy efforts inflame them”, I added, “since no other route lay open, they resolved to do so through the ruin of the whole Church.” After that I also said: “Because anyone who acknowledges free choice and God as Creator is called a follower of Caelestius and Pelagius, simple people, terrified by this unjust language, abandon even sound faith to escape the hatred of the name. They will undoubtedly come to believe both that human beings have no free choice and that God is not the Creator of newborn children, once they have abandoned the two claims they had previously affirmed.” You omitted all of this. After it come the words you quoted; it will not be difficult to prove how true and unassailable they are. I therefore omitted nothing from your statements, while you did not even reproduce the first passage in the order in which I had arranged it. I emphasize this so that the African author's seriousness may stand out.
1.74Let us hear, then, what you wrote in reply to these words of mine: “It is not as you say, whoever said this; it is not so. You are greatly mistaken, or planning to mislead. We do not deny free choice. But Truth says: ‘If the Son sets you free, then you will be truly free’ (John 8:36). You begrudge this liberator to the captives to whom you attribute an empty freedom. ‘For whatever has overcome someone has made him its slave’, as Scripture says (2 Peter 2:19). No one is released from this bond of slavery except through the liberator's grace, and no human being is exempt from it. ‘For through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned’” (Romans 5:12; Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.8).
The cause we defend has the greatest dignity, as consideration and weighing of the matters themselves show, and as your fear also shows. You fight to shed our people's blood by pouring out money, giving away estates, sending horses, stirring up the populace, and corrupting officials. Yet you are ashamed to profess the faith of yours that we attack, and take refuge in the language of our position, from which you have strayed.
1.75What Babylon's shameful betrayal has undertaken is so wicked that, when we charge you with it, you deny it. What we believe is so holy that you wish to hide in its shade, though your minds oppose it. For when I drew out what was scattered throughout the parts of your argument and compressed the issue into a brief statement, so that the extent and character of the cause of the Church's division would appear without smoke or mist, I said that you deny both free choice and God as the Creator of newborn children, while we defend both. That is why you raise an empty din in uneducated ears about the names of catholic men who struggle alongside us for the apostolic faith we defend. Those afraid of being called Caelestians by you lose the dignity of heavenly faith; those terrified of being called Pelagians plunge into the sea of Manichaeism. Uneducated people come to think they cannot be called Christians if the advocates of inherited sin have called them Pelagians. Sensible people, by contrast, decide that they must endure any hatred or insult attached to names rather than abandon the catholic faith.
But do not boast that even this type of abuse was invented by your ingenuity. Remember that all heretics commonly give us different names. At the council of Rimini it became especially clear what wickedness an ambiguous word or the threat of a new label can achieve in leaden minds. Under an Arian ruler, Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, a man of great steadfastness and thoroughly sound faith, resisted after almost the whole world had slipped away from the apostles' faith and the times had become impious. For this he was driven into exile. Out of six hundred and fifty bishops, as the report goes, scarcely seven were found who valued God's commands more than the king's: they would neither agree to Athanasius's condemnation nor deny the confession of the Trinity. Besides fear of mistreatment, the entire crowd of those broken spirits was deceived chiefly either by the threatening label “Athanasian” or by a cunning question.
1.76The Arians, who held power at that time, put the question: “Do you wish to follow ‘of one substance’, or Christ?” They immediately answered, as though devoutly loyal to the name, that they followed Christ; they rejected “of one substance”. And so they left rejoicing as though they believed in Christ, whom they had already denied by rejecting “of one substance”, that is, of one substance with the Father. In the same way you now manufacture deceit and frighten uneducated ears, so that if people do not want to be stained with the names of men who struggle for the faith, they must deny both free choice and God as humanity's Creator. This is plainly the charge I made in that passage. The present discussion will openly show how true it was. You therefore answered: “We do not deny free choice”, and added nothing further of your own. Consistency required you to complete your statement without evasion. Having begun by saying that you did not deny freedom of choice, you should have added: “Rather, we confess that the freedom of choice given by God remains in human nature.”
1.77By this statement you would have established something definite. If you had then spoken against it, you would have appeared exceedingly shameless; if you had consistently maintained it throughout, you might have appeared corrected, even if belatedly. But now you say that I deceive, although I prove my charge through your own words; and you immediately lie in what you think you have constructed consistently. You say: “We do not deny free choice”, and append the Gospel's testimony: “But Truth says, ‘If the Son sets you free, then you will be truly free’” (John 8:36). Yet it is established that our Lord Jesus did not utter those words in that passage against free choice. Let us postpone their explanation a little and use definitions and distinctions to make clear what each of us means. According to the teaching of all learned people, a discussion ought to begin with a definition.
1.78For, as the author says, “Every discussion of a subject undertaken rationally ought to begin with a definition, so that what is being discussed may be understood” (Cicero, On Duties 1.7). Thus, just as we discussed the definitions of justice and sin above, let us now consider what definition belongs to freedom of choice, so that it may be clear which of us agrees with it and which opposes it. Freedom of choice, by which God gave the human being independence, consists in the capacity to commit sin and to abstain from sin.
1.79For the human being was made a rational, mortal living being, capable of virtue and vice. Through the capacity granted to him, he could either keep God's commands or transgress them, or by nature's teaching preserve the law of human fellowship. He was free to will either alternative; in this lies the substance of sin and justice. For when he draws something according to virtue for those in need, either from the springs of mercy or from the breasts of justice, it is justice itself working outwardly, which a holy will conceived and brought forth within.
1.80Likewise, on the opposite side, when someone resolves to act wrongly to others' injury and becomes unjust or cruel, the act by which he harms others comes outward from the wickedness that an evil will sowed and generated within. But when the means are lacking by which the force of the hidden will may break out against one's neighbors, the character of kindness or malice is nevertheless complete in that will alone, when it has accomplished something good or evil not through a brief impulse but through deliberate thought and desire.
1.81The capacity for good and the capacity for evil are therefore both good. Being able to do good is the palace of virtue; being able to do evil is the testimony of freedom.
1.82A person can therefore possess a good that is his own precisely because he also has the capacity to do evil. The entire fullness of divine judgment is so closely bound up with this human freedom that whoever recognizes one knows both. Consequently, whoever violates one violates both. Let the freedom of human choice therefore be preserved just as divine fairness is preserved. This is the understanding of free choice that has subjected belief in fate, the calculations of Chaldean astrologers, and the fantasies of the Manichaeans to the Church's truth. This is the understanding that shows you too, along with those we have listed, to be strangers to Christ. Freedom of choice, then, is the capacity either to commit or to avoid sin, free from compelling necessity. It has within its own authority which of the alternatives that arise it follows: either the steep and rugged heights of the virtues or the sunken marshes of pleasures.
1.83To state it briefly, it is a capacity whose sole watchful task is to ensure that no one is either driven into sin or dragged away from sin by someone else while the will is held captive. That the will cannot be captured unless it chooses to surrender is shown by courage, whose strength in despising pain has constantly shone forth among both pagans and Christians.
1.84If, then, as reason has disclosed, freedom of choice excludes compulsion, so that no one is either good or evil without being free to be the opposite, how could you acknowledge free choice while about to use a testimony suited to captives? Or how could you append such a testimony after acknowledging free choice? You say: “We do not deny free choice. But Truth says, ‘If the Son sets you free, then you will be truly free’” (John 8:36). It is clear that in that passage Christ addressed a captive conscience. He showed it to be not free, but subject to the punishment that condemns sins committed by free will. You misunderstand that statement, that is, you do not understand it, or perhaps you understand it as applying to yourself, but drag it here against its own nature. You have put it in a place where its whole proper meaning conflicts with your words. Let us join the words themselves: what is set free is captive; what is captive is not free; what is free is not captive.
1.85Simply acknowledge whichever of these you choose, then, and stop quibbling. Either say with us that choice is free, and remove the testimony that was appropriately spoken in its own setting, or say, as in those books you have now sent to Boniface through Alypius, that the choice we call free is captive, and stop denying that you are a Manichaean.
1.86These two things you join together, free and not free, that is, free and captive, cannot both fit the thing under discussion. But they testify that you possess extraordinary foolishness, a new shamelessness, and an old impiety.
1.87It is now time to discuss the Gospel's statement. The evangelist John says: “Jesus said to the Jews who had believed in him, ‘If you remain in my word, you will truly be my disciples; you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free’” (John 8:31–32). That is, our Lord Jesus was telling those who believed in him not to rejoice in worldly nobility or claim glory from Abraham's descent, but to strive and labor for virtue and, after recognizing Christ, to serve no sins. They would thereby retain true freedom with a joyful conscience and, through hope in things that are certain, that is, eternal, be freed from desire for everything else, which because of its fragility is frequently called empty and false.
Then the Jews, not understanding what freedom Jesus meant, answered him: “We are Abraham's offspring and have never been anyone's slaves. How can you say, ‘You will be free’?” (John 8:33). “Freedom” is commonly used in many senses. Here it means holiness. In the apostle it means resurrection, when he says that creation is to be freed from slavery to corruption into the glorious freedom of God's children (Romans 8:21). In its better-known sense it is spoken of in contrast to slavery. The same name is also used for freedom of choice. Let us therefore distinguish the cases, so that things far apart are not confused because they share a name. Here the Lord does not say that freedom of choice needs to be set free. Rather, while it remains intact, he calls on the Jews to receive forgiveness and be freed from guilt, obtaining the freedom that is greatest in God's sight: to begin to owe no debt for crimes.
The evangelist continues: “Jesus answered them, ‘Amen, amen, I tell you: everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. The slave does not remain in the house forever; the son remains forever. If, then, the Son sets you free, you will be truly free’” (John 8:34–36).
1.88He made plain the slavery of which he was speaking: “Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin” (John 8:34). How forcefully this very statement opposes your error! He says that no one is a slave of sin except someone who has himself committed sin, and that sin cannot cling to anyone unless the person in question has personally committed it, either in action or even by will alone. How clearly he also shows that the whole human race cannot now be possessed by the devil, when he distinguishes between slave and son, that is, between the just and the unjust! Here Christ separated not only himself but each of the saints from the condition of slaves. Such people existed both before and during the Old Testament; he declares that they remain in his Father's house and rejoice at his table (Luke 13:28–29). This whole kind of exhortation would have been pointlessly spoken if he were not addressing people with free choice.
1.89To make you understand that he reproaches their lives rather than their nature, he continues: “I know that you are Abraham's children” (John 8:37). There is the dignity of descent on account of which they had declared themselves free. Now he shows the slavery to which they are subject: “You seek to kill me, because my word finds no room in you. I speak what I have heard with my Father; and you do what you have seen with your father” (John 8:37–38).
1.90See how different the accounts of nature and will are. Jesus did not deny that their flesh belonged to Abraham's offspring. But he presses upon them that through an unjust will they had moved to the devil as their father, who is called their begetter because he is shown to be their teacher in crimes. “The Jews answered and said to him, ‘Abraham is our father.’ Jesus said to them, ‘If you were Abraham's children, you would do Abraham's works. But now you seek to kill me, a man who has spoken to you the truth I heard from God. Abraham did not do this; you do the works of your father’” (John 8:39–41). Do you see the distinctions Wisdom makes in its language? He denies that they are Abraham's children after saying above that they were Abraham's children. But because nature and will require different treatment, he shows that the ancestor of their innocent flesh is one person, and the deceiver of their wretched will another.
1.91Here, then, when the Lord said, “If the Son sets you free, you will be truly free” (John 8:36), he promised forgiveness to guilty people who, by sinning, had lost not freedom of choice but a righteous conscience. Free choice remains as complete after sins as it was before sins. Indeed, it is through its action that many renounce the hidden things of shame and, casting away the filth of disgraceful deeds, clothe themselves in the distinctions of virtue (2 Corinthians 4:2).
1.92Stop making yourself impious, then, if any distinction between right and wrong still remains for you, by explaining Christ's words as though he had denied free choice. Without that choice remaining intact, the fairness of his own judgment cannot stand.
1.93Listen to where he shows the power of human freedom: “I came in my Father's name, and you did not receive me. If another comes in his own name, you will receive him” (John 5:43). And again: “Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad” (Matthew 12:33). And again: “If you are unwilling to believe me, believe the works” (John 10:38). Most forcefully of all, he says that his intention was hindered by human will: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often I wanted to gather your children as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling!” (Matthew 23:37). He does not then add, “But I gathered you against your will.” Rather: “Your house will be left to you desolate” (Matthew 23:38). Thus he shows that they are rightly punished for their evil action, but ought not to have been forced away from their own intention by any compulsion. In the same way he had spoken through the prophet: “If you are willing and listen to me, you will eat the good things of the land. If you are unwilling and do not listen, the sword will devour you” (Isaiah 1:19–20). How, then, do you not deny free choice, when you pronounced it unfree, not indeed in your own wording but through the Gospel's testimony as interpreted by you?
1.94In the work which I said above you recently sent to Rome, you revealed your meaning more boldly. In its first book, having similarly set before yourself our charge that you deny free choice, you argue as follows, you most consistent and subtle debater: “Which of us says that through the first human being's sin free choice perished from the human race? Freedom indeed perished through sin, but the freedom that existed in paradise to possess complete righteousness with immortality. Human nature therefore needs divine grace, as the Lord says in his Gospel: ‘If the Son sets you free, then you will be truly free’ (John 8:36), that is, free to live well and justly. Free choice has so far not perished in the sinner that through it people sin, especially all who sin with pleasure and love of sin and approve what they enjoy. Hence the apostle says: ‘When you were slaves of sin, you were free from righteousness’ (Romans 6:20). See, they are shown to have been unable even to serve sin except by another sort of freedom. They are free from righteousness only by freedom of choice, but are freed from sin only by the Savior's grace. For this reason that admirable teacher carefully distinguished even the words: ‘When you were slaves of sin, you were free from righteousness. What fruit did you then have in the things of which you are now ashamed? Their end is death. But now, freed from sin and made slaves of God, you have your fruit leading to sanctification and your end eternal life’ (Romans 6:22). He called them free from righteousness, not freed from it. But regarding sin he very carefully preferred to call them not free, lest they attribute this to themselves, but freed, referring this to the Lord's statement: ‘If the Son sets you free, then you will be truly free.’ Since the children of humanity do not live well unless they become God's children, why does this man want to attribute the power of living well to free choice? This power is given only by ‘God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord’ (Romans 7:25), as the Gospel says: ‘To as many as received him he gave power to become God's children’” (John 1:12; Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians 1.2.4).
A little later you say again: “The power is therefore given to those who believe in him to become God's children. Unless God gives this power, none can come from free choice. For what the liberator has not freed will not be free for good. But a person has choice free for evil when a hidden or open deceiver has implanted delight in wickedness, or when that person has persuaded himself to it. Thus it is not the case, as some say we claim and as this man even dares to write, that everyone is forced into sin against his will, as it were, by the necessity of his flesh. Rather, if people are old enough to exercise the choice of their own mind, they are held in sin by their own will and plunge from sin into sin by their own will. But this will, free in evil because it delights in evil, is not free in good because it has not been freed. A human being cannot will anything good unless helped by the one who cannot will evil” (Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians 1.6–7).
In all these words of yours that I have quoted, I see grace's name so entangled with denial of free choice that the goodness of the names cannot vindicate the evil of your meaning. Rather, the dignity of the names is degraded by attachment to your doctrines. You have not made yourself honorable by these words; you have dishonored the ornaments themselves. We, however, separate what you have joined, so that the divinity of grace, disentangled from these perverse connections, will suffer no attack from our reply and will be praised with catholic seriousness rather than Manichaean flattery.
We therefore acknowledge Christ's grace in its many forms. Its first gift is that we were made from nothing. Its second is that, just as through sensation we surpass things that merely live, so through reason we surpass things that sense. Reason was impressed upon the mind to disclose the Creator's image; the granted freedom of choice belongs equally to that dignity (compare Genesis 1:26–27). To this same grace we credit the increase of benefits he never ceases to bestow on us. This grace sent the Law as a help (Isaiah 8:20, LXX wording). Its task was to awaken by many kinds of teaching, and nourish by its invitation, the light of reason that examples of wrongdoing and habitual vices were dimming. To the fullness of this grace, that is, the divine goodwill that gave things their existence, belonged the Word's becoming flesh and dwelling among us (John 1:14). For God, asking his image to return his love, made clear with what immeasurable affection he had done everything for us. Thus we might, even if late, love in return the one who, commending his love toward us (Romans 5:8), did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us (Romans 8:32), promising that if we henceforth chose to obey his will, he would make us fellow heirs with his Only Begotten (Romans 8:17).
1.95This grace, then, which in baptism not only forgives sins but along with that gift of pardon also advances, adopts, and consecrates us, changes what the guilty deserve. It does not create free choice, which we receive when we are created and use when we acquire the power to distinguish good and evil. We therefore do not deny that countless forms of divine help assist a good will. But this does not mean that these forms of help construct a freedom of choice that had been destroyed, or that at some time freedom is excluded and a necessity of either good or evil is thought to lie upon anyone. Rather, every help cooperates with free choice.
1.96It is solely because of this free choice, the Teacher of the Nations writes, that we must be revealed before Christ's judgment seat, so that each may receive what belongs to the body's deeds, according to what he has done, whether good or evil (2 Corinthians 5:10). Catholics acknowledge this free choice, but you deny it, not only with Mani but also with Jovinian, whom you dare to pin on us. Your denial takes a different form but involves similar impiety. To make this clearer, let us examine the distinctions. We say that a person's sin changes not the state of nature but the character of what the person deserves. That is, in the sinner the nature of free choice remains the same: through it he can cease from sin, just as through it he was able to depart from righteousness.
1.97The Manichaean says that an evil will is inspired by a nature that cannot will good, while a good will is poured in by a nature that cannot will evil. Thus he imposes on the natures of each kind of thing a necessity such that their own wills cannot will the opposite. There is certainly a great gulf between him and us. Let us now see how far you have departed from him. You say that the will is free, but only to do evil; it is not free to cease doing evil unless a necessity of willing good is imposed on it by that nature which, to use your words, “cannot will evil” (Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians 1.7). You therefore define the human race as doing nothing through free choice except sinning, and as unable to do anything else. By this you declare outright that human nature always desires only one thing, evil, and cannot will the opposite. God's nature, however, cannot will evil; therefore, unless it makes evil human nature share in its own necessity, no good action can exist in human nature. After this, God may see in the secrecy of your heart whether you have little love for Mani. But as far as the kinship of your doctrines shows, you have done absolutely nothing except change the order and establish the same thing he asserted.
1.98You are joined to Jovinian on one point. In the second book of his work he says that a baptized person cannot sin, while before baptism a person can both sin and refrain from sin. With you, then, he thinks that from the time of baptism a necessity of good is imposed on human beings. This is just as false as your belief that before baptism human beings possess a necessity of doing evil. For when you say, “A human being cannot will anything good unless helped by the one who cannot will evil” (Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians 1.7), you mean that through sharing in grace and a good nature a person obtains the capacity to do good; you say, however, that this can happen from the time of baptism. Caught between impiety and fear, you have therefore fled to Jovinian's company, but have not yet left Mani's brothel. Yet Jovinian is as much more innocent than you as Mani is more profane than Jovinian.
To gather up our argument still more briefly: the Manichaean says, “In all human beings the nature of darkness, which inspires the evil will, sins and cannot do anything else.” You say, “In all human beings nature, infected by the darkness of the first sin and therefore the author of an evil will, sins and cannot will good.” Jovinian says, “The human will does indeed sin, but only up to baptism; afterward it can will nothing but good.” Catholics, that is, we, say that from beginning to end there is no compulsion from anything belonging to nature. In each person it is the will that sins, including before baptism; at the very time it sins it has the power to depart from evil and do good, so that freedom remains a reality.
None of you therefore possesses true doctrine. Nevertheless, since you set out from a single starting point of error, it would at least have been less dishonorable to accept the consequences. Since you say with Mani that sin occurs through an evil nature, that is, through defective freedom, you should also have said with him that it cannot be cleansed in any way. You do affirm this elsewhere; but you should have added its necessary consequence, that it therefore has no need of baptism's sacraments. Or if you assert with Jovinian that good desires are imprinted from the time faith is received, you should have said with him that nature was good even before baptism: although it had the capacity for evil, it did not have its necessity, and so by consecration it reached an unmistakable good. In this way, even if you opposed reason, at least you would not contradict the doctrines of those you follow.
1.99As it is, however, faithless to everyone, you say that a necessity of sin has arisen in the nature of the flesh,
1.100so that, having lost the possession of eternity, which it plainly never possessed by its origin, the will would be bent continually upon seeking wrongdoing. And you add: “The will that is free in evil is not free in good.” With a declaration of foolishness no less than of profanity, you call something free while saying it can will only one thing.
1.101Although you are consistent in no respect, let the sensible reader consider what you have advanced. Let us agree that a will unable to will good can be called free. You assert that this will is freed in baptism. I ask: in what way is it freed? Is it compelled always to will good and unable to will evil? Or can it desire either? If you answer, “It is compelled always to will good”, you yourself recognize how much of a Jovinianist you are. If, however, you say, “How can a will be free if it is compelled always to will good?”, I answer, “How was it called free before, if it was compelled to will only evil?” If you therefore reply that after baptism the will becomes free in the sense that it can both sin and refrain from sin, you thereby declare that there was no free choice when it could not do both. You are enclosed on every side by the snares of your own argument. If choice was free before baptism, it had the capacity to do good just as it had the capacity to do evil; and the whole stage set of your doctrine, by which you urge an evil inherent in nature, collapses.
1.102But if it was not free for good before, and after baptism became free in the sense that it could not do evil, then it never possessed freedom of choice. It is shown to have sinned without guilt before and afterward to possess the glory of holiness without effort.
1.103Once this is established, you are proved to deny your own doctrine outright when you promise that you do not deny free choice, which you overthrow first by the necessity of evil and afterward by the necessity of good.
1.104Recalling our earlier definitions, however, also helps demolish your doctrine completely. If sin is nothing but the will to retain and commit what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain, then on your account no sin can be found anywhere in reality.
1.105For if justice imputes only what one is free to abstain from, and before baptism there is a necessity of evil, since the will, as you said, is not free to do good and consequently can do nothing but evil, then the very necessity it suffers defends it against the disgrace of evil. It cannot be burdened with its deeds before that justice which imputes no evil except what one is free to abstain from. After baptism, however, if there is a necessity of good, there certainly cannot be any sin. See, then, how impossible it is to find in seed what reason shows sin to be, when according to your definitions it can no longer be found even in conduct.
1.106With this conclusion of our discussion sealed in the sensible reader's mind, let us examine how your baptism, which you say was provided solely because of the stirring of the genitals, performs its entrusted task. It professes to cleanse human beings from sins. But when the will's case is heard before justice, a will that could not will otherwise is not pronounced guilty. When the accusation of guilt vanishes, the display of pardon vanishes too: one cannot forgive what one cannot rightly impute. Thus it fails to fulfill its promise. It finds no crimes whose forgiveness might earn it praise, nor anyone indebted to it for the benefit by which the bonds of sins are loosed, because it cannot convict those sheltered in the sanctuary of necessity of an evil will. All this shows it to be superfluous.
But the grace provided by Christ is not superfluous. Let us retain a rational account of its generosity, by which the sinner's will is proved guilty, since it could certainly have willed good just as it willed evil. The entire fiction of necessity therefore vanishes. Consequently, there is no sin from the condition of nature; free choice remains in human nature. You deny it with the Manichaeans; we acknowledge it with the apostles and all catholics.
1.107Your explanation of the apostle Paul's words would deserve to be passed over with a laugh if it did not frighten those unfamiliar with Scripture. The apostle says: “When you were slaves of sin, you were free from righteousness” (Romans 6:20). He certainly could not have said “freed”. The language of liberation is fittingly and properly used when a person is freed from harmful things. Those who resolve to owe nothing to the virtues, however, can be called free from virtues. A person can therefore be called free either from good or from evil when, serving one, he aims to owe nothing to the other. But a person can be called freed only from evil, because the word “liberation” contains a sign of the distress that is driven away. What difficulty, then, could be raised here about the apostle's words when, following ordinary human usage, he called them free from good and freed from evil?
He says: “When you were slaves of sin, you were free from righteousness. What fruit did you then have in those things of which you are now ashamed?” (Romans 6:20–21). But lest you suppose that we become slaves of sin through nature, hear the apostle himself speaking in the same passage: “Do you not know that when you present yourselves as slaves to obey someone, you are slaves of the one you obey, whether of sin or of obedience to righteousness?” (Romans 6:16). He says that you presented yourselves as slaves to sin, so that you would understand him to impute sin to will, not birth. He therefore called them free from righteousness solely because they had refused to keep its commands.
1.108He immediately adds that they are slaves of righteousness in the same way that they had previously been slaves of sin. You may now, if you wish, call them free from sin when they serve righteousness, just as he called them free from righteousness when they served wrongdoing. Most foolishly, then, you wanted to bring an accusation against the apostle's straightforward language. He did not, as you think, very carefully indicate the point you imagine; rather, you are very sleepily examining what he said. You argue that he preferred to say “freed” rather than “free” so that we would understand that freedom of choice enables evil but cannot bring about good. Yet the very order of his words resists you. If he had thought as you do, that freedom produced only sin, he should have said, “You were free for sin”, not “You were free for righteousness” (Romans 6:20), so that a person would be called free with respect to what that freedom accomplished. If we are to weigh even the force of grammatical cases, he said that they were free “for this righteousness”, not free “from this righteousness”. His phrasing would therefore help us more consistently, if we too wished to press such slight matters. Far be it from us! We understand the apostle's meaning and are content with the service of words straightforwardly spoken.
The Teacher of the Nations meant nothing other than: “You were free; you did not serve righteousness. You have been freed; you have received forgiveness of sins.” Freedom of choice remains, through which they could obey sin before and righteousness afterward.
1.109He shows what his exhortation contains by saying first: “I speak in human terms because of the weakness of your flesh. Just as you presented your members to serve impurity and lawlessness leading to lawlessness, so now present your members to serve righteousness leading to sanctification. For when you were slaves of sin, you were free from righteousness” (Romans 6:19–20). With perfect consistency he says that those whom he had urged to keep their members in complete sanctification had been free from righteousness.
We have spent no little time here proving the complete certainty of what I said earlier in section 73: people terrified by your speech would deny free choice and be driven by empty fear into real destruction; and you are the chief denier of free choice. Let us therefore return to the book addressed to Valerius, to prove that at first you denied God as Creator, while now you deny him in some places and in others acknowledge him far more wickedly than you denied him. How absolutely you denied God as humanity's Creator in that earlier book of yours became sufficiently clear when it was examined. You said that the devil rightly plucked the human race like the fruit of a shrub he himself had planted (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 1.26). You added many other things, offered as arguments, that support this error. In this second book, although your doctrine as a whole pursues the same course, you attempt to amend your former statement in a more destructive way.
1.110Let us briefly complete, however, the reply owed to the passage of yours quoted above in section 74. I answer firmly and faithfully that we do not begrudge human beings their liberator, the Lord Jesus Christ. We urge them not to believe you and be crushed by despair of amendment, abandoning Christ's teaching as though he commanded things that mortal nature could not grasp because it was burdened by an inborn evil.
1.111Rather, let them run to the one who cries: “My yoke is gentle and my burden light” (Matthew 11:30). With immeasurable generosity he both grants pardon to an evil will and, through renewal and adoption, makes better the innocence that he creates good.
1.112I therefore wonder that you dared to quote the testimony: “Whatever has overcome someone has made him its slave” (2 Peter 2:19). This most plainly supports us, who maintain that no one can be subject to the devil except someone who, after a contest of will, has been overcome by a base surrender. You should not have appropriated it, since it strongly opposes your attempt to persuade us that newborn children belong to the devil's kingdom. Without a will of their own, they could neither have been defeated nor have sinned.
1.113Seeing that this weighs heavily against you, you act as though the testimony itself had asked: “How, then, are infants in the kingdom of the hostile power, if we believe Scripture that each person becomes the victor's slave when he is defeated, and if infancy, without the use of reason and will, plainly could neither fight nor surrender?” (Psalm 101:1;) You add: “For through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned” (Romans 5:12). You continue: “God is the Creator of newborn children in such a way that all go from the one into condemnation unless he becomes their liberator through rebirth. For he is called ‘the potter making from the same lump one vessel for honor according to mercy, another for dishonor according to judgment’ (Romans 9:21), to whom the Church sings, ‘Mercy and judgment’” (Psalm 101:1; LXX Psalm 100:1; Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.8).
As for your statement that sin entered through one human being, the apostolic testimony by which you have stirred many hearts, though uneducated ones, I briefly showed in my fourth book how it should be understood. Yet with Christ's help we will explain it more fully in this work. In the second book we will set other things aside and discuss that apostolic passage most fully in its own context (see below, Book II, section 20).
1.114Here I would briefly warn that it cannot support you in establishing an opinion which all learning, all reason, and God's Law convict of being utterly unjust. Let the attentive reader therefore notice your declaration that God is the maker of evil people, and creates people of such a kind that, without anything deserved by a will of their own, absolutely all of them go into condemnation.
1.115So that we could not miss the period you mean, you declare that from Adam, who you say was all people in one, until the end, those who have not been baptized are found liable to condemnation and subject to the devil. By this opinion you try to cure yourself far more destructively than you previously wounded yourself. For to remove the hostility rushing upon you because you called the devil humanity's Creator, you correct yourself by acknowledging God as Creator, but of the sort of people the Manichaean assigns to the prince of darkness.
1.116Believing human beings evil by the condition of birth, the Manichaean assigned them an author through whom the blame for the evil work could be kept away from the good God. Since he had erred in the definition of sin, thinking natural something that can only be voluntary, he consistently went on to invent an evil maker for an evil origin. In this he was more reverent toward God and more defiant toward nature. You, however, say that people are born evil, but that God is the author of the evil: you are more defiant toward God and more respectful toward nature. For nature is defended by its author's majesty, while its author is accused by the ugliness of his work.
1.117You did not fear, most wicked man, to apply to God something for which the Manichaean invented another creator precisely to avoid attributing it to him. Both of you are enemies of the truth, but before you it was thought impossible to surpass him in impiety.
1.118You, however, have “justified your sister Sodom”, as the prophet says (Ezekiel 16:48, 51, 55). The Manichaean will seem acquitted if compared with your blasphemies. In the first book of my work I had boasted that I was attacked by the mouth from which the apostles too had suffered injury. Now I am awed by the greatness of my good fortune: I am reviled by someone who brings charges against God.
1.119How did I come to deserve the dignity of so great an insult? By praising me you could have bestowed nothing like it. You say my views deserve rejection, but God's works deserve condemnation. You declare that I argue badly, but that God creates wickedly. You shout that I err, but that he is cruel. You assert that I do not know the Law, but that God does not know justice. You cry out that I am not catholic because I say Christ calls people in order to save them; but you swear that God creates people to condemn them, and brings them into being for no other reason than that all should go into condemnation (compare Romans 5:18) (Romans 5:18).
1.120I therefore see a great distance produced by the progress of your learning between you and Mani, the progenitor of your ideas. Although he introduced two authors, he left hope of salvation on the side on which he said that the good God was utterly removed from injustice and cruelty. You, however, by speaking of one good God who is also the Creator of evil people, have utterly abolished both reverence for divinity and hope of salvation.
1.121For no one remains to help the guilty when the one who alone is God, from a desire to create misery, punishes even those in whom he recognizes nothing except what he himself made.
1.122Having surveyed the abyss of your impiety, though nothing more profane could ever be found, a brief discussion will nevertheless show how powerless it is and what follows from the things you added. God, who wished to be called by this name, is believed to be supremely just as well as supremely powerful. If one of these is absent, neither will be present. He is humanity's most kindly Creator and the most equitable assessor of what each deserves. Everything he makes is very good (Genesis 1:31). Consequently, no one is evil by nature; whoever is guilty is accused for conduct, not origins.
1.123Evil is therefore not inherent in nature, and God cannot create guilty people or place them in the devil's kingdom. These conclusions show you to be a Manichaean, indeed worse than a Manichaean. They also make clear that humanity enters this world without sin, that the fruit of human fertility is under God's authority rather than the devil's, and that nature is innocent.
1.124With this established, consider what follows from your course of argument. The prophets and patriarchs and all the saints of the Old Testament plainly did not receive baptism, yet were created by God and afterward shone with their own virtues. They must therefore, against the Law's testimony, be believed to belong to the devil's kingdom and be destined for eternal punishments, because you declare that all are created from Adam for condemnation (compare Romans 5:18) (Romans 5:18).
1.125If you say this, even your patrons will be able to acknowledge how openly Manichaean you are. But if you recognize so great an army of the true King fighting against your opinion, and realize that you cannot harm their standing, admit that what you built has been destroyed. Consequently, not everyone goes from one into condemnation (Romans 5:16), but only those who, rebellious against God's will, are overtaken by their final end without repentance or correction.
1.126You should never have mentioned that God is called “the potter making from the same lump one vessel for honor and another for dishonor” (Romans 9:21). For as we explain it consistently, it wholly opposes you. When some are said to be made for honor and others for dishonor, this supports the catholic understanding that the different outcomes of the vessels correspond to the differences in human will.
1.127But you, who had said above that everyone goes into condemnation, with what effrontery did you quote a testimony declaring that one goes to honor and another to dishonor?
1.128Nothing is more contradictory than saying “all” (Romans 9:21) and “not all”. You say that God the potter makes everyone for condemnation. The apostle says that not everyone is for condemnation and not everyone for honor. I will explain the worth of this statement in its proper place. Even in the wording of the statement, however, there is plainly a great disagreement between you. The potter who shapes everyone for condemnation is not the same as the one Paul says fashions some for honor. You do not believe in the one proclaimed by that admirable teacher, because your potter shapes everyone for condemnation, while the apostle's potter shapes very many for glory (compare Romans 9:21).
1.129I have said this to make it immediately apparent that you possess extraordinary ignorance or shamelessness, using statements opposed to you as though they were your own. Piety and reason, however, will explain that my God forms no one for dishonor,
1.130but creates his image, that is, all human beings, good (compare Genesis 1:26–27). Even when they have been ruined by perverse pursuits, he desires to restore them through the generosity of his remedies. To him the Church indeed sings “mercy and judgment” (Psalm 101:1; LXX Psalm 100:1) (Genesis 1:26–27). He is kind to those who have done no wrong, and by a just judgment punishes those who, created good by God, sinned by their own will and rejected the help of mercy. This is the mercy and this the judgment sung by the Church of the catholics. In your church, however, nothing of the kind can resound, since it says that God, the Creator of evil people, without justice, judgment, or mercy, forms those whom he will punish, and punishes them because he himself formed them from Adam (Psalm 101:1;).
1.131Let the dignity of the apostolic statement now be defended, lest it be thought that he meant about some people what you supposed about all. The apostle Paul, debating the objections of Jews who swelled with pride in the dignity of their ancestry and disdained believers from the nations being made equal to them, commends both God's justice and his grace. He argues that their generosity accounts both for the knowledge of the Law that first ennobled the Jews and for the preaching of Christ that afterward also admitted the nations. For there is one Creator of both peoples, who will judge the former through the Law, the latter without the Law, and the former in the Law (Romans 2:12; Romans 3:29–31). He is not the God of Jews alone but also of the nations (Romans 3:29), returning to each what belongs to that person without deceit or favoritism, that is, without partiality toward anyone. This is the sense of “favor” (Romans 2:6) in the definition of justice (compare Romans 2:6, 11).
Thus he rightly condemns those descended from Abraham when they live wickedly and drives them from his inheritance, just as he does Gentiles found acting similarly. Conversely, he rewards the good wills, true faith, and upright deeds of either people with eternal joys. The Teacher of the Nations therefore restrains Jewish pride and shows that the difference lies not in human seed but in conduct. They must recognize that unless they take care to be faithful, no privilege of circumcised ancestry will defend them. Jacob and Esau, after all, were conceived through one reception of seed and delivered through one act of giving birth, yet experienced very different outcomes because of the difference in what they deserved (compare Genesis 25:21–26; Romans 9:10–13) (Romans 2:11) (Genesis 25:21–26) (Romans 9:10–13) (Genesis 25:21–26; Romans 9:10–13).
1.132For Esau, profane and sexually immoral, sold his birthright for a single meal. He sought the blessing he had despised and did not obtain it, although he begged for it with tears (Hebrews 12:16–17; Genesis 25:29–34; Genesis 27:34–38). Jacob, however, quiet and gentle, obedient to his parents' instructions and most eager for holy blessings, advanced so far that among the holy people God was called the God of Jacob as well as of Abraham and Isaac (Genesis 25:27; Genesis 27:8; Exodus 3:6; Matthew 22:32).
All examples therefore establish that by a just judgment God does not withhold his mercy from good minds in any nation, while allowing no nobility of ancestry to defend evil minds. The Jews should understand that they must not despise the nations' faith. Just as Israelite ancestry does not defend crimes, so Gentile descent is no obstacle to virtues. The apostle pursues all this in that debate. In some passages, however, to bow down the pride of the circumcised, he settles the issue on God's power alone under the name of grace (Genesis 25:29–34) (Genesis 27:34–38) (Genesis 25:27) (Genesis 27:8).
1.133They boasted of observing ceremonies and sacrifices, and therefore supposed that other nations, consecrated by none of the Law's rites, neither could nor should suddenly be admitted to fellowship with them. He would tell them that even if the whole of righteousness had consisted in those observances, God would still have had power to make a change among the peoples, rejecting whom he wished and taking whom he wished. In answer to this meaning, a reply is made in the person of the Jews: nothing should now be demanded from the human will, since God “has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills” (Romans 9:18). To this the apostle replies: “O human being, who are you to answer back to God?” (Romans 9:20). He introduces the prophet Isaiah's testimony: “Does what is molded say to the one who molded it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’” (Isaiah 45:9; Romans 9:20). He adds in his own words: “Does the potter not have power over the clay to make from the same lump one vessel for honor and another for dishonor?” (Romans 9:21).
The meaning is this: “Because I commended God's will and explained the authority of his grace, saying that he grants mercy to whomever he has mercy on, you, O Jew, raised a false accusation against me. You acted as though my commendation of divine will and power involved the destruction of divine justice. Because I said, ‘He does what he wills’, you argued that nothing should any longer be demanded of human will if God does everything according to his own will. Yet the dignity of the person concerned left no room for that objection. If I had said, ‘God does what he ought, according to the laws of his justice which judges each person's deserts’, you certainly would not have raised the objection you now raise. But because I said, ‘God does what he wills’, you thought I had stolen something from justice's dignity. Both statements, then, mean the same thing. When I say of God, ‘He does what he wills’, I say nothing other than, ‘He does what he ought’, because I know that he wills nothing other than what he ought. Where will is inseparably joined to fairness, whichever of them I name, I have indicated both.”
1.134That pride wished to remain idle and cover its laziness with an appearance of necessity, so as to protest against the Gospel's reception of the nations. It therefore hears: “Even if matters were as you imagine, you should nevertheless petition God, not stir up a revolt.” With these words Paul checks the man's wickedness. Seizing upon ambiguous language, that man tried to attribute to divine necessity the difference in deserts that comes from the character of the will. He wanted to establish that one of two things must follow: either the nations do not enter into fellowship in the promise, or, if God is permitted to admit them, the tasks of free will are abolished.
But this did not suffice for the issue. Such a teacher could not commend God's authority while leaving his justice undefended. Most consistently, then, Paul adds that vessels made for dishonor and those made for honor receive this as the wages of their own will: “If God, wishing to show his wrath and make his power known with great patience in vessels of wrath completed for destruction, and to make known the riches of his glory in vessels of mercy which he prepared for glory, whom he also called, namely us, not only from Jews but also from the nations” (Romans 9:22–24). Here he certainly clears up what the previous debate had concealed: God brings wrath only upon vessels completed for destruction, while glory is given to those prepared for it. By whom such vessels are prepared to receive the things we have named, the apostle's own words disclose: “In a great house there are not only gold and silver vessels but also wooden and earthenware ones, some for honor and some for dishonor. If, then, anyone cleanses himself from these, he will be a vessel sanctified for honor, useful to the Lord, prepared for every good work” (2 Timothy 2:21).
1.135See the task of free will: “If anyone cleanses himself” from association with cheap vessels, a name that denotes vices, “he will be a vessel sanctified for honor, useful to the Lord, prepared for every good work” (2 Timothy 2:21). These vessels are therefore prepared for either wrath or glory through their own pursuits. God makes his power known in both cases, either by displaying severity toward the impious or by bestowing blessing on the faithful. It is therefore clear that this statement of the outstanding teacher has given no aid to Manichaean views; on the contrary, it has consistently armed us.
1.136Consequently, it strongly opposed you too by saying that not everyone is formed for the condemnation into which you declare everyone goes. You habitually make the utterly absurd argument: “But those who are afterward freed are not formed for condemnation.” Yet not even the surface of the apostle's words can agree with you in that way. When you say, “Everyone is created for condemnation by the law of birth, but some, though very few, are freed from it through the mysteries”, you do not assert what he does. He proclaims not only that people are freed from among the condemned, but that not everyone is formed for condemnation: some are formed for dishonor, others for honor.
1.137Just as it has become clear that the apostle said this about conduct, so it is apparent how desperately you lack the Law's testimonies. Against reason's thunderbolts you seek help from statements that disdain to assist you, indeed cannot assist you by their very nature.
1.138These arguments concern the apostle's testimony. In Isaiah, however, from whom Paul took the statement itself, God is so far from deterring rational creatures from examining his judgment that he deigns to explain the reasoning of his dealings, lest he seem to have acted by power alone rather than justice. Through the same prophet he had said: “Cease acting perversely, learn to do good, help the oppressed; and come, argue with me, says the Lord” (Isaiah 1:16–18) (Isaiah 45:9). Here likewise he announces to the Jewish people suffering in captivity that the time of redemption is approaching, when they will return to their own land. He discloses the reason both for their preceding distress and for their coming joy.
He says: “Let heaven above feast, and let the clouds scatter righteousness; let mercy arise from the earth, and let righteousness arise together with it. I am the Lord God who created you; making you better, I prepared you like a potter's clay. Will the plowman plow the earth all day? (Isaiah 45:9) Does the clay say to the potter, ‘What are you doing? You are not working; you have no hands’? Does what is molded say to the one who molded it, ‘Did you mold me wisely?’ (compare Isaiah 45:9) Or does someone say to a father, ‘What will you beget?’ and to a mother, ‘What will you give birth to?’ For thus says the Lord God, the Holy One of Israel, who made the things to come: ‘Question me about my sons and daughters, and give me instructions about the works of my hands. I made the earth and the human being upon it; with my own hand I established heaven; I commanded all the stars. I have raised up a king with righteousness, and all his ways are straight. He will build my city and bring back my people's captivity, not for a reward or for gifts,’ says the Lord of Hosts” (Isaiah 45:8–13, LXX-based wording).
1.139In its historical meaning, then, this passage contains the following sense, as God speaks to the people: “I did not hand you over to captivity out of hatred, nor have I now released you from the bonds of Babylonian captivity through forgetfulness of judgment. As far as it lay with me, I was ready to cherish you with constant goodwill, but I owed it to my justice both to hand over sinners to their enemies and to restore and free those who had suffered. Someone skilled in farming does not always devote himself to one task, merely breaking the fields with the plowshare; he prepares the land in different ways for the fruitfulness he desires (Isaiah 28:24–29). So I too vary the turns of my dealings, so that by distress at one time and comfort at another I may fit your will for the fruits of righteousness.
To make you understand how fairly I deal with you, I could disregard your complaints on the strength of my power: just as something molded cannot say to its potter, ‘What have you done?’ (Isaiah 45:8–13), I could impose the weight of silence on you. Nevertheless, contrary to these examples, I invite you to question me about my sons and daughters, that is, yourselves and the works of my hands, and to learn that I have done everything justly and never anything cruelly.”
1.140Both the prophet and the apostle therefore introduced the potter as an example to serve only as a comparison, not to indicate that human beings are as worthless in God's sight as clay is in potters' kiln and wheel. Having completed the explanation just given, we point out that according to the recent translation another meaning shines out in the same passage: “Drop dew, heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the righteous one. Let the earth open and bring forth the Savior, and let righteousness arise together with him. I, the Lord, created him. Woe to one who contradicts his maker, a potsherd among the earth's earthenware! Does the clay say to its potter, ‘What are you doing?’ and ‘Your work has no hands’?” (Isaiah 45:8–9).
Although historically these words describe King Cyrus, prophetically they describe the Savior's incarnation. Since he was to be born of the Virgin, the stubbornness of Jews and all unbelievers is challenged, so that they may not be enemies of trustworthy signs. For after saying, “Let the earth open and bring forth the Savior, and let righteousness arise together with him”, he said: “I, the Lord, created him.”
1.141The earth opens to bring forth a shoot before it receives seed through the cultivator's work. This is fulfilled in the Virgin's childbirth: through the gift of motherhood she preceded and excluded the function of a wife. Almighty God promises to do what was not customary. Foreseeing the multitude of unbelievers, he adds: “Woe to one who contradicts his maker, a potsherd among the earth's earthenware!” (Isaiah 45:9). That is: “Woe to those who, despite God's promise, insist that a virgin could not become pregnant! Although every one of them is shaped in a mother's womb from seeds established by God, with God's power intervening, they obstinately insist that flesh could not have been fashioned from the Virgin's flesh without a man's service” (compare Luke 1:34–35).
“You stubborn people, when you think I could not do this and prescribe limits to me because of its difficulty, although you yourselves were plainly made by my hands, you are like clay that, while being worked by its potter, said to him, ‘You have no hands’, the very hands then shaping it into a vessel. So you who ask who gave the Virgin a son without a man's seed must recognize that it is the same one who made you from seed.”
But since Holy Scripture permits varied interpretation, and both explanations have harmonized in a devout and reverent way, let the first book now end. Let its ending nevertheless remind the reader to believe that God is the maker of newborn children, the protector of the innocent, the rewarder of catholics, and the condemner of Manichaeans.
To Florus — Book 2
2.1We would be treated fairly if we were allowed to defend the cause of truth before educated judges—or, since that is denied us for now, if at least we were not battered by the uproar of the ignorant.
2.2And since we suffer the loss of raising a trophy for the churches’ salvation—a trophy that discerning judges would have awarded our just cause with remarkable support—at least the crowd’s approval should have no further power to insult us. Of the two groups I have mentioned, one would then help us and the other do us no harm, if the first possessed authority or the second a sense of shame. But affairs are deeply confused, and fools are very numerous. The church is being robbed of reason’s steering gear so that popular doctrine can sail on with its horn held high.
2.3Thus, when the wise are allowed little while the worthless are allowed whatever they please, the judgment of virtue has been expelled from the churches by the decree of rioters. What counts against us among the common people is our refusal to swell the ranks of error. I mean the crowd that weighs the worth of an opinion by its success and judges it truer the more people it sees approving it.
2.4Cicero says against Epicurus that there is clear evidence his teachings lack subtlety: people of every sort everywhere declare that they like them (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.7). These people, perversely as in everything else, treat that as evidence of wisdom.
2.5For lustful souls positively delight in slandering every holy person who has ever lived anywhere, so that the examples of distinguished deeds will not rebuke them.
2.6They positively delight in—and are deeply attached to—pleading nature’s weakness, saying that the flesh is subject to sins from birth, and placing the achievement of reform outside the human will. They call the crimes of deliberate conduct the functions of bodily parts. They say that the catholic faith consists in confessing a free will, but one through which a person is compelled to do evil and cannot will the good.
2.7They call the teaching of those who assert that a just God created humanity free to act well empty and heretical human talk: the teaching that each person has the power to turn away from evil and shine through the pursuit of virtue. For this would drive the sting of anxiety and fear into those who attribute their shameful acts to the necessities of the flesh.
2.8Finally, in churches that enjoy great honor and large congregations, they preach that sin has such power that, before the limbs are formed and before the soul begins or arrives, it flies over the seed as it is deposited, invades the mother’s hidden chamber, and makes the unborn guilty. Guilt, older than birth itself, waits for the substance to exist. Then this law of sin, dwelling in the limbs, compels the captive human being to serve crimes—a person who, even in shameful conduct, deserves pity more than punishment. For what we call the faults of an evil will is called an inherited affliction in the church by men, women, and eminent bishops (allusion to Romans 7:23) (Romans 7:23).
2.9These, then, are the whores of the Manichaeans, pandering to people’s ears with their utterly filthy doctrines.
2.10This nettle has stirred up our enemies of both sexes. Formerly its sting, produced by the vice of evil habit, was nevertheless treated with the ointments, so to speak, of wholesome exhortation.
2.11But now it has begun to be offered as medicine, and pleasure has gained the support of authority. With almost the whole world’s consent, shamelessness runs riot: the queen of minds, ruling through the bodily organs, the conqueror of decency, the undefeated captor of every soul. The more honorable our defense of truth, the harder it has therefore become. For the few who heal through speech have little power against reckless crowds hostile to their own remedies. What then? Should we sound the retreat at the sight of them, avenge the insults we have suffered by keeping silent, and laugh at others’ shipwrecks from the safe harbor of our conscience? But first, the goodwill we owe the human race opposes such hatred. So do our hope and faith in God. Besides repeatedly restoring the seemingly hopeless wreckage of the times, God has rewarded with eternal recompense the steadfastness he wished us to exercise until death, even when no result followed in the present.
2.12Rejoicing, then, in this comfort of faith, let us press on with the work we have begun and fulfill our promise to argue the case. We do not doubt that this itself is a very great part of our reward: we stand in the citadel of a doctrine which, though attacked by the envy of so many and the error of still more, has risen so far above uncertain fortunes that it enjoys an invincible reputation, holding victory in its possession.
2.13For if, as the preceding discussion has shown and the following discussion will show, everything belonging to reason, learning, justice, devotion, and the testimony of sacred Scripture supports the doctrine we defend, all our enemies’ efforts achieve nothing except to prove them utterly shameless before every learned person, utterly defiant before the holy, and utterly irreverent toward God.
2.14The advocates of inherited sin have nothing to set against the force of the reasoning that crushes them. Their other writings bear witness to this, and so do the little books we are answering. Addressed to a military man who, as he himself can acknowledge, is occupied more with other business than with literature, they beg for the help of unrestrained power against us. In their own support they keep recommending the decisions of little crowds, whether of country people or theatergoers, although no history records the deliberation by which those decisions were issued.
2.15Yet we certainly cannot deny what I have said: filthy crowds greatly enjoy blaming nature for the offenses of the will and defending moral wantonness by slandering human seed. The result is that no one tries to correct what he expects something else within him to be committing.
2.16But the feeble protection offered by blind opinion increases sins; it does not diminish them. This itch of miserable people who willingly make themselves sick will carry no weight against reason itself. Yet they claim that certain scriptural passages, especially the words of the apostle Paul, establish natural sin. I postponed explaining those passages until the second book, and now it is time to fulfill that promise. First, to equip the reader better, I will briefly distinguish what has been done from what remains. We have shown that nothing can be proved from holy Scripture which justice cannot uphold. If God’s law contains justice in its perfect form, then its adversary, injustice, can gain no strength through that law. Consequently, authority cannot defend what reason disproves. Next we proved that God is known to us by his virtues. We must therefore confess his justice just as we confess his almighty power. If his justice is allowed to collapse, his whole majesty will begin to totter. God is just in such a way that, if he were proved unjust, he would be proved not to be God. We concluded that we worship God in the Trinity as perfectly just, and it became irrefutably clear that he cannot charge infants with someone else’s sin.
2.17Just as we discussed the definition of justice, we also discussed the nature of sin. Sin proved to be nothing other than an evil will that was free to refrain from what it wrongly desired.
2.18Thus the clearest evidence taught us conclusively that there is no sin in newborn children, since the exercise of the will cannot be found in them.
2.19Clear reasoning also showed that those who say sins are natural deny free will. Indeed, the Carthaginian denied it, not in his own words—lest they carry too little weight—but with a testimony from the Gospel (John 8:36), as though that gave his denial greater authority. By explaining this testimony, we restored it to the Gospel’s dignity. We also freed the apostle Paul’s testimony from the slanderer’s snares and, with the prophet as witness, showed that our God, the potter of good vessels, is the creator of everyone (Romans 9:21; Isaiah 45:8–13) (Romans 9:21) (Isaiah 45:8–13).
2.20These are the principal points established in the first book. Any one of them alone is amply sufficient for the victory of truth. Although the further work is more than necessary, it remains for us to discuss the Teacher of the Gentiles’ statement that sin entered the world through one man (Romans 5:12). We will use the definitions already given whenever necessary and prove that reason has said nothing false. It is an act of injustice to charge some people’s births with other people’s deliberate deeds. Through testimonies from the law, in this book or the next, we will also show that this very injustice displeases God and is forbidden by him, although no one should have doubted it. These points necessarily establish both that we are entirely right to maintain that no one is born with sin and that God cannot judge newborn children guilty. Free will is therefore as intact as each person’s nature is innocent before the exercise of that person’s own will.
2.21The Manichaeans, however, rebel against both devotion and reason. They suppose that sin exists before the time of willing, which the nature of things does not allow; that the one they argue to be unjust is God; and that holy Scripture deserves slander, since they claim its written records establish a crime on the part of the deity. But none of these three things can be demonstrated by reason: neither sin without will, nor injustice in God, nor perversity in the law. Only they themselves are shown to be foolish, shameless, and impious.
2.22Above all, then, let the discerning reader hold firmly to this: all sacred Scripture contains only what catholics understand to honor God, as the light of its many statements makes clear. If a difficult expression raises a question, it is certain that the passage’s author did not intend anything unjust. It must be understood in accordance with what clear reason and the brilliance of other, unambiguous passages have disclosed. Let us now set down the words of our opponent. In that part of his argument where he had brought his God to the point of being a potter of sinners—the argument we opposed in the preceding book—he briefly said that sin entered the world through one man, without dwelling on the passage’s explanation (Romans 5:12). After many words against the excerpts he says were sent to him, however, he reached a passage of mine which he set before himself as though to attack it. Yet he offered nothing that answered the attack made on him. Instead, he took refuge in the apostle’s statement that sin entered the world through one man, and tried to explain the passage’s whole sequence in accordance with his own doctrine. For this reason I have passed over other matters and hurried to this part. Since I promised to resolve this question in the second book, I wanted both to keep that promise and to show what his argument actually was. Otherwise I might be thought dishonest for suppressing his explanation and supplying the one we acknowledge as catholic (see Against Julian, Unfinished Work 1.113).
2.23In my first work, then, I examined his statement: ‘For just as sin, whether infants derive it from this source or that, is the devil’s work, so a human being, whether born from this source or that, is God’s work’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 1.1). I quote it here as it stands in my own work, from which this man had stolen a very large portion.
2.24There I replied: ‘With due respect to your teaching authority, you are evading the issue. But understand that the truth has taken away your freedom to wander. Look: we too agree that sin is the work of an evil will, or the devil’s work. But through what is this sin found in an infant? Through the will? Yet there has been no will in the infant. Through the body’s form? But God gave that. Through the soul’s arrival? But the soul, newly created by God, owes nothing to bodily seed. Through marriage? But marriage belongs to the parents’ activity, and you previously said that they did not sin in this act. If that concession was insincere, as your subsequent argument indicates, marriage itself must be cursed for causing the evil. Yet marriage has no substance of its own: its name designates people’s activity. The parents, then, whose union caused sin, rightly deserve condemnation. There can therefore no longer be any doubt that married people are consigned to eternal punishment, since their activity enabled the devil to gain dominion over human beings. If you concede this, you lose everything you previously seemed to maintain: namely, your statement that a human being is God’s work. For the offspring’s origin lies in the union of bodies. Therefore, if evil comes into human beings through their origin, and the devil’s right over human beings comes through evil, it necessarily follows that the devil is the maker of human beings, since the origin of those born comes from him’ (quoted in Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.44–49). After this I repeated his words: ‘For just as sin, whether derived from this source or that, is the devil’s work, so a human being, whether born from this source or that, is God’s work.’ At once I challenged him as follows: ‘When I think of that frightened statement of yours that marriage is not evil, I cannot consider these other remarks without laughing. If you believe that human beings are made by God and that married people are innocent, see how impossible it is to maintain that original sin is derived from them. Certainly the one born does not sin, the one who fathered the child does not sin, and the one who created the child does not sin. Through what cracks, amid so many defenses of innocence, do you imagine sin has entered?’
2.25He therefore set this continuous passage from my earlier work before himself in his second book, although with alterations (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.44–49). For he passed over, by design I suppose, my mention of the body’s formation and the soul’s arrival. Reason, the authority of sacred law, and the catholic church all establish that a new soul is created by God in each person.
2.26He then assembled the rest, although varying some expressions. Against these objections of mine he devised nothing that could strike back at me. Confessing through his lack of an argument that my conclusion was true, he says that the apostle must answer all these points for him—the apostle who declares that sin entered this world through one man (Romans 5:12). At this point, what educated person could think him sound in the head? He did not understand that he should either pass over objections against which he could find nothing, or think up some answer to them and attach the apostle’s words in support of it.
2.27I asked, then, in strict logical sequence, as all learning will acknowledge with me, through what sin—the work of an evil will, which is also called the devil’s work—could be found in an infant. Through the will? Even our present opponent admits that no such will has existed in the infant. Through marriage? No one doubts that marriage belongs to the parents’ activity, and he had previously stated that they did not sin in this union (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). If our debater regretted this concession, as the course of his work indicated, he should admit that the parents are guilty, since their union prepares a kingdom for the devil over God’s image. I added, by the necessary steps of argument, that original sin makes the devil the creator of bodies. For if evil comes into human beings through their origin, and the devil’s right over human beings comes through evil, the devil is the maker of human beings, since the origin of those born comes from him. Realizing that these arguments would imprison the advocates of inherited sin in the Manichaeans’ cave, I turned the key to give the captives a way out. I warned him that, if he truly believed human beings were made by God and sincerely confessed married people innocent, he should understand that original sin cannot be derived from them. ‘Certainly,’ I said, ‘the one born does not sin, the one who fathered the child does not sin, and the one who created the child does not sin. Through what cracks, amid so many defenses of innocence, do you imagine sin has entered?’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.47). What, I ask, could have been framed more reverently, truthfully, clearly, briefly, and firmly than my drawing a fourth proposition—the decisive conclusion—from the three premises my opponent had conceded? Sometimes one or two premises necessarily establish a third. By what rule, then, should I be forbidden to infer the fourth proposition that follows from three admitted premises? And this is only in the second argument. In the first, five or more points are conceded to me, after which a valid and undefeated conclusion follows.
2.28Let us now turn to him. You had granted me that sin is an act of the will. I could immediately have said, as a consequence: ‘But infants have no will that sins; therefore infants have no sin.’ Yet to press you with more witnesses I asked, step by step, through what this sin could be found in an infant. Could it perhaps be through the will? Then, with your acquiescence, I adopted the premise that the infant had had no consciousness of willing. I added the question whether the infant had acquired the outlines of its limbs through the first fault. But you had conceded that God shapes them and that they are therefore good. Third, I asked whether you thought guilt was brought in through the soul’s arrival. Yet it was established that this soul was new and owed nothing to the seed. Next I asked whether, since nothing in these things remained for you to accuse, you called marriage—that is, the union of bodies—the devil’s work. But, again with your agreement, I showed that this belongs to the parents’ activity. Once everything mentioned above had been acquitted, your doctrine of transmission enslaved to the devil the married people who had caused the sin. After all this I drove home the consequence approaching you: you believe the devil is the creator of bodies, since you assigned to him the work of sexual union without which bodies could not originate. This argument showed the disease oppressing you. The second showed both how pitiable you are with such views and how invincible the catholics remain, supported even by your fear. You conceded that God makes human beings, that married people are innocent, and that infants perform no acts on their own. From these three premises it was irrefutably inferred that, when the one born does not sin, the one who fathered the child does not sin, and the one who created the child does not sin, no crack remains through which sin can be shown to have entered. If you dislike the conclusion, then deny your concession. Say that either the one who fathered the child sinned, or the one who created the child, or the child who was born. Of these alternatives, one is insane, another Manichaean, and the third goes beyond the Manichaeans: insane if you say infants commit offenses; Manichaean if you accuse married people; beyond the Manichaeans if you consider God the author of sin. But if all these things are so far from the truth that you still fear to confess them openly, with what shamelessness, most senseless of men, do you persist in denying the conclusion we have drawn?
2.29The case here concerns four persons: God the maker; the two parents, from whom the material is supplied to the maker; and the infant who is born. You say sin dwells in this company. I ask who commits it. God? You say no. The father? Again you say no. The mother? The same answer. The infant? No. And you still do not think it has been proved that something none of these four commits cannot exist among these four?
2.30What, then, will you try to persuade us of by rereading Scripture or naming people who agree with you, when you still cannot define your own view? What good does it do you to prove that Adam sinned, something I do not deny at all? Adam died so many centuries ago. Our question is through what sin is found in an infant—the sin by which God’s image is transferred to the devil’s ownership.
2.31If it comes through the parents’ union, openly condemn the marriage your argument condemns, and spare us the work of proving you a Manichaean. But if you do not dare say this, and, defiant of reason, bow to those having intercourse, you produce unheard-of monstrosities of argument. You say that lust is diabolical and, although located in the feelings of those coupling, provides the parents’ pleasure but the newborn children’s guilt. You certainly expose your own madness and shamefulness. But please do not presume so far as to think we are not free to defend newborn children’s innocence while honoring God, when you are permitted—and pleased—to accuse God while clearing the lustful people’s own bodies of what you call lust’s guilt.
2.32For when you declare that the prince of darkness planted sexual desire in humanity, and that it is the devil’s shrub producing the human race from itself as its own fruit, you clearly betray yourself: you call the devil, rather than God, the creator of human beings. By this utterly impious doctrine both the business of marriage—that is, genital union—and all flesh are condemned.
2.33But after this blasphemy you add that, while you profess the pleasure of married people who beget children to be diabolical, and the movement of the genitals diabolical, nevertheless neither the moving organs themselves nor the married people experiencing pleasure are guilty. Instead, for all these things you accuse new human beings: the deity’s fresh handiwork in newborn children. You abandon none of the Manichaeans’ impiety, but display such monstrous madness of a deranged mind that it would more properly be judged a condition to nurse than to cut away—except that the ruin of many people, your obstinacy, and your proliferation of writings testify to your deliberate will and zeal in this matter.
2.34Read the fourth book of my work on this subject too. You will understand how much, under the guise of accusation, you flatter the devil whom you call your father, and lust, your mother.
2.35But let us now examine the words of the apostle, whom you said answers everything I set out above. You write: ‘The apostle answers all these points for him. He accuses neither the infant’s will, which does not yet exist in the infant as a personal will capable of sin; nor marriage, insofar as it is marriage, which has not only its institution but also its blessing from God; nor the parents, insofar as they are parents, lawfully and legitimately joined to one another to produce children. Instead he says: “Through one man sin entered the world, and death through sin; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned” (Romans 5:12). If these people received this with catholic ears and minds, they would not have hearts rebelling against Christ’s faith and grace. Nor would they vainly try to twist these completely clear and evident apostolic words into their own peculiar, heretical meaning. They claim that this was said because Adam sinned first, and thereafter anyone who wished to sin found in him an example of sinning. Thus, they say, sin passed from that one man into all human beings, not by generation but by imitation of that one man. Yet surely, if the apostle had meant imitation here, he would have said that sin entered this world and passed through all human beings through the devil, rather than through one man. For Scripture says of the devil: “Those who belong to his party imitate him” (Wisdom of Solomon 2:24; Latin numbering 2:25). But he said “through one man,” from whom the generation of human beings certainly began, precisely to teach that original sin passed through all people by generation’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.45).
2.36Any educated reader of our works understands that you abuse your supporters’ ignorance and hide behind ambiguous words. The remaining crowd, of whom the prophet says to God, ‘You have regarded human beings as the fish of the sea’ (Habakkuk 1:14), are deceived as they follow one another’s lead. Ignorant of the distinctions that would save them, they think everything they see joined in words can also be joined in reality. Only a very learned and attentive person can judge what follows, what conflicts, and what the invincible and venerable law of argument requires one to infer from given concessions.
2.37That is the chief reason why, grieving over the churches’ ruin, we appeal to examination by men distinguished for their wisdom: to reveal not merely what is said, but what is said consistently. If the dispute were heard before such a council, you would certainly not be allowed to assert what you had denied or deny what you had affirmed. But in your book, which no discipline of shame restrains, you boldly heap together what catholics say and what Manichaeans say. You are content with this one impression: that people say you have answered. You think it pointless even to consider what weight or consistency your argument possesses.
2.38In fact, you grant what I asked without hesitation. Seeing what follows from these concessions, you acknowledge that you are powerless against the case we have built. You say the apostle Paul opposes everything we have said, yet introduce him as conceding the same points you had conceded. For you say: ‘The apostle does not accuse the infant’s will, which does not yet exist in the infant as a personal will capable of sin’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.45). Once this is granted, it is already proved that there cannot be any sin in the infant. For sin, even according to your own definition, has no other nature than the will to commit what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain.
2.39If, then, the apostle does not accuse the infant of a personal will, understanding that such a will could not yet have existed, he certainly declares that no sign of guilt appears in the infant. This is especially true when the judge is justice, which imputes no sin except one from which abstention is possible. But, not content to grant this alone, you add: ‘Nor does the apostle accuse marriage, insofar as it is marriage, which has not only its institution but also its blessing from God’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.45). This by itself could equally suffice to overthrow natural sin. For if the apostle knows, as he does know, that marriage is not to be accused, and if the pleasurable union of the sexes, instituted and blessed by God, belongs to marriage as its means and instrument of union, then no possession by the devil can sprout from marriage. Nor is its fruit guilty, especially before that justice which imputes no sin except one from which abstention is possible.
2.40Let us consider the third point, too, so that your generosity may be seen in your readiness to agree. ‘Nor does the apostle accuse the parents, insofar as they are parents, lawfully and legitimately joined to one another to produce children’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.45). Weigh what you have said: the apostle does not accuse the parents insofar as they are parents. He therefore declares that, insofar as they are parents, they cannot bear fruit for the devil, and that nothing coming from them insofar as they are parents belongs to the devil. Children, however, belong to parents precisely insofar as they are parents. Children are therefore proved neither guilty, nor under the devil’s kingdom, nor liable to accusation by the devil. To make our point clear by repetition: the union of the sexes contributes to offspring insofar as the married people become parents. If, however, they choose to behave more wantonly with one another, or stray into unlawful adulterous intercourse, that cannot concern their children, who are born from the power of seed, not from the obscenity of vices.
2.41Therefore what passes from those who beget to those born is not their shameful conduct but their seed. God instituted the power of seed and, as you are compelled to confess, blessed it.
2.42Children, then, are not guilty even when their parents sin in begetting them. For parents are connected to their children only insofar as they are parents; correspondingly, children are connected to their parents only insofar as they are children. It is established that offspring share in their progenitors’ nature, not their fault. If you declare that the apostle confirms what reason demonstrates, then we rightly defend, under his instruction, the position that parents’ sins cannot belong to their children. The apostle, radiant with the Holy Spirit; we, instructed by reason’s light; and you, crushed by the weight of the truth you attack, all jointly and truly confess that parents, insofar as they are parents, are not guilty. They are connected to their children only insofar as they are parents. Consequently, children insofar as they are children—that is, before performing any act through their own will—cannot be guilty.
2.43Let the ingenious minds of Manichaean reasoning now go and attempt everything they can. Let them endure the toil of thought for as long as they please. Reverently, not arrogantly, I promise that this structure can never be shaken.
2.44With what effrontery, then, do you add: ‘But through one man sin entered the world, and death through sin; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12)? You interpret this to mean that the apostle says sin was transmitted from that man to his descendants by generation (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.45). Above, you had conceded that the Teacher of the Gentiles does not accuse marriage, which God blessed; that no will to sin exists in the newborn child; and that parents, insofar as they are parents, are lawfully and legitimately united to produce children. Immediately you add, as though you had said the earlier things in your sleep, that guilt is transmitted to descendants by generation. If they beget only insofar as they are parents, and insofar as they are parents are lawfully and legitimately united, and this union is not disapproved by the apostle because God not only instituted but also blessed it, with what mouth, by what rule, with what effrontery do you maintain that this generation is the cause of guilt, a root of crimes, and the devil’s slave?
2.45So it does not deserve accusation by the apostle, yet is possessed by the devil! It is instituted by God, yet is a fountain of crimes! Finally, it is blessed by God, as you confess, yet accused by you of being the devil’s shrub!
2.46All literary learning testifies that you have achieved nothing against me. The conflict between your statements shows how you struggle against the apostle and rage against God. But now that we have shown that things separated by their very nature cannot be joined, let us question the apostle too. Otherwise the barbarity proved to exist in your statements might be thought to exist in his understanding.
2.47I hear Paul declaring: ‘Through one man sin entered the world, and death through sin; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12). You maintain that this was said with reference to generation, not to an example of sin. You call us heretics for referring it to examples, and imagine that this argument helps you: ‘Surely,’ you say, ‘if the apostle had meant imitation, he would have said that sin entered through the devil and passed through all human beings, rather than “through one man.” For Scripture says of the devil: “Those who belong to his party imitate him” (Wisdom of Solomon 2:24; Latin numbering 2:25). But he said “through one man,” from whom the generation of human beings certainly began, precisely to teach that original sin passed through all people by generation’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.45). But I see that the apostle said nothing intended to slander human generation, condemn natural innocence, or accuse God’s work of crime.
2.48In fact, you tried to infer by argument what the words themselves had not indicated. You add that, if he had been speaking about imitation, he ought to have mentioned the devil; but because he meant generation, he preferred to say ‘a human being’ (Psalm 37:1;) rather than ‘a demon.’ I therefore ask what gave you occasion for this opinion. What? Do you deny that people sin by imitating human beings? Although so plain a matter needs no scriptural testimony, listen to David: ‘Do not compete with evildoers or envy those who practice injustice’ (Psalm 37:1; LXX/Vulgate 36:1) (Leviticus 18:3); ‘Do not envy the one who prospers in his way’ (Psalm 37:7; LXX/Vulgate 36:7) (Deuteronomy 18:9). Moreover, all the Old Testament Scriptures warn Israel not to imitate the practices of an impious nation (compare Psalm 37:1; Deuteronomy 18:9). What necessity, then, required the apostle, if he meant imitation, to name the devil rather than a human being, when he knew that people sin by imitating both human beings and the devil? Either prove that no one can sin by imitating human beings and that this is found nowhere in the law, and then maintain that room has been made for your conjecture; or else, since it is evident that nothing has strengthened sins more than the imitation of vices, acknowledge that you inferred with great ignorance that the apostle would certainly have spoken of the devil if he had meant imitation (Psalm 37:7;) (Leviticus 18:3; Deuteronomy 18:9).
2.49It is clear, then, that imitation of evil human beings is not merely a consistent expression but a necessary one. For the moment, it is evident that this argument of yours lies defeated. You add that Scripture says of the devil, ‘Those who belong to his party imitate him’ (Wisdom of Solomon 2:24; Latin numbering 2:25). I too agree that the author of that book, whoever he is, said this wisely. But the statement that some sin by imitating the devil does not help you unless you show that people cannot sin by imitating human beings.
2.50Both expressions are customary. Sometimes a person envies because he has imitated the devil; sometimes, by copying a human being, he is stained with envy or the filth of shameful conduct. The word ‘imitation’ can therefore apply to either person, whether one is speaking of a human being or of the devil. Your insistence that Adam could not have been indicated in connection with imitation is ridiculously foolish.
2.51The discussion hurries toward what remains, but we must press this point further, dividing it as briefly as possible to help the reader both understand and remember it. In almost every area we find homonyms, which we call words with more than one meaning.
2.52To keep our discussion on the matter at hand: generation properly concerns the sexes, while imitation always concerns minds. This disposition of a mind that imitates what it freely chooses either incriminates a person or advances him, according to the different circumstances. Thus, in good conduct, a person is said to imitate God, angels, and apostles. God: ‘Be perfect, as your Father is perfect’ (Matthew 5:48) (Psalm 32:9;). Angels: ‘Your will be done on earth as in heaven’ (Matthew 6:10). Apostles: ‘Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ’ (1 Corinthians 11:1). In evil conduct, however, a person imitates the devil, as Scripture says: ‘Those who belong to his party imitate him’ (Wisdom of Solomon 2:24; Latin numbering 2:25). People imitate human beings: ‘Do not be gloomy like the hypocrites, disfiguring their faces’ (Matthew 6:16). They imitate animals, as in the command: ‘Do not become like a horse or mule, which have no understanding’ (Psalm 32:9; LXX/Vulgate 31:9). These words, whether encouraging or warning, show the disposition to imitate. If it were impossible, we certainly would not be told to guard against it.
2.53Just as the word ‘imitation’ plainly applies in common to different things, so ‘generation,’ in its true and proper sense, indicates a substance that begets. It applies to deliberate activities only figuratively, not properly. Yet because this usage is now established, what it indicates is recognized, without allowing it to prejudice the words’ proper meanings. Thus the devil is said to beget sinners, according to the Lord’s words in the Gospel: ‘You are from your father the devil’ (John 8:44). With these words he called the devil the father of criminals who were shown to imitate his malice. Yet the meaning is perfectly clear: the name ‘father’ assigns neither a sex to the devil nor an airy substance to those human beings. Let our intended conclusion now become plain. Suppose a human being were never properly said to imitate another human being, and the apostle had said that everyone sinned through Adam. I would freely insist that scriptural usage must vindicate the apostle. Just as the Lord had called the devil a father, though he could not beget by substance, so the apostle would have described a human being as imitable, to avoid the belief that he taught anything against clear reason.
2.54But as things stand, even if I gather the Gospel’s figurative expressions, they do not support them. Much less did the apostle Paul provide any occasion for error: he said nothing improper if he declared that the first sinful man was an example to later sinners (compare Romans 5:12) (Romans 5:12).
2.55Your argument, then, was exceedingly stupid: that if the apostle Paul had wanted sin’s passage to be understood as imitation, he would have named the devil rather than Adam. For it is clear that the evil of either a human being or the devil could pass on only through imitation. But now that your construction has been torn apart, not so much by my hands as by those of reason itself, attend to what we bring forward (compare Romans 5:12) (Romans 5:12).
2.56The apostle showed that he was not saying sin passed on by generation when, naming a human being, he added ‘one.’ One is the beginning of number. Explaining through whom he said sin had entered, he not only named him but also counted him: ‘Through one man sin entered this world’ (Romans 5:12). This one person is sufficient to supply an example for imitation but insufficient to accomplish generation. Sin passed on, but through one. Clearly, then, what is accused here is imitation, not generation, which cannot take place except through two. Either show that generation occurred through Adam alone, without a woman—that would hardly be inconsistent with the refinement of your mind—or else, since you see that generation cannot exist without two, agree at last that the work of two was not accused by the number one. ‘Through one man,’ he says, ‘sin entered the world.’ In saying ‘through one,’ he did not mean us to understand ‘through two.’ Why, I ask, was number brought into these teachings, so that the apostle took such care to name not merely a human being but one human being? We see here the careful language of a lofty purpose: through the Holy Spirit’s revelation it anticipated and disarmed the errors of our times. When the subject required him to recount sin’s beginnings, he said sin passed on through a number that could not fit procreation, so that no one would think he had said anything to slander marriage instituted by God or blessed fertility. Certainly the first two human beings had both sinned, and both can rightly be called models of sin for their descendants. Why, then, did the apostle not say that sin passed on through two, which would have agreed better with the historical account? Nothing could have been wiser than his action. He saw that if he named the two who had provided the beginning and example of transgression, and affirmed that sin passed through them, there would be an opening for error: someone might think that by naming two he had condemned their union and fertility. Very wisely, therefore, he preferred to name one. Insufficient to indicate generation, one was more than enough to signify an example: accusing him would condemn imitation, while counting him would not accuse fertility. To sum up our argument briefly: the fertility instituted in the first human beings cannot operate except through two; but the apostle declares that sin entered through one.
2.57It is irrefutably established that the apostle shows this sin to have been conveyed to descendants through conduct, not through seed. Consider, then, the great falsehood that flowed from your mouth: ‘But the apostle said “through one man,” from whom the generation of human beings certainly began, precisely to teach that original sin passed through all people by generation’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.45). In fact, the apostle said ‘through one man’ precisely so that no one would think original sin had passed through all people (Romans 5:12). Your foolishness makes it hard for me to hold back laughter: you say generation began from one human being, although both the distinction between the sexes and the reading of divine Scripture testify that generation could not occur unless two human beings—a man and a woman—had first existed.
2.58Or perhaps, since your doctrine cannot stand otherwise, you will reply that Adam conceived and gave birth by himself. No one doubts that the apostle did not mean that. But you will show what you wanted to happen to your own sex.
2.59Let us leave that aside and crush, by reason’s strength, the argument it seems you could offer at this point. You may say that Scripture describes this union by saying that the two become one flesh, and that in this sense the apostle said ‘through one man’ to indicate the joined bodies of those who beget (Romans 5:12). I will answer that this too counts against your impiety. For it does not say, ‘The two human beings will become one human being,’ but, ‘The two will become one flesh’ (Genesis 2:24). The language of union teaches that this pleasure of those coupling, this desire which affects their sensation and stirs their organs—which, as that wise man understood, strives to make one flesh—was instituted by God and implanted in their bodies before sin.
2.60Consequently the devil can claim nothing for himself either from its delight or from the modesty connected with it.
2.61Yet if the apostle had meant anything of the kind here, he would have said sin entered ‘through one flesh,’ (Romans 5:12) not ‘through one man.’ In generation, only the substance of flesh is shared with the offspring: a soul is not derived from a soul, but flesh from flesh. The term ‘human being,’ however, properly includes both mind and body. Thus, by naming one human being, the apostle neither indicated the work of fertility—in which he knew nothing was imparted except the substance of flesh—nor intended two to be understood. He stressed one to teach that sin passed by imitation, not generation (compare Romans 5:12).
2.62Although the truth has already played its part here, I nevertheless urge the reader to pay attention. In this contest I have surrendered a great deal of what I was entitled to claim. Following where my opponent’s rashness challenged me, I have defended the teachings of sound faith to this extent: even if the Teacher of the Gentiles had used the words the advocate of inherited sin supposed him to have used, it would still be clear that he meant nothing about natural sin. Naming a human being, but one, he would certainly have blamed examples of guilt, not its generation.
2.63But the apostle’s words plainly do not have the sequence our enemy imagined. His argument runs like this: ‘If the apostle had meant imitation,’ he says, ‘he would have said that sin entered through the devil and passed through all human beings, rather than “through one man” (Romans 5:12). For Scripture says of the devil: “Those who belong to his party imitate him” (Wisdom of Solomon 2:24; Latin numbering 2:25). But he said “through one man,” from whom the generation of human beings certainly began, precisely to teach that original sin passed through all people by generation’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.45). His falsehood, then, lies in affirming that blessed Paul declared that sin entered the world through one man and so passed into all human beings. This, I repeat, is not found in the Teacher of the Gentiles’ words. Paul did not say sin passed on, but death. The sequence is: ‘Just as through one man sin entered the world, and death through sin, and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12). The church’s exalted teacher weighed what he should say: ‘Through one man sin entered the world, and death through sin, and so it passed into all human beings.’ He had already named both death and sin. Why, in speaking of what passed on, did he need to separate death from association with sin? Why expressly show that sin entered this world through one man, and death through sin, but that what passed into all human beings was not sin but death—death imposed by the severity of judgment, avenging transgression, pursuing not bodily seed but moral faults? Surely because he took care to commend and safeguard his meaning, so that no one would suppose he had given any support to your doctrine.
2.64Consider, then, the distance between you and Paul. He says ‘through one man’ (Romans 5:12); you say ‘through two,’ that is, through generation. He declares that both sin and death were in the first man, but that only death passed to his descendants. You, on the contrary, maintain that both sin and destruction spread to everyone.
2.65You therefore hide shamelessly in the shadow of his name, although your statements are greatly different and opposed. He accuses human beings’ work; you accuse God’s work. He accuses sinners’ deliberate conduct; you accuse newborn children’s innocence and life. He accuses human will; you accuse nature.
2.66According to the apostle, then, sin entered this world through one man, and death through sin, because the world saw that man guilty and destined for condemnation to everlasting death (Romans 5:12). Death passed into all human beings because the same form of judgment encompasses transgressors in later ages too. Yet this death is not permitted to rage against any holy or innocent people: it invades those whom it finds imitating the transgression (compare Augustine, Proceedings of Pelagius 23.57).
2.67Although this transgression did not become natural, it was nevertheless a model of sin. Thus, although it does not burden those who are born, it accuses those who imitate it.
2.68The death imposed by judgment passed on because all sinned—but they sinned by free will (Romans 5:12). In keeping with scriptural usage, the word ‘all’ here indicates a multitude, not absolutely everyone.
2.69But let us proceed to what remains, so that the unfolding of the apostle’s sacred discourse may show which doctrine he agrees with, as has already largely become clear. You write: ‘What else do the apostle’s following words indicate? After saying this he added: “Until the law, sin was in the world” (Romans 5:13)—that is, because not even the law could remove sin. “But sin was not reckoned when there was no law” (Romans 5:13). It therefore existed but was not reckoned, because it was not disclosed so that it could be reckoned. As he says elsewhere: “Through the law comes knowledge of sin” (Romans 3:20). “But death reigned,” he says, “from Adam until Moses”—the same as his earlier “until the law.” Not until Moses as though sin ceased thereafter, but because not even the law given through Moses could remove death’s reign, which certainly reigns only through sin. Its reign consists in hurling a mortal human being into the second death also, which is everlasting (Revelation 20:14; Revelation 21:8). “But it reigned.” Over whom? “Even over those,” he says, “who did not sin in the likeness of Adam’s transgression, who is a figure of the one to come” (Romans 5:14). Of which coming one, if not Christ? And what sort of figure, if not one by contrast? As he also says elsewhere: “As in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive” (1 Corinthians 15:22). As the one thing is in the first, so the other is in the second: that is the figure. But this figure does not correspond in every respect. Therefore the apostle went on to add here: “But the gift is not like the offense. For if through the one man’s offense many died, much more did God’s grace and the gift in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ abound to many” (Romans 5:15). What does “abound much more” mean? Because everyone who is freed through Christ dies a temporal death on account of Adam, but will live without end on account of Christ himself’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). You have asserted that the apostle’s subsequent words indicate nothing other than original sin. But we have proved that he did not indicate it even at the beginning, since he specified that sin passed through one, not through two.
2.70Nevertheless, we must consider whether he now at least intimates what he previously passed over. ‘Until the law,’ he says, ‘sin was in the world’ (Romans 5:13). You say the apostle intended this sin to be understood as natural. I therefore ask: if it existed until the law, why did it cease to exist after the law? I do not agree to understand ‘until the law’ as until its end rather than until its appearance. The expression’s proper meaning supports me: in saying it existed until the law, he shows it does not exist after the law. Anything removed in the course of time was not natural. Therefore what the law’s discipline broke, and in breaking largely extinguished, evidently arose through imitation, not generation.
2.71But lest I seem too unyielding with you here, let us agree that ‘until the law’ can be understood as ‘until Christ’ (Romans 5:13). You therefore concede that this sin which you call original does not exist after Christ. How, then, do you say that the devil’s work, the shrub of the hostile power and the law of sin, remains, flourishes, and lives in the apostles’ limbs and in all the baptized, even down to today, so many centuries after Christ’s coming?
2.72Let us also examine what follows. ‘But sin was not reckoned,’ the apostle says, ‘when there was no law’ (Romans 5:13). You then add: ‘It therefore existed but was not reckoned, as he says elsewhere: “Through the law comes knowledge of sin”’ (Romans 3:20; Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). If, then, knowledge of sin came through the law, and the sin of inherited transmission was not imputed before the law, show that it was imputed under the law. If through the law came knowledge of sin, and before the law there was ignorance of sin, there can be no doubt that a chief reason for promulgating the law was to expose, and enable people to avoid, what had previously been hidden.
2.73Let this, then, be the decisive issue: show that original sin was imputed to anyone under the law; show that it was revealed there; and I will agree that the apostle was speaking of this sin.
2.74Or else, since this cannot be found in the law, agree, most shameless man, that the apostle is speaking of the sin acquired by imitation, committed by will, exposed by reason, disclosed by law, and punished by justice.
2.75But the original sin you invent cannot even be transmitted through one person, since generation is accomplished through two.
2.76Nor could it ever have existed if it can at some time cease to exist, because natural properties persist from the beginning of a substance to its end.
2.77Nor was it revealed by the law, nor could it have been. No lawgiver would ever reach such madness as to command anyone, ‘Do not be born this way or that.’ And where it would be inappropriate to give a warning so that something may be corrected, it cannot be just to impose punishment.
2.78And what exists until the law is shown not to exist after the law—shown, at any rate, not to exist after Christ (compare Romans 5:13) (Romans 5:13).
2.79Consequently, even according to your argument, it ceased to exist long ago; according to the testimony of truth, it never existed.
2.80To impress our argument on the reader’s memory: you once defined sin, quite excellently, as nothing other than the will to commit what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain.
2.81This definition also opened the way to understanding God’s justice. We could judge that the fairness of divine judgment could never stand unless God imputed as sin only an act from which he knew the person punished for it had been free to abstain.
2.82The Teacher of the Gentiles armed reason with the special force of authority by declaring that guilt passed into this world through one man (Romans 5:12). By this expression he excluded the activities of marriage, which cannot occur without the participation of two. We emphasized that he named one precisely so that no one would dare understand two.
2.83Indeed, I am far more consistent in maintaining that the one whom the apostle names is one, to show that the fault lay in imitation, not generation. The advocate of inherited sin, by contrast, uses the name of the one said to be sin’s gateway to attach a matter of will to seed—something the nature of things does not permit (compare Romans 5:12) (Romans 5:12).
2.84Afterward we came to the law. The apostle wrote that undisclosed sin prevailed until its time (Romans 5:13). You tried to extend that time until the law’s end, without understanding that your argument was futile. For we would compel you either to prove that this sin—which you falsely claim Paul discussed, and which you assert reigned until the Old Testament was abolished—was or could have been imputed under the law; or else to agree that it does not reign after Christ. At least then the apostle’s statement, though violently twisted, would agree with your views. But you can deliver none of this. The purity of our faith therefore stands on solid ground, in agreement with reason’s principles, justice’s dignity, and all the apostle’s teachings.
2.85But let us examine the rest. After saying, ‘This figure does not correspond in every respect,’ you add: ‘Therefore the apostle went on to add here: “But the gift is not like the offense. For if through the one man’s offense many died, much more did God’s grace and the gift in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ abound to more people”’ (Romans 5:15). You explain this statement as follows: ‘What does “abound much more” mean, except that everyone freed through Christ dies a temporal death on account of Adam, but will live without end on account of Christ himself?’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). The apostle, whose meaning we are disputing, certainly declared that the Savior’s grace works more effectively and abundantly to confer salvation than Adam’s sin works against it. He thus showed that Christ helped far more powerfully, and helped more people—his grace, to use the apostle’s own expression, ‘abounded to more people’—than were harmed by the first man’s transgression, which you say bound sin into human seed.
2.86Prove, then, that what the apostle understood fits your doctrines.
2.87For if Adam, as you say, through natural sin begot everyone for condemnation and poured so much poison from his own body into his offspring that he disrupted every ordinance God had placed in human nature (compare Romans 5:18)— (Romans 5:18)
2.88—so that marriage, which God had created, could not exist without the devil’s gift, to which you assign sexual desire; or rather, so that the marriages God had ordained flew away with the honor of his institution, and Adam forced and proved the marriages whose order remained to be the devil’s work, not God’s, with their genital movement, the partners’ modesty, the heat and agitation of their limbs, the delight of their senses, and the guilt of their newborn children—
2.89—and finally overthrew the very freedom of the will by the impact of one sin, so that afterward no one had the power to reject former crimes by choosing virtue, but everyone was swept in a single torrent of ruined humanity toward condemnation—
2.90—if, I say, the first man’s wickedness inflicted all this on God’s image, Christ’s grace is plainly very weak in its gifts, since it has found nothing to remedy so many massive evils. Or if it has found a remedy, state it. Let us now compare each point individually. If Adam overturned the institutions of nature itself, beyond the acts of his will, Christ should above all have repaired what Adam had shattered, following the very tracks along which Adam had destroyed it.
2.91That is, no sexual desire should be felt in the marriages of baptized people, nor should their genitals move in the same way as those of the other nations.
2.92After the gift of grace, the modesty of those coupling should disappear; no semblance of repose should spread through their limbs; their senses should not undergo the burden of sweetness. Finally, free will should be restored to the baptized, so that, with nature corrected and the law of sin expelled, you would acknowledge that mortals can as readily shine with the brilliance of virtues as be repulsive with the filth of vices. Indeed, those initiated into the sacraments should not be mortal at all.
2.93For if the medicine combats the wound, and death is said to have arisen through sin, removing sin should accomplish the removal of death.
2.94But none of these things we have mentioned is known to happen to baptized people’s bodies. And truth, clearer than the sun, has shown that full healing could not—or rather should not—take place except by these methods of treatment. You must therefore confess either that the things we listed earlier did not arise through sin and so were not wounds of nature, thus preserving a coherent account of grace, which plainly has not displaced them from their order; or else you must deny that Christ’s mysteries contain any medicine at all, since they have not been able to heal even one of the many diseases you describe.
2.95So far I have argued as though the apostle regarded the power of the gifts and the wounds as equal, although opposite in effect. But the sound faith we defend undoubtedly rises still higher when we consider that Paul not only did not rank the sickness of sins above the remedies of grace: he judged the benefits more abundant than the losses (compare Romans 5:15) (Romans 5:15).
2.96Let the discerning reader consider what this further argument has established. The apostle said that Christ’s gift abounded to the salvation of more people than Adam’s fault had harmed (Romans 5:15).
2.97You say that this fault brought upon nature the disasters listed above. Not even one of them, however, is known to be healed in those who come to Christ’s sacraments. Consequently, you assert that the first man’s wickedness had far more power to harm than Christ’s grace possesses to heal. This conclusion shows that the disagreement between you and the apostle Paul is as great as that between catholics and Manichaeans.
2.98I could very properly despise your trifling explanation of this passage and pass it over unanswered, as lying too low on the ground, if I did not fear that this might be credited to evasion rather than confidence. You speak as follows: ‘What does “abound much more” mean (Romans 5:15), except that everyone freed through Christ dies a temporal death on account of Adam, but will live without end on account of Christ himself?’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). If you considered what follows consistently from this statement, you would confess that your entire fortress—that is, inherited transmission—had fallen. For you say Christ’s grace abounded much more because through it eternal life is conferred, whereas through Adam’s sin temporal decay must be undergone. If, then, Adam brought nothing but bodily death, in contrast with which Christ conferred the more generous benefit of life without end, it appears that what passed to descendants was not Adam’s sin but death.
2.99It will follow entirely consistently that everlasting death—that is, eternal punishment—was not transmitted to us, and consequently that sin transmitted by descent cannot exist. To make briefly clear the position we must hold: the apostle ranks Christ’s gifts above the first man’s sin. Do you say that through this sin of yours—the sin of inherited transmission—one death passed on, or two? If one, and bodily death, as you have confessed here, then Christ’s grace clearly excels the first man’s sin, and no one is born a sinner. For if, as you said above, sin’s kingdom consists in a person being hurled into the second death, or everlasting punishment, and you say that through Adam only bodily death was brought on, then neither sin nor eternal death is transmitted through Adam to his descendants (compare Romans 5:15; Revelation 20:14) (Romans 5:15) (Revelation 20:14) (Romans 5:15; Revelation 20:14).
2.100But if you say that through Adam’s sin wickedness became natural and two deaths arose, one eternal and the other temporal, while through Christ’s grace only one—the everlasting death—is removed for the present from the person, not from nature, and temporal death remains, then the apostle is convicted of falsehood. For he said that grace helped much more than sin harmed (Romans 5:15). But the apostle cannot be accused. You, therefore, are rightly rejected.
2.101The apostle said that Christ’s grace abounded more than Adam’s fault (Romans 5:15). Thus he accuses neither nature, nor generation, nor fertility, but will, the choice of evil, and corrupt conduct.
2.102Consequently, if truth still has any place in human affairs, and the whole world has not been utterly deafened by the uproar of injustice, it will acknowledge that reason, argument, the apostle’s faith, and his own statement as witness have fully demonstrated this: the distance between advocates of inherited sin and catholics is as great as that between Paul and Mani, between wisdom and foolishness, between reason and insanity, between consistent statements and the fluctuation you endure with extraordinary disgrace. Almost in the same lines, you deny what you said and affirm what you denied.
2.103‘And the gift,’ he says, ‘is not as it was through one who sinned. For the judgment was from one to condemnation, but grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). You attach this explanation to the apostle’s words: ‘“From one”—from one what,’ you ask, ‘if not offense? For what follows is “But grace is from many offenses.” Let these people say how judgment comes from one offense to condemnation, unless even the single original sin that passed into all human beings is sufficient for condemnation. Grace, however, is from many offenses to justification because it releases not only that single sin inherited at birth, but also the other sins each person adds by the movement of his own will. “For if through one man’s offense death reigned through one, much more will those who receive the abundance of grace and righteousness reign in life through the one Jesus Christ. Therefore, as through one man’s offense it came upon all human beings to condemnation, so through one man’s righteousness it came upon all human beings to justification of life”’ (Romans 5:17–18; Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). After these apostolic words, as though you had achieved something, you insult us: ‘Let them persist in the vanity of their minds (Ephesians 4:17) and say that one man did not transmit sin by descent but supplied an example of it. How, then, does it come “through one man’s offense upon all human beings to condemnation,” rather than through each person’s many offenses, unless that one sin alone is sufficient to bring condemnation even when no other sins are added? It does so to dying infants born from Adam, unless they are reborn in Christ. Why, then, does this man ask us what he refuses to hear from the apostle: through what sin is found in an infant—whether through will, marriage, or parents? Let him hear through what. Let him hear and be silent: through what sin is found in an infant. The apostle says, “Through one man’s offense upon all human beings to condemnation”’ (Romans 5:18; Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). We know that you fear nothing more than questioning that probes your mind and doctrine. That is why you use every resource to obtain from the powers of this world a refusal of examination. You understand that you must act by force when reason’s help deserts you.
2.104But your opinion will not carry such weight among the wise that, although you are ‘the source and cause of these evils’ (Virgil, Aeneid 11.361), you can withdraw from the middle of the contest by putting the apostle in the way. You suppose that he should take the blows for you, although he is precisely the teacher and leader who arms us against you. To understand, then, what you can consistently say: if you and I agreed that the apostle confirmed the Manichaeans’ doctrine of natural sin, you could confidently place him in the path of someone aiming at your head. As it is, however, the Teacher of the Gentiles’ dignity remains inviolable for me. I will not permit your interpretation to injure his words, which, according to the rule of reason set out above, I maintain are opposed to a foolish, filthy, and impious doctrine. I prove that he said nothing in favor of natural sin. With what shamelessness, then, do you insist that he answer me in your place, when he is not being questioned because his wisdom is not doubted? Or how do you shout that I refuse to hear from the apostle what I detest in you precisely through the sound understanding the apostle has handed down to us?
2.105Let us bring out the force of your arguments. After Paul said that the Savior’s grace abounded much more in healing than the first man’s transgression in harming, he continues: ‘And the gift is not as it was through one who sinned. For the judgment was from one to condemnation, but grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). You contend that this one offense sufficient for condemnation is original sin, passing into all human beings. You say that grace is called ‘from many offenses to justification’ because it releases not only that one sin inherited at birth but also the other sins each person adds by the movement of his own will (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). A little later, to confirm this, you argue that, if the apostle had described this one offense sufficient for condemnation as acquired by imitation, he should have added that all people go to condemnation not through one offense, but through the many each has committed voluntarily. Since the apostle’s language must be disentangled here from the Manichaeans’ nets, I urge the reader to pay attention. You say that, according to our understanding—that the first fault supplied a model to sinners—the apostle ought to have said that death reigned through many sins, just as he said grace produces justification from many offenses. But with this argument you struggle entirely against yourself. I prove that, according to your doctrine, the apostle speaks inconsistently in saying, ‘But grace is from many offenses to justification,’ after saying, ‘The judgment was from one sin to condemnation.’ Let us leave our own territory and spend some time in yours. Suppose freedom of will was overthrown by the first sin, and thereafter remained so crippled throughout the human race that it can do nothing but evil; that it has no power to choose the other side—to turn from evil and do good (possible allusion to Psalm 34:14; compare Psalm 37:27 and 1 Peter 3:11)—but, oppressed by the necessity of wickedness, is compelled to obey a craving for crimes. Suppose that, with every law of justice broken, things once voluntary became natural; that the law of sin dwells in the limbs (Romans 7:23), having gained tyranny over God’s image and work through marriage’s modesty and pleasure; that the devil’s shrub is planted in the inner body before the soul arrives, and grows with natural growth, puts out leaves, and becomes heavy with deadly fruit. If, I say, the first man’s single fault produced all these things as you claim, it is more consistent to say that the mortal race goes into condemnation from one offense than that grace frees it from many offenses. One should more properly understand this grace as freeing those it frees from one offense. For no other sins are added by the movement of a personal will if all evil is worked by the first parent’s fault that infects the seed, with freedom of will broken and honorable desire excluded.
2.106Consequently, if natural sin is the author of so many evils, Christ’s grace certainly does not produce justification by forgiving many offenses. It carries out its work of kindness by pardoning one sin. When it promises to do so, it will make its promises good if it heals the things said to have been introduced through sin’s wound. But if, even after the remedies it has brought, the same succession of diabolical diseases persists, we owe thanks for its good intention and forgiveness for its presumption: it lacked the power to cure the inborn plagues, not the will (compare Romans 5:16) (Romans 5:16).
2.107What, then, has this argument established? That your understanding does not agree with the apostle. The apostle says that many offenses are forgiven by grace’s generosity. Your doctrine, however, asserts that one natural sin, which you call the law of sin, fashions desires for wickedness in all human beings. Plainly, then, you accuse nature, which is God’s work, while he accuses the will. He ought not to have spoken otherwise than he did: condemnation can result from one sin. For that first man supplied an example of wrongdoing through one sin, and just as one transgression was enough to condemn him, so one fault can suffice to make others guilty. Hence Ecclesiastes says, ‘Whoever sins in one thing destroys much good’ (Ecclesiastes 9:18); and James: ‘If you keep the whole law but stumble in one point, you have become guilty of all’ (James 2:10).
2.108The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, however, was not given so as to provide separate remedies of forgiveness for separate sins, as for separate wounds, and to pardon different sins through different baptisms. Rather, by the power of its supremely effective medicine, applied to crimes—that is, the works of an evil will—it gives comprehensive help, wiping away different kinds of guilt by the power of a single consecration.
2.109Wisely, therefore, when speaking of Adam, he named one sin, which he intended to be understood as a model of transgression. He mentioned one, I repeat, and not many, because he knew that only one sin of Adam is recorded in the law’s history. But he praised grace for sending those it initiates out into justification from many offenses, to prevent any suspicion of a meager benefit. If he had said, ‘Grace is from one offense to justification,’ it might have seemed to abolish individual sins rather than all sins. Thus, by first mentioning one sin he remained faithful to the history; by adding, ‘Grace is from many offenses to justification,’ he commended the sacrament’s generosity and abundance (Romans 5:16).
2.110This explanation agrees with reason and destroys your position. This very point compels you to admit that, in all the preceding words, the apostle did not speak of the sin of Manichaean inherited transmission, since in mentioning grace he showed that many sins are forgiven (compare Romans 5:16) (Romans 5:16).
2.111For by commending these sins as many, and all forgiven through grace, he showed that the one sin he mentioned earlier also belonged to their kind. You agree that these many sins are those each human being commits by the movement of his own will. Therefore that one sin too belongs to the same kind.
2.112It should therefore be understood as acquired by each person through the movement of his own will. What is accused will then be not the fertility of seed, but the perversity of deliberate conduct. If, however, he had intended that one sin to be understood as original, he certainly would not afterward have spoken of many sins which, as he testifies, are forgiven through grace.
2.113Although what we have already accomplished more than suffices to defend the truth, I nevertheless urge the reader to attend to what we add. It will appear irrefutably that in these passages the apostle Paul discussed not human nature but human conduct. Setting the power of Christ’s grace and of the first sin opposite each other, and comparing the effects of both, he worked to show that Christ’s mystery helped more than the first man’s sin harmed. We have shown that this cannot hold under the interpretation of inherited transmission. Among the many points he listed, then, he intended this especially to praise grace: ‘The judgment was from one offense to condemnation, but grace is from many offenses to justification of life’ (Romans 5:16). The defender of natural evil explained this as follows: ‘It says “from one offense to condemnation” because that one sin inherited at birth is sufficient to lead to condemnation, as it leads infants born from Adam unless they are reborn in Christ, even if there are no other sins. “But grace is from many offenses to justification,” because it forgives not only the sin inherited at birth but also the other sins each person adds by the movement of his own will’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46). See: you have professed, though with Manichaean impiety, that natural sin exists, but that it is one sin, on account of which you say newborn children must be condemned.
2.114Prove, then, that what the apostle Paul attributed to Christ’s grace is fulfilled in them: namely, that it produces justification from many offenses, bestowing righteousness through a single, once-for-all remission of many sins. Either show that infants are liable for many crimes, so as to persuade us that the feature in which the apostle placed his praise of Christ’s generosity applies to them too, and that they have been freed from many sins; or confess that Paul discussed neither infants nor human nature in these passages, since he testified that grace’s generosity forgives things which, even with your agreement, cannot be found in newborn children (compare Romans 5:16) (Romans 5:16).
2.115‘Grace,’ he says, ‘is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). You say infants are liable for no more than one sin. You therefore see praise of grace limping in their case, because it finds no multitude of sins whose forgiveness can earn it praise. Consequently, the apostle Paul’s words, ‘But grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16), are exposed as utterly false in infants’ condition. Where will you try to jump from here? No doubt you will say—for your previous argument has disclosed this intention—that the apostle’s statement, ‘But grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16), is fulfilled in adults, who are proved liable for many offenses through the movement of their own will; but that in infants justification comes not from many offenses but from one.
2.116But with this explanation—which will not enable you either to distort the meaning or to escape—you have lost not only your tricks but also the manufactured hostility you were inflaming against us. You used to claim that we gravely offended against the faith by saying this: Christ’s grace must indeed be administered uniformly, and its words and institutions must not be unsettled. It confers the gifts of adoption, sanctification, and advancement equally on all whom it initiates. Yet it does not find everyone who approaches it in the same state of guilt. Those who have sinned by their own will—without whose activity no sin can exist—it frees from guilt and makes good out of evil. But it does not accuse the innocent, blessed in the unstained freshness of their first age, of any act of an evil will, since it knows they have had no experience of such a will.
2.117Instead, it makes the good better. It raises everyone it receives to the same summit of sanctification, but does not find everyone in the same swamp of vices. It finds some in the condition of the innocent, others engaged in wrongdoing. This is what we say, protected by sound faith, reason’s support, and reverent understanding. Through it Christ’s grace is rightly praised and no guilt is attributed to God. Yet you say the sacrament’s authority totters. With a sharpness blunter than any pestle, you assert that grace loses its authority unless the crime of slander is attributed to it, unless it overturns the institutions of justice, unless it charges those without knowledge with the guilt of another’s conscience. Finally, you say it accomplishes nothing unless it is proclaimed to operate uniformly in everyone.
2.118It is clear, then, that your own explanation has made all this disappear—the whole device by which you deceived minds sullied with foolishness.
2.119For the apostle declares, ‘But grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). You say this cannot hold for infants but is fulfilled only in adults, because by the movement of their own will they have added other sins to that one. You therefore undoubtedly confess that grace operates differently according to the differences among those who approach it. In those who exercise their own will, it finds material for glory, since it leads those it adopts from many crimes into justification. But in infants, according to you, in a leaner, narrower, poorer fashion—with no great power, no adequate medicine, no intact honor, and no secure modesty—it promises to remove that one sin which it should not even have imputed, and tries to send those it frees from that one sin into justification.
2.120You have therefore confessed that grace operates one way in older people and another in younger ones. Do not imagine any room remains for your answer if you add that the difference is indeed great, but concerns the remission of sins, so that it still finds a sin to forgive, even if only one. This argument advances nothing. It does not matter under what heading you acknowledge different effects of one grace, provided you acknowledge that its effects can differ.
2.121I am content with what you have been compelled to grant me: what the apostle praised in grace’s generosity cannot apply equally to every age. Even if you adduce something to establish that grace also effects forgiveness at the earliest age of newborn children, you have not altered this: the feature for which the apostle declared Christ’s grace praiseworthy is not fulfilled in infants. For when he ranked the sacrament’s medicine above the sin of the first man, whom he taught was a model for those who followed, he said: ‘The judgment was from one offense to condemnation, but grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). Therefore the feature by which he ranked grace higher—its producing justification from many offenses—does not hold for infants even according to you. Despite your resistance, you have been brought to acknowledge that grace does not act identically in different ages.
2.122Once you accepted this, it became clear that there was no necessity to stir up slander against human nature merely to avoid saying that baptism’s grace has different effects according to people’s ages. With this pretext for persuasion removed, if you have any strength, intelligence, or power, struggle to prove natural sin, which you see destroyed by reason, authority, and justice. What consideration deceived you into calling the union of bodies instituted by God—and sexual pleasure, which brings about that union—the devil’s work and shrub? This pleasure flourishes in human beings and animals alike, and points as its author to the very one it indicates as the bodies’ creator.
2.123What reason led you first to wound innocence with another’s crime, and then to try to mix a matter of deliberate conduct into human seed?
2.124Why deprive baptism of the truth of its own operation? Why attribute an obvious crime of injustice to God, who is wholly just and cannot be God without justice?
2.125So obvious, I repeat, that God himself has condemned by his law’s authority this very form of injustice which you falsely claim belongs to his judgments.
2.126What necessity, then, was there for so many blasphemies, if even the necessity you embraced did not exist? Although it had no real weight, it at least seemed like a plank you were holding amid so great a shipwreck. Now, though late, your defeated arms have let it go. To make the matter clear by repetition: all sorts of fools thought you should be tolerated as a Manichaean lest Christ’s grace seem not to have one effect in everyone. Yet without any compulsion from us, the progress of your own explanation has now led you to this: you say that the apostle’s statement, ‘But grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16), can be fulfilled in older people but cannot be fulfilled in infants. In infants there is something else, smaller, thinner, poorer—something which, although you invent it, you confess the apostle never said.
2.127Thus, even according to you, grace has an equal effect in adoption throughout every age; but in the remission of sins the reckoning is not the same for everyone. Yet so far I have acted far too sparingly and patiently.
2.128In the preceding argument I was content to prove that even you, who stirred up a great uproar against us on this point, say that remission of sins does not follow one identical pattern in everyone. Even if you could persuade us of this one natural sin, it would still be clear that we must say those who approach grace are not always in one condition, and that the apostle’s phrase ‘from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16) is fulfilled only in adulthood, not in earliest infancy as well.
2.129Now, however, I maintain consistently that the apostle had no notion of Manichaean inherited transmission. He showed that it would gravely insult the mysteries if they were in every respect comparable to sins—that is, if grace did not help more effectively than the example of sin had harmed. The Teacher of the Gentiles therefore located the Christian faith’s highest dignity in his affirmation that it surpasses offenses. That is why he took care to rank the medicine’s effect above the old diseases (compare Romans 5:15) (Romans 5:15).
2.130He thus showed grace to be praiseworthy if what he said applied to it fully: ‘The judgment was from one to condemnation, but grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). By what license, then, will you rob Christ’s grace of the praise with which the apostle wished it proclaimed? Will you cast down the title of dignity through which alone the chosen vessel wished its honor to be recognized (allusion to Acts 9:15)?
2.131He said, ‘Grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). He ranked the abundance of the medicine above sin’s effectiveness. This meaning agrees with the catholics’ doctrine. They understand that remission of sins takes place in those in whom many sins can be found—sins acquired by the movement of their own will. But where this movement of a personal will does not exist, that is, in infants, there are no sins at all, not merely no multitude of sins.
2.132The apostle therefore strengthens our doctrine where he ranks grace above sin (compare Romans 5:15) (Romans 5:15).
2.133Now show where he made grace equal to sin. Since your faith cannot admit remedies ranked above wounds, let it at least admit remedies squeezed down so that they do not exceed the comparison. Even if you found that written somewhere, Paul would still clearly reject such a view. To bring the apostle’s whole meaning to light briefly, he says: ‘Grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). Even according to you infants do not have many offenses; according to the apostle they have none.
2.134It is clear, then, that here the Teacher of the Gentiles was discussing not newborn children, but those who already exercise the movement of their own will.
2.135What the apostle added—‘As through one man’s offense it came upon all to condemnation, so through one man’s righteousness it came upon all human beings to justification’ (Romans 5:18)—gives us as much support as it brings crashing destruction on your doctrine. By placing ‘all’ on opposite sides, in statements that cannot be combined, he sends us back to scriptural usage, so that we understand that ‘all’ is commonly said for ‘many.’ For on the surface of the words there is a great incongruity. Who are the ‘all’ who come to justification if all have gone to condemnation? Or who are the ‘all’ who go to punishment if all are swept into glory? Making one side universal excludes the other.
2.136To see how strongly we are protected here too, understand the scope of the wounder from the scope of the healer. If Christ saved absolutely everyone, let it also be imagined that Adam harmed absolutely everyone (compare Romans 5:18) (Romans 5:18).
2.137If Christ changed the functions of the genitals, let it be believed that Adam corrupted them. If Christ corrected something in bodily sensations, let it be supposed that Adam’s fault disturbed them. If Christ made medicine pass through descent, let it be said that Adam transmitted the offense through generation.
2.138But if all these things remain in the order they receive from nature, while the will is attracted to faith by exhortations, signs, examples, and the promise of rewards or punishments, without necessity being imposed; if the will is healed through teachings, mysteries, and gifts—not crushed, but awaited, free, and invited—then it is clear that each person’s will, not birth, was stained by imitation of sin, even if the whole world with one breath roars or rages in opposition.
2.139Yet I have argued far too gently. Even if Christ were shown, from the time he came, to have blocked the road to death for all human beings and given everyone everlasting life—so that from the very day ‘the Word became flesh’ (John 1:14) absolutely no one fell into sin or feared punishment for sin—the first wickedness would still not have the same character as this later generosity. For God can and commonly does help the undeserving, earning praise for mercy; but he cannot punish those who have not sinned without overthrowing justice.
2.140Consider, then, what the whole argument has established. If Christ’s grace and Adam’s fault were judged equal in their opposite effects—equal at least in the number of their operations, though differing in kind—it would have to be shown that grace benefited as many as the fault harmed, so that the balance and weight of the scale in which they were weighed remained fair. The medicine should therefore have helped in precisely the places and parts where the disease had settled. If the ancient crime had done anything to genital movements, the sensations of those coupling, the shamefulness of bodily parts, or the misery of newborn children, grace should have brought remedies by changing those things. Otherwise, it would be striking evidence of a feeble and useless medical art that it failed even to find the disease’s location, and, while the natural functions lay sick and ruined, applied ineffective soothing treatments to people’s wills.
2.141But amid these points, truth has shown that even if medicine, poured out universally, benefited bodily movements and mortal people, including those who had earned it by no effort or intention, guilt would not therefore harm newborn children who could have contributed no assent to it. Consequently, even if grace and sin were rated equally, it was clear that even then such a weighing would not extend so far as to prove anyone born guilty.
2.142Now, however, the apostle not only did not rank grace below the fault; he ranked it above, saying that benefits abounded to far more people than losses had crept into (Romans 5:15). Under the theory of inherited transmission, by contrast, sins clearly did far more harm than grace did good. It has therefore been irrefutably proved that the apostle Paul meant nothing about inherited transmission; rather, his statement destroyed its advocates together with their Manichaean teachers.
2.143But since I have spent rather long on this, let us proceed to what remains.
2.144You write: ‘He said “all” come through Adam to condemnation and “all” through Jesus Christ to justification of life. Certainly Christ does not transfer to life all those who die in Adam. He said “all” in both places because, just as no one comes to death without Adam, so no one comes to life without Christ. It is like what we say about a teacher of letters if he is the only one in a town: “This man teaches everyone here their letters.” Not everyone learns, but no one learns except from him. Those he had called “all” he afterward called “many,” yet signified the same people by “all” and “many”: “For just as through one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so through one man’s obedience many will be made righteous” (Romans 5:19). Let him still ask through what sin is found in an infant. The holy pages answer him: “Through one man sin entered the world”’ (Romans 5:12; Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.46–47). We indeed confess that the apostle’s pages are holy, for this reason alone: in agreement with reason, devotion, and faith, they teach us to believe in God’s inviolable justice, to defend his works as good and honorable, and to maintain the moderation, wisdom, and justice of his commands.
2.145Consequently, they teach us to deny that anyone can be condemned for another’s sin, and to deny that any sin passes to descendants as a condition of nature. They teach us to believe and assert that a human being born through the fertility God instituted is addressed by the just laws of free will: to avoid everything evil and practice everything good. Such a person should not suppose, as you do, that a love and necessity of crimes clings to the causes of his substance—to the seed itself. Nor should he accept that so foolish, insane, and impious a statement, insulting nature, reason, and God, is contained in the apostle’s book merely because he said sin entered this world through one man and death passed into all human beings (Romans 5:12). For he did not allow this to remain obscure for long, but added that those he had called ‘all’ should be understood as ‘many,’ who sinned through imitation, not generation (Romans 5:19).
2.146He untangled the whole argument by saying: ‘For just as through one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so through one man’s obedience many will be made righteous’ (Romans 5:19). Thus, just as no one earns virtue’s rewards unless, after Christ’s incarnation, he strives toward them by imitating Christ’s holiness, so no one is held as a transgressor in Adam unless he has sinned in imitation of the first man, transgressing the law through which knowledge of sin came (allusion to Romans 3:20).
2.147Christ’s grace also reaches the innocent, whom Adam’s fault does not reach. That is why he carefully emphasized: ‘Much more did God’s grace and the gift of the one man Jesus Christ abound to more people’ (Romans 5:15). The earlier comparison of equals thus indicates imitation in opposite pursuits among people old enough to use reason; this preference for grace’s generosity, however, establishes that the innocent are consecrated and advanced. Since this is so, recognize that the apostle opposes you, not me; understand that he bears arms against you. Even if everything else were lacking, this one point would powerfully overthrow your doctrine and that of your teacher Faustus, by whom you received your first coloring, so to speak: he says that through one man’s disobedience many, not all, were made sinners, and through one man’s obedience not all but many were made righteous (Romans 5:19). To make the reader understand carefully how this statement opposes you: the apostle declares that not all were made sinners through Adam. You say that absolutely all belong to the devil’s jurisdiction through Adam by natural sin. There can be no doubt of the great conflict between you and the apostle.
2.148For while you and the Manichaean say, ‘All are sinners by nature,’ the apostle says, ‘Many, not all, are sinners’ (Romans 5:19). He removes from seed the accusation armed against conduct, and destroys original sin. Let us press this same point. The apostle directs us to understand that many are sinners through Adam’s disobedience and many righteous through Christ’s obedience, showing that those who are righteous are distinct from those who are criminal. With what shamelessness do you struggle to argue that these words prove natural sin? When you say all are born guilty through Adam and therefore belong to the devil, but that some are afterward freed from this through Christ, you do not mean what the apostle means: he says not all but many were made sinners through Adam.
2.149If he had meant anything like what you mean, he certainly ought to have said: ‘Through one man’s disobedience (Romans 5:19) all were made sinners, but through Christ’s obedience some of these returned to righteousness.’ That is exactly how he should have spoken if he intended your invention to be understood. Yet with such a statement he could not also have asserted that Christ’s grace helped much more than Adam’s wickedness harmed. Even if, then, we had no idea at all what manner of conduct was meant by saying many were made sinners through one man’s disobedience, it would still remain firmly established that this does not concern original sin, since the apostle emphasized that it applies to many, not all (compare Romans 5:19).
2.150Your ignorance or shamelessness is therefore exposed: either you do not care to explain what is said, or you cannot. The light of truth itself—which Christ called himself (John 14:6)—has shown that nothing in the apostle Paul’s words agrees with the Manichaeans’ madness, that is, yours. Let us now devote ourselves to explanation. Just as we have shown how Paul cannot be understood, let it also become clear how he should and can be understood.
2.151Writing to the Romans at the time when the Gentiles had begun to be brought in, and churches were therefore being filled with Jews and Gentiles alike, he calms the disturbances of both peoples. He insists that the Gentiles cannot wash away their impiety—their exchanging God’s glory for a likeness of the image of a human being, birds, four-footed animals, and reptiles (Romans 1:23)—by pleading ignorance of the law. Through their inborn power of reason they could know God from what he had made: God disclosed through his works, though hidden in the depth of his substance, even if they did not know the observance of Jewish ceremonies (Romans 1:20). Each person’s own feeling suggested the rule of the law insofar as it concerns upright living: namely, to inflict on a neighbor nothing of the kind he would be unwilling to suffer himself (compare Matthew 7:12; Luke 6:31; Tobit 4:15). He thus proves that the Gentiles’ impiety can quite rightly be condemned, even if not through the law, then through the justice that established the law. By its judgment, those who sinned without the law will also perish without the law (Romans 2:12). The Jews, however, had even more at stake. They were especially swollen with contempt for the Gentiles, claiming honor for themselves from the law’s purifications. They therefore supposed that Christ’s sin-forgiving grace had not benefited them as it benefited the Gentiles, since they had avoided those sins through the law’s instruction. He shatters this claim with powerful arguments, maintaining that they received all the more through forgiveness precisely because, after the law’s warning, they sinned without any ignorance. By this he proves that they were guilty and could have been severely condemned at justice’s examination, where those who sinned under the law will be judged through the law (Romans 2:12): ‘For it is not hearers of the law who are righteous before God, but doers of the law who will be justified’ (Romans 2:13) (; Luke 6:31; Tobit 4:15). Arguing with this purpose throughout the book, he both restrains the Jews’ pride and removes the Gentiles’ excuse for their folly, to teach that Christ’s medicine benefited both peoples equally.
2.152Christ both forgave the will’s crimes, from which they had been free to abstain, and granted the glory of blessed eternity to those corrected by imitation of him, the model and rule of virtues. Although Paul addresses both nations as the course and demands of his book require, in these disputed passages he is engaged entirely with the Israelites. They dared to despise those coming from uncircumcised stock so thoroughly that they asserted these people could not enter their fellowship even through the support of faith. Against this arrogance he recounts the Jewish people’s beginnings and shows, at the very root of circumcision, that the foreskin is not so important that leaving it makes people unjust or removing it makes them just.
2.153‘For the promise to Abraham that he would be heir of the world came not through the law but through the righteousness of faith. If those who are of the law are heirs, faith is emptied and the promise destroyed. For the law produces wrath; but where there is no law, neither is there transgression. Therefore it comes from faith, so that according to grace the promise may be secure for all the offspring—not only those who are of the law, but also those who are of Abraham’s faith. He is the father of us all, as it is written: “I have made you the father of many nations,” (Genesis 17:5) before the God whom he believed, who gives life to the dead and calls the things that do not exist as though they exist. Beyond hope, he believed in hope, so that he might become the father of many nations, according to what was said: “So shall your offspring be.” (Genesis 15:5–6) Without becoming weak in faith, he considered his own body, already dead, since he was nearly a hundred years old, and Sarah’s dead womb. Yet he did not hesitate in distrust over God’s promise, but was strengthened in faith, giving glory to God and knowing most fully that God is also able to do whatever he has promised. For this reason it was also reckoned to him as righteousness’ (Romans 4:13–22; embedded quotations from Genesis 17:5 and Genesis 15:5–6).
2.154How thoroughly this passage opposes your opinion was discussed in my first work; whatever needs to be recalled from it will be examined. For now, observe that the promise made to Abraham as a reward for his faith, saying that he would be established as the father of many nations, showed two things. He should not be maintained to be the progenitor of only one people, since he was foretold as the father of many nations. Nor did he receive the reward of belief so exclusively that others who believe in the same way should be thought excluded from sharing the reward. ‘But it was not written only for his sake,’ Paul says, ‘that it was reckoned to him, but also for ours, to whom it will be reckoned as we believe in the one who raised Jesus Christ our Lord from the dead, who was handed over because of our offenses and rose because of our justification’ (Romans 4:23–25).
2.155Since, then, while still uncircumcised, Abraham was declared a witness to faith and obtained the enlargement of his offspring as faith’s reward, by what rule, Paul asks, do you, a Jew, think Gentiles do not belong to the fellowship of righteousness when they reproduce Abraham’s faith by believing the same things about God’s powers?
2.156Why, he asks, do you think the nations cannot be brought into Abraham’s family without the law’s consecrations, when it is established that the promise made to Abraham preceded the law and was granted not for washings but for conduct (compare Romans 4:13–15) (Romans 4:13–15)?
2.157‘For if those who are of the law are heirs, faith is emptied and the promise destroyed’ (Romans 4:14). Unless this statement is understood, it introduces a very great difficulty. Undoubtedly by ‘those who are of the law’ he means those whom he had earlier called ‘of the circumcision.’ He knew they claimed so much for themselves that they thought no one besides themselves could be admitted to the dignity of Abraham’s offspring. Yet his argument had established that not only the circumcised, but also those of the uncircumcised who chose to follow the footsteps of Abraham’s faith, should rightly be reckoned Abraham’s children.
2.158Earlier, then, he had worked to make us understand that the Gentiles could not be excluded from the fellowship of righteousness, but through the same faith are counted in Abraham’s family with the children of circumcision. Now he has added that none of the circumcised belongs to the promise given to Abraham. Unless properly understood, this is a complete contradiction. Therefore, when he says, ‘For if those who are of the law are heirs, faith is emptied and the promise destroyed’ (Romans 4:14), he did not declare that no Jew can be believed to become an heir of the ancient promise through faith. Rather, a word is missing, whose place understanding supplies: those of the law are not the only heirs. It is as though he had said, ‘For if those who are of the law alone are heirs, faith is emptied.’ The uncircumcised would indeed seem excluded if the inheritance of blessing reached none beyond the circumcised. We must therefore understand scriptural usage: what is not said is not automatically denied. Understanding must supply what the words leave out.
2.159The apostle accordingly formed his argument in this way: if none were heirs of the blessing except those who are of the law, then just as the uncircumcised would clearly be excluded, it would follow that no one who was of the law could be deprived of the blessing. In other words, if circumcision had such power that faith was powerless without it, then just as the Gentiles were clearly rejected, it would be proved that no Jew could ever have gone to destruction (compare Romans 4:14) (Romans 4:14).
2.160But since you confess that transgressors under the law are not heirs of the blessing, because for such people the law produces wrath (Romans 4:15), it is clear that the promise concerns faith, not circumcision. The promise would be destroyed if no one were righteous apart from the law. For the law, introduced four hundred and thirty years after the promise (Galatians 3:17), would show Abraham himself, Isaac, Jacob, and all the holy people in between excluded from a blessing which could not have been conferred on anyone without the law.
2.161This is plainly false. Sinners under the law deserved punishment, and before the law righteousness and faith were not deprived of their reward’s fruits. Clearly, then, the glory of that promise belongs not to flesh cut with a blade, but to minds distinguished by uprightness. What follows is a thunderbolt against inherited transmission: ‘For the law,’ he says, ‘produces wrath; but where there is no law, neither is there transgression’ (Romans 4:15). Persuade us, then, that a law was given to those conceived in the womb, that a law can be given to newborn children, so that it may convict them of transgression. We, however, believe with the apostle—whom we defend as having meant nothing contrary to reason—that there is no transgression at an age when law could not exist, because ‘where there is no law, neither is there transgression.’ This law produces wrath not through its own fault but through the wickedness of those who prefer sins to virtues.
2.162The apostle therefore established that it was not written only for Abraham’s sake that faith was reckoned to him as righteousness (Romans 4:23), but also for ours. It is undoubtedly reckoned to us when we believe in God, who raised Jesus Christ from the dead: ‘Who was handed over,’ he says, ‘because of our offenses and rose because of our justification’ (Romans 4:24–25).
2.163How forcefully he impresses upon us that, before God the just judge, one person’s sins do not harm others! Praising Christ’s death, he carefully declares that Christ underwent death because of our offenses—which were both many and ours—not because of one offense belonging to another, a man long dead (Romans 4:25).
2.164The one who says ‘many offenses,’ then, has no notion of the Manichaeans’ one offense—the offense of inherited transmission.
2.165‘Therefore, justified by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we also have access to this grace in which we stand, and we glory in the hope of God’s glory’ (Romans 5:1–2). You who see that justification has been conferred on you through the forgiveness of sins, he says, hold firmly to harmony, and with united minds praise the Mediator’s gifts. By his gift we have been granted entrance into this grace. Those whom justice held guilty—because it was will, not nature, that made us guilty—he restored to freedom and snatched from retribution. He granted that we who expected eternal punishments should now glory in the hope of God’s glory.
2.166To express more fully the power and assurance of this teaching, he goes on to describe what Christian philosophy confers on believers: ‘And not only that, but we also glory in afflictions, knowing that tribulation produces endurance, endurance proven character, proven character hope; and hope does not put us to shame, because God’s love has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us’ (Romans 5:3–5). That is: these benefits have not merely enabled us to rejoice someday in the abundance of gifts. Even now, placed amid the burning heat of distress, we are cheerful in the possession of virtue itself. We laugh at the fury of persecutors, judging the wicked’s cruelty a training in endurance rather than a disruption of joy. Thus we do not merely refrain from sin because of rewards; we regard refraining from sin as itself a reward.
2.167Then, when we see the promises of the Testaments being fulfilled, we count absolutely all the good and evil things of present life among trifles. We judge the trustworthiness of God’s promise from the greatness of his love toward us. The disappointment of eternal benefits will not refute our hope, because we hold God’s love as a guarantor of future blessedness. It ‘has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us’ (Romans 5:5): that is, through the Holy Spirit’s gifts God has proved his love for the human race.
2.168He will therefore faithfully supply everything he has promised to the faithful.
2.169For the one who did not spare his own Son but handed him over for us all—through whom he consecrated us by the Holy Spirit’s operation—undoubtedly gave us everything with him (Romans 8:32). ‘For why, when we were still weak, did Christ at the appointed time die for the ungodly?’ (Romans 5:6).
2.170‘For scarcely does anyone die for a righteous person, though perhaps someone would dare to die for a good person. But God commends his love toward us because, if Christ died for us while we were still sinners, much more, now justified in his blood, shall we be saved through him from wrath. For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, once reconciled, shall we be saved in his life. And not only this, but we also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received reconciliation’ (Romans 5:11). He has revealed the great compassion with which Christ did everything: he deigned to die for people who deserved nothing good.
2.171For they had trampled reason and law through their love of crimes, following their own desires, which conscience itself—a force of the greatest power—rebuked. Yet the prophets too were known to have shone repeatedly in their contempt for death for the sake of justice. Many others had run toward destruction with fearless minds for great causes radiant with the splendor of their inherent worth. Lest examples like these obscure the uniqueness of Christ’s virtue, the apostle added something to show that Christ’s love and courage stand at an unmatched height. I too agree that some people, though rarely and scarcely, have chosen to die for just and good causes. But the worthiness of their affairs—that is, the nobility of the causes for which they fought—softened the pain of their dangers. Christ, however, had nothing to love in the activities of the ungodly, and did not disdain to expend himself for those made ugly by their own will. Plainly he excels everyone’s virtues: even if he can have a few companions in endurance, he can have none in the cause for which he endured. Let us therefore despair of nothing from his generosity. If he died for us while we were still sinners, much more, now justified in his blood, shall we be saved through him from wrath (Romans 5:8–9).
2.172After the reconciliation with God that we have obtained through the Mediator’s works, we should therefore grasp everlasting joys in our minds and hope not only for salvation but also for glory.
2.173‘Therefore, just as through one man sin entered this world, and death through sin, and so death passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12). To tame the Jews’ pride—they thought they needed forgiveness of sins less than the Gentiles did, claiming holiness for their race through the law’s privilege—he attacks the disease of human conduct and traces the multitude of sinners backward. The authority of antiquity itself would thus reveal how great a dominion wickedness had seized in this world. He would show how many long-established crimes Christ’s grace had removed: crimes passed from the indecency of predecessors to descendants through the hands of mutual imitation. For this reason he recalls the first man, not as the one with whom sin began—it is established that the woman sinned first—but as the one who, through the privilege of his sex, had assumed leadership in wrongdoing. Through him, then, sin entered, and through sin death—undoubtedly the death foretold for sinners, namely eternal death. ‘And so,’ he says, ‘death passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned.’ He has made perfectly clear how this death passed to descendants: by imitation, not generation.
2.174For after saying, ‘It passed into all human beings,’ he immediately added, ‘in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12). This phrase, ‘in whom all sinned,’ indicates nothing other than ‘because all sinned,’ in accordance with David’s words: ‘In what does a young man correct his way?’ (Psalm 119:9;) That is, ‘How does he correct his way?’ ‘By keeping your words’ (Psalm 119:9; LXX/Vulgate 118:9). He is thus said to be corrected ‘in’ that through which he is corrected. Likewise, the apostle said death passed on ‘in’ the fact that all sinned by their own will. The phrase ‘in whom’ should not be taken to indicate either Adam or sin; it should be understood as expressing the fact that all sinned.
2.175Countless scriptural examples testify that ‘all’ is used for ‘many.’ For example: ‘All have turned aside; together they have become useless.’ A little later he says, ‘They devour my people as a meal of bread’ (Psalm 14:3–4; LXX/Vulgate 13:3–4), showing that this people was distinct from all those whom he had declared evildoers. The Gospel reports: ‘And all the people cried out, “Crucify! Crucify!” (Matthew 27:22–23)’ (Luke 23:21; Mark 15:13; compare Matthew 27:22–23). Yet the universality of this expression certainly includes neither the apostles, nor Nicodemus, nor the holy women. This same apostle shortly afterward calls ‘many’ those whom he now calls ‘all’ (Romans 5:19) (Psalm 14:3–4;).
2.176Let our result be plain: by ‘all,’ the apostle meant very many, whom he says are subject to death because they sinned by their own will. He therefore accuses voluntary crime, not original crime. In fact, if the words’ reliability and proper meaning are weighed, they indicate nothing else. For if he believed sin passed to descendants by generation—that is, was hurled from Adam at people who had not been there—he would speak utterly falsely in declaring that all sinned (compare Romans 5:12) (Romans 5:12).
2.177What one person does and directs toward others cannot truthfully be described as something they all did. Either it passed to them and they themselves did not sin; or they themselves sinned—a phrase expressing the activity of doing something—and it passed to them only through imitation.
2.178The argument you thought you could oppose to us, whether in the book I am now answering or in those you wrote to Marcellinus, is this: sin passed on at the time when all human beings, to use your own words, ‘were that one man’ (Augustine, Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 1.11). Truth crushes this without difficulty and exposes it to the ridicule of every discerning person. Such an argument reveals nothing except your impiety: the impiety by which you believe in a transmission of souls, long ago condemned in the irreverence of Tertullian and Mani, just as there is a transmission of bodies. This is so abominable that when we charged you with it in the letter we sent to the East, you tried to repel it by denial in the books you recently sent to Boniface. You say: ‘They say, however, that we confess a transmission of souls. In whose books they have read this I do not know’ (Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians 3.26), thereby swearing that you say nothing of the kind. But to expose your falsehood by comparing your own words: how do you say that transmission of souls—a truly impious opinion—is not held in your understanding, when you profess that all human beings were that one man? If you do not believe a part of the soul is bound into the seed, with what mouth do you write that all human beings were Adam alone, when a human being certainly cannot exist except as soul and body together?
2.179Moreover, even if you refer this only to flesh, the stupidity of your understanding still cannot be excused. You say, ‘All were that one man,’ although at the time Adam sinned there were already two human beings, not one: himself and his wife. From their substance, not their fault, the human race sprouted according to God’s institution.
2.180Finally, the holiness of their son Abel, celebrated throughout Scripture, testifies that his parents’ sin did him no harm (Genesis 4:4; Matthew 23:35; Hebrews 11:4; 1 John 3:12) (Genesis 4:4) (Matthew 23:35) (Hebrews 11:4) (1 John 3:12).
2.181On the opposite side, Cain—envious and a murderer of his brother, born from the same nature but developing through a different will—is ravaged by trembling that tears his soul apart (Genesis 4:8–14, following the Greek/Old Latin description of his trembling). Thus the apostle said that sin entered this world through one man, and death through sin, and that death so passed into all human beings who sinned (Romans 5:12). This statement agrees with catholic doctrine and lends you no help (Genesis 4:8–14).
2.182For it is arranged in words that indicate an earlier example and the following activity of someone who imitates it.
2.183If, however, he had intended to show generation infected by sin or subject to it, he would have said that sin entered not through one human being, but through two.
2.184Nor would he have said, ‘Death passed on in that all sinned’ (Romans 5:12), but, ‘In that they flowed from the diabolical pleasure and flesh of the first man and first woman.’ Had he declared this, the apostle would not have established your doctrine but overthrown all his own statements. He therefore accuses sinners’ will and sin’s example. Consequently, both reason and Paul fight against you.
2.185‘For until the law, sin was in this world; but sin was not imputed when there was no law. Yet death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam’s transgression, who is a figure of the one to come’ (Romans 5:13–14). Through different terms he distinguishes kinds of sin, showing that sin is one thing and transgression another. At least in this passage, he intends every transgression to be regarded as sin, but not every sin as transgression. The term ‘transgression’ increases the odium of sin, so that those who crossed a command appear more guilty than those who sinned without the law’s warning by disregarding their inborn reason. Therefore, before the law given through Moses and committed to writing—whose enactment prescribed a pattern of conduct that people living under it were not permitted to ignore—the apostle accuses mortals stained with various forms of corrupt activity of sin, not transgression: those living in the interval between Adam and Moses.
2.186Those to whom a law was not given should thus be understood not to have transgressed commands. Yet they are convicted as guilty because, neglecting the reason to which each person’s own feelings bear witness, they violated the rights of human society or of decency. They are therefore said to have sinned by imitating one another, but not by transgressing a law not yet given. Until the law, then, there was sin, not transgression; after the law, not only sin but also transgression. Eternal death reigned, which God had promised to assign to Adam if he sinned (Genesis 2:17). Thus that death owed to sin, that punitive death, reigned before the law over those who sinned: for example, the Sodomites, those destroyed at the time of the flood, and people of various ages destroyed because of wickedness—voluntary wickedness, however (Genesis 6:5–7; Genesis 7:21–23; Genesis 19:24–25). It also reigned after the law over those it found guilty of transgression (Genesis 6:5–7) (Genesis 7:21–23) (Genesis 19:24–25).
2.187For under the judgment of justice, which imputes no sin except one from which a person is free to abstain, those who sinned without the law will be judged without the law, and those who sinned under the law will be judged through the law (Romans 2:12). The apostle’s words, ‘But death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam’s transgression’ (Romans 5:14), make his meaning shine through. He defines Jews who sin under the law as having transgressed like Adam. For the first man too had received a law, though delivered to his ears rather than in books: to abstain from tasting the tree, which tested obedience. By eating from it against the command, he incurred the crime of transgression (Genesis 2:16–17; Genesis 3:6). Thus the people who sinned after the law was given through Moses’ ministry are proved to have sinned in the likeness of Adam’s transgression, because, like him, they sinned by transgressing a law. But in the age between the two laws—the first given but not written, the second both promulgated and committed to writing—those who sinned are not shown to be free from sin. Rather, they are said to have erred without the likeness of Adam’s transgression, because they had not received a law (Genesis 3:6).
2.188Adam is called a figure of the one to come, that is, Christ (Romans 5:14), but a figure by contrast: as the former is understood as a model of sin, so the latter is a model of righteousness. Yet Christ’s incarnation was not the first model of righteousness but the greatest. Even before the Word became flesh, virtues shone in the prophets and many other holy people through their faith in God (John 1:14). When the fullness of time arrived, however, the exact standard of righteousness shone out in Christ (Galatians 4:4). The one foretold as ‘Father of the age to come’ stood forth as the rewarder both of the saints who preceded him and of those who followed (Isaiah 9:6).
2.189Likewise, on the opposite side, Adam is called a model of sin—not the first, but the greatest (compare Romans 5:14) (Romans 5:14).
2.190I say ‘greatest’ not because I deny that the devil was more guilty, but because, when a basis for instruction was being sought, it was more fitting for the apostle to mention a human being, to whom successive generations of humanity especially looked, than a being of airy substance. Within humanity itself, however, it was established that the first woman sinned first (Genesis 3:6; compare 1 Timothy 2:14). But because fathers’ authority is more effective and greater in all things, he called the man the model of sin—not the one with whom the offense began, but the one who, through the power of the male sex, is shown to have been more readily imitated. You see how the coherence of the interpretation testifies that truth is within it (Genesis 3:6) (1 Timothy 2:14).
2.191Now consider how greatly your explanation conflicts with the rest of the passage and with these words in particular: the apostle declares that death reigned even over those ‘who did not sin in the likeness of Adam’s transgression, who is a figure of the one to come’ (Romans 5:14). If he were dealing with natural sin, about which, as you suppose, he had said ‘in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12), who would these people be whom he immediately declares not to be found liable—not merely for Adam’s transgression, but not even for the likeness of his fault?
2.192‘Death reigned,’ he says, ‘even over those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam’s transgression’ (Romans 5:14). You see that he made a clear distinction between those who went wrong like Adam and those who went wrong differently.
2.193This division cannot fit natural sin, which, if it existed, would bind absolutely everyone equally. No one, then, would lack this evil, and no one could truthfully be described as not having sinned in the likeness of that sin in whose reality everyone had sinned.
2.194But the apostle concludes and declares that some sinned as Adam did, while others were not even touched by the likeness of the ancient transgression. It is therefore perfectly clear that these are crimes of conduct, not of seed. To repeat our results briefly: the apostle says sin entered through one man (Romans 5:12). Reason shows that this fits imitation, not generation, which is the work of two.
2.195He continued: ‘And so death passed into all human beings’ (Romans 5:12).
2.196He made a distinction so that no one would think sin had passed on. Death, which had gone before, was shown under justice’s judgment to follow grounds for punishment which it found in each sinner’s pursuit of an evil will. He therefore showed that nature must not be accused, but deliberate conduct.
2.197He added that death reigned in that all sinned (Romans 5:12). This expression describes not the ruin of someone being born but the works of someone acting. He thus proved that he accuses perversity and does not wound innocence.
2.198After this he added that sin reigned until the law, showing that sin’s reign fell when the law was given (Romans 5:13).
2.199But generation, which began with Adam, remains after the law too. If it were the fountain of sins and the devil’s shrub, as you argue, this crime would certainly flourish not only until the law but after the law and after Christ. Therefore the sin of which the apostle declares that it existed until the law and could not remain after the law is proved to belong to action, not birth (Romans 5:13).
2.200‘But sin,’ he says, ‘is not imputed when there is no law’ (Romans 5:13). By this statement, as by all his sayings, he has killed the theory of inherited transmission.
2.201For if sin transmitted by descent was not imputed before the law, and did not exist after the law, it never possessed any poison capable of harming the human race. Natural sin was not imputed before the law; it was not imputed under the law either, since nowhere in the law is it ever shown to have been revealed or imputed. Plainly, then, the apostle accuses sin committed by free will before the law, and transgression likewise committed by free will after the law (compare Romans 5:13) (Romans 5:13).
2.202It is therefore established that he said nothing about sin transmitted by descent. Although these points were ample to prove that the apostle meant nothing about natural sin, which cannot exist and is invented by the Manichaeans, he nevertheless added the further distinction: absolutely everyone was not stained by Adam’s transgression, since even among those in whom destruction reigned because of wickedness, many could be found who were shown to have had no share in Adam’s transgression (compare Romans 5:14) (Romans 5:14).
2.203See, then, whether even you should still doubt what we say: that the innocent, God’s fresh handiwork before the exercise of their own will, did not sin in Adam. For even among the wicked, the apostle testifies that there are many who did not sin in the likeness of Adam’s transgression (Romans 5:14).
2.204But let us examine the rest. ‘But grace is not like the offense. For if in one man’s offense many died, much more did God’s grace and the gift in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ abound to more people’ (Romans 5:15). He says that the evil of the offense is surpassed by the abundance of grace, and ranks the number of those saved above those whom he declares to have perished through transgression.
2.205If you uphold the truth of the apostle’s words and do not think he lied shamelessly, explain how this statement would not bring on him the disgrace of public falsehood if he were speaking about natural sin. If original sin existed, making absolutely all human nature belong to the devil’s jurisdiction, where would there be room even to make the numbers on the two sides equal—those saved and those perishing? In the Gospel, when the Lord showed how few are blessed, he said: ‘How narrow and constricted is the way that leads to life, and few are those who find it (Matthew 7:14)! How broad and spacious is the way that leads to destruction, and many are those who enter through it!’ (Matthew 7:13–14).
2.206Surely your expressions ‘many’ and ‘few’ concern an unspecified quantity, since it is through mutual comparison that a number is found great or small. Comparing those to be saved with the multitude who perish, the Lord called them few. Here the apostle, comparing those whom Christ’s grace saves with those who had sinned as Adam did, declares them far more numerous (compare Matthew 7:13–14; Romans 5:15) (Matthew 7:13–14) (Romans 5:15) (Matthew 7:13–14; Romans 5:15).
2.207Maintain, then, that this fits the Manichaeans’ sin—that is, sin transmitted by descent.
2.208If natural sin transferred to the devil’s kingdom everyone whom human fertility produced, and some are thought to have been freed from it through Christ in the world’s final age, what truth or authority belongs to that teacher who, against such clear evidence from the whole world, says righteousness abounded to more people than guilt? Why believe him when he discusses obscure doctrines, if he lies about things so obvious? But to think this is sacrilege, and it was your doctrine that forced it to be said. Let the apostle’s honor therefore crush the Manichaeans’ worthlessness (compare Romans 5:15) (Romans 5:15).
2.209The apostle does not lie. Therefore Christ’s grace abounded to more people than Adam’s fault. Those who sinned under the law are said to have sinned in imitation of that fault; and until Christ, only the Jews sinned under the law. Compare, then, the Jewish nation alone—and only its adults—placed under the law and therefore sinning in the likeness of Adam’s transgression, since he sinned after receiving a law, with the thousands saved by grace’s generosity from the multitude of Gentile nations called through the preaching of the Gospel. Then you will understand that the apostle Paul truly declared that God’s grace and Jesus Christ’s gift reached more people than did participation in the ancient transgression (compare Romans 5:14–15) (Romans 5:14–15).
2.210Having explained grace’s generosity in the abundance of people saved, he compares the gift and sin. With great learning he praises the gift for healing many wounds by one power: ‘And the gift,’ he says, ‘is not as it was through one sin’ (Romans 5:16).
2.211‘For the judgment was from one offense to condemnation, but grace is from many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16). That is, serious sins, even singly, can suffice for the accusation and condemnation of the guilty.
2.212Grace, however, is not conferred in the same way, repeatedly applied to each sin individually. Instead, poured in once, it wipes away many different crimes in a single concentrated action of its power. That is why he says, ‘From many offenses to justification’ (Romans 5:16): it leads human beings freed from many offenses to the glory of justification bestowed on them. Therefore he does not here mean Adam’s single sin, as you suppose. He uses the numbers one and many solely to praise grace: grace need not be repeated as often as each mortal person has sinned, as though individual baptisms could heal only individual sins.
2.213Rather, he took care to express this: although individual sins had mortally wounded their guilty doers, this grace, with its unique power administered once, saved people pierced by countless wounds.
2.214‘For if through one man’s offense death reigned through one, much more will those who receive the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness reign in life through the one Jesus Christ’ (Romans 5:17). He consistently confirms what he began. He has set down two statements, intending what he added at the end to apply to both. He declares that death reigns through one who was a model of sin, and in whose likeness those who sin under the law transgress. He also declares that those who have obtained abundant grace reign in life through one—a grace which benefits those who imitate virtue. No question about the ‘one’ therefore remains. The added statement that those who receive abundant grace reign in life also resolves the first statement: no one is driven to death unless he has embraced the sinner’s example.
2.215The life in which the holy will reign is shown to be eternal. Therefore the death that follows voluntary wickedness should also be understood as eternal. ‘Therefore, as through one man’s offense it came upon all human beings to condemnation, so through one man’s righteousness it came upon all human beings to justification of life. For just as through one man’s disobedience many were made sinners, so through one man’s obedience many will be made righteous’ (Romans 5:19). Every difficulty is resolved. It is shameless to stir up a false accusation about universality; it is utterly foolish to hunt for a knot in a smooth rush. The apostle declares that not all but many learned sins through the first man’s disobedience, and that many, not all, obtained righteousness through the other’s obedience. Human origin is not under discussion here. Conduct is displayed in opposing pursuits. Disobedience and obedience show the activity of deliberate conduct, not of generation. Surely, if the apostle thought as you do, where could he more fittingly have declared that all go to condemnation by birth but few to life by believing, than here, where the argument’s conclusion was to be completed? He ought to have said: ‘Just as through one man’s disobedience all were made sinners’—or rather, not ‘through disobedience,’ but ‘Just as through the first man’s generation all were born sinners, so through one man’s obedience many will be made righteous.’
2.216Had he put it that way, the statement would have been shown as impious as it was foolish. The comparison itself would be utterly stupid, because the persons were presented on different terms and unlike things were compared: nature and will. On the evil side he would place the necessity of seed, but on the good side only freedom of effort—or rather, no freedom any longer, since the power to choose good and avoid evil would not be available if guilt were natural. The apostle, then, the church’s wise and learned teacher, says that sin arose and passed on through disobedience, and that righteousness multiplies (compare Romans 5:19) (Romans 5:19).
2.217Consequently, he destroys the theory of natural sin and teaches that the causes of substance and of will are different. Lest this understanding be attributed more to our ingenuity than to apostolic teaching, let us hear what he added to this passage: ‘But the law came in,’ he says, ‘so that the offense might abound. But where sin abounded, grace abounded beyond it, so that, just as sin reigned into death, grace might reign through righteousness into eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord’ (Romans 5:20–21). Maintain, then, how your sin—the sin of inherited transmission—began to abound after the law, and what increase it received after Moses’ ministry.
2.218You certainly contend that in these passages the apostle discussed natural sin. Earlier, he said it existed until the law, so that we would understand it ceased after the law. Now, however, he says of the same sin that it began to grow and abound after the law. We have shown that both statements fit the catholic understanding we follow. But with what shamelessness are they claimed for your doctrine, so that one and the same sin is said earlier to have ceased when the law was given, and now to have grown? How, then, did natural sin abound after the law? Did the genitals begin to move more fiercely, so that increased and novel movements seem to have added power to your sin? Or was a law given to newborn children, admonishing those begotten from sexual desire—which you call diabolical and the root and fruit of sin—to amend what they had been made, and correct the activity they had undergone when their parents begot them? Were they finally to compel what had happened not to have happened, and by refusing to hear this incur the crime of disobedience? No fool, much less the law God gave, could charge them with that (compare Romans 5:13; Romans 5:20) (Romans 5:13) (Romans 5:20) (Romans 5:13; Romans 5:20).
2.219What, then, was added after the law to natural sin, which is shown in the law not to have been prohibited or condemned, nor even lightly censured or faintly disclosed?
2.220Certainly even you are not so senseless as to say that sin transmitted by descent became greater after circumcision. How, then, did it abound after the law when it is neither accused nor revealed in the law? But see how well this agrees with the sound understanding that places sin solely in the wrongdoer’s will. The apostle says sin existed until the law, so that after the law it should be understood as transgression (Romans 5:13): it crosses commands that have been promulgated. In this way sin abounded when the law came in, because transgression added odium to its guilt. The act of an evil will, which before the law was sin, after the law also began to be transgression. Yet God did not give the law with the purpose of making mortals worse through its enactment. For the law is neither sin nor the cause of sin, but ‘the commandment is holy, just, and good’ (Romans 7:12). Wrongdoers’ perversity, however, wounded itself with the blade that should have healed it, and opposed God’s purpose, so that it found danger where it should have found healing. The apostle says that the outcome of events injured the apparent purpose of God’s decision to give the law. Human amendment did not result as the lawgiver intended; rather, the opposite occurred in very many people. He says sinners’ efforts went so far that the law seemed given for no other reason than to make the wicked more wicked and add transgression to sin.
2.221In this sense, then, the offense is rightly said to have abounded: each person’s will committed it both before and after the law, but before the law the will was sinful, while after the law it was also transgressive. Something grows and abounds when it gains increase within its own kind, just as after Moses the additional weight of transgression was added to the sin of free will. For it belonged to the same kind, though at a different time: an evil will which sinned both before and after the law, not through irresistible compulsion, but through blameworthy effort. Since this is so, nothing in the apostle’s words can fit your position. The coming of the law is not shown to have made inherited sin more abundant or greater. Nor can something plainly unrelated to newborn children’s will rightly be said to abound through sins of will. Therefore what the law could neither prohibit nor punish did not abound after the law. ‘But where sin abounded, grace abounded beyond it, so that, just as sin reigned into death, grace might reign through righteousness into eternal life’ (Romans 5:20–21).
2.222As he proceeds, the apostle explains himself more clearly. He teaches that, when human salvation was being lost, God, moved by the abundance of his compassion, brought a medicine more effective than usual to a desperate situation. Those whom he had not corrected by commands he would bind to himself by benefits, requiring devotion for the future while not imputing past deeds. People should then strive to preserve the righteousness they had obtained by the direct path of belief. The abundance of preceding sins therefore called for the help of such abundant mercy: unless the forgiver’s generosity had been so great, no other discipline could have helped diseases so serious. But in commending this divine benefit, the apostle saw room for an objection from people who might say: ‘If we rightly assess the worth of causes by their effects, and the abundance of sins obtained an outpouring of God’s mercy, we should persist in sins so that grace’s abundance does not fail.’ Anticipating such an opinion, he says: ‘What, then, shall we say? Shall we remain in sin so that grace may abound? Far from it! For we who died to sin, how shall we still live in it? Or do you not know that all of us baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death? We were therefore buried with him through baptism into death, so that, just as Christ rose in the Father’s glory, we too might walk in newness of life’ (Romans 6:4).
2.223He says that we died to sin at the time when, to receive the gift of forgiveness, we professed our renunciation of the world and all sins. Remembering the gift, we should therefore live in a way that shows we have been buried with Christ and visibly bear his resurrection in holiness. Just as, after rising from the dead, he undergoes no bodily weakness or scourging, so we too should strive to be invulnerable to all sins and vices. ‘For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall also share his resurrection, knowing that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin might be destroyed, so that we no longer serve sin. For the one who has died has been justified from sin’ (Romans 6:5–7). He binds believers with clear reasoning. If you wish, he says, to share his resurrection, imitate the power of his death too, so that, dead to vices, you may live in virtue. You will share that happiness if you bear the image of his death by dying to sins. Our old self should be shown nailed to his cross, to destroy the body of sin through the courage of suffering. By ‘body of sin,’ according to his customary usage, Paul means vices, not the substance of flesh. For he continues: ‘So that the body of sin might be destroyed, so that we no longer serve sin. For the one who has died has been justified from sin.’
2.224He was, of course, speaking to living people and telling them that righteousness had been conferred on them through the mysteries. How, then, does he say someone is justified whom he calls dead, unless he is showing beyond ambiguity that here he calls renunciation ‘death’? He adopts the name of death to show that believers should cease from sins as dead people cease from activities.
2.225‘For if we died with Christ, we believe that we shall live with Christ, knowing that Christ, raised from the dead, dies no more; death will no longer rule over him. For the death he died to sin, he died once, but the life he lives, he lives to God. So you too reckon yourselves dead to sin but alive to God in Christ Jesus’ (Romans 6:11). Just as Christ, he says, died to sin once—that is, died because of our sins once—and dies no more, but lives in God’s glory, so you too, reckoning yourselves dead to sin, should live and serve virtues alone.
2.226Where here is nature accused? Where are the beginnings of human substance blamed? Where is the movement of the one begetting a child condemned? It is clearer than light that the Teacher of the Gentiles addresses only the will, so that it renounces hidden disgrace (2 Corinthians 4:2) and advances to a better life through corrected actions. But now let our explanation take a shorter course and stop continually interpreting the apostle’s words in these passages. Let us hear him discuss his own meaning. At the end of his argument it will become clear whose doctrine and faith he agrees with. We say, of course, that the apostle spoke of the sin of human will, present in each person who sins. You speak of the sin which, believing Faustus, you think was transmitted through generation and received by everyone without willing it. Let our disputes, then, cease, if you please. To proceed modestly, let us set aside the apostle’s dignity. On that ground alone we could insist that, even if his words agreed with you in every respect, he nevertheless could have intended nothing so disgraceful, given the splendor of his office: the fault would lie in ambiguous expressions, not perverse meanings. Let us grant him only this in the present matter: as a man whose mind was not disordered, he should be believed to have understood his own writings better than you do. ‘Therefore,’ he says, ‘do not let sin reign in your mortal body so that you obey it’ (Romans 6:12). I could already say here that the exhortation proves he is treating sins of will. For if evils were natural, they could be defended on grounds of justice or, at least, lamented out of pity; but in no way could people be admonished to avoid them. Greater than any natural evil, if such an evil could exist, would be the evil of the madness possessing anyone who demanded devotion in avoiding natural things. But the apostle enacted nothing that could justly be criticized. He therefore indicates a sin of will when he insists that it must be avoided.
2.227‘Do not present your members as weapons of injustice to sin, but present yourselves to God as people alive from the dead, and your members as weapons of righteousness to God. For sin does not rule over you: you are not under law but under grace’ (Romans 6:13–14). You should, he says, serve God more faithfully because you do so more freely. Sin ruled over you when punishment for guilt hung over you. But after you received the benefits of God’s grace and breathed freely with the weight of your guilt laid down, a free person’s sense of honor should prompt you to show gratitude to your healer.
2.228But this gave occasion for the same question he had explained above: someone might object that people freed from the law, which threatened wrath, could safely sin under the kindness of God’s grace. He therefore immediately added: ‘What then? Shall we sin because we are not under law but under grace? Far from it! Or do you not know that when you present yourselves as slaves for obedience, you are slaves of the one you obey, whether of sin or of obedience to righteousness?’ (Romans 6:16). Do we now believe him about the kind of sin he has been discussing? When you present yourselves, he says, as slaves for obedience, you are slaves of that one, whether of sin or righteousness. Where, then, does the apostle indicate here that sin which is imagined to have flown over the very seed before the time of willing, before the activity of obedience, before the age of knowledge and conscience? Such a thing certainly can be found only in Manichaean books.
2.229The apostle, however—if he can obtain any credibility from people in this age—shows that he calls none slaves of sin except those who are known to have obeyed sin by their own will. By changing that will, they began to serve righteousness. He therefore placed obedience in the middle and attributed to it their effort to obey vices earlier and virtues afterward (compare Romans 6:16–18) (Romans 6:16–18).
2.230‘But thanks be to God,’ he says, ‘that you were slaves of sin, but obeyed from the heart the pattern of teaching to which you were entrusted. Freed from sin, you have become slaves of righteousness’ (Romans 6:17–18).
2.231A change of obedience made from the heart, he says, freed you from sin and made you cling to holiness.
2.232‘What I say is human, because of the weakness of your flesh. For just as you presented your members to serve impurity and lawlessness for lawlessness, so now present your members to serve righteousness for sanctification’ (Romans 6:19). What a teacher, filled with God’s Spirit! Truly a golden vessel, and a trumpet sounding not broken shrieks but clear notes! He gains authority for his words through the humanity of his exhortation.
2.233To avoid seeming to command anything arduous and inaccessible to a human being, he took an expression from ordinary speech and called it ‘human’: that is, easy to handle, something made gentler by comparing the cases. I do not demand of you, he says, an intensity matching these exalted realities; nor, great as virtue’s riches are, do I establish correspondingly novel commands by which you must obtain them. I impose nothing harsh, prescribe nothing barely bearable. If I commanded such a thing in proportion to righteousness’s splendor, you might complain of the flesh’s weakness and plead that you could not bear constant toil. So now I address you with this moderation: apply to virtues the same effort you previously applied to crimes. Although it insults honorable things to pursue them with merely the same determination spent on disgraceful things, it nevertheless suffices for your present training if you pursue righteousness with at least the intensity with which you pursued lawlessness and impurity.
2.234Let us therefore believe the Teacher of the Gentiles and bear witness to his truthfulness. Truly, as he said, what he commanded is human: that correcting the will should amend the will’s vices.
2.235But just as this is human, the other position, if he had held it, would have been not merely inhuman and savage, but unjust—and not merely unjust, but insane. If he knew sin was inborn, he would be reproaching people of his own age with the faults of an ancient birth, commanding abstention from things he believed innate, and prescribing with threats that I must lay down things I had begun to possess before my soul entered my body and my body entered this world.
2.236Those whom he strove to amend would more rightly admonish him to weigh how much he commanded and recognize that the first step of sound counsel is to observe moderation in commands. Teaching is stripped of authority when fairness does not defend it; it is full of authority when justice’s balance commends it. It is therefore established that the apostle, the churches’ revered teacher, giving an account of his teaching through good judgment, fairness, and humanity, meant nothing about natural sin. Rather, he insisted, as was the case, that we had been slaves of vices only through our will, and that through the same will, if corrected, we can serve righteousness. But since I have been occupied this far in explaining this passage, to show that the Manichaeans can find no defense in the apostle Paul’s words, and since the sequence of his discourse has disclosed the truth he follows throughout the entire body of his statements, let this be the end of the second book. Here, however, we must warn that nothing remains for the advocates of inherited sin except shamelessness. They confessed that they had no defense in reason and claimed all their comfort from the apostolic words we have explained. Now that it is clear these prescribe nothing disgraceful, nothing at odds with holiness and reason, their position has plainly fallen. Reason, together with many scriptural authorities, and the catholics’ reverence for God have overthrown it; and the supposed meaning of this passage no longer protects it (compare Romans 6:17–19) (Romans 6:17–19).
To Florus — Book 3
3.1Respect for every virtue ought to flourish among the human race. People ought always to resist wrongdoing with a wise mind and win their Creator’s favor by good pursuits. Or at least, since this first and happier level of constant devotion seems both rare and exceedingly difficult, they ought to reject even long-cherished vices and return to the shelter of reform and repentance. Surely reverence for God ought at least to have remained untouched in this respect: we should not have to defend the divine law in so great a struggle. But the frenzy of sinners has reached the point where we must labor strenuously to teach that God is just. So, trusting in the help of the very justice whose cause we plead, let us now fulfill what we promised in the preceding book.
3.2In the first book, clear definitions established that God is just in such a way that, if he could be proved unjust, he would be proved not to be God. Once no doubt remained about this, it also became clear that justice is simply the virtue that never judges unfairly or acts unfairly, but gives each person what belongs to that person, without deception or favoritism—that is, without showing partiality (Romans 2:11).
3.3The character of this virtue would be maintained only if God punished none of those subject to him except for offenses established to have been committed by free will.
3.4He would not command people to do things he knew their nature made them unable to observe; nor would he judge anyone guilty for what belongs to their nature.
3.5Nor would he charge some people with other people’s sins. Accordingly, he would not sentence innocent children to eternal punishment because of their parents’ wrongdoing, when those children had personally done nothing either good or evil by which they could be shown to have imitated their parents’ crimes. Taken together, these considerations establish both that God exists and that he is just. For it was clear that, if he did anything unjust, his divinity would suffer exactly as much damage as his fairness did (Romans 9:11).
3.6And yet—how wretched human error is!—when I consider the very subject of our dispute, I am shaken by overwhelming grief. Could this really have come into doubt? Could this cause have needed defending? Could churches professing belief in Christ, I ask, really have doubted whether God judges justly—that is, reasonably?
3.7But my very reverence for these matters has made me forget too completely the dispute at hand. I marvel that God’s fairness could have been questioned, although it is well established that in the assemblies of the advocates of inherited sin there is no doubt at all about his unfairness.
3.8This is worse by as much as the pursuit of evil is worse than neglect of good, as deliberate irreverence is more destructive than doubt about the truth, and, finally, as daring to accuse God is more wicked than refusing to worship him.
3.9As the prophet David testifies, the fool did indeed say in his heart that there was no God (Psalm 14:1; Psalm 53:1; LXX/Vulgate Psalms 13:1; 52:1). Yet he did not say that God existed but was unjust. The voice of all nature declared in such harmony that justice belongs inseparably to God that someone denying his existence was more readily found than someone denying his fairness. Someone could arise who thought that what he could not see did not exist; no one had yet been found who called unjust what he believed to be divine (Psalm 14:1; Psalm 53:1;).
3.10That fool, then, seemed to have reached the furthest limit of wickedness by denying God. Yet a race of Manichaeans and advocates of inherited sin has been found whose irreverence surpasses his (Psalm 14:1) (Psalm 53:1).
3.11But to return to the point from which we digressed: it had become clear that the one we acknowledge as the true God can do nothing in judgment that conflicts with justice. Consequently, no one can be held guilty for another’s sins, and so the innocence of newborn children cannot possibly be condemned for their parents’ wrongdoing, since it would be unjust for guilt to pass through reproductive seed.
3.12Although this is so obvious that nothing could be more decisive or more true, I had promised to prove this very point by the testimony of divine law: it would be utterly unjust to charge newborn children with their parents’ crimes. God is so opposed to this that he expressly forbade judges in his law to perpetrate anything so disgraceful. I had therefore promised to establish this. But since the second book was occupied with explaining statements of the apostle Paul, it is fitting to fulfill that promise in the opening part of this book.
We read in Deuteronomy, among the commands ordering that people’s life and conduct, that God also gave this entirely explicit command. To show where it stands among the preceding and following provisions, he says: ‘You shall not withhold the wages of a poor and needy worker, whether one of your own people or one of the foreigners living in your towns. You shall pay his wages daily; the sun must not set before you pay them, because he is poor and places his hope in them. Otherwise he may cry to the Lord against you, and you will be guilty of sin. Fathers shall not die for their children, and children shall not die for their fathers. Each person shall die for his own sin’ (Deuteronomy 24:14–16).
3.13‘You shall not distort justice for the foreigner, orphan, or widow. You shall not take a widow’s garment as security, because you were a servant in the land of Egypt and the Lord your God freed you from there. That is why I command you to do this’ (Deuteronomy 24:17–18).
When God established the pattern for judging, he immediately took care to decree that neither parents should be struck down for their children’s crimes nor children for their parents’. He showed, then, that the first principle and starting point of the justice he commanded judges to maintain was this: family ties must not burden the innocent, and the hatred an individual had deserved must not spread to the family itself. In matters of conduct, justice therefore distinguishes those whom kinship joins. It certainly would not do so if will and reproductive seed operated on the same principle, or if an act of choice passed to descendants through reproduction. With this single testimony we have shown, more than sufficiently, that the ancient authority of the enacted law crushes the utterly repulsive corruption of judgment embraced by this new error. This pronouncement bears on the case in a way that leaves no room for doubt.
3.14In establishing the pattern to be followed in trials, God commanded that innocence should not be implicated in the dangers faced by a relative. Just as he separated the father from the punishment of a sinful son, he separated the son from the father’s condemnation. By giving both persons the same outcome, he clearly showed that parents’ sins can no more pass to children than children’s sins pass to parents (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.15Therefore, anyone who contradicts this pronouncement by saying that sin is transmitted should also say that sin travels back again. If sins descend from parents to children, let them also ascend from children to parents, since the authority of divine law shows that parents’ crimes do not harm their children, just as children’s crimes do not harm their parents (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.16Anyone determined to oppose this pronouncement, then, should assert that both things happen, when both were equally forbidden. For it is easier to reject God’s law than to correct it. Rejection is irreverent, but correction is still more irreverent and absurd. If you honor one of its two decrees and detest the other, the part you accept will force you, against your will, to obey the part you reject. The dignity of the one you value also defends the one you opposed. It is completely absurd to imagine you honor commands when you dare attack part of them. Thus rejecting the whole law is more consistent than correcting it. Yet only an impious person will attempt to correct it; devout and sensible people accept and praise it in its entirety.
No one should be troubled here by seeing that the old sacrificial rites ceased in the age of the New Testament. Virtues and sacrificial victims are not governed by the same principle: commands are enduring; sacrifices are temporary. Yet when Christ came, whom the ancient sacrifices foreshadowed, what had been established was fulfilled, not condemned. Those observances are not denounced as having been practiced in their proper times; they came to rest when the perfection promised through their service arrived (Matthew 5:17) (Hebrews 10:1).
3.17The commands containing devotion, faith, justice, and holiness, however, not only did not cease; they were increased. This law about maintaining justice in judgments, which we quoted from Deuteronomy, concerns the enduring character of commands, not the temporary age of ceremonies. It did not disappear with circumcision; it continues with justice (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.18It is therefore settled—if Moses, through whom God speaks, is believed rather than Augustine, through whom Mani speaks—that children are not made guilty by nature for their parents’ sins (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.19And so parents’ crimes do not pass to their descendants, although those descendants were born from them, just as children’s crimes do not pass to their parents, who certainly could not have been born from their own children. Birth, then, can no more damage someone’s innocence where that birth exists than it can where it does not exist (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.20The case is settled. Still, I urge the reader to attend to what I now bring forward. Suppose someone openly professed what the advocate of inherited sin tries to establish by argument: suppose he declared war on God’s law, fearlessly despised the pronouncement we quoted, and asserted, by whatever means he could, that both requirements God wished observed were false. Suppose he did all he could to overthrow both sides of the pronouncement under discussion and fully believed that parents are and ought to be condemned for their children’s sins, and children for their parents’. Even a person like that could not establish the transmission of sin, even on his own assumptions. Why? Because even if the law’s pronouncement were proved false—the pronouncement testifying that relatives of this kind cannot be stained by each other’s crimes—it would remain unshaken that sin is not transmitted. The very fact that parental guilt passed to children and children’s guilt returned to parents would establish that birth was not what brought parents’ sins to children, since they also returned from children to parents, where birth could not be the cause.
Let the result of my argument be clear. Divine law has an inviolable authority, which no arguments of impiety can overthrow. Its decree prescribed with the greatest precision and completeness that declaring children guilty for their parents’ sin is a disgraceful opinion and a distortion of judgment, which it commanded us earnestly to avoid. This thunderbolt shattered the structure of inherited sin. Yet the faith we defend is protected by such strong defenses of truth that even the irreverence capable of denying God’s law cannot shake it (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.21Now, then, let my words address the man with whom we are disputing. Do you submit to God’s law—at least in your profession, for we know what you do in argument—or do you resist it? If you submit, the dispute is over; if you resist, our agreement is over. If you submit, the error of the advocates of inherited sin is extinguished; if you resist, the unbelief of the Manichaeans is exposed. At all events, it stands established that your opinion and God’s law cannot agree.
3.22Unless perhaps you say that God indeed commanded this, but does not do what he commanded—indeed, that he acts contrary to what he ordered others to do.
3.23Although the extent of this irreverence is glaringly obvious as soon as it is mentioned, let us—with the permission of the very God whose fairness we defend—consider its character, even through a brief examination. What forces him to become a violator of his own law: the pressure of circumstances that overwhelm him, or his own weakness? Or, since it is neither, is it simply a desire to do wrong? But even Mani could not say this, and so he invented a story that your god had endured a terrible battle.
3.24If neither calamity nor weakness nor a desire to transgress bears on him, how can he destroy in judging the pattern of justice he commended by commanding? Indeed, he would be raging not against that justice but against reverence for himself. For fairness has such power that it both condemns those who stray and loses none of its force through the authority of those who abandon it. How, finally, could he want us to do what is just and himself do what is unjust? Does he want us to seem more just than he is—or rather, not more just, but ourselves fair and himself unfair?
3.25Or is what he does just—namely, charging some people with other people’s sins—while what he commands us to do is unjust: declaring each person guilty for the offenses of that person’s own will (Deuteronomy 24:16)?
3.26And where would such envy or malice come from in him? It is envy if he deceived his creature by his commands to prevent it from trying, as far as it could, to imitate his virtues. But it is malice—indeed cruelty—if he punishes mortals for unjust acts they committed by obeying his law.
3.27Or perhaps he does not punish them—which is certainly prudent—but even rewards servants who obey his commands, although those commands teach injustice? Then what did his envy achieve, if mortals arrived by doing unjust things at the same destination they would have reached by observing justice? Those he deceived lose nothing of their happiness, while he is deprived both of the consciousness of goodness and justice and of the honor belonging to them. How much more tolerable it would have been to throw off the profession of religion than to steer a course along such steep and deadly paths!
3.28Therefore, since God does not allow even his servants to commit the sort of act you claim he perpetrates himself, it is clear that you have fled from honoring him no less than from human reason. Consequently, we are not deceived, as you say, by Pelagian error; we are guided by God’s law when we maintain that it is unjust to charge children with their parents’ crimes (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.29This, to our grief, is the monstrous offspring produced in our time by inherited sin, the daughter of the Manichaeans and your mother.
3.30It has therefore become clear that God commanded what we maintain. Although the plain, genuine meaning of the pronouncement itself is accessible to everyone’s understanding and contains no blemish of obscurity, you might still take refuge in accusing us of slow intelligence and say we do not understand the command. So let us use another testimony, this time not a command but an action performed according to the command, to show how the law was understood.
In the fourth Book of Kingdoms, we read about Amaziah, son of Joash, king of Judah: ‘After the kingdom was firmly established in his hands, he killed his servants who had killed his father. But he did not kill their sons, in accordance with the covenant of the Lord’s law, which commands: Fathers shall not die for their children, nor children for their fathers’ (2 Kings 14:5–6). You see how the truthful historical account displays the justice of the king’s judgment. Although he had been devout, he is reported to have faltered in some respects. The authority of God’s law was therefore recalled to confirm his judgment. So that the deed should not carry too little weight because of the person who did it, it is commended as having been performed according to God’s law and covenant.
3.31Two or three witnesses are ordinarily believed even in a case involving someone’s life. How much more should two sacred witnesses be believed when God’s honor is at stake: the law contained in Deuteronomy and the history recording the kings’ deeds! God himself prescribed how he wished judgment to be given; judgments delivered according to his law testify how his command should be understood. Is there still doubt that Scripture’s authority cannot establish the transmission of sin?
Surely the positions over which we fight such lengthy battles—what you defend and what we defend—are contrary. They are so opposed and incompatible that you fight by persecution and we by argument, you by fury and we by reason. Both sides therefore agree that these statements differ and conflict: children are punished for their parents’ sins; children are not punished for their parents’ sins. Guilt is natural; guilt is not natural. God’s law commands that parents’ sins be charged to children; God’s law commands that parents’ sins not be charged to children. It is obvious that these mutually hostile opinions and propositions cannot both be true.
The rules of trained argument also show that when two opinions arise about uncertain matters, both can be false, but both cannot be true. This can indeed occur in differing alternatives said to admit a middle position, but not in opposites that have no middle. These matters are familiar to dialecticians; for readers unfamiliar with this discipline, however, let us explain them with an example (Deuteronomy 17:6) (Deuteronomy 19:15).
3.32Suppose, for example, the question concerns Goliath’s complexion, and one person insists he was black and another that he was white (compare 1 Samuel 17:4–5). These opposing opinions can both be false, but they cannot both be true. It cannot be true that he was black if he was always white, or that he was white if he remained black throughout his life. Thus these two opinions, which cannot both be true, can both be false if his complexion was neither white nor black but tawny—or a moderate blend of the opposites, with whiteness softened but no full blackness introduced. Differing and opposed descriptions can therefore be denied together more readily than affirmed together.
But opposites without a middle, such as good and evil, just and unjust, innocence and guilt, cannot coexist at one time in one and the same subject; so affirming either necessarily denies the other. For example, a command, advice, or assistance cannot be both just and unjust at the same time. Equally, a person cannot at one and the same time be both guilty and innocent, both good and evil.
3.33Now apply these examples to the case. Charging children with their parents’ sins and not charging children with their parents’ sins cannot both be shown equally just. If justice consists in holding the offspring guilty, it must be injustice to declare them not guilty for those same sins. And just as it is good to command justly, it is evil to give an unjust order. Argument may weaken the force of something already obvious, yet it is helpful to confirm an established case by the supporting judgments of divine law. Let us stay with this point: anyone who stands here with a sound mind will not be allowed to wander among the precipices of our present disputes.
You therefore concede, preacher of natural evil, that God’s law commands that children must not be punished for their parents’ sins. You also acknowledge that this people understood the command precisely as we now maintain it should be observed. Consequently King Amaziah, obeying God’s commands, restrained with praiseworthy moderation the anger caused by his father’s murder. He killed his father’s assassins but spared their sons, out of justice, not cowardice. Amaziah is praised; he is said to have done this according to God’s law, and commended for obeying the Lord’s will. Yet the account does not conceal that remnants of false worship stained him, and it shows that he did not imitate the devotion of his ancestor David (2 Kings 14:3–6). Even this man, who fell short of his family’s holiness, maintained in judgment the justice commended by divine law. Such was the power of reverence for unmistakable fairness! Consider, then, what evil your belief embraces: you attribute to God, whom we acknowledge as eternal, good, and just, an injustice that neither a king’s pride nor a bereaved son’s grief committed.
3.34But let us press the point. It has been established that injustice cannot belong to God. It has also been established that he himself commanded that parents’ sins must not harm their children. The dignity of the one giving the command itself declared unjust what he forbids. Yet, to deal more generously with you, I give you the opportunity to answer. Of the two opinions I just placed face to face—parents’ sins should be charged to children, or should not be charged to them—which do you think should be regarded as just?
If you say your own, which you want applied even at the final judgment, I ask in turn whether you regard the remaining opinion, ours, as just or unjust. You will undoubtedly pronounce it unfair. But the law’s authority commands this very position to be maintained. You see, then, that one of three alternatives necessarily remains. Either you admit that God’s law is unjust—indeed, through the law, accuse God himself of injustice—or you resort to your teachers’ language and say that the law given through Moses was not commanded by your god. Or, if you dare say neither, you must admit that inherited sin is asserted against the law’s teaching and commands. Surely we cannot believe you capable of such madness as saying that God maintains justice in his commands but injustice in his judgments—or, according to your doctrine, justice in his judgments but teaches injustice in his commands. Although we dealt with this above, it was necessary to repeat it now (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.35But if you say both are just, both what we say and what you say—that is, both what God’s law decreed and what Mani and the advocate of inherited sin invented—then, restraining the force of plain reason, we question you more gently and kindly. If you believe both what we say and what you say to be good, why have you stirred up all Italy with so much organized intrigue? Why have you hired crowds to raise riots in Rome? Why have you fed herds of horses throughout almost all Africa at the poor’s expense and sent them, with Alypius escorting them, to tribunes and centurions? Why have you corrupted worldly officials with the estates offered by wealthy women, so that the tinder of public fury would blaze against us? Why have you shattered the churches’ peace? Why have you stained a religious emperor’s reign with the wickedness of persecution, if we say nothing except what even you are forced to acknowledge as good?
3.36Enough of gentler speech. The brightness of blazing reason now shows that evil and good, profane and sacred, godly and ungodly, just and unjust have no partnership. Therefore there is no conflict between God’s commands and judgments. Charging people with others’ sins is contrary to commanding that those same sins must not be charged to them. Of these two, accepting one necessarily excludes the other; showing one just shows the other unjust. Yet God’s law prescribes that parents’ sins must not be charged to their children (Deuteronomy 24:16). Consequently, by that same authority, its opposite—the theory of inherited sin—has collapsed completely, together with the Manichaeans (2 Corinthians 6:14).
3.37I have certainly shown that what we defend is nothing other than what reason first identifies as entirely fair, what God then confirms in his law, and what, thirdly, was carried out with praise for the deed, precisely as we maintain the command should be understood. I have also repeatedly emphasized that this is true justice, which God showed to be pleasing to him by commanding it. Thus it has been established that the Manichaean transmission of sin finds no support either in reason or in the law’s testimonies (Deuteronomy 24:16) (2 Kings 14:5–6).
3.38But perhaps someone will be so obtuse as to demand explicit statements proving that God does not judge differently from the way he commanded judgment to be given. The demand itself is a wicked contention. Still, truth supplies weapons sufficient to satisfy every demand for proof, and I will gladly produce the strongest witnesses to this very point. Filled with the Holy Spirit, the prophet Ezekiel therefore says:
‘The Lord’s word came to me: Son of man, what do you mean by using this proverb in the land of Israel: The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge? As I live, says the Lord God, this proverb shall no longer be spoken in Israel. All souls are mine: the father’s soul and the son’s soul alike—all souls are mine. The soul that sins shall itself die.
‘But a man who is just, who practices judgment and justice, does not eat on the mountains or lift his eyes toward the objects of desire of the house of Israel; he does not defile his neighbor’s wife or approach a menstruating woman. He does not oppress anyone; he returns the debtor’s pledge and commits no robbery. He gives his bread to the hungry and clothes the naked. He does not lend his money at interest or take an excessive return. He keeps his hand from injustice and judges fairly between a man and his neighbor. He has walked in my commands and kept my ordinances by carrying them out. This man is just; he shall surely live, says the Lord God.
‘But suppose he fathers a corrupt son who sheds blood and commits sins. This son has not walked in the way of his just father; instead he has eaten on the mountains, defiled his neighbor’s wife, oppressed the needy and poor, committed robbery, and failed to return a pledge. He has fixed his eyes on idols and acted wickedly; he has lent at interest and taken an excessive return. This man shall not live. He has committed all these wicked deeds; he shall surely die. His blood shall be on himself.
‘But suppose this man fathers a son who sees all the sins his father has committed, is afraid, and does not act in the same way. He has not eaten on the mountains or lifted his eyes toward the objects of desire of the house of Israel. He has not defiled his neighbor’s wife or oppressed anyone. He has taken no pledge and committed no robbery. He has given his bread to the hungry and clothed the naked. He has kept his hand from wrongdoing, has taken neither interest nor an excessive return, has done justice, and has walked in my commands. This man shall not die for his father’s iniquities; he shall surely live. His father, however, because he inflicted suffering, committed robbery, and acted wrongly among my people, died in his own iniquity.
‘You have said: Why has the son not borne his father’s iniquity? Because the son has practiced justice, judgment, and mercy; he has kept all my statutes and carried them out. He shall surely live. But the soul that sins shall itself die. The son shall not bear his father’s injustice, nor shall the father bear his son’s injustice. The just person’s justice shall rest on himself, and the wicked person’s wickedness shall rest on himself.
‘If a wicked person turns away from all the iniquities he has committed, keeps all my commands, and practices judgment, justice, and mercy, he shall surely live and shall not die. None of the offenses he committed shall be remembered. Through the justice he has practiced he shall surely live. Do I really desire the wicked person’s death, says the Lord God, rather than that he turn from his evil way and live?
‘But if the just person turns away from his justice and commits iniquities, acting according to all the iniquities the wicked person has committed, he shall not live (Ezekiel 18:24). None of the righteous deeds he has done shall be remembered. In the offense by which he fell, and in the sins he committed, he shall die.
‘You have said: The Lord’s way is not right. Listen now, house of Israel: Is my way not right? Rather, your way is not fair. When the just person turns away from his justice and commits an offense, he shall die in the offense he committed; in that very offense he shall die. And when the wicked person turns away from the iniquity he committed and practices judgment and justice, he has preserved his soul and lives. Because he turned from all the iniquities he committed, he shall surely live and shall not die.
‘The house of Israel says: The Lord’s way is not right. Is my way not right, house of Israel? Is it not rather your way that is not right? Therefore I will judge each of you according to your own ways, house of Israel, says the Lord God’ (Ezekiel 18:1–30).
3.39Does God not appear a fully competent defender of his own judgments, when on this question he has not only passed judgment but also reasoned through so many points? Clearly, foreseeing the errors of our times, he justly and providently accomplished two things through the brightness and abundance of his words. First, no one should be unsettled by any ambiguity in the questions. Second, those who willingly plunged into shipwreck should have no plank of excuse remaining.
He speaks to the Jews, whose crimes had earned captivity. To divert the blame for their own disobedience, they claimed captivity was owed to their parents rather than to their own conduct. He confronts them with a father’s authority: ‘Why do you use this proverb: The parents ate sour grapes, and the children’s teeth were set on edge? As I live, says the Lord God, this proverb shall no longer be spoken in Israel. All souls are mine: the father’s soul and the son’s soul alike—all souls are mine. The soul that sins shall itself die’ (Ezekiel 18:2–4).
3.40To illustrate and confirm the fairness of his judgment, God uses an oath, adding a solemn pledge to the authority of his decree. The apostle understood this manner of speaking when he explained to the Hebrews: ‘God, wishing to show the heirs of the promise the unchangeable nature of his purpose, intervened with an oath, so that through two unchangeable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we might have the strongest encouragement’ (Hebrews 6:17–18).
3.41He therefore says that these two things show God cannot lie: the fact that he promised, and the fact that he calls himself to witness that he will fulfill his promise. This does not mean that God’s word is normally weak or doubtful without such an attestation. Rather, to load his truth with weighty proofs, he adopted the kind of speech that makes even people accustomed to deceiving others believable. With this same weight God warns and commands in the present case: no one among his people should suspect what the advocates of inherited sin assert, and everyone should understand that God cannot judge in the way he condemns. ‘As I live, says the Lord God, this proverb shall no longer be spoken in Israel’ (Ezekiel 18:3).
3.42What does ‘It shall no longer be spoken’ (Ezekiel 18:3) mean, when the Manichaeans still maintain it today with such effort? It means this: no one belonging to the people of Israel, or accepting this Scripture’s authority, will dare believe such a thing after my ruling. Anyone who persists in that opinion neither obeys these writings nor will be counted among the true Israel (Romans 9:6).
3.43After exposing the emptiness of that proverb and ratifying his judgment by a divine declaration and oath, he also deigns to explain the reason for his justice: why relatives are not burdened with each other’s sins. ‘All souls are mine,’ he says; ‘the father’s soul and the son’s soul alike—all souls are mine. The soul that sins shall itself die’ (Ezekiel 18:4). Thus he also uses his ownership of souls to show why this measured judgment is perfectly fair.
3.44He says: Since the father’s soul is mine and the son’s soul is mine, it is utterly unjust and foolish for my possession, my image, to be burdened with another’s deeds. This testimony, like many others, teaches that the soul owes nothing to reproductive seed, since God claims it for his own authority (Genesis 1:26–27) (Ezekiel 18:4).
3.45I gave it this condition: no outsider could harm it against its will; instead it would freely embrace either sin or justice, either reward or guilt.
3.46So you are angry with me because I believe God under oath rather than Mani dreaming! Especially since Mani produces no testimonies of sound faith, or even arguments of an alert intelligence. Such arguments could never be found strong enough to overthrow truth’s foundations; still, if aptly expressed, they might at least offer some immediate relief from the shame of stupidity.
God persists in strengthening by an oath what he had made sacred by a command. He goes on to make his decree plain through examples. Suppose, he says, a man maintains every form of justice with unstained devotion and fathers a son who clings to corrupt behavior and turns away from his father’s paths. The noble standing acquired by his father’s great devotion to justice does that son no good. Conversely, he presents this sinner’s son avoiding his father’s ways by a better decision, and shows that his parent’s iniquity does him no harm. He places justice and sin on an equal footing, asserting that parents’ vices no more travel through reproductive seed than virtues can. All souls belong to his authority. This also exposes the irreverence of your claim that newborn children’s souls and bodies belong to the devil’s dominion (Ezekiel 18:5–18).
3.47Having established the balanced scales of his judgment, he was already condemning your opinion in people who thought similarly. ‘You have said: Why has the son not borne his father’s iniquity? Because,’ he says, ‘the soul that sins shall itself die. The son does not bear his father’s injustice, nor does the father bear his son’s injustice. The just person’s justice shall rest on himself, and the wicked person’s wickedness shall rest on himself’ (Ezekiel 18:19–20). Which of us could ever have discussed this with as much care as God did through his prophet’s mouth, distinguishing, comparing, and repeating the points?
3.48Yet, not content to explain this alone, he brings in another argument from the works of mercy to confirm this justice. He declares that past errors do not harm even the very people who sinned voluntarily, if they turn to repentance and reform. ‘If the wicked person turns away from the iniquities he committed and keeps my commands, none of the offenses he committed shall be remembered. Through the justice he has practiced he shall surely live’ (Ezekiel 18:21–22). That is: Since my merciful purpose is to forgive even people’s own sins when they reform, how could I charge newborn children with someone else’s? Or could things be so arranged that innocence is guilty before me when it is created, although it has power with me when it is recovered after having been interrupted?
3.49This displeased idol worshipers; and our faith, which you see shaped by this law, displeases you too. Those irreverent people therefore said: ‘The Lord’s way is not right.’ ‘Listen, then, house of Israel,’ he says. ‘Is my way not right? Is it not your way that is unfair? Therefore I will judge each of you according to your own way, says the Lord God’ (Ezekiel 18:29–30).
Do you see the testimonies defending us? Are we chasing ambiguities? Are we hunting for vague phrases? Are we defending faith with weak or tangled arguments? We condemn what God condemns; we understand what God explains; we discuss what God argued; we believe what God swore to uphold: ‘The son shall not bear his father’s iniquity, nor shall the father bear his son’s injustice. The just person’s justice shall rest on himself, and the wicked person’s wickedness shall rest on himself’ (Ezekiel 18:20). The way God promises to judge shines clearly: he charges neither children with their parents’ sins nor parents with their children’s. Thus Scripture’s testimony has also established what reason would not allow to be doubted: God maintains in his judgments the same justice he maintained in his commands.
3.50But perhaps you will try to deceive simpler hearers with this quibble: God was speaking here about adults, saying that their parents’ crimes do not harm those children who have canceled natural evil by the holiness of their own deeds. We must show that this trick accomplishes nothing. God has prescribed without qualification that parents’ iniquity does not condemn innocent children, but each person is convicted by personal iniquities; a faithful mind cannot doubt this. Still, let us handle again the corpse of your opinion, pierced by so many thunderbolts of the law. How far do you think this divine argument should extend? Does it mean that parents’ offenses harm neither adult nor newborn children? Or that they are prevented from harming only those already older and practicing justice, while little children, before draining away the natural poison through their own justice, are burdened by their parents’ crime—so that the very thing God denied through the prophet actually happens (Ezekiel 18:19–20)?
3.51Here is our reply. Then admit that the other proposition, which carries equal weight, also holds: parents’ righteous deeds benefit and sanctify their children, and fail to benefit only those who, once older, have worn away their inborn righteousness by their own crimes. God denied both propositions, explaining and repeatedly emphasizing each through the example of the other. Since you see that his denial opposes your reasoning and insist that it is false concerning infants, refute both its parts by the condition of newborn children. When you do so, you will commit two evils together: you will attack God’s pronouncement, and you will assert that a righteous person is born from a righteous person and a criminal from a criminal (Ezekiel 18:19–20).
3.52But if, unable to endure truth’s clamorous protest, you try to escape elsewhere, you will fall into stronger nets. Suppose you say: The prophet’s pronouncement that relatives are not burdened with each other’s faults is indeed true concerning adults; concerning infants, however, it lies in the part saying they are not guilty of their parents’ crimes, but does not lie in the part asserting that they gain no assistance from their parents’ virtues. Then you will openly display a most disgraceful appetite—not for argument but invention, not for eloquence but mere talk, not the appetite of a sane person but of a Manichaean losing his mind. You would be imagining yourself free to reject whatever you please and accept whatever delights you, against plain reason, God’s honor, examples, the testimony of commands, and the explanation of judgments (Ezekiel 18:19–20).
3.53Who are you, rushing to destroy fairness under the impulse of Marcion’s frenzy? Who are you, forcing both God’s judgments and his commands under the censorship of your tongue, still slippery from Manichaean mysteries? No one ever attempted this without first rejecting them. Will you dare, with Mani as your authority, to break God’s testament, which reason, fairness, devotion, and truth—as though a line of sacred witnesses—sealed through the prophets writing faithfully? You long ago lost both purity of understanding and the appearance of religion if you think the pronouncement in Ezekiel either offers support for your inherited sin or fails to contain its destruction (Ezekiel 18:19–20).
3.54‘The wicked person’s iniquity,’ he says, ‘is upon his own head. I will judge each of you according to your own ways’ (Ezekiel 18:20, 30). ‘Fathers shall not die for their children, nor children for their parents’ (Deuteronomy 24:16). ‘The soul that sins shall itself die. All souls are mine; I will judge each person for that person’s own iniquities’ (Ezekiel 18:4, 30).
3.55Look at the light, the crowd of pronouncements, the dignity of judgments that your inherited sin is unafraid to insult and tries to overrule! Here there is no doubt you will not be ashamed to say what seems the only remaining reply: the prophet’s pronouncement—or rather God’s through the prophet—is true, and the reasoning of wise people is invincible, teaching that charging children with their parents’ sins is utterly unjust (Ezekiel 18:19–20).
3.56You do not think the reproductive seed of all people is polluted by the guilt of an act of will; yet you claim this justice has no force in the case of Adam’s crime alone, and his is the one sin charged to everyone. I do not know how to respond first. Should I laugh, as your extraordinary absurdities demand? But the destruction of the many people you deceive calls for pity and tears. Should I therefore be overcome by earnest grief? Yet your monstrous arguments provoke laughter even in a sorrowful mind.
3.57If this age has any time left, who will be able to believe the written record that there existed a man who believed and swore that what was natural was not natural, that what belonged to generation did not belong to generation, and that what affected certain people solely because they were parents did not belong to the condition of parents? I think a future generation will consider these claims invented rather than defended by any mortal.
These are the lurchings, nausea, and vomitings your party and belief undergo. You say: Parents’ sins cannot flow to their children through nature, because an act of choice is not bound to reproductive seed; but Adam’s sin, conceived by his will, passes through nature to all people, because an act of choice is bound to reproductive seed. Again: God does not condemn children for their parents’ sins, because that is the height of injustice; but he condemns Adam’s descendants for their parents’ sin, which no justice can defend. Finally: What applied to Adam only because he fathered children under the law of marriage does not belong to the condition of generation by which spouses become parents.
Is this steering a course, or floundering? Is this digesting an argument, or feeling sick? Is this taking in anything solid, or constantly vomiting? In the same words you affirm what you denied; in the same lines you deny what you affirmed. And you are angry that we do not submit to a man so shattered by serious illness that he cannot retain what he takes in!
3.58Even you see that this is not worth disputing. Still, we must help unwary minds that seize on the crudest opinions, flattering bad conduct, to comfort a wounded conscience. We therefore ask whether you discovered any occasion in Scripture for an invention of such stupidity. If you say, ‘Through one man sin entered the world’ (Romans 5:12), we remind you to reread the preceding book of this work. If you remember it, you will be unable to appropriate the apostle’s testimony.
3.59If, however, you say that one form of baptism consecrates people of different ages, you will admit, even if I say nothing, that it contains no mention of infected generation, diabolical flesh, or Adam. Although this does not concern the transmission of sin, we shall nevertheless answer it fully in its own place.
3.60Produce, then, at least one pronouncement of the law against the great authority of the witnesses we have brought forward, against manifest justice and clear reason—a pronouncement through which you can show you were deceived. I add that last phrase because even if some passage seemed, through ambiguous wording, to indicate such a thing, the brilliance and teaching of other pronouncements would compel it to be explained in a way consistent with justice.
3.61But as it is, not even a slight occasion for this opinion can be found in the holy Scriptures. On the other side, the faith we defend is fortified by examples and testimonies no less than by its own reasons. You are therefore completely possessed by a deadly obstinacy, believing that Manichaean dreams must be accepted at the expense of law, reason, wisdom, and justice.
3.62Still, attend to what we bring against this view. Even if you could prove that Adam’s sin is charged to his children, you would nonetheless agree that other parents’ crimes do not harm their offspring (Deuteronomy 24:16).
3.63It would therefore be clear that it was not generation but some other cause that made children appear liable for the sin of this one parent—before an unjust judge, however.
3.64Thus, just as the judge’s reputation would be stained by condemning the innocent, the condition of generation would be vindicated by the examples of other parents. For if the source of the transmission and the guilt lay in the work of reproduction, that condition would pollute all reproduction.
3.65But if the outcomes differed although the mode of generation did not, it would become entirely clear that even in the marriage whose guilt its offspring had shared, generation itself had not been corrupted.
3.66What, then, have we established? That the nonexistence of inherited sin is so certain that, even if you showed children punished for Adam’s sin, it would still be established that sins cannot be inborn and guilt cannot travel with reproductive seed, since you would admit that this does not happen in all reproduction. Consequently, even if vices were handed on to persons, they would not be mixed into conception.
But as it stands, you and I agree that a parent’s sin could not pass to children except through corruption and guilt in generation itself. Reason, examples, and the law agree that the condition of generation cannot possibly have been corrupted. Your own concession confirms this, for you say that no parents’ sins except those of two people pass to their children. It has therefore been established beyond defeat that the devil neither corrupted the first humans’ reproductive power nor made any sin capable of being born.
3.67We are asked, then, why we do not agree that sin is natural. We answer: Because the idea has no appearance of plausibility, much less truth, no appearance of justice or piety; because it makes the devil appear to be humanity’s creator.
3.68Because it fastens the charge of injustice upon God as judge.
3.69Because it weakens and destroys free will, the chief defense protecting Christ’s Church against various errors.
3.70By saying that all people are so incapable of any virtue that they are filled with ancient crimes inside their mothers’ wombs.
3.71Yet you invent a power for these crimes that not only drives out natural innocence but also afterward compels people throughout their entire lives into every vice.
3.72You swear that this law of sin remained and flourished even in the prophets and apostles, already illustrious through the great brilliance of their conduct and miracles, and even after the grace of Christ’s mysteries—which you suppose comes to the aid of all these outrages of your doctrine (Romans 7:23).
3.73Because it extinguishes efforts toward every kind of honorable conduct; because it comforts and increases moral obscenity by defaming God’s works, that is, human nature; because it exposes all the law’s commands to the charge of demanding the impossible—that is, to the charge of injustice.
3.74Because it contains no less indecency than irreverence, embracing shame concerning the genitals as its chief evidence.
3.75And because, in place of sacred authorities, it swells with accusations against God.
3.76It claims there is tyrannical excess in his commands.
3.77Savage injustice in his judgments.
3.78And Punic deceit in his oaths.
3.79Because, in place of arguments and every kind of logical demonstration, it relies on Mani’s dreams and madness.
3.80These, then, are the reasons that fire us to attack natural evil and make us disdain and despise association with the ruined.
3.81They ensure that all the world’s uproar frightens us no more than the sight of a rustling stand of bitter lupines shaken by filthy pigs or gusts of wind. [Literary allusion: Virgil, Georgics 1.75–76.]
3.82We therefore believe God to be just, good, and truthful. Consequently, we maintain that his law has commanded nothing impossible, his testimonies confirm nothing false, and his judgments pronounce nothing unjust. He himself is the creator of human beings, whom he creates liable to no crime, but full of natural innocence and capable of voluntary virtues.
3.83Taken together, these points require one of two conclusions: either God must be believed to be what the Manichaean advocate of inherited sin invents, or you, together with everyone accepting the doctrine of inherited sin, must be recognized as the kind of person the God we honor opposes. But God cannot be what Mani dreams. He is the good, just, and true God whom all holy Scripture, the whole law, and our faith worship. Consequently, such is your doctrine that, just as it is accepted by dishonoring God, it is destroyed by honoring him.
3.84It is time to move on to other matters. Yet the importance of the case requires us to supply even what we think we passed over in the preceding book. A sensible reader may judge this unnecessary. Still, experience shows that a case brought low by its dangers clings even to slight supports. It is worth taking away the consolations of those whose defenses you have removed.
3.85When we came to the apostle Paul’s statement that the advocate of inherited sin used to peddle to people unfamiliar with Scripture—‘Through one man sin entered the world’ (Romans 5:12; see this work 2.56–57)—I first showed that the wording itself excluded the advocates of inherited sin from the inner meaning of that passage. When the Teacher of the Gentiles traced sin’s antiquity, he placed a definite number as a powerful guard protecting generation. By saying sin entered the world through one man, he expressly indicated that he meant nothing about generation, which cannot occur except through two. I showed that a distinction had been made between parents’ sexual union and their sin: sin was indeed said to have entered the world, but through a number that could not apply to offspring. Throughout the book we argued sufficiently that the passage identifies not sin’s nature but its pattern, adopted by later transgressors through imitation, not generation.
Yet in the Letter to the Hebrews we read concerning the Jews: ‘They sprang from one, and him as good as dead’ (Hebrews 11:12)—that is, from Abraham. Earlier in the same letter, too, we read of Christ: ‘The one who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all from one’ (Hebrews 2:11). The advocate of inherited sin might seize on one of these texts, or similar ones if any can be found, and argue that it weakens our answer. We said that ‘one’ was used for the person through whom sin passed so as to exclude generation from the meaning, yet in this letter generation is indicated by the mention of ‘one.’ For this reason, I thought the matter should be reconsidered. I urge the reader to pay attention: this objection will be destroyed in several ways.
Where Abraham is mentioned, his wife Sarah is included too. Here is the sequence of the words: ‘By faith the one called Abraham obeyed the call to go out to a place he was to receive as an inheritance, and he went out without knowing where he was going. By faith he lived in the land of promise as in a foreign land, dwelling in tents with Isaac and Jacob, co-heirs of the same promise. For he was waiting for the city that has foundations, whose designer and builder is God. By faith Sarah herself, though barren, received power to conceive seed even beyond the usual age, because she believed the one who promised was faithful. Therefore from one man, and him as good as dead, there sprang descendants as numerous as the stars of heaven and as countless as the sand along the seashore’ (Hebrews 11:8–12).
After mentioning both Abraham and Sarah, and saying that she was past childbearing through old age but received the power to conceive seed by faith, he could confidently add that from one arose so many people, comparable in number to the stars. Both praise of the faithful and the truth of the event required the parents’ union to be described. But the art of praise prompted him, in commending the multitude descended from those two, to name one rather than both. He wanted to show how much steadfast faith had gained. Saying that God’s power had produced a multitude beyond counting, he judged it more fitting to praise God’s work by calling them descendants of one rather than two. This was especially so because the added praise in the final expression caused no loss to historical accuracy: he had already supplied that accuracy by mentioning both persons.
3.86In Hebrews, then, where generation is the subject, many are said to have arisen ‘from one.’ In Romans, however, where the apostle discusses sin, he says sin entered ‘through one man.’ (Hebrews 11:12) By that number he taught with complete clarity that he meant nothing about generation (Romans 5:12).
3.87Where it is said of Christ, ‘The one who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all from one’ (Hebrews 2:11), this can be understood as referring not to Adam but to God, by whose power Christ according to the flesh and the whole human race were made. Consequently, the similarity of other expressions has contributed nothing to undermine the apostle’s meaning when he said that sin entered the world through one man.
Yet what follows should stay firmly in the sensible reader’s mind: understand that so far I have argued far more leniently than the matter required. Let us allow that many testimonies show generation, which cannot happen except through two, is nevertheless commonly said to occur through one. The theory of inherited sin will still gain nothing. Why? Because some expressions are figurative or extended, and others are proper and exact. Things with proper names can lend their terms without suffering loss. But things spoken of in a borrowed sense are not allowed to impose the implications of their own definitions on the primary things to which the terms properly belong. All this happens without fault when we lend words to matters about which there is no doubt.
3.88But when something contrary to everyone’s opinion is introduced by an expression whose sound provides its whole support, a serious error is committed if its proper name is readily available but it is labeled with a borrowed, inexact term. When we are speaking of offspring, no one doubts that every person born has two parents, and this needs no corroboration. It will therefore not obstruct understanding if I say that someone was born from one person: my words will not so unsettle anyone that they think he could have been born without either a father or a mother.
3.89But when the subject is sin, which is represented as inborn against everyone’s opinion and all reason—
3.90And this sin is properly said to have passed through one person if he offered an example of wrongdoing, but most inappropriately if he implanted the sin by generation, since it could not pass to descendants except through two— (Romans 5:12)
3.91And the apostle has emphasized that sin passed, but through one, while truth has shown that this properly refers to an example—the advocate of inherited sin acts with intolerable shamelessness when he says that the number, bent into an inexact sense, can extend to his position too (Romans 5:12).
3.92It would be an unheard-of monstrosity if someone tried to establish even a tolerable but novel doctrine by abandoning exact expressions for inexact and ambiguous ones. How infinitely more disgraceful, then, that Augustine tries to establish obscene claims accusing God’s justice through statements so double-edged that he admits they speak properly against him and only by indulgence in his favor! What educated person would trust an argument that, once it came to court, his opponent could claim as a slave born in his household, while he himself could possess it only as a runaway he had kidnapped?
3.93The phrase in Hebrews, ‘All from one,’ is required by the praise of God, after the parents have first been mentioned. But what is said about Christ—‘The one who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all from one’ (Hebrews 2:11) —refers to God.
3.94Thus the apostle says to the Corinthians: ‘Just as woman is from man, so man is through woman; but all things are from God’ (1 Corinthians 11:12) (Romans 5:12). Thirdly, reason shows that even if neither of the two supporting points we offered existed, Paul’s statement that sin entered this world through one man would still have formed no alliance with the Manichaeans.
3.95Consequently, our answer remains unshaken. It shows that the apostle does not claim that generation was damaged and corrupted through one man. Rather, nature remains intact, and only the will of sinners is shown to be corrupt (Romans 5:12).
3.96But let us return to the book he addressed to Valerius, in which he selected statements from just one of my books for discussion and refutation. In the first book of the present work I had reached those statements of Augustine where his shamelessness was uncovered. Trying to escape the odium of an opinion that would seem to make the devil humanity’s creator, he declared that God is the author of evils and himself creates a substance of such a character that it incurs guilt before it acquires the use of reason, and is placed in the devil’s kingdom by its Creator’s hands.
3.97And that God is the potter fashioning vessels of wrath and destruction (Romans 9:22) (Romans 9:21).
3.98But vessels driven to destruction not by the course of their free will but by the power of their maker (Romans 9:22).
3.99He tried to strengthen this immense wickedness of a monstrous doctrine with statements of the apostle Paul, which I explained through the context of the entire passage. I also showed that the prophet Isaiah, from whom this potter comparison was admittedly taken, most fully defends the cause of divine justice (Isaiah 45:9) (Isaiah 29:16).
3.100I filled the second book with an exposition of the apostle, setting Augustine’s arguments against it, to the extent truth supplied me the ability. So now let us return to the sequence of his book.
3.101After putting forward one passage from the brief preface of my earlier work as though to attack it, and adding his claim about his god as the potter of sinners, he accuses me. Let his own words display how consistent and straightforward he is:
‘It is not, then, as you say while deceiving yourself and others, that anyone who says humans have free will or that God creates newborn children is called a Caelestian and Pelagian. The catholic faith says these things too. But anyone who says humans have free will to worship God rightly without God’s help, and anyone who calls God the creator of newborn children in such a way as to deny that he redeems infants from the devil’s power, is called a Caelestian and Pelagian. Both of us, therefore, say that humans have free will and God is the creator of newborn children. That is not why you are Caelestians and Pelagians. But that anyone is free to do good without God’s help, and that infants are not rescued from the power of darkness and thus transferred into God’s kingdom—these are your claims. That is why you are Caelestians and Pelagians’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.8; compare Colossians 1:13).
I have frequently shown you floundering in the swamp of your irreverence and fear; a sensible reader surely will not doubt it.
3.102In the first book, therefore, I showed that I had not lied when I wrote that everyone who fled the stigma of association with us fell over the precipices of the Manichaeans, who deny free will and God as humanity’s creator. I also showed that you immediately embraced, in entirely explicit language, what you had attempted to repel, even quoting the writings you sent to Boniface (see this work 1.14). Yet this answer of yours, which I have just quoted, admits the same thing. You said the catholic faith believes both in free will and in God as the creator of newborn children. Among all heretics, the Manichaeans are certainly the ones who deny both, along with you.
3.103But stripped of the substance of catholic faith, you put on its name alone like a thin cloak. You want us to believe that you too hold what catholics confess: that humans have free will and God creates newborn children. If you said this straightforwardly and faithfully, end the dispute by falling silent. Let the reputation of accusers return to us for having charged you with what your confident denial has erased. Add only this to your declaration: if any sect or argument is found trying by some reasoning to overthrow this twofold confession, which you have professed catholic, it is either not yours or no longer defended by you.
If you prefer to defend by substantial argument your denial of the positions in question, explain the definitions of free will and surround its boundaries, as with markers, by precise distinctions.
3.104And also maintain that God creates the kind of human beings fitting for his hands and his justice.
3.105You have certainly done neither. After replying that catholics acknowledge free will—and pretending to be one of them—you immediately added a definition taking away what you seemed to have granted. For you say: ‘But anyone who says humans have free will to worship God rightly without his help is called a Pelagian.’ And again: ‘We say that humans have free will; but you say that anyone is free to do good’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.8).
3.106When you claim we say everyone’s freedom of choice is sufficient to worship God rightly without his help, you are lying outright. Worship of God is understood in many ways: keeping the commands, condemning vices, simplicity of life, the ordering of sacred mysteries, and the depth of doctrines Christian faith embraces about the Trinity, the resurrection, and many similar matters. How could we say without distinction that free will is sufficient to worship him without God’s help, when we read the Lord saying in the Gospel: ‘I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you hid these things from the wise and discerning and revealed them to little children. Yes, Father, because this was pleasing in your sight’ (Matthew 11:25–26)?
Freedom of choice could not discover on its own all these things, whether doctrines or mysteries. Natural reason, however, could teach people not to worship idols or despise God, who became known as the Creator of the world itself, as the Teacher of the Gentiles testifies (Romans 1:20). Neither we nor any sensible person, then, says what you invent. We maintain that God makes a human being with free will, helps that person through countless forms of divine grace, and leaves that person able either to keep God’s commands or to transgress them. This is where we defend free will: while God shows his kindness in so many ways—commanding, blessing, sanctifying, restraining, inviting, enlightening—each person already using reason is free either to keep or to despise God’s will.
3.107We do not, then, believe that free will without God’s help is adequate for the worship offered by those initiated into the sacred mysteries. Rather, we acknowledge freedom of choice as a fully competent witness to divine fairness. When we must appear before Christ’s judgment seat and each receive what belongs to deeds done in the body, whether good or evil (2 Corinthians 5:10), God will be shown to judge nothing unjustly: he charges no one with a sin unless the person punished for it could also have avoided it.
3.108Your first statement, then, will gain nothing through its obscurity. Your second, in which you repeat that you acknowledge free will, yet do not believe any human being free to do good, has laid your whole inner self bare.
3.109Look: just as we did in the first book, we now press you closely to show how you have not denied free will. Let our reader remember that you have admitted catholics proclaim free will and God as the creator of newborn children—two things no one but a Manichaean ever denied. Yet although we both granted these in common, neither you nor your doctrine leaves freedom of choice intact. It follows completely that you and your doctrine retain nothing of the catholic faith.
I ask, then: what is the power of free will, and what is its definition? Certainly it has no power to change natural conditions. No one ever changed the functions of the senses within himself—for example, receiving sounds through the nose or smells through the ears. No one changed the characteristic of his sex; no one could pass into the form of another animal or, through free will, replace his body hair with a naturally grown fleece. No one could claim a body of whatever quality or size he wished. We may extend these examples to everything falling under this condition.
Let us move, then, from natural things to external circumstances. Whose will controls fruitful fields, successful voyages, noble birth and riches, or the continued standing of that nobility, so that he could say God made him with free will to acquire these or similar things for himself? Natural conditions follow fixed orders; external circumstances are always carried along by uncertain chances.
Where, then, does free will reside—the thing by which humans surpass beasts, by which they were made in God’s image (Genesis 1:26–27), and on which alone the justice of divine judgment rests? Where, I ask, is this free will, which the Manichaeans certainly deny and which you yourself admit catholics affirm? Undoubtedly in a person’s ability, without any unavoidable compulsion from natural conditions, either to direct his will into wrongdoing or to hold it back from wrongdoing.
3.110To illuminate this clear matter with a few examples: a person is as free to choose sacrilege as to refuse it; as free to choose the murder of a parent as to refuse it; as free to choose adultery as to refuse it; as able to give truthful testimony as false; as free to obey God’s command as the devil’s persuasion.
3.111In the preceding examples I emphasized a fully formed intention rather than the accomplishment of acts, because murder of a parent, sacrilege, adultery, and similar deeds are easier to avoid than to commit. An evil will does not always have the opportunity to carry out what it wants. Conversely, abstaining from these things involves complete quiet—unless you call the very unwillingness to toil a kind of toil. I pass over what holy Scripture, presented by prophets, evangelists, and apostles, and teachers shining with catholic soundness—John, Basil, Theodore, and others like them—have commended: committing crimes takes much greater effort than avoiding them.
3.112For now I stress what concerns the present question: free will was given for no other purpose, and can be understood in no other way, than that no one is dragged with a captive will either toward justice or toward injustice.
3.113Vices certainly have sweet enticements, and punishments inflicted by persecutors often bring bitter tortures. But the judgment of honor beats back the former, and the greatness of patience overcomes the latter.
3.114Yet possessing virtues is not a wretched business. Besides a kind of kingdom in a good conscience, it enjoys the promised height of eternal blessedness. The aids of God’s grace are also present, never abandoning the will on virtue’s side. Although grace has countless forms, they are always applied with such restraint that they never displace free will. They offer support for as long as the will chooses to lean on them, without overpowering a resistant mind. That is why, just as some people rise from vices to virtues, others also fall back from virtues to vices.
3.115How, then, do you acknowledge free will when you say it can do only one thing—evil—but cannot turn away from evil and do good (Psalm 34:14; LXX/Vulgate Psalm 34:14) (Psalm 34:14;)?
3.116For now I say nothing about the frenzy with which you rage against the whole law, believing that it commanded mortals things it saw they had no capacity to do.
3.117Instead I ask: with which poets did you stumble upon a Hippocrene like this, to invent a two-part beast—not by composing poetry but by blaspheming—whose body you fashioned from an evil necessity while coating only its face with the name of freedom?
3.118For in the work you sent to Rome you argue this way too: ‘The will, which is free in evil things, is not free in good things’ (Augustine, Against Two Letters of the Pelagians 1.7).
3.119And here you call someone a Caelestian for believing that anyone is free to do good. You therefore call free what you insist can do nothing but evil. Find, if you can, another definition of something unfree, and claim this as free! Even if you had lost your senses so completely that you could not see freedom’s definition in the thing itself, ought you not to have understood freedom’s essence from its opposite?
Suppose you were similarly uncertain what eyesight meant and defined it as follows: Sight means having the eyes gouged out, or being unable to see anything through some obstruction when it is time to see. Suppose you thought this definition fitted sight, but then turned to explain its opposite, blindness. You could find no other explanation except that, in an animal whose nature includes eyesight, the eyes have been gouged out or blocked by thick fluid, taking away the ability to see. You would surely come to your senses and recognize that one definition cannot fit contrary things.
Then, if blindness could mean only the deprivation of sight in an animal’s eye when it should be able to see, the definition of sight would emerge by denying the conditions used to explain blindness. Sight would be the proper capacity to see at the appropriate time, with eyes neither gouged out nor blocked. If you stubbornly resisted after this was shown, you would achieve only this: listeners would either think you opposed your own conscience with shameful obstinacy, or, if you convinced them that you really thought this way, they would judge your mind’s eyes as thoroughly gouged out as those of the person you had defined as possessing sight.
3.120To apply the example to our case, then: you could have understood what to call free from the definition of unfree. Even if your understanding grew dark when defining free will, so that you thought something could be called free while confined to one of two opposites, you should have noticed that captivity—that is, lack of freedom—can be explained only as being bound to one of two opposites. Freedom must therefore be named by denying captivity. Since what is unfree is forced to cling to one of the opposites, its contrary, what is free, cannot be bound to either.
3.121Since this is so, and you resist this point so miserably, it is uncertain which judgment better fits you: that you defend falsehood against your conscience, or think what is false to be true. Thus whether you have lost the eyes of reason remains uncertain, while it is certain that you have lost the eyes of faith.
3.122To repeat our conclusions briefly: free will is assisted on evil’s side by the pleasures of vice or the devil’s persuasions, and on good’s side by teachings of virtue and the various forms of divine grace. It cannot exist unless necessity is removed from it in respect of both justice and sin.
3.123Catholics acknowledge its reality. The advocates of inherited sin deny it, together with their teachers, the Manichaeans.
3.124We therefore spoke truly: those deceived by you become Manichaeans to avoid being called heretics. Fearing a false disgrace, they incur a real crime, like wild animals surrounded by a line of feathers to drive them into nets, forced into actual destruction by an empty fear.
We call God the creator of newborn children in this sense: since it is certain that the God of catholics, who is the true God, can do nothing evil, the dignity of the maker himself forbids belief that the human beings he makes come from his hands unjust and guilty before they use their will. By denying one of these points you undermine both. You say you believe God is the creator, but the creator of evil human beings. Consequently you contradict your own doctrine when you deny asserting that the devil creates humans.
3.125For when you attribute to God’s work the kind of beings he cannot make, you show that what you said he makes has nothing to do with God.
3.126Although we dealt with this more fully in the first book (see this work 1.52, 64), let us briefly state your meaning here too. You fear assigning any substance to the devil’s work, yet you do not fear fastening a great crime—not merely some small fault—on God. Human flesh’s nature commands more reverence from you than God’s justice. You feared attributing human substance to the devil as though that were an important matter, but attached the formation of wickedness to God’s justice and holiness as though they were unimportant. As if, between two opinions that are both false, attributing flesh to the devil’s works would not be more tolerable than attributing iniquity to God’s works!
3.127Just as you said here that God forms infants guilty and under the devil’s power, so in later parts of your book you vomited out something more repulsive than the Manichaean mysteries, saying about God: ‘He creates evil people in the same way as he feeds and nourishes evil people.’ The source compares Isaiah 45:7.
3.128God, then, creates evil.
3.129And innocent people are punished for what God does.
3.130And the devil possesses them because God does this.
3.131And God charges people with the crime of his own hands.
3.132And what the devil weakly persuaded someone to do, God skillfully and persistently fashions, protects, preserves, and forms.
3.133And God demands the fruit of goodness from a person in whom he implanted evil at birth (Matthew 7:17–18).
3.134And afterward he lies throughout the whole law by saying that the Lord is just.
3.135And one capable of so many crimes is still called God?
3.136The Manichaeans’ memory will perish with a crash, because ‘the Lord remains forever; he has prepared his throne for judgment, and he himself will judge the world with fairness’ (Psalm 9:6–8; LXX/Vulgate Psalm 9:7–9) (Psalm 9:6–8;). There is no crime in God. He therefore does not create evil people: if they were evil by nature, God could not create them. Consequently, just as confessing God as creator of good beings belongs to catholics, believing God the creator of evil beings belongs specifically to Manichaeans.
3.137But let us examine the rest as well.
3.138[Augustine writes:] ‘Listen briefly, then, to what this question involves. Catholics say that the good Creator God made human nature good, but, corrupted by sin, it needs Christ the physician. Manichaeans say human nature was not made good by God and then corrupted by sin. Rather, the prince of eternal darkness created humanity by mixing two natures that always existed, one good and the other evil. Caelestians and Pelagians say the good God made human nature good, but it is so healthy in newborn infants that at that age they do not need Christ’s medicine. Recognize, then, your own name in your doctrine, and stop charging the catholics who refute you with someone else’s doctrine and name. Truth refutes both the Manichaeans and you.
‘For it says to the Manichaeans: “Have you not read that the one who made humankind from the beginning made them male and female? For this reason a man shall leave father and mother and cling to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh. So they are no longer two but one flesh. Therefore what God has joined, let no human separate” (Matthew 19:4–6). Thus it shows that God both creates human beings and joins spouses, against the Manichaeans who deny both.
‘To you, however, it says: “The Son of Man came to seek and save what was lost” (Luke 19:10). But you, excellent Christians, answer Christ: If you came to seek and save what was lost, you did not come to infants; they were not lost and were born safe. Go to older people. We lay down the rule for you from your own words: “The healthy do not need a physician, but the sick do” (Matthew 9:12).
‘Thus the Manichaean, who says an evil nature is mixed into humanity, at least wants the good soul saved from it by Christ. You, however, maintain that in infants, when their bodies are sound, Christ has nothing to save. Accordingly the Manichaean blames human nature in a detestable way, but you praise it in a cruel way. Whoever believes your praise will not offer their infants to the Savior’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.9).
I pointed out even in my first work that your chief aim is to be poorly understood.
3.139And I showed that most of your inventions require almost more effort to understand than to defeat.
3.140But if I wanted to do that with every point, I would seem needless by repeating the same things and lengthy by pursuing them all.
3.141Everything you have published against us rushes toward one goal: persuading us that natural things are evil and that either the devil creates humans or God creates crimes. Still, I think brevity will gain something if I gather from different places into one account the chief arguments with which, when you wrap yourself in obscurity, you think you defend your whole opinion. I will first help them by an explanation, making clear what they attempt; then I will overthrow them, gathered rather than scattered, unfolded rather than tangled.
3.142In the later parts of your book, after saying, ‘God creates evil people in the same way as he feeds and nourishes evil people,’ you add:
‘For what he gives them by creating them belongs to the goodness of nature. When he gives them growth by feeding and nourishing them, he gives good assistance not to their wickedness but to that same good nature which he, being good, created. Insofar as they are human, there is the good of nature, whose author is God. But insofar as they are born with sin and will perish unless reborn, this belongs to the seed cursed from the beginning by the fault of that ancient disobedience (compare Wisdom of Solomon 12:11). Yet the maker of even the vessels of wrath uses this well to make known the riches of his glory in vessels of mercy (Romans 9:22–23). Thus, if anyone belonging to the same mass is freed by grace, he should not credit his own merits, but “let the one who boasts boast in the Lord” (1 Corinthians 1:31).
‘Departing from this faith, this man refuses to allow that newborns are under the devil, so that infants will not be brought to Christ to be rescued from the power of darkness and transferred into his kingdom (Colossians 1:13). In this way he accuses the Church spread throughout the world, in which everywhere all infants about to be baptized are breathed upon in exorcism for no other reason than to cast the ruler of this world out of them’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.32–33; compare John 12:31).
Again, further down, you discuss sexual desire, without which spouses cannot unite. We defend it as natural and belonging to God’s work, not as some great good, but as a sensation of bodies made by God. You maintain that the devil implanted it in human inward parts, and, founding your doctrine on the shame surrounding it, you try to establish this in so many writings. About this same desire, then, as often elsewhere, you say in a later part of your book:
‘Therefore we do not criticize the honorable union of spouses because of the body’s shameful desire. Such union could have existed without any preceding commission of sin, and spouses would not have blushed for it. But this desire arose after sin, and their confusion forced them to cover it (Genesis 3:7). Hence later spouses, although using this evil well and lawfully, still avoid human sight during such an act. They thus acknowledge something shameful, although no one ought to be ashamed of something good. Therefore anyone who has lawful intercourse through shameful desire uses an evil well, while anyone who has unlawful intercourse uses an evil badly’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36).
3.143[Augustine continues:] ‘For what makes both evil and good people blush is more rightly called evil than good. We do better to believe the apostle, who says, “Good does not dwell in my flesh” (Romans 7:18), than this man who calls it good.’
3.144A little later you add: ‘Human nature, whether born from marriage or adultery, is God’s work. If it were evil, it should not be generated; if it had no evil, it should not be regenerated. To sum up both points in one word: if human nature were evil, it ought not to be saved; if no evil were within it, it would not need to be saved. Whoever says it is not good denies a good Creator to the nature that was created. Whoever denies it contains evil begrudges a merciful Savior to the nature that was corrupted. Therefore, in the birth of human beings, adultery must not be excused because of the good created from it by the good Creator; nor must marriage be condemned because of the evil that the merciful Savior must heal there’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36).
I have quoted these many passages from your writings, in which you endured great labor of thought to seem to say something clever. In keeping with our practice of using no tricks, and in confidence in the truth, they ought to be distinguished through our restatement, because your words are scarcely intelligible. You said, then, that the Manichaeans condemn flesh’s nature and maintain that humanity was made by mixing two natures, one good and the other evil. You said that we, whom you call heretics, say human nature was made by the good God and is good on its maker’s testimony, but is so healthy in infants that they do not need Christ’s medicine. Your own claim is that Adam’s nature was once good, made by the good God, but was corrupted by sin and therefore needs Christ’s medicine.
In the first book of this work I set your opinions beside the Manichaeans’ and showed that your faith differed in no way from their irreverence, from which it clearly sprang. There it appeared that fear unites you with Jovinian, but love wholly unites you with Mani. We must discuss this in the present context too, but first I distinguish our views, then yours. You correctly said we maintain that the good God made human nature good. But only this much is ours. You either failed to notice or suppressed one part needed to complete our position and inserted another of your own that is not ours. For we do not merely say God made human nature good in Adam. We say that in all infants it is created good by the same God who made that first human being. That is why we affirm that he creates all people.
3.145You not only removed this part from our definition; in its place you inserted your own, which could arouse hostility at first glance but would disappear under examination. You wrote that we say nature was made good by the good God, but is so healthy that it does not need Christ’s medicine. See how short of truth you are, when you do not shrink from such obvious theft even in terms called opposites! Having first put ‘good nature,’ you then added ‘so healthy.’ Is ‘healthy’ the opposite of ‘good’?
Surely when we say ‘good,’ its proper opposite is nothing but ‘evil.’ If the subject requires us to say ‘healthy,’ we put ‘weak’ or ‘sick’ opposite it: if it is healthy, it is not weak; if weak, it is not healthy. But when we say ‘This is good,’ we identify its contrary with the word ‘evil,’ not with ‘healthy.’ You should therefore have said that we define human nature as created good by God, and as so good in infants that it needs no one to correct the way it was made. Or, if you preferred to indicate goodness by the different term ‘health,’ you should have marked the entire statement with consistent language.
Instead you slip like a little eel between the rocks of definitions. Truth forced you to admit that we call human nature good and made by the good God. Seeing much reason but no grounds for hostility in that part of the statement, you immediately shifted to other words, adding that we defend it as so healthy that we do not believe Christ’s medicine necessary for it. If you stumble into all this through ignorance, you prove utterly dull; if you do it by cunning, utterly crafty.
3.146Here is my brief answer: far from denying Christ’s medicine to infants, whom we know to be innocent, we acknowledge that they especially need it in greater abundance. They are born tiny and weak, unable not only to feed themselves through their own labor but even to ask their parents for help. They are exposed to so many accidents that even milk that is too thick, and often the sleep of those nursing them, can cause their death.
3.147Because their bodies are mortal, they also encounter the hardships of illness, the suffering of pain, and the dangers of disease. We therefore acknowledge Christ’s medicine as necessary not only to infants, whom he also made, but to the nature of all mortals.
3.148Just as its infirmities are eased in this present life by various remedies, so they will also be removed completely at the coming resurrection—in the bodies of the righteous, however.
3.149See, then, in how many respects we acknowledge Christ’s medicine necessary to human nature. But I know you will cry out that I am quibbling with you: you did not mean medicine that helps bodies; by ‘medicine’ you meant Christ’s grace, which you claimed we deny. You could be answered that this is your fault, since you refused to identify with proper terms what you wanted understood. Yet now that we have understood, even belatedly, which medicine you meant—the medicine you falsely and vaguely alleged we deny—let us answer this second point too. As we declared in our first work, we acknowledge Christ’s grace, that is, baptism, from the time Christ established its rite, to be necessary for all ages alike. We pronounce an eternal anathema on anyone who denies that it benefits even infants.
3.150Since we repeatedly stress this in a clear profession, you are convicted of a public falsehood when you write that we defend human nature as so good that, being healthy in infants, it does not need Christ’s medicine.
3.151Yet this grace, because it is also called medicine, makes some people good from being evil, while preserving the law of justice. But infants, whom God makes good by creating them, it makes better by renewing and adopting them (Titus 3:5) (Romans 8:15).
3.152It is therefore clear that we do not deny the benefit of Christ’s grace to infants. What controversy remains, then, for which the advocate of inherited sin accuses us of error? That we do not agree that Adam’s nature was made good but everyone else’s evil? I freely acknowledge that we not only refuse to agree but attack this with all our strength. Put aside, then, those childishly twisted nets of your inventions and the popular bogeys through which you whispered that we deny Christ’s grace to the cradle. Let us contend over the central issue of the dispute. Following the order I promised, now that I have defended our views, let us weigh yours and those of Mani, whom you pretended to oppose.
3.153He says, then, that the prince of darkness, the author of evil, created humanity by mixing two natures, good and evil. What do you say? That the good God indeed creates human beings, but creates them all evil.
3.154Thus between you and Mani there is no disagreement about nature’s character, only about its author. You charge to God, whom you acknowledge as infants’ creator, the same evil Mani charges to the prince of darkness, whom he considered human nature’s maker. Little obstacle remains to renewing your alliance. Soon, however, I shall show that although neither of you shows any trace of truth, his statements agree with one another better than yours do.
What do we say? Undoubtedly something opposed to both of you: neither did the good God make an evil nature, nor did the prince of darkness make or mix another nature. Rather, the one God, author of all things, not only made human nature good at first but also makes it good in every newborn child. Yet we profess the help of its Creator to be both useful in many ways and necessary to it. The making of creatures is one matter and gifts another; and the work is not valued more highly here than the craftsman.
Both you and Mani therefore equally establish natural evil: you both call human nature evil, but he does so more consistently, you more deceitfully. Both of you suppose this evil was breathed by the devil into human inward parts. He exempts no one’s birth from it. You, however, to seem different in some way—although there is no difference—try to exempt just two human beings. Yet you do not free even their persons from sin. With the advance of a more learned intelligence, you say that what you persuade us became natural through them was not natural in them. So, lest your fraud escape punishment even here, the added stupidity punished the theft you committed against your teacher. To believe natural what you admit was adopted by the will is an invention not merely of an uneducated mind but of a drunken one. More about this elsewhere; for now, let us press the matter.
Mani maintains that evil is natural; you agree. He says sins are born; you consent. He says human nature is evil; you confirm this too. He says the nature of absolutely everyone; here you resist, asking that the first pair be set aside. Yet you do not vindicate even them from guilt; rather, you affirm that they originated natural evil. Even if we could indulge you in this, your teacher will not. Perhaps he will even punish your slow intelligence with a schoolmaster’s rod, forcing you either to submit to his authority or to leave his school altogether. Finally he draws his conclusion: an evil nature cannot have a good author. Therefore humanity, which both of you acknowledge to be naturally evil, is the work of the prince of darkness, that is, the devil.
3.155But you rise up completely against this last point. Although you boarded the same ship as Mani and the same wind directed your course, once across the strait you thought you should nevertheless disembark on a different shore. Perhaps, however, choosing an immediate advantage may make hesitation tolerable, even if late. Into what harbor, then, do you steer your vessel? ‘I say,’ you answer, ‘that God is good, yet he also creates evil beings.’ What an escape from danger—straight onto the rocks! You wanted to pour the whole of Mani’s bilge over the one you consider God.
3.156It is therefore perfectly clear that his opinion has more consistency: if something evil were created as such by nature, it would indicate an author resembling itself.
3.157Truth, however, first lays down that what is as its nature compelled it to be cannot be called evil—that is, sin—and that sin is nothing other than a free will straying from the path of justice.
3.158These defenses protect the innocent nature of all things, which, remaining as it was created, is proved liable to no crime.
3.159Evil, then, cannot be natural. Consequently, no creature is guilty by nature, nor is its author evil. For evil is found not to be a subsisting nature. Just as every creature is good insofar as it is created, so God, the author of good natures, is proved entirely good, stained by no crime in his work. Everything Mani brought forward is therefore overthrown by this single catholic argument (1 Timothy 4:4).
3.160Yet the man slain by the thunderbolt of such clear truth seems still to breathe in some respect when compared with you. His whole doctrinal structure collapses when only its foundation gives way. But three things in your case totter as his one does. Consider, then, whether any part of your building can rise.
Mani thought sin natural, though it can only be voluntary, and so laid his foundations in empty space. The rest he placed consistently alongside: since sin is natural, nature is evil; an evil thing cannot have a good author; therefore the whole human race must be attributed to the prince of darkness. All this could have stood, had truth not undermined his first claim: sin, a work of free will, cannot be shown natural, and whatever is natural cannot be sin.
3.161By overthrowing his first definition, the wedge of reason brought his rooftops crashing to the ground. What hope have you, then, whose three claims stand on ground as slippery as his one? First you say sin is natural. Second, that God is good although he creates, shapes, and extends evils—that is, sins. Third, that an act of will has been mixed into reproductive seed. Each of these three heads of your definitions totters in itself. Totters, I say? Rather, like ropes made of sand, they fall apart before coming together.
One claim—natural sin—already lies destroyed in the direct defeat of Mani. The other two, peculiar to your opinion, fell in the same familiar destruction that struck him. If he could not establish that humans are born guilty through either an evil nature or the prince of darkness, how much more foolish are you, who added an accusation against God to demonstrate newborn children’s crimes! Just as nature cannot be sin—the thunderbolt that shattered Mani’s doctrine—so, conversely, what is sin cannot be natural. An act of will does not pass into the condition of a substance, as you suppose happened. Much more certainly, the good God never creates evil beings. Thus it has become clear that sin cannot exist in a newborn whom God creates.
3.162The matter is clear and was sufficiently established in my first work. Yet because you wanted to be so deceitful as to attempt a distinction between yourself and Mani, I must now press the case. It must be clear that we have answered not only your past statements but also anything you may try to introduce afterward. We say, therefore, that God’s work in a newborn is so good that the natural characteristics of its substance need no corrector. Anyone who judges that what he acknowledges God made ought to have been made differently undoubtedly criticizes the one he acknowledges as the maker of a creature supposedly needing correction into another form.
3.163Thus, while maintaining in every newborn the approval and measured praise due to created natures, we say that increases of divine benefits are useful and necessary to all ages alike. Yet neither virtue nor sin is attributed to anyone without that person’s own will.
3.164God’s mercy is nevertheless shown still richer in this: he sanctifies infants who do not know it. That belongs to the praise of mercy, whereas their ignorance leaves them unstained by guilt; that belongs to the laws of fairness.
3.165But I am speaking of the virtues we acquire through the use of fully developed reason. Since it was necessary to stress this here, as often elsewhere, I now urge the reader to attend to what follows. The reader will see that advocates of inherited sin differ from Manichaeans in nothing, offering against us as arguments only what is contained in their books. I already demonstrated this in the fourth book of my first work.
3.166But since, after those books were published, a letter of Mani was found in Constantinople at your request, most blessed father Florus, and sent to these regions, it is worth inserting some of it. Everyone can then understand where these arguments for inherited sin originate.
3.167In that first work I had already argued about fleshly desire or pleasure, also called lust, implanted in the sexes for the reproductive activity of generation. I showed that it is nothing other than one of the body’s instruments, implanted alike in rational and irrational beings and belonging to God’s work, since he equipped our flesh with sensations. Yet Augustine attacks it fiercely, calling it evil—that is, natural sin and the parent of every sin. He tries to persuade us chiefly from its shame, and mocks me for being ashamed to name it directly.
3.168So I too will now briefly vindicate the character of this thing, which in my earlier writings I defended by making distinctions against Mani’s attack, by exposing its accusers—who nevertheless profess that they serve it unwillingly.
3.169What your books contain, then, old Augustine, is this: ‘Desire arose after sin, and their confusion forced them to cover it’ (Genesis 3:7) (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36; compare Genesis 3:7).
3.170And again: ‘Anyone who has lawful intercourse through shameful desire uses an evil well; anyone who has unlawful intercourse uses an evil badly. For what makes both evil and good people blush is more rightly called evil than good. We do better to believe the apostle, who says: “Good does not dwell in my flesh”’ (Romans 7:18; Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36). Elsewhere: ‘Desire is not the good of marriage, but the obscenity of sinners, the necessity of those who generate offspring, the heat of wantonness, the shame of marriage’ (Marriage and Sexual Desire 1.13). And this: ‘What they afterward did in producing offspring is the good of marriage; what they first covered in confusion is the evil of desire, which everywhere avoids being seen and seeks privacy out of shame’ (Marriage and Sexual Desire 1.8).
These and the other things you regularly use for this argument come more from your memory than your intelligence. Mani, then, labored to compose what he thought clever; you were disappointed in thinking you could conceal what you had read and retained.
3.171Listen now, then, and recognize what your father writes to a certain daughter of his, your sister.
3.172‘Mani, apostle of Jesus Christ, to his daughter Menoch. May grace and salvation be given you from our God, who truly is the true God. May he enlighten your mind and reveal his justice to you, because you are a fruit of divine stock.’ A little later: ‘Through them you too have been made radiant by recognizing what you were before and from what kind of souls you flowed—a kind mixed with all bodies and attached to flavors and various forms. For just as souls are generated from souls, so the body’s formation is drawn from bodily nature. Therefore, “What is born of flesh is flesh, and what is born of spirit is spirit” (John 3:6). Understand spirit, however, to mean soul: soul from soul, flesh from flesh.’
3.173You surely recognize how explicitly Mani affirms the transmission of souls by descent, and which testimony he uses to condemn flesh: precisely the one constantly on your lips, ‘What is born of flesh is flesh, and what is born of spirit is spirit’ (John 3:6).
3.174He therefore stresses, not merely by saying it but by repeating it, that belief in souls’ transmission by descent is characteristic of his doctrine. He also tries to establish it through the analogy of bodies generating offspring: ‘Just as souls are generated from souls, so the body’s formation (John 3:6) is drawn from bodily nature; and as flesh comes from flesh, so soul comes from soul.’ But let us proceed to the rest: ‘Just as God is the author of souls, so the devil, through desire, is the author of bodies. Thus, in the devil’s birdlime, through a woman’s desire, the devil snares not souls but bodies—’
3.175‘Whether through sight, touch, hearing, smell, or taste. Remove, then, the root of this evil stock, and immediately you see yourself as spiritual. For Scripture says: “Desire is the root of all evils” (1 Timothy 6:10)’ (compare 1 Timothy 6:10).
You see in what spirit and for what doctrine Mani attacks fleshly desire, calling it the law of sin: if it were removed from bodies, his daughter, to whom he writes, would see that she had become spiritual. Let us hear which statements of the apostle he tries to use to establish this opinion: ‘“The flesh opposes the spirit,” because it is the daughter of desire; “and the spirit the flesh,” because it is the son of the soul’ (Galatians 5:17).
3.176You understand that the innermost substance of Mani’s doctrine has been exposed—the substance from which your faith grows. Now he goes on to accuse us, that is, catholics: ‘See, then, how foolish they are who say this bodily formation was created by the good God, when they know it is generated by the spirit of desire.’
3.177‘For they come together while the mind is unwilling, and act in secret shame. At that time they hate the light, so that their deeds will not be exposed (John 3:20). This is why the apostle says, “It is not of the one who wills” (Romans 9:16)—understand: this act. If we do good, it is not of the flesh, because “the works of the flesh are obvious: fornication,” and the rest (Galatians 5:19). If we do evil, it is not of the soul, because “the fruit of the spirit is peace and joy” (Galatians 5:22). Finally, the apostle also cries to the Romans: “I do not do the good I want, but I perform the evil I abhor” (Romans 7:19). You see the voice of the soul resisting desire and defending the soul’s freedom. It grieved because sin—that is, the devil—produced every desire within it (Romans 7:8). The law’s authority shows its evil by condemning all its uses, which the flesh admires and praises. Everything bitter to desire is sweet to the soul; through this the soul is nourished and summoned to strength. Indeed, the mind of someone restraining himself from every use of desire stays awake, grows rich, and increases; through the use of desire it usually diminishes.’
Do you now understand, even belatedly, that we have discovered the source not only of your thinking but of your language? You embrace your teacher with such love that you follow not merely his routes but even his footprints. All your writings assert this, as both the books you published under Marcellinus’s name and those you addressed to Valerius testify: this fleshly desire, which you also call shameful, was mixed into human bodies by the devil.
3.178You say it is sin’s daughter and the mother of other sins, and that the apostle Paul complains about it when he says, ‘I know that good does not dwell in my flesh’ (Romans 7:18), and, ‘I do not do the good I want, but do what I hate’ (Romans 7:15). Catholics have always explained this as blaming habit, not defaming nature.
3.179Yet by argument and by appropriating Scripture’s testimonies, you maintain that this desire, which you call the law of sin, both polluted him and all the saints and drew their complaints (Romans 7:23).
3.180What does Mani say? ‘The devil creates bodies through desire. Through it he snares bodies, not souls. Remove the root of evil stock,’ he says, ‘and you will become spiritual. About this the apostle cries to the Romans: “I do not do the good I want, but I perform the evil I abhor”’ (Romans 7:19). He also calls us foolish for saying that this bodily formation belongs to God, although we acknowledge that it was generated through desire.
You see, then, how fully you and Mani agree in attacking us. You fight with his words, rely on his arguments, and call us liars for saying you not only were his disciple, as you yourself write, but still are. Yet even here he is more sensible. Believing this fleshly desire was introduced by the devil, he concluded that whatever appeared produced from diabolical desire must be acknowledged not to belong to God’s work.
3.181You are duller: you call a human being the fruit of diabolical desire, yet assign him to God’s works. You do not say he was made good from evil, but that he is evil and produced from an evil root, yet has a good author—while the devil claims him as the fruit of his own root (Matthew 7:17–18).
3.182For in your words, the devil rightly plucks all who are born from desire as fruit from his own tree (compare Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 1.26). You therefore revile us just as Mani does for maintaining that fleshly desire was created by God.
3.183And that statement of yours, which I examined in my earlier work—‘Sometimes desire does not act when the mind is willing, although sometimes it acts when the mind is unwilling’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 1.7)—and your accusation of its arrogance because it stirs against the mind’s will: all this is expressed not merely in Mani’s ideas but in his words. Having criticized us for saying God makes human beings although we admit they are conceived through the pleasure of those coupling, he says: ‘Fools say what they know is generated by desire was created by God, although they couple while the mind is unwilling.’
3.184As for your statement, ‘It is the evil of desire that everywhere avoids being seen and seeks privacy out of shame’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 1.8), Mani says the same: ‘They act in secret shame; at that time they hate the light, so that their deeds will not be exposed’ (John 3:20).
3.185You say: ‘Anyone who has lawful intercourse through desire uses an evil well’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36). You remind us to believe instead the apostle, who said good did not dwell in his flesh, and you want what is not good—that is, the evil dwelling in the apostle’s flesh—to be understood as fleshly desire (Romans 7:18). Mani put it no differently. After saying, ‘So that their deeds will not be exposed,’ he adds: ‘This is why the apostle cries to the Romans: “I do not do the good I want, but I perform the evil I abhor” (Romans 7:19) (John 3:20). He grieved because sin—that is, the devil—produced every desire in him (Romans 7:8). The law’s authority shows desire’s evil by condemning every use of it, which the flesh admires and praises.’
3.186You thought it would be highly effective in maintaining a distinction between you and Mani to say that nature was indeed made good, but only in the first humans, while afterward it was entirely overthrown through desire. Mani argued this way too: ‘It is worth observing that the first soul, which flowed from the God of light, received this structure of the body to govern it with its bridle. The commandment came; sin, which had seemed captive, came to life again. The devil found his own limbs, brought the material of desire into the soul by deception, and through it killed the soul. The law is indeed holy—but holy for a holy soul; and the commandment is just and good—but for a just and good soul’ (Romans 7:9–12) (compare Romans 7:9–12). Similarly in his letter to Patricius, he calls the first human ‘better than those who followed, as though made from the flower of the first substance.’
It is therefore no great thing, and contributes nothing to your defense, that you thought Adam should be excluded from the accusation against human nature. We shall soon discuss his condition more fully. Here it is enough to have shown that nothing in your ideas is so fresh that Mani has not already worn it out by rolling it over.
3.187He persists in attacking us and adds: ‘As for those who have dared call this desire good against the evangelical and apostolic books, which they read to no purpose, you can see their saints sometimes sleeping with their daughters, sometimes carrying on with several concubines and wives. They do not see the apostle’s question: “What partnership is there between light and darkness, a believer and an unbeliever, Christ and Belial?” (2 Corinthians 6:14–15). They wander wrapped in desire’s cloud, enjoying its poison so much that, seized by madness, when they do this they think God has permitted it. As though they did not know the apostle said: “What they do in darkness is shameful even to mention” ’ (Ephesians 5:12).
You surely see how he presses the matter of shame and thinks it tells powerfully against us, because we dare not call evil what we nevertheless acknowledge must be covered through modesty. Thus you have woven no garment to cover your doctrine’s deformity except the rags you accepted in your father and teacher’s inheritance.
He keeps rising up against us and turns directly to his opponent: ‘Come, defender of desire, describe its fruits and works in plain words. See, in opposing it I do not fear the light which it dreads and hates. “Everyone who does evil hates the light and does not come to the light, so that his deeds will not be exposed” (John 3:20). Do you see that desire is the source of evil, through which miserable souls serve lust unwillingly, because this is the only thing we do while the mind is unwilling?’
This is the source of your own statement: ‘Why is it that moving the lips, tongue, hands, and the bending of the back, neck, and sides for their proper tasks lies in our power, but when it comes to sowing children, the organs created for this task do not obey? Instead we wait for desire, as though acting under its own authority, to stir them; sometimes it fails to act when the mind is willing, although sometimes it acts when the mind is unwilling’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 1.7). You listed the functions of all the bodily members, emphasized their obedience to the will’s command, and said desire’s activity is the only thing we do against the mind’s will. What does Mani say? ‘Do you see that desire is the source of evil, through which miserable souls serve lust unwillingly, because this is the only thing we do while the mind is unwilling?’
But let us see what else he adds: ‘Every sin is outside the body, because it consists in action; but the fornicator sins against his own body (1 Corinthians 6:18). Every sin does not exist before it is committed, and afterward only the memory of the act remains, not its actual form. But desire’s evil, because it is natural, exists before it is enacted, increases while it is enacted, and afterward both appears and remains.’ Why, then, quarrel with us for calling you a Manichaean, when his writings contain nothing but what you say, and yours nothing but what he wants to persuade us to believe?
And that saying circulating on ordinary people’s lips, though put there by you, is contained in this same letter of Mani: If sin is not natural, why are infants baptized, when they plainly have done no evil themselves? I said it flies over many people’s tongues because it is a more popular argument, understood even by the slowest. In your books, however, you place your entire hope on it. Your teacher develops this very point as follows: ‘I must ask them in these words: If every evil consists in action, why does anyone receive purification by water before doing evil, when he has done no evil personally? Or if he has not yet acted but needs purification, it is possible to show that they are by nature shoots of evil stock—those very people whose madness prevents them from understanding either what they say or what they confidently affirm’ (compare 1 Timothy 1:7).
Do you hear how he insults us? He calls us mad and unable to understand what we say or affirm, because we deny that people are shoots of evil stock, although we baptize in purifying water even those who have done no evil—that is, infants. Many passages from his statements have now been quoted. Yet if the heading did not name his daughter Menoch and Mani, who calls himself Christ’s apostle, they would altogether announce you as their author (see this work 3.172). Since you say nothing except what you learned from Mani’s teaching, do you think catholics should regard you differently from the man through whom you drank in the mysteries of these doctrines?
3.188It remains to examine your statement which, promising to reduce it to one expression, you gathered up briefly—and, it must be admitted, rather cleverly: ‘If human nature were evil, it should not be generated; if it had no evil, it should not be regenerated. To sum up both in one word: if human nature were evil, it ought not to be saved; if no evil were within it, it would not need to be saved’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36).
Here you must not be cheated of praise for your intelligence. From your standpoint it could not have been said better. Yet the nature of things prevents even precise cunning from accomplishing anything. It is altogether hard for you to kick against the goad (Acts 26:14). Whatever you put together melts like ice when the fire of truth is brought near. Now attend to our reply. You concluded: ‘Surely if human nature were evil, it ought not to be saved.’ We agree; you spoke entirely truly. If it were evil, it ought not to be saved, because something evil by nature would neither deserve nor be capable of salvation. Why incapable? Because it could not become other than it had been made. Why undeserving? Because nothing in it would be worthy of deliverance by God’s mercy.
When we say ‘if it were’ about what certainly cannot exist, we are not giving hope that the denied possibility can occur. Rather, to destroy another opinion that arises, we commonly speak about impossible things. For example: If this or that existed, that consequence would undoubtedly follow. Since the first cannot exist, the conclusion introduced in order to remove it is denied all the more. We have already shown frequently that nothing can be evil by nature. Nevertheless, without prejudice to that settled point, we now approve the part of your statement saying, ‘If human nature were evil, it ought not to be saved.’
You located salvation in baptism and argued consistently that if the Manichaeans, who call nature evil, spoke truly, Christians would be foolish to believe baptism’s remedy should be applied to an evil nature. Thus anyone affirming that human nature is evil is forced to deny grace. This also works in reverse: anyone affirming grace praises human nature, understanding grace to have been provided for its salvation.
3.189Observe the conclusion: denying grace does not attach to praising human nature. Rather, these four positions are so connected that one cannot be maintained without the other: defaming nature produces denial of grace, and praising grace produces commendation of nature. These implications can run in either direction. You therefore spoke well: ‘If human nature were evil, it ought not to be saved’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36). The Manichaeans say both things: flesh’s nature is evil, and it neither can nor ought to be saved through grace.
3.190But afterward you introduce the statement dear to you: ‘If no evil were within human nature, it would not need to be saved. Whoever says it is not good denies a good Creator to the nature created; whoever denies it contains evil begrudges a merciful Savior to the nature corrupted’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36). Let the reader pay attention: you will see that he has said nothing other than what he had denied should be said. You have pronounced evil naturally present in the very thing you said was not naturally evil.
3.191But an evil nature can mean nothing other than something having evil inborn within it.
3.192To make the conclusion brief and plain: if evil exists in nature in such a way that evil is born from it with the reproductive seed itself, that nature is undoubtedly proved evil.
3.193But if nature is vindicated from evils and defended as good, evil can neither be born from it nor naturally exist within it. Your conclusion has therefore vanished: the statement you introduced second did not distinguish itself from the first but duplicated it.
3.194‘If human nature were evil,’ you say, ‘it ought not to be saved; if no evil were within it, it would not need to be saved’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36). What have you shown except that one thing ought to be saved for the very reason you had denied that it ought to be saved?
3.195Consequently you have come back to restoring by argument the Manichaean whom you despised in your profession. Saying, ‘If it were evil, it ought not to be saved,’ you assumed the appearance of fighting him. Adding, ‘But if no evil were within it, it would not need to be saved’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36), you showed that you serve him faithfully. It has therefore become clear that your pronouncement contains the same as Mani’s: human nature is evil, since both you and he say evil exists within it. And you have declared that an evil nature ought not to be saved. It has thus been established completely that your faith, with its forces wholly united to his, attacks both nature and grace.
3.196It follows that no one can praise Christ’s grace without praising the Creator’s good work in nature.
3.197Certainly the question here does not concern adults’ pursuits, but only the condition of newborns, in whom nature’s state is examined. Alongside Mani, you maintain that this nature, without any contribution from its own will, is guilty, condemned, and full of evils—that is, crimes. We defend it as guiltless, free from wickedness and the evil of sin, and capable of virtue.
3.198Do you therefore charge this nature in infants with being criminal, corrupt, and condemned because of its own will or because of the condition of birth? If through its own will—so that those infants are said to have sinned by their own efforts—a monstrous opinion arises, but inherited sin is denied: someone did not receive from another what he could commit himself. But if it receives so many evils not by its own action but by its condition, it is proved naturally unjust.
3.199Where, then, do you and Mani differ in your judgment of nature? ‘He admits it is evil,’ you say. If you deny that, then pronounce it good, and the dispute is over. Truth’s nets will immediately catch you for salvation. But you protest. Let us hear what you bring forth, Aristotle of the Carthaginians! ‘So much evil exists within it,’ you say, ‘that the devil possesses it and it deserves eternal fire.’
3.200‘Yet it is so far from evil that no one but a Manichaean can accuse it.’
3.201‘Nevertheless,’ he says, ‘I am no Manichaean, although I acquit it with words and condemn it with judgments.’
3.202What should I accuse first here: the liar’s shamelessness, the debater’s appetite, or the irreverence of believing such perverse things? Yet I understand that we should use the prophet’s words: ‘We are blessed, Israel, because we know what pleases God’ (Baruch 4:4).
3.203But the readers’ judgment will supply the task of denunciation; let us move on to the rest. Certainly among things there is no other evil that is truly evil except what we call sin.
3.204From this sin, you say, natural evil is born in each person. Therefore nothing is truly evil except evil desert.
3.205Mani calls nature evil for no other reason than that he considers it deserving of evil, and thinks punishments should be inflicted on it. You also affirm evil exists in human nature, and no different evil from Mani’s: fleshly desire, which you publicly proclaim was poured in by the devil. You say nature is so deserving of evil that you persist in sentencing it to eternal torments. Without doubt, then, you pronounce it utterly evil and condemned in exactly the same way as Mani.
3.206Let us see, then, how the second part of your statement returns to this point too. You said: ‘Whoever says human nature is not good denies a good Creator to the nature created; whoever denies it contains evil begrudges a merciful Savior to the nature corrupted’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.36). As you have been forced to profess, anyone denying that it is good also denies its good Creator, that is, God. And for nature to be evil means nothing other than to possess evil desert naturally. Thus even your confession supports our truth: you deny the good God as creator of humans, whose nature you swear is evil, appealing both to its vices and to its punishments.
3.207We therefore do not begrudge a Savior to the nature we defend on the grounds of its Creator’s dignity. We deny that it is evil, so as not to become Manichaeans; we deny that evil is in it, so as not to be the very same Manichaeans under changed names.
3.208We say that in each person already acting well or badly by personal choice, it is the person’s moral standing, not nature’s, that is corrupted. Accordingly we maintain that Christ’s grace heals what can be corrupted, since nothing is shown wounded except what is shown healed.
3.209In those baptized, what is removed is not fleshly desire, which is natural, but the guilt of evil desire.
3.210Consequently, the testimony of both the Creator and the Redeemer of the human race proves that no sin exists in nature.
3.211To repeat our conclusions: by the testimony of both God’s commands and his judgments, I have shown that the theory of inherited sin is hostile to God’s justice.
3.212By inserting Mani’s own writings, I have demonstrated that only a Manichaean accuses the fleshly desire God, the creator of bodies, implanted to bring the sexes together for reproduction.
3.213I have shown that you have no arguments for inherited sin except those supplied by Mani.
3.214Through examining your statement, I have exposed you as a denier of free will and of God as the creator of newborn children.
3.215By explaining the statement you promised to compress into one word, I have proved that you pronounce nature evil.
3.216I am therefore confident that even those slowest to understand, or deceived by favor toward you, can see clearly that you reject only Mani’s name. In everything you believe, along with all the followers of inherited sin, you cling to his doctrines, which are no less filthy than foolish.
To Florus — Book 4
4.1I think an attentive reader may wonder why, although I have divided my little work into a definite number of books, as writers customarily do, I nevertheless settle in one book questions belonging to another. For example, in the third volume I argued that the statement that the Jewish people descended from the one man Abraham (Hebrews 11:12) did not in the slightest shake the apostle’s meaning when he said that sin entered the world through one man (Romans 5:12), a numerical expression that demolished the opinion of original evil. The reader whom I now intend to satisfy may think this should have been placed in the second volume. Let him understand, then, that this faithfulness in replying, by which even things thought to have been passed over are supplied in the following book, causes no disadvantage to the contest. It comes not from confusion caused by haste, but both from the requirements of the subject and from a considered plan. Many great minds offer examples that could justify such a sequence of writing. But it is foolish boasting to call on the resounding names of ancient writers to defend a simple matter, and to make an innocent action look suspicious by defending it.
I therefore ended the second book, which I had devoted to defending the apostle’s statements, when the necessary discussion was complete, so that adding trivial questions would not stretch it to excessive length. But after fulfilling the duty of serious argument, I chose to answer even foolish questions and to take account of the very slowest readers, who can be disturbed even by feeble objections. Accordingly, in the third book I showed how many people could be said to have been born from one. It is also entirely fitting for a following volume to discharge the debt of its predecessor: the books then show a strong agreement with one another, and readers are encouraged to learn the whole work. Even if they consider that some points were postponed in the earlier books, they understand that they were not omitted. Having shown, then, that what we have done accords with the work’s faithfulness and care, let us fight the Manichaeans on behalf of God’s works and laws. From his works we repel the ugliness of natural evil; from his laws, the injustice of deadly judgments. We teach that in the commands of those laws justice has lost none of its goodness, and into the seeds of those works the devil has mixed none of his evil. In short, the laws are worthy of God as ruler, and the works supremely worthy of God as creator.
4.2If you believe these two things, that God’s works are not evil and his judgments are not unjust, the whole doctrine of inherited sin is crushed. Conversely, if the impiety of inherited sin is accepted, these two things, God’s creation and his judgment, through which alone God can be understood, are destroyed.
4.3Let us now weigh the things this slanderer of nature has put together. But to help our reader both understand and distinguish matters entangled in our replies to one another, I will explain the way he fights. He professes to answer writings of mine that he says were sent to him on a short sheet, and he quotes and attacks little pieces of statements attributed to me that are not found in my work.
4.4He therefore says to Valerius: “Notice the arguments by which he thinks he agrees, against us, with the heading set out above. He says, ‘God, who had fashioned Adam from mud, built Eve from a rib and said: She will be called Life, because she is the mother of all the living’ (Genesis 3:20). That is not actually how it is written, but what does that matter to us? Memory commonly goes wrong over words, provided the meaning is retained. Nor was it God who named Eve Life, but her husband. The text says: ‘And Adam called his wife’s name Life, because she is the mother of all the living’” (Genesis 3:20) (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.4.12).
What astonishing learning in this teacher, who allows not even the slightest departure from Scripture’s language! He rebukes my ignorance, yet deigns to pardon the lapse of memory through which I had supposedly said that God called the woman by the name Life. He thus used a small opportunity to try to appear both learned and kind. But just as identifying who named the woman is no remarkable feat of diligence, so his shamelessness is intolerable when he wants to forgive something he cannot blame. For my work does not read as his inventions have it. I first quoted the Law’s testimony, where the Creator of all things is shown saying, “It is not good for the human being to be alone; let us make him a helper like himself” (Genesis 2:18). Then I said: “What does this mean, ‘It is not good for the human being to be alone’? Had God made anything that could rightly be called not good, especially when he had made everything not merely good but very good (compare Genesis 1:31)? How, then, does he say, ‘It is not good for the human being to be alone’? These words do not criticize the creature’s condition; they show that being alone could have been ruinous for the human race unless a succession of descendants had sprung up through the service of the other sex. For even if Adam may be thought capable of becoming immortal had he not sinned, it is nevertheless clear that he could never have become a father unless he had found a wife. Taken from his side while he slept, she heard at her first naming the work for which she had been prepared: ‘She will be called Life, because she is the mother of all the living.’ This statement showed that thereafter no human being could either exist or live without coming into existence through the benefit of conception” (compare Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.4.12).
It is therefore clear that, although the matter is not very weighty, I said nothing that anyone could criticize without extraordinary shamelessness. The stamp of public falsehood has been branded on this most destitute of men. By trying to give away what he does not possess, he offends in two ways at once: he lacks the right to do it, and he courts applause for his generosity.
4.5After criticizing this with such solemnity, he proceeds to the rest and tells his patron to attend to what follows. “God, then,” he says, “the creator of male and female, formed organs suited to reproduction.” But after inserting only this much from the beginning of my statement, he omits a very large number of lines. These chiefly stress that souls are newly created and owe nothing either to flesh or to seed. He then adds my words: “Thus he ordained that bodies should be generated from bodies. Yet his active power intervenes in their production, governing everything that exists by the same power with which he created it. If, then, offspring come only through sex, sex only through a body, and a body only through God, who could doubt that fertility is rightly attributed to God?” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.4.12). After quoting this from my work, he commends it, saying that he too acknowledges these statements to be catholic. Who would not then think that the man had changed? But he does not forget himself. He supposes that a perverse doctrine and his sense of shame are in a similar condition: that the doctrine can recover even from its evident destruction, just as his shamelessness grows harder through constant wear. So he approves my statement and, by voluntarily embracing it, drives the blade of an adverse judgment into his own belief. Yet afterward, as though his strength were unimpaired, he imagines that he still has something with which to fight.
He continues as follows: “After these things, which have been said truthfully and catholically—or rather, which are truthfully written in the divine books, but have not been said catholically by this man, because they were not said with the intention of a catholic heart—the Pelagian and Caelestian heresy now begins to be introduced, which is why he said them. For notice what follows.” Here he adds my words again: “What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes, by which he can rightly possess their offspring? Their difference? But that exists in the bodies God made. Their union? But it is defended by the privilege of God’s blessing no less than by his institution. For it is God’s voice that says, ‘A man will leave father and mother and cling to his wife, and the two will be one flesh’ (Genesis 2:24). It is God’s voice that says, ‘Increase and multiply, and fill the earth’ (Genesis 1:28). Or perhaps fertility itself? But that is the very reason marriage was instituted” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.4.13).
To this he replied that the devil recognizes neither the difference of the sexes, nor their union, nor their fertility as something of his own by which he can rightly possess their offspring. But after acquitting all these things he found something to assign to the devil. He attacked my decency as fear, saying that amid so many functions of bodies and sexes I had been afraid to name the desire of the flesh. This, then, is what he tells his patron against me: “But amid all these things he was unwilling to name the desire of the flesh, which is not from the Father but from the world (1 John 2:16). The devil is called the ruler of this world. He did not find this desire in the Lord, because the Lord came among human beings as a man without it. Hence the Lord himself says, ‘See, the ruler of this world is coming, and he will find nothing in me’ (John 14:30): nothing, that is, of sin, either inherited at birth or added in the course of life. Among all the natural goods he mentioned, this man was unwilling to name the desire that makes even marriage ashamed, although marriage glories in all those goods. For why is that act of married people withdrawn and hidden even from their children’s eyes, except that their praiseworthy union cannot take place without shameful lust? It was this that made the first people blush when they covered their private parts (Genesis 3:7). Those parts had not previously been shameful, but deserved praise and glory as God’s works” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.4.13).
Most blessed father Florus, in the four books of my first work I pleaded the case for marriage, for sexual union, for bodies, for the sexes, for God’s work, and finally for God’s reputation. Just as his reputation is necessarily praised by the goodness of his works, so it is wounded when they are defamed. Throughout that entire work, truth that cannot be obscured proved that the devil had added nothing either to the body’s formation or to its sensation. Thus it was thoroughly demonstrated that the belief in inherited sin had been drawn from Manichaeus’s mud.
4.6Although this was established there with the fullest possible treatment, it must also be repeated, briefly, in the present discussion. Let us turn, then, to the man himself, whose learning we are contesting. You agree, surely, that I reasoned correctly: if offspring exist only through sex, sex only through a body, and a body only through God, there can be no doubt that fertility belongs among God’s works. The ruler of darkness recognizes nothing of his own in the sexes by which he could keep their offspring as his rightful property. For their difference belonged to sex, their union to the difference of their organs, and the fruit of fertility to God, who had also established those who generate offspring. Accordingly, nothing remained for which the fertility of sexual union should be awarded to the devil.
What comfort or defense, then, do you think the decency of my language gives you because I did not wish to name the desire of the flesh in this passage? Even if I had passed it over in silence throughout the whole work, that would have brought no blame or injury upon the thing itself. It was being defended under more decent names, and indeed in language perfectly clear to the understanding. Suppose, then, that with more reserve than the subject required I had chosen to veil in silence the name of what we cover with clothing. Must all reason and all truth therefore be thrown away? Must understanding, the judge of matters, therefore lie helpless because there is something that cannot always be brought decently before the ears, just as it cannot always be brought before the eyes? Yet what is ugly about naming the desire of the flesh? I have named it when the occasion required, and you mention it frequently, although you insist that you find it untamable.
4.7A little later comes this: “Through what, then, are infants under the devil? They are born from bodies God made, from the union of sexes that God distinguished in forming them, joined in blessing them, and multiplied by implanting fertility; and God made the infants themselves from the material of seed. If you acknowledge that the material of bodies, their reproductive organs, the union of those organs, the power of seeds, and the form and life of everyone born all exist through God, what do you think is left for which you can transfer so many of God’s works to the devil?” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.15). So you call someone else’s argument a heresy as a whole, although you acknowledge that every one of its parts is correct and catholic.
4.8For my conclusion is fortified by such truth that its whole force falls upon you. Unable even to violate it with abuse, you praised it under God’s compulsion; yet you accuse the result to which it leads.
4.9“If, then,” I say, “offspring come only through sex, sex only through a body, and a body only through God, who could doubt that fertility is rightly attributed to God?” This is so certain that it forced even your mouth to praise it. But after paying this passage your tribute, you warn that a heresy is being introduced, although the words I added merely repeated what had come before, with an explanation attached.
4.10For I say: “What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes, so that, as you say, he rightly possesses their offspring? Their difference? But that exists in the bodies God made. Their union? But it is defended by the privilege of God’s blessing no less than by his institution. Or perhaps fertility itself? But that is the very reason marriage was instituted.” What was new here? What disagreed with the previous conclusion you had approved, so that you thought you should blame it after praising it? Certainly nothing. What follows, then, from such disgusting inconsistency? Clearly, since my argument has not changed while your assessment of my words has altered, your intention is utterly foul and your reasoning weak.
4.11And your praise of catholic statements comes from your fear, not your faith.
4.12Your blame of what you have praised therefore comes from frenzy, not judgment.
4.13You will never be free of that frenzy unless you first reject your obscene doctrine. For you are caught between two crushing rocks: the shame of repentance, which Christians nevertheless never reject, and your lack of an argument. You must either follow or tear apart the sound statements that overwhelm you.
4.14Still, let us see which of my statements you have seized on to attack under the name of error. “But amid all these things,” (John 14:30) you say, “he was unwilling to name the desire of the flesh, which is not from the Father but from the world. The devil is called the ruler of this world. He did not find this desire in the Lord, because the Lord came among human beings as a man without it” (1 John 2:16) (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.14; compare 1 John 2:16; John 14:30). You certainly said I was introducing a heresy, but you add none of my words to prove it (1 John 2:16; John 14:30).
4.15Instead you say I was unwilling to name the desire of the flesh. If I was unwilling to name it, I kept silent; and if I kept silent, I said nothing for you to criticize. Who, then, persuades someone to adopt an error by keeping silent? What new and previously unheard-of monstrosities of accusation! He says a perverse doctrine is being constructed out of my silence!
4.16Let every sensible person weigh this and laugh at hostility to a speech being displayed under the name of silence. You therefore admit that I said nothing you can refute.
4.17Indeed, by harassing my silence, you have brought out something that could never be defended before, and that now cannot even be concealed, since Manichaeus’s letter, passages from which I quoted in the third book, has become public.
4.18“He was unwilling,” (John 14:30) he says, “to name the desire of the flesh, which is not from the Father but from the world. The devil is called the ruler of this world. He did not find this desire in the Lord, because the Lord came among human beings as a man without it” (1 John 2:16) (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.14; compare 1 John 2:16; John 14:30). In the very words of Manichaeus, then, you profess that the desire of the flesh was made not by God but by the world, whose ruler you nevertheless say is the devil (1 John 2:16; John 14:30).
4.19I said that you used language entirely belonging to Manichaeus because, although some of these words occur in the apostle John’s letter, it is certain that this teacher of the Church meant nothing there about the flesh, its sensation, or marital desire like what Manichaeus constructs by appropriating his words. I therefore rightly called them the words of the man whose meaning they served: language should be judged according to the intention behind it. In Saint John these words deserve reverence for their apostolic dignity, because they convey truth; in Manichaeus they appear as obscured traces of those words, not their faithful expression.
4.20For the apostle John was urging the faithful toward the summit of every virtue and stretching their pursuit of holiness to the height of the Lord’s manner of life. To be brief, he embraced under the name of the whole world every attraction of present goods and pleasures: “Do not love the world or the things in the world. If anyone loves the world, the Father’s love is not in him, because everything in the world is the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not from the Father but from the world. The world passes away, and its desire; but whoever does God’s will remains forever” (1 John 2:15–17). If we look only at the surface of the words, he commands hatred of all the elements and declares that the world and everything in it are not from the Father and should not be loved.
4.21He is certainly an apostle, loved by the Lord Jesus with a special affection (compare John 13:23). Yet if neither the Gospel he wrote nor the weight of his letters revealed his intention, these words I have quoted could count in no way against created things: they would have to give way to all the Scriptures that declare the world was made by God. But he himself secured his position in the revered opening of the Gospel he wrote. “The Word,” he says, “was God. Everything was made through him, and without him nothing was made” (John 1:1, 3) (John 13:23). And afterward: “He was the true light, which enlightens every human being coming into this world. He was in this world, and the world was made through him” (John 1:9–10). Again: “The Word became flesh, to dwell among us” (John 1:14). These testimonies leave no obscurity in his meaning. They show that he knows and proclaims God as creator of the whole world and of everything in it, and thoroughly demonstrate that the Manichaeans have no way into his teaching. For someone who proclaims God as creator of all natures can use the names of substances figuratively to signify excessive desire, without damage to the faith.
4.22He therefore commands us not to love the world or the things in it, and says that God’s love cannot be present in lovers of this age. But in saying that love must be withdrawn from the world, he does not mean us to understand that its creator is someone other than the true God. Rather, he wants the faithful to recognize that no desires of the present life should be preferred to virtues. Their minds must not become so occupied with acquiring wealth or pursuing pleasures that they are drawn away from the vigor of Christian philosophy, which is the true philosophy. “For everything in the world is the desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not from the Father but from the world. The world passes away, and its desire; but whoever does God’s will remains forever” (1 John 2:16–17). By the name “world,” then, he indicated the conduct of people who suppose there is nothing after this life, and the various displays and luxuries of mortals.
4.23For he had also said in his Gospel: “The world was made through him, and the world did not know him” (John 1:10). He certainly did not mean that the elements, which lack reason, could appear capable of knowing or denying Christ. He meant the multitude of unbelievers to be designated by the name “world.” In the same way here, too, he says that everything in the world—that is, every sort of person so devoted to pleasures that they measure all the goods of a rational creature by the trappings of power, loads of wealth, or the senses—has swollen with hateful pride. This is not from God, meaning it does not please God, but is from the world: it is conceived through the perversity of the human will. “Therefore,” he says in effect, “it must not corrupt you by making you imitate it. Whoever does God’s will comes to share eternal blessedness and does not fly past with the frailty of present things.”
So the apostle John commanded the world to be hated in the same way that the Lord in the Gospel showed that not only our body but even our soul itself must be hated: “Whoever does not hate father or brother, and even his own soul as well, is not worthy of me” (Luke 14:26; compare Matthew 10:37). Yet the mind of a believer certainly cannot hate itself when, out of the most thoughtful love, it purchases its own happiness even through pains and dangers. What, then, have we established? That the apostle John, following Scripture’s custom, struck with the word “world” not the nature of things but the vices of wills. And he denied that the desire of the flesh is from God in the same way that he denied this of everything in the world. Manichaeus seized on this, as though following its logic, but according to his own faithlessness rather than the apostle’s meaning. He asserts that neither the desire of the flesh, nor flesh itself, nor, finally, the whole world was made by God. Following him, you believe that the desire of the flesh was created not by God but by the devil.
4.24It is therefore established that blessed John gave you no occasion for error, and that you have swallowed what Manichaeus put forward. Now that we have defended the apostle’s reputation, let us briefly come to grips with this point. What do you think Saint John means here when he declares that the desire of the flesh and the desire of the eyes are not from God? Does he mean the very kind of desire that falls into vice not through its permitted moderation but through its forbidden excess? Or does he mean only the excess, which is found to be voluntary, not natural (compare 1 John 2:16) (1 John 2:16)?
4.25If you say that the name “desire” (1 John 2:16) includes even that measure in which it experiences the lawful pleasure of natural things, so that the desire of the flesh seems condemned in its entirety, then profess that the sense of sight, the world itself, and everything in the world were created by the devil. For all are equally said not to be from God. If you agree to that, you will certainly not become a Manichaean, since you already are one. You will simply show it by your confession, as you long ago showed it by your arguments. But if, frightened at having your error exposed, you say that under the names “desire of the flesh,” “desire of the eyes,” and “world” the apostle did not condemn the things themselves—which are harmless when they remain within permitted limits, and become blameworthy when they run into forbidden territory—then the point I argued in my first work will be clear: neither the kind, nor the form, nor the proper measure of natural desire is blameworthy, but only its excess. Therefore have the decency to leave this apostolic testimony alone from now on. If you pollute it with even a passing mention, you will be shown to have gained no defense at all, while being publicly exposed (compare 1 John 2:16).
4.26I treated this passage in the second book of my earlier work and showed that the desire of the flesh, which stirs the appeal of taste and sight, existed in the human being before guilt did (compare Genesis 3:6) (Genesis 3:6).
4.27Here, however, I must demand to know what dreams revealed to you that the name “desire” should mean the lust of those having intercourse. Without surrendering the resources of truth that a long discussion has disclosed, let us suppose it has not yet become clear that the flesh’s sensations belong to the same author as its form.
4.28Even if we pretend that this is uncertain, the thickest cloud of doubt will immediately envelop you. For this phrase, “desire of the flesh,” contains absolutely no indication of the reproductive organs. I can therefore say that this expression strikes at ears thirsting for different songs; I can say that Saint John rebukes the glutton’s palate; I can say that he blames nostrils dying for perfumes. In short, I can say anything except what you suppose. The choice is open when no specific word imposes a restriction. Either deny, then, that people desire the things I have named, and contradict everyone’s awareness, as you usually do; or, if your shamelessness has not yet hardened enough to resist these facts, admit that a condemnation of sexual pleasure is not found even in the words.
4.29What help, then, can you gain from my unwillingness, amid discussion of the union of the sexes and the fertility of those who join together, to disparage it by the name of desire? Neither you nor Manichaeus has been able to prove that it is devilish. And the very sequence of the preceding argument had already made it clear that this sensation, which affects the bodies of those who unite, goes back to the work of the same one whose institution accounts for bodies, marriages, and seeds.
4.30After my first work, published to the holy Turbantius, there should be no need to discuss the necessary modesty surrounding natural functions. The matter was handled there so fully that no uncertainty about it can arise unless people abandon their minds altogether.
4.31Yet since the defender of inherited sin cannot move even a fingernail’s breadth away from it, and wears out my modesty with his rhetorical elegance over why the act of sexual union itself pleases different people, I choose to settle these points with the brevity appropriate to matters already treated. Both here and in passages below, where I said, “For this reason a man will leave father and mother and cling to his wife, and the two will be one flesh” (Genesis 2:24), and added that the prophet came close to endangering modesty in order to express faithfully what took place, he is delighted, as though he had found plunder. He exults and cries: “An entirely open confession, forced out by the power of truth! Let the reason be given why the prophet came close to endangering modesty when expressing God’s works. Can it really be that human works should cause no shame but be openly gloried in, while divine works are shameful? Can it really be that, when God’s works are spoken of and expressed, the prophet’s love or labor wins no honor, but his modesty is endangered? What could God have done that his spokesman would be ashamed to say? More seriously, should a human being be ashamed of some work that God, not man, has done in man, when all craftsmen labor and strive as much as they can not to be ashamed of their works? Surely what shames us is what shamed those first human beings when they covered their private parts (compare Genesis 3:7). It is the punishment of sin, the wound and trace of sin, the lure and fuel of sin, the law in our members fighting against the law of the mind (compare Romans 7:23). This causes shame, and rightly causes shame. For if this were not so, what could be more ungrateful or irreligious than for us to be ashamed in our members, not of our own fault or punishment, but of God’s works?” (Romans 7:23) (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.9.22).
His delight is certainly clear. He cannot put a bridle on his joy. He has hold of a statement of mine by which he thinks he can show that natural desire is evil and assign it to the devil’s works. He says that this statement was forced from my mouth by the power of truth, and proclaims that it is utterly wicked and profane if we acknowledge that things we say were made by God must be covered out of modesty. But, carried away by his excitement, he could not weigh what he was saying. He asserts that there is nothing shameful in God’s works, but that the activity of the reproductive organs is shameful and therefore cannot be assigned to the Creator’s works. Then suddenly he confesses that it was assigned to our bodies not only honorably but justly, not only by God creating but even by God judging! I showed in the third book of my earlier work that the same thing cannot be both punishment and guilt.
4.32There is therefore no need to labor over this. Still, I commend the disputant’s sharpness: what he says was imposed by God as punishment, he refuses to say was created by God. He pronounces incompatible with God’s works what he wants to be compatible with God’s judgments.
4.33So there is no shame in his works, but the greatest ugliness in his sentences! Guilt certainly deserves punishment. But does the disgrace due to guilt therefore pass into the punishment, so that what the guilty person did can be named without shame, while what God did in judging cannot be spoken of without dishonor?
4.34It is nevertheless clear that my accuser is rolling in the very mud he recoils from. For he has invented the claim that the punishment of lust was justly imposed, and insists that this justice belongs to the divine sentence. Yet he does not deny that the pronouncement of the sentence is God’s work. He says lust, which he admits is shameful, arose from that sentence. He has therefore brought back into God’s work the very shame he had driven away.
4.35As though to crown this with a wickedness all his own, he added that God inflicted a punishment that was a lure and fuel for sin: a law in our members fighting unconquered against the law of our mind (compare Romans 7:23). By this sort of vengeance God would multiply crimes, not punish them. Having been angry at the evil will by which the sin was committed, he would make sinning a necessity thereafter. Let Manichaean frenzy decide what kind of judgment this is. At least it is clear that this judge invented by Augustine only pretends to abhor sin. In reality, he clings to sins with such affection that they could not find a more attentive nurse (Romans 7:23).
4.36What, then, do you mean, most subtle disputant? Is modesty about God’s works sacrilegious, because everything God has made must be done openly, lest our hesitation seem to accuse the craftsman? Then the apostle Paul was wrong when he described God’s works and said, “Our less respectable parts receive greater honor; and God arranged the body, giving more abundant honor to the part that lacked it, so that there should be no division in the body” (1 Corinthians 12:23–25).
4.37Then respectable people are also wrong to take care to screen natural functions with modesty. So you yourself should evacuate the remains of your food—which you certainly admit do not belong to lust—under the people’s eyes. Indeed, to lend your doctrine authority by your example, perform in church everything you say happens at the will’s command. Be content to hide only the act of sexual union, from which you long ago abstained by resolution and perhaps now also through old age. Say that it is a great sacrilege for anything whose creator is God to avoid public view. Eat, then, in the marketplace or in the meeting places where your arguments resound. And when clothes become a burden under a scorching sun, cover only that part of your body that the devil has moved, and walk about otherwise naked. For you pronounce it ungrateful and profane to cover anything assigned to God’s works. Since you do none of these things—unless further progress has already brought you to do them—your very conduct confirms one of two conclusions: either everything you do not perform in public view belongs to the devil, or your doctrine has fallen, on the testimony, if not of your heart, at least of your belly.
4.38These are foolish matters, which insult my pen more than they burden it. Yet they follow necessarily from your belief. Still, I again urge the reader to pay attention. You tried to assert that whatever is proved to be God’s work is not shameful. Though you could not establish that, you committed yourself most clearly to this: you would remove shame from lust if it were shown to be God’s work. I proved this so thoroughly in my first work that I do not think even you will doubt it once you read it. Nevertheless, since this invention of yours indicates that those books have not yet reached your hands, I will not shrink from demonstrating the same point here as well.
Who, then, do you think created the irrational animals? At certain seasons they are stirred by the most ardent lust, so that it even sharpens each species’ ferocity: “Then the boar is savage, then the tigress most cruel”; “Above all, the frenzy of mares is remarkable” (Virgil, Georgics 3.248, 266). In spring the grasses swell; in spring an abundance of tender moisture overflows; “And the herds seek mating on their appointed days” (compare Virgil, Georgics 2.324–331). It would take too long to go through them one by one. Every kind of creature—held aloft by flight, submerged by swimming, or scattered by wandering through air, sea, or woods, yet neither raised by reason nor lowered by guilt—is inflamed by the familiar pleasure of bodily union. Did they receive the sexual ardor they experience through God’s work or the devil’s? You will undoubtedly cry out: God’s. So God kindles sex with natural pleasure. Manichaeus, to be sure, denies this more consistently than you do.
For the man from whom you learned to condemn the desire of the flesh considered what he must say. He pursues wherever he can find it the thing he had defined as devilish and removed from God’s works. Thus, through desire he assigned human bodies to the devil as their author, and through human beings he assigned all living creatures to him. But you still remain in Manichaeus’s camp and carry his largest dragon standard, from which you breathe deadly poison into unhappy minds by teaching natural evil and the criminality of marriage. Yet you refuse to hurl the weapons your teacher supplied against all natures. Friendlier to the beasts—though you spare them only to accuse the condition of rational creatures with greater authority—you agree that God made in their bodies what the devil made in ours, although you admit that the same thing exists in human beings more mildly than in animals.
Let the thoughtful reader understand what has been established. You do not deny that God made bodily lust in animals. This feeling is therefore not unworthy of God’s works, since it is found more strongly in substances that have taken nothing of the devil’s evil, not even by the slightest act of will. Desire, then, is defended by the example of animals and by the dignity of its author. What God, the maker of bodies, made, and what a nature free of sin possesses, is neither evil nor devilish. Once this is clear, I ask whether you agree that God made the lust experienced by human bodies. If you agree, the dispute is over: you will be corrected and Manichaeus will remain crushed. But if you say, “It could not have been made by God in human bodies,” I reply that you consider this pleasure and desire of the flesh unworthy of human works, not God’s. There can be no doubt: if you acknowledge something was made by God somewhere, yet say it could not have been made in human beings, you are not taking away the testimony due to desire but seeking an undeserved distinction for the human body.
See, then, how profane your sect’s conclusion is. You call unworthy of mortal flesh what was not unworthy of the Creator’s work. By this reasoning you have not disparaged lust; you have exalted the human being you meant to accuse. Such is the consistency, and such the reward, of someone who declares war on truth: he is always struck by results opposite to his efforts. I will therefore now rise against you with a more consistent use of your own words, as every sensible person recognizes. Can it be that when God’s works are assessed and described, reason receives no hearing and the examples of all natures receive no consideration (compare Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.9.22)? Does human madness rise so high that a man thinks unsuitable for his own flesh what he sees flourishing through God’s work in creatures that share his nature? For the origin and constitution of our bodies are no different from those of these creatures.
4.39Just as we received God’s image through the reason of the mind (compare Genesis 1:26–27), so we experience our kinship with cattle through the affinity of the flesh. Although its form differs, its substance, drawn from the material of the elements, is one. Our flesh will indeed see eternity according to the merits of the rational soul: either miserable in suffering or glorious in rewards (Genesis 1:26–27).
4.40On what grounds, then, would something be unworthy, not of God’s image—for the soul’s substance differs from the flesh’s—but of the perishable servant of God’s image, when it was not unworthy of God himself to create it? God made bodies; God distinguished their sexes; God made the reproductive organs; God implanted the feeling through which these bodies unite; God also gave power to seeds; God works in nature’s hidden places from the material of seeds. But God makes nothing evil and nothing guilty.
4.41God made the lust of human beings just as he made that of animals. In animals he left the impulses unrestrained, but in rational human beings God established a limit. The prudence and decency God gave provide desire with a covering. Therefore God blames neither its proper measure nor its kind, but its excess. That excess arises from the unruliness of free will and accuses not nature’s condition but what the agent deserves.
4.42Now consider what follows from your opinion: whatever is believed good should not be covered out of modesty. But I have shown that this desire naturally implanted in the sexes is not evil, since it belongs to God’s work. Accordingly, you must abandon either your impiety or your modesty. But why do I say this? “If the Ethiopian changes his skin or the leopard its spots” (Jeremiah 13:23), then you too will be washed clean of the Manichaean mysteries.
4.43It follows, then, that you must put aside modesty and, while remaining friends with your teacher, enter an alliance with the Cynics. As Cicero reports in On Duties, the arguments of some Stoics also accompany them. They criticize ordinary decency because we regard as disgraceful in speech things that are not shameful in reality, while we call by their proper names things that are shameful in reality. Committing robbery, perpetrating fraud, and committing adultery are shameful acts, but naming them is not obscene. Working to produce children is honorable in reality but obscene in name. “They argue many other things,” he says, “against modesty along these lines. But let us follow nature and avoid everything that offends the approval of eyes and ears” (Cicero, On Duties, book 1).
So you too, who dislike this natural reasoning, the sister of decency, must either say that working to produce children—a task that requires modesty—is uglier and more profane than robbery, sacrilege, and murder of a parent, all of which are supremely shameful in reality but contain no obscenity in their names; or, if you blush to accuse marriage so far that it outweighs even crimes when compared with them, urge married couples to name that union as confidently and freely as we usually name murder of a parent or robbery. If you then add, to mock Christian ears as you usually do, that bodily union intended for offspring is stained by no injustice but can be judged good within its proper measure, embrace the deed of Crates of Thebes. He was a wealthy and noble man so devoted to the Cynic sect that he left his inherited wealth and moved to Athens with his wife Hipparchia, who followed this philosophy with equal commitment. When he wished to have intercourse with her in public, as Cornelius Nepos relates, she drew her cloak over herself to conceal it and was beaten by her husband. “Plainly,” he said—in keeping with your views—“you are still poorly taught, since you do not dare to do in others’ presence what you know you are right to do” (Cornelius Nepos).
Such conduct is entirely due from your flocks: natural acts should be practiced without any barrier of modesty, because they are proved good by having been created by God for multiplying bodies. Return the favor to the four-footed animals, then. Their examples defend your bodily sensation against the devil’s ownership and Manichaeus’s mouth; you too should imitate their freedom in mating as testimony to the goodness of the act. It is fitting that those who have defended your organs should provide instruction for your conduct.
To establish by repetition what we have done: you said lust should be clothed in no modesty if God had made it. Although I treated this fully in the four books of my earlier work, I have also shown here, through the testimony of all the animals that you still admit were created by God, that sexual lust was created by God. Yet I acknowledge that in human beings it should be screened by modesty. It therefore follows from your doctrine that you should bring back before us the elegance of the Cynics after its long exile and perform natural acts before the city’s eyes, because they were made by God. Do you see how blindly you leaped upon my statement, “In order to express faithfully what took place, the prophet came close to endangering modesty” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.9.22)? Your teacher, whose inventions I quoted in the previous book, criticizes this consistently with his own fables, since he denies that God made any bodies. But you have shamelessly dared to handle it while acknowledging—though out of fear—that God created the bodies whose sensation you attribute to the ruler of darkness. That claim has been crushed with all the power of truth expressed in the evangelist’s faithful words: “Everything was made through God, and without him nothing was made” (John 1:3).
4.44The time urges us to move on to other matters. But since you plainly have nothing to peddle to uneducated ears except modesty about natural functions, I will touch as briefly as possible on what seems to remain. Who denies that the decency with which we cover our genitals varies according to persons, places, occupations, and customs? Thus nakedness that would be quite obscene in public gatherings carries no shame in the baths. The dress of the bedroom is one thing, half-naked and carefree; dress in public is another, more careful and more ample. Again, neglect of precautions often indicates familiarity: the more unknown or honored the person present, the more carefully one dresses. And no one has blamed sailors or many craftsmen for nakedness. To show that such simplicity belongs more to the work than to the person, even the apostle Peter, following everyone’s custom, fished naked in the boat after the Lord’s resurrection (John 21:7). Turn your eyes next to the work of physicians: in their care for health they apply their art to the parts modesty conceals. Nakedness is even becoming to athletes.
Moreover, not only among young people bound together in a wanton companionship, but even among certain whole nations, both sexes go uncovered and unite without choosing a private place. Yet why be surprised if a Scot and the barbarity of neighboring peoples do this, when the philosophy mentioned above judged the same thing acceptable, and the doctrine of the advocates of inherited sin has arrived at the same point? What fixed measure of modesty, what boundary, can be maintained amid so many variations, and amid practices defended partly by necessity and partly by companionship, by which it could be proved that the devil mixed natural ardor into the sexes? Your opinion’s support has plainly been dissolved by occupations, places, customs, arts, and whole nations together. Meanwhile, what I defend through reason itself and the teaching of the apostle Paul remains unconquered: God, the author of all things, created every body, every bodily member, and every bodily sense. But he arranged them so that, as occasions require, modesty should clothe some of our members and natural decency should display others. It would be as indecent to cover these others as to expose the privacy of the genitals at an unsuitable time (compare 1 Corinthians 12:23–25) (1 Corinthians 12:23–25).
4.45Having settled this in the present work as far as a matter already treated required, I come to your statement that this natural desire was not in Christ. For this is how you object to me: “But amid all these things he was unwilling to name the desire of the flesh, which is not from the Father but from the world. The devil is called the ruler of this world. He did not find this desire in the Lord, because the Lord came among human beings as a man without it” (John 14:30) (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.2.5; compare John 14:30). You have therefore pronounced that Christ, whom the catholic faith confesses to be a true human being in every respect, did not have in his flesh the desire spoken of by the apostle John. But John, as his words showed, declares that the desire of the flesh and the desire of the eyes, together with the whole world, are not from the Father (1 John 2:16). I have explained how this ought to be understood.
4.46But you fasten on the very name “desire” and want the sensation of the eyes to have been as absent from Christ’s body as that of his inner parts.
4.47Here, then, I urge the reader to attend with his whole mind. He will see the Apollinarist heresy revived through you, but with a Manichaean addition. For Apollinaris is said at first to have introduced this account of Christ’s incarnation: only a body seemed to have been assumed from human substance, while the divinity itself took the place of a soul. Christ would thus appear to have taken up a human corpse, not a human being. This began to be overturned by the testimony both of reason and of the Gospel. For if he had assumed flesh alone, everything Christ said in calling himself a man whom the Jews persecuted for speaking the truth would necessarily be accused of falsehood, since a human being cannot exist without soul and body together (compare John 8:40). Or again, he had said in the Gospel: “I have power to lay down my soul, and I have power to take it up again” (John 10:18) (John 8:40). What soul could be laid down if none had been assumed? After being refuted by the authority of such testimonies and by evident reason, Apollinaris devised another claim from which his heresy, still continuing today, arose. He said that Christ did possess a human soul, but lacked bodily sensations; and he pronounced him incapable of being affected by any sins.
4.48He was not, on this account, someone who avoided offenses through the strength of his judgment, but someone who could not feel the desire for vices because his flesh had the advantage of being separated from our sensations.
4.49As the matter shows, such flattery gravely damages the catholic faith. It is not merely unnecessary but profane. By wishing to show something superior in Christ’s body, lest sharing our flesh should diminish it, Apollinaris deprived him of the full possession of natural sensations. He did not see how far the ruin would extend when truth was damaged even by flattery. For an objection raised by the catholics thundered against him: under such a belief, Christ’s saving mysteries would suffer a greater loss than his members. “If,” (Luke 4:2) they said, “Christ was made from David’s seed (Romans 1:3), made from a woman and made under the Law (Galatians 4:4), in order to give us an example, so that we might follow the footsteps of the one who committed no sin and in whose mouth no deceit was found (1 Peter 2:21–22), yet he did not put on all the properties of our substance—if he bore either flesh without a soul or a human being without the sensations nature gives us—then he is not shown to have fulfilled the model of an example and a law. What was praiseworthy in despising the enticements of the senses if, through nature’s favor, he was incapable of them? What was remarkable in restraining eyes that did not wander because his flesh kept them from doing so? What was great in turning his nostrils away from enticing scents if they did not know how to receive them? What was astonishing in maintaining strict restraint over meals every day if he could not feel their appeal? Finally, what difficulty was there in fasting for forty days if hunger could not trouble him (compare Matthew 4:2; Luke 4:2)? What reverence did the discipline of ears deserve, receiving only honorable words, if they had an inborn deafness to improper ones? And what glory was there in chastity if manhood, rather than willingness, was absent, and what was thought to arise from strength of mind came from weakness of the members?” (Matthew 4:2)
4.50Finally, what prize was there for endurance if the pain of wounds and blows could not reach the soul because the path of sensation was blocked? What, then, did Apollinaris’s flattery achieve? All the beauty of the virtues Christ had embodied was emptied out and withered by undeserved praises of his nature. Stripped of all the splendor of its truth, it exposed the Mediator’s sacred teaching to ridicule. Moreover, he would not merely lose the distinction of his works, being fortunate by birth rather than by virtue: he would also face charges of fraud if he told mortals, “Strive toward the patience of a man who feels nothing, and come through real torments to the virtues of an unreal body that suffers no pain”; or, “Conquer the definite impulses of your own nature and imitate the chastity of someone whom weakness made appear pure.” Certainly nothing more profane or wicked can be imagined than such inventions.
Apollinaris had not actually said all these things. But by making that one pronouncement—that the man Christ lacked the sensations implanted by nature, which fall into vice through excess rather than through use—he received all these replies from the catholics in silence, condemned by his own opinion. For the catholic faith is built by affirming all the things whose denial, or the consequences of whose denial, formed and condemned Apollinaris’s heresy. Judge, then, what verdict should be passed on you. You condemn the union of the sexes like Manichaeus. You separate the nature of Christ’s flesh from the common condition of humanity, according to the Manichaeans. You accuse the desire of the flesh, following the statements of your teacher Manichaeus. You say that sensory desire was not present in Christ’s body, whether according to the Manichaeans or according to the Apollinarists. Yet you want us to call you neither an Apollinarist nor a Manichaean! Still, I yield and grant you a favor; I do not regret being generous. As far as I am concerned, you may avoid appearing a follower of Apollinaris, for he devised the lesser impiety. But you yourself make it impossible for you to be called anything other than a Manichaean.
4.51I showed in the third book of my first work that, if natural sin were believed, one would necessarily and irrefutably have to say that Christ too inherited guilt from Mary’s flesh. You place him under the devil’s power by asserting that the entire substance of human beings belongs to the devil’s jurisdiction.
4.52So, leaving that aside for the present, I demand to know where you have read that Christ was a eunuch by nature.
4.53Although he was born from a virgin as a sign (compare Isaiah 7:14), he did not reject the male sex; rather, he assumed its reality. He was complete in every internal part, complete in body, a true human being, a perfect man, if we believe the apostle Peter’s discourse in Acts (Acts 2:22, 33). He was distinguished by unbroken chastity, guarding both mind and eyes without ever relaxing his heart’s strength. That he accomplished all this by strength of mind, not weakness of flesh, is witnessed by his sleep, food, beard, sweat, labor, cross, and the lance (compare Matthew 8:24; Luke 24:42–43; Isaiah 50:6; Luke 22:44; John 4:6; John 19:18, 34). These testify that the desire of the flesh, mingled with the senses of the whole body, and the reality, soundness, and natural condition of his members were present in him. He did not lack bodily sensations; he ruled them.
This is the ground on which the catholic faith challenges the nations and the Manichaeans: the message of his flesh, like that of his cross, is foolishness to those who perish, but God’s power to those who will be saved (compare 1 Corinthians 1:18). This is how he commended his love toward us (compare Romans 5:8): the Mediator’s devotion assumed everything that Manichaean impiety tears apart. Therefore nothing in my Lord makes me ashamed. I hold fast to the reality of the members he took on for my salvation, so that I may receive the solidity and strength of his example (Isaiah 7:14) (Matthew 8:24) (Luke 24:42–43) (Luke 22:44) (John 4:6) (John 19:18) (John 19:34) (1 Corinthians 1:18) (Romans 5:8).
4.54I proclaim that all his holiness rested on the benefit of his mind, not on an exemption granted to his flesh. In this way nature is defended both by his creation of it and by his assumption of it, and human life is directed by imitation of his virtues. Neither of these two things can be praised without the truth of the other. His sacred work will have as much dignity as his human body has reality; and the defense of his flesh will extend as far as the holiness of his life requires. Conversely, blame of one affects both. As much will be taken from his virtues as is taken from his limbs. If anything is scraped away from the solidity of his substance, all the adornments of his conduct perish; and losses inflicted on the one born return as an insult to the one who suffered. In short, if the substance of his flesh is reduced by removing any natural property, the entire display of virtues vanishes.
I will therefore deny nothing in the members of the Mediator, made from a woman, that is known to be natural (compare Galatians 4:4). And see how different the boundaries of reason and modesty are. The Christian faith is not ashamed to say that Christ had genitals, although we conceal them in ourselves as decently as we can (Galatians 4:4).
4.55Thus nature has prescribed that there are certain things reason, and likewise faith with reverence, may name, though modesty and decency of conduct do not allow them to be exposed to sight. In this way the Teacher of the Nations assigns reality to Christ’s flesh and holiness to his spirit: “Great,” he says, “is the mystery of devotion, which was manifested in flesh, justified in spirit, appeared to angels, was preached among the nations, was believed in this world, and was taken up in glory” (1 Timothy 3:16). Just as he commended this to be believed as true, so he announced that its opponents would arise at the end of the age. For he immediately continues: “In the last times some will depart from the faith, attending to deceitful spirits and teachings of demons, speaking lies in hypocrisy, having their conscience seared, forbidding marriage, requiring abstinence from foods that God created to be received with thanksgiving by the faithful and by those who have known the truth; for every creature of God is good” (1 Timothy 4:1–4).
The apostle both foresaw and condemned this pollution of the churches that you vomited out by following Manichaeus: this betrayal by those departing from the faith, which consists in preaching natural evil and condemning marital union. He showed not only what would be said, but also what would follow from it.
4.56When he says that abstinence from foods will be taught, an intelligent reader understands that he is not accusing Christian restraint or announcing the possible appearance of people who prescribe the ordeal of fasting (compare 1 Timothy 4:1–4). Rather, he shows that people would arise who said that all the animals God created for mortals’ food were polluted by the devil’s evil because they were born through desire and sexual union. He then expressed the consequence: foods must be renounced if their reproduction is believed devilish. That is why you remove this slander against bodily union from animals, so that your pretense can survive. Yet you say that human beings, made in God’s image, belong to the demon’s jurisdiction because of this very desire in those who beget them (compare Genesis 1:26–27). Both you and Manichaeus therefore have one reason for disparaging substances and transferring them to the devil. But he condemns every animal because of this feeling experienced in a natural act; you condemn not all, but—what is uglier—the better ones. You acquit pigs, dogs, and donkeys to appear to avoid the Manichaeans. But for the very same reason as Manichaeus you condemn all human beings, who were made in God’s image. Placing natural evil nowhere except in God’s image, you declaim against us as accuser of the saints and defender of donkeys (1 Timothy 4:1–4) (Genesis 1:26–27).
4.57Christ, then, no less a true human being than true God, lacked nothing natural. But it was right that the one giving the example of perfection should excel in every pursuit of virtue. His chastity, exalted by uninterrupted integrity and stirred by no lustful appetite, had remained virgin in its holy mind. His greatness of soul mastered every sense and conquered pain. Through his humanity it was to become imitable by all the faithful, and through its sublimity, wonderful.
4.58So here, as in everything, you have spoken most profanely in saying that what belongs to human nature was absent from Christ’s flesh. You drew this, deceived, not from any sound vein of Scripture but solely from Manichaean filth. Yet to display a greater abundance of resources for defending truth, let us grant your dream that the desire of the flesh you speak of was absent from Christ. This was certainly condemned first in Manichaean and afterward in Apollinarist frenzy. But what support could it give your doctrine? It would not immediately follow that something was evil if he had chosen not to assume it. Since good things rise by degrees in worth, one could say that he proceeded through the best without condemning goods placed below him by choosing those above. Just as he did not defame marriage by following virginity, so he would not have condemned the sensation of the reproductive flesh even if he had been unwilling to possess its capacity in his own substance.
4.59To confirm a plain matter by an example: it is better to possess reason than not to possess it. Human beings were made rational, while animals were made irrational. Yet because human nature surpasses four-footed animals, those animals must not therefore be called an evil or the devil’s work. Suppose, then, that when Christ formed his own members, he chose not to mingle with them a sensation of the reproductive organs that he would not use. When he formed the members of Isaac, Jacob, and everyone else, giving them both sex and sensation, was he therefore doing something evil? Or did he call the devil to help when he came to these things, so that the devil might mingle necessary pleasures into the members Christ himself had assembled? As I have shown, with God’s help, both in this work and in the earlier one, you have obtained absolutely nothing, however small, against the divine works through the person of Christ. For it has become clear that the Savior’s body lacked nothing belonging to human nature.
4.60Accordingly, there can be no sin in that nature, since no injustice was found in the one in whom the whole nature is present (compare 1 Peter 2:22) (1 Peter 2:22).
4.61Therefore, whether sexual desire was or was not in Christ’s flesh, it is not shown to be evil or devilish.
4.62I hurry toward other matters, yet astonishment at these things holds me fast. What is this great fury against another person, that even if you do not understand Scripture, you fail to weigh your own words? You always argue in such a way that whatever you throw returns upon you with greater force. You said, of course, that there is no cause of modesty except the desire of the flesh displayed in movements of the reproductive organs.
4.63You also said that it is sacrilege to judge anything believed to have been made by God shameful, apart from this desire of the flesh; and that Christ did not have this desire of the flesh, which gives mortals a reason for modesty. Did you not see what follows? Christ should have joined gatherings naked, without any regard for modesty, so as not to incur the sacrilege you invent by being ashamed, in his flesh that had no desire, of his own and his Father’s works. But if he had no such desire and nevertheless observed modesty, then even on your account it is irrefutably proved that modesty is due to the human body, not to its sexual heat.
4.64You therefore see that you vainly called it a sin to acknowledge that a covering must be applied to these works God made: our Lord instituted this as humanity’s maker and practiced it when he became human. May reverence for the Redeemer grant pardon because, to defend the truth of the mystery and destroy the Manichaeans’ wickedness, I speak boldly of his flesh. Unless faith demanded it, restrained reverence would not touch this subject.
4.65“But he,” you say, “was unwilling to name the desire of the flesh. He is silent because he is ashamed; and with a remarkable shamelessness of shame, if one may say so, he is ashamed to name what he is not ashamed to praise” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.7.17). So you are displeased that we know, according to the apostle, that our less respectable parts must be covered with the decency they require (1 Corinthians 12:23). In this, our judgment follows the Creator’s: what he placed in a private part of the body, we likewise cover with a modest screen.
4.66The varieties of expression whose service I use, and which you not only fail to imitate but even attack, were developed by refinement in Greek and Latin, not in every language. Other languages are called natural because subsequent cultivation has brought them neither richness nor polish; they use entirely simple names for bodily parts. Thus among the Hebrews, in whose language Scripture’s purity is contained, everything is indicated by its own proper word.
4.67The genitals of both sexes are named as freely as feet and knees. Yet even with this authority supporting me, I have not neglected the aids of more modest speech. Neglect of decency without any compulsion from the subject lies open to the most just criticism. Decency should be maintained in words no less than in actions, as far as the subject allows. Natural desire, then, could not be convicted by the reproach of shame and has been defended by its Creator’s dignity. The purpose was not to treat it as some great good, since it is shared by human beings and animals, but as a necessary instrument of the sexes: rescued from the demons’ jurisdiction and placed among the works of the one who made the world and bodies. No one accuses it except Manichaeus and his heir, the advocate of inherited sin. It is therefore evident that the entire fiction of natural sin has vanished, since its whole support depended on accusations against nature.
4.68I therefore had to ask what the devil recognized as his own in the sexes, by which he could rightfully pluck their fruit. He had not assembled the flesh, formed the members, given the reproductive organs, distinguished sex, or ordained marriage. Nor had he honored with fertility or sprinkled with pleasure the union without which marriage cannot exist.
4.69Trying to meet these arguments with a deer’s fear and a fox’s deceit, you deceived the patron to whom you write by telling him that the ruler of darkness dominates God’s works and image because of natural bodily sensation, that is, the desire of the flesh (compare Genesis 1:26–27). Yet the flesh’s sensation must necessarily belong to the same author as the flesh’s nature (Genesis 1:26–27).
4.70It is therefore clear that you did not strive to refute the objections, but to deceive miserably the patron to whom you were writing. You wanted him to think you had brought forward some crude statement that you could rightly bite at, although you had already praised it by conceding the preceding points and the divine institution of bodies.
4.71I admit, however, that you thought very hard about what to say. Your talent and your effort are evident. You certainly weighed most skillfully what should be asserted on behalf of inherited sin. No one else could have written more cleverly for natural evil. Indeed, even you could not have accomplished it so elegantly had your old teacher’s inventions not helped your talent.
4.72For you understood that a charge could never be fastened on infants, who have deserved nothing of their own, without condemning bodies. You therefore needed the help of Manichaeus, who excluded the desire of the flesh from God’s works and assigned both marriage and bodies themselves to the devil as their author.
4.73So the ugliness of the cause you defend has made truth rout you and drive you away. Otherwise, if you wished to come over to the catholics, how much more elegantly and fully you yourself would develop what I assert!
4.74Although I hardly dare pronounce you gifted with a sharp and watchful mind, when I see how sluggish and ugly your judgment is in choosing the cause you have undertaken.
4.75For if, with your faith entirely intact, you were attempting to shake what cannot be defeated merely to show the strength of your learning, in the manner of a school exercise, while intending to award the victory to those you opposed once the playful contest ended, I would approve your literary enthusiasm but rebuke your irreligious example. Instead, you follow with the ugliest stubbornness a doctrine that lacks even the false coloring of plausibility and that you cannot defend by any testimonies of the Law, since these never count against reason. It bristles with impiety and lies prostrate in foolishness, existing nowhere except amid the groins of human desires, pierced through by decency, argument, and sacred law. One of three conclusions therefore follows: either your understanding is leaden, or you suffer the chains of that sorcery we have heard is contained in the Manichaean mysteries, or both at once.
4.76I, however, find nothing to admire in my own talent because I understand that sin cannot exist without will, bodies without God, bodily sensations without bodies, marriage without union, or newborn people without God’s activity. And I hold as certain that what is proved unjust is not divine, and what is divine cannot be proved unjust. It is no less plain than these things that imputing one person’s sins to others who were not even there, much less consenting, is unjust. Enlightened by these suns, I am entirely justified in looking down on the Manichaeans’ caves. They think either that sin can exist without will, or that God does not make human beings, or that bodily sensation belongs to one author and bodies to another. They suppose either that someone weighed down by charges of injustice is God, or that the eternal creator of all can be charged with the crime of injustice, or that even a shadow of justice remains when one person’s acts of will are attached to another person’s birth. Accordingly, I assess the merits of the opposing sides by their causes, not by their talents.
4.77But let us return to the case. You said I had been unwilling to name desire because “it is not from the Father but from the world. The devil is called the ruler of this world. He did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord came among human beings as a man without it” (1 John 2:16) (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.26.41; compare 1 John 2:16; John 14:30). Notice this: you were speaking of a natural thing, and after saying it was from the world, you added that the devil should be believed ruler of the whole world. You were thus acknowledging him as author not of voluntary acts but of natural things—that is, of natures (John 14:30) (1 John 2:16; John 14:30).
4.78After saying this, you added: “Hence the Lord himself also says, ‘See, the ruler of this world is coming, and he finds nothing in me’” (John 14:30). Then you add your own explanation: “Nothing, that is, of sin, either inherited at birth or added in the course of life.” Show, then, that the Lord said in the Gospel that he had no sin inherited at birth.
4.79Why do you deceive unhappy souls by lying that something was indicated when it was not? The Lord says in the Gospel: “See, the ruler of this world is coming, and he finds nothing in me” (John 14:30). The devil certainly encountered no sin in him, because he was defeated in every temptation he brought against him, whether when he hungered or afterward when he preached, through his persecutors (compare Matthew 4:1–11; Luke 4:1–13). The Savior therefore declares that the devil detected no sin in him. Yet he certainly would have found it if anything were inherited through the flesh’s condition, since Christ too had been made from a woman descended from David’s seed and Adam’s stock (compare Galatians 4:4; Romans 1:3; Luke 3:23–38) (Luke 4:1–13) (Galatians 4:4) (Romans 1:3) (Luke 3:23–38).
4.80The devil would therefore have found a natural crime in him if any such crime existed. He would have held the body liable if he had poisoned it either in the first parent or in the very woman who bore him. It would not matter whether a late and ineffective intention of the will resisted the conditions of its own material. Struggling against nature, it would not cleanse the one born but would provoke the tyrant—all the more since the will could not be free if nature were captive. So if sin lay in the very sensation and condition of the flesh, if human nature itself belonged to the demon’s dominion, Christ would either have been guilty or would not have been human. If, then, a curse is assigned to human nature, the one who became flesh to dwell among us must likewise either be assigned guilt or be deprived of humanity (compare John 1:14) (John 1:14).
4.81Manichaeus did both. Having invented the claim that evil exists naturally in flesh, he said that there was no flesh in Christ, to avoid confessing that there was injustice in him.
4.82But the catholic faith crushed him on both points. It declares that evil does not exist naturally in flesh and that therefore Christ lacked nothing human and possessed nothing unjust. Conscious of his own saving work, he cries: “See, the ruler of this world is coming, and he finds nothing in me” (John 14:30). Certainly nothing he could accuse: he could not defame a nature whose will he had not bent toward sins.
4.83That was the very reason he tempted Christ: following his customary art, he wanted to capture him by persuasion, since he could corrupt no one by creating him (compare Matthew 4:1–11; Luke 4:1–13) (Matthew 4:1–11) (Luke 4:1–13).
4.84Thus Christ’s incarnation defends the work of his own divinity. He brought to me my nature and his own will, offering that will as a mirror and a rule for me. By declaring that the devil had found no sin in him, he showed that guilt is acquired not from the flesh’s creation but solely from the will (compare John 14:30). Nowhere in Scripture do we read that Christ escaped a sin he knew was inherited at birth. Rather, clear testimony fully teaches that the righteousness of the humanity he assumed rested not on a difference of nature but on voluntary action (John 14:30).
4.85For the apostle Peter says: “Christ died for us, leaving you an example, so that you might follow his footsteps. He committed no sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth” (1 Peter 2:21–22). The apostle’s statement certainly agrees with the Lord’s voice. The Lord says in the Gospel, “The ruler of this world is coming, and he finds nothing in me” (John 14:30). The teacher of the Church commends the same point, saying there was no offense in Christ. But by truthful testimony he explains why Christ had no sin: “Because,” he says, “he committed no sin.” He did not say, “Because he received no sin,” but, “Because he committed no sin.”
4.86But if there were a crime in nature, Peter’s statement would have been ignorant. He evidently judged it sufficient testimony to spotless holiness to clear Christ’s actions of crimes, although sin would be believed to dwell in him through natural poison. If Peter had thought anything of natural evil, he would therefore have mentioned this part more carefully and emphatically. He would have written, “Christ left us an example: he neither committed sin nor acquired the sin we inherit at birth.” (1 Peter 2:21–22) Then it could fittingly follow that no deceit was found in his mouth (compare 1 Peter 2:21–22). But if Peter had thought this, he would never have mentioned an example. For whom would he have presented for human beings to imitate if the nature of an alien flesh had set Christ apart, and a difference of substance had impeached the authority of his teaching?
4.87Moreover, the belief in natural sin would not merely destroy the force of imitation; it would expose fraud in the very praise offered to Christ. With what seriousness, with what face, could anyone say that no deceit was found in his mouth? If he had come in a condition of flesh different from ours, he would be proved to have practiced deliberate deceit not only in teaching, which is less serious, but even in being born, which is more serious. What sort of conduct would this be? Human beings would be established in natural evil and the devil’s kingdom, sinning under the deadly necessity of an inborn plague, or naturally serving the law of sin that ruled in their members (compare Romans 7:23). Yet he would force them, even under threat of punishment, to imitate him, and demand his own righteousness from people of a flesh whose evil had terrified him so greatly that, though he wished to display a model of goodness under its appearance, he avoided the reality of its nature. How much more rightly could the sickness of sinners, secure in their claim to be compelled, say to him: “When we are well, we all give sound advice to the sick. If you were in this condition, you would think very, very differently!” (Romans 7:23)
What, then, has your impiety achieved? This necessary consequence: if sin is believed naturally present in our flesh, Christ either assumed that flesh and is liable to its evil, or did not assume it and is bound inescapably by the injustice, not of his birth, which then appears false, but of deliberate deception. All this is so foul with blasphemy that it can scarcely be set out without horror, even while being torn apart. Let the Mediator’s dignity therefore stand by his example and his work, and by our faith. Defending the truth through both his words and his apostle’s, that faith never ceases to proclaim that Christ, a true human being, assumed from Mary’s womb flesh of the same nature as ours. Though a true human being in every respect, he had no sin. To indicate this, it suffices for the apostle Peter to say that he committed no sin, teaching that one who had not committed it could not possess it (compare 1 Peter 2:21–22). No deceit was found in his mouth. He offered a holy example to those sharing his nature, which he himself had made in everyone. Sin is therefore clearly not inborn, since Christ did not have it: without losing the honor of his divinity, he became flesh precisely so that we could imitate him (1 Peter 2:21–22).
4.88Having completed these points as the subject required, I would like to question you at least briefly. With what confidence do you say there was no sin in Christ while praising Jerome’s writings? In that Dialogue he composed under the names Atticus and Critobulus, with a remarkable elegance befitting such a faith, he even relies on the testimony of a fifth Gospel, which he says he translated, to try to show that Christ had not only natural but even voluntary sin, because of which he knew he needed cleansing by John’s baptism (compare Jerome, Dialogue against the Pelagians 3.1). From another testimony of John the evangelist, he also fastens on Christ the disgrace of falsehood (compare Jerome, Dialogue against the Pelagians 2.6; John 7:8–10). In the letter you sent to Alexandria, you boast of this work so much that you say Pelagius, overwhelmed by its masses of Scripture, cannot defend free choice. But that work was answered by the catholic man who had been attacked. I have now mentioned it only to make you recognize that you agree neither with the holy Scriptures nor even with the helpers of your own doctrine (John 7:8–10).
4.89For you abandon the Manichaeans when they disparage pigs and goats, though you accompany them in accusing human nature. With them, too, you overthrow in Christ not the appearance of flesh but the basis of his example. At least in words, you also remove natural sin from Christ, lest you seem to place him too under the devil’s power, something not even Manichaeus himself did. Yet you praise Jerome, who does not fear to blaspheme him by saying that he entered into familiarity even with voluntary crimes. So you roll without turning aside among your friends’ various filth and inventions, and rage in abuse only against the catholics. For they say that God is not the author of evil; that human beings made by him are not naturally evil; that God’s laws are just; that his image can turn away from evil and do good (compare Genesis 1:26–27; Psalm 34:14); and that Christ committed no sin in his members, his commands, or his judgments (compare 1 Peter 2:22). Therefore, although the assertion of truth makes you sick, I believe that thoughtful people are instructed, and even some of those wounded by your lies can be healed (Genesis 1:26–27) (Psalm 34:14) (1 Peter 2:22).
4.90Enough of these matters. Let us now come to the point on which a large part of the case turns. Examined and drained of life by its force, the Manichaeans’ envoy has produced evidence of a reply as faithful as his talent is elegant. After praising and approving the words of mine I quoted above, with nothing new intervening, he approached the part in which the argument I had promised was completed. I had asked through what those whom God made were under the devil. I answered in his name, “Through sin, not through nature,” and replied in my own: “But, as you yourself agree, just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will. Do infants, then, possess a will at the time of conception, when they do not yet possess a soul? Or at the time of their birth, when they do not yet possess the use of reason?”
When he reached this point, he set out only this much of my objection: “But just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will.” And he replied: “Indeed, that is so. For in this way ‘through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12). Through that one man’s evil will, all sinned in him, when all were that one man. For that reason, each inherited original sin from him” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.15).
I therefore urge the reader to examine our contest attentively. What did you gain, most learned of two-footed creatures, by failing to complete my statement? Although the part you suppressed contained an explanation of the earlier statement, the whole force nevertheless remains equally in what you put before yourself. I faithfully set out your usual reply, as your own assent made clear. Asking through what infants whom God made were under the devil, I answered in your place, “Through sin, not through nature.” You certainly see that I practiced no deceit here. I said what is on the advocate of inherited sin’s lips, although it is not in his doctrine. To this I replied, “But just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will.”
You broke this apart with shameless deceit. You mentioned my words that, just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will; but you suppressed what followed about the infants’ will. And you answer, “Indeed, that is so. For in this way ‘through one man sin entered the world’ (Romans 5:12): through that one man’s evil will, all sinned in him.” Is this answering? Is this arguing? Is this, finally, even showing a regard for sobriety? Learned people certainly laugh at the cleverness of sophisms, where shared words are used to trick the respondent’s simplicity. Yet those sophisms, though lacking the solidity of truth, are at least colored by an elegant surface. What sort of monstrosity of argument is this, which is neither solid with truth nor polished with sophistry? I certainly said that sin cannot exist without free will. Once that is granted, your doctrine is destroyed, since you think an offense exists in human nature without any will on the part of those held guilty.
4.91With what shamelessness, then, do you both approve my statement and refuse to abandon your doctrine? The statements of the two sides cannot be joined by any agreement, since opposite assertions do not share the truth at the same time. If I agreed that sin was natural, I would necessarily fall away from the force of the statement that sin can exist only in free will. In the same way, you, by agreeing that I spoke rightly in declaring that no sin exists without will, should immediately have rejected the opinion by which you believed sin to be natural.
4.92For it is evident that whatever is natural is not voluntary.
4.93Therefore, if sin is natural, it is not voluntary; if it is voluntary, it is not inborn. These two definitions are as opposed to one another as necessity and will, whose affirmation arises from the denial of the other. Just as “voluntary” means nothing other than “not compelled,” so “compelled” means nothing other than “not voluntary.” These two therefore cannot exist, or as it were live, together. Their nature is such that one lives only when the other is extinguished.
4.94Since this is so unshakable that no argument can overthrow it, choose whichever you prefer and consistently affirm either my statement or yours, so that you impute guilt either to necessity or to will. When I say “whichever you prefer,” I am not advising you as though your opinion were still hidden: you learned through Manichaeus to bring crimes into nature. I give this warning so that the truthfulness of your argument may be put on record.
4.95Let the thoughtful and attentive hearer weigh what you answered me. We are certainly discussing infants, who possess no will of their own minds. The question is through what they are under the devil, when God made them and you agree that they themselves have done nothing evil. You proclaimed that they belong to the demon’s jurisdiction because of sin, not because of nature. My reply rose against this: “But just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so an offense cannot exist without will.” (Romans 5:12) You answered, “Indeed, that is so”—that is, an offense cannot exist without will. But after confirming this, with what shamelessness did you add, “Yet through one man sin entered the world, through that one man’s will” (compare Romans 5:12)?
4.96Had you been asked about Adam’s actions, or whether he sinned by his will? That question will indeed soon be put against you. Granted, you enjoy deceiving others; but how ugly it is to deceive yourself! Yet I cannot persuade myself that you suffer such ugliness from conviction rather than fraud. In one and the same line you agree that an offense cannot exist without will, then immediately add that the sin which you said could not subsist without a free movement of mind reigns in all human beings without will.
4.97Again, there is a large difference between the propositions. You said, “There is no offense without will,” and answered, “But there is an offense through one person’s will.” Does the following reply, introduced by a preposition taking the accusative case, agree with the earlier definition, secured by a preposition taking the ablative case? The question was whether a crime could exist without will, and it had been established that it could not. You added that sin entered through one man. Yet the issue was not through what it began, but without what it could not exist.
4.98This detestable theft is plain. It was immediately punished by the retribution that clings to sins: before it could spread to destroy its hearers, it entrapped its own author. No one denies that the first human being incurred a sin. The question is how that sin could be found in newborn people. Define what you think the condition of the first sin was. You say, “There was free will, for sin cannot exist without will.” I approve this. But then you add, “Yet this sin, which cannot exist without will, clings to newborn people without will” (compare Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.15).
4.99Then your concession that sin does not exist without will is false, if, although committed through will, it could nevertheless pass to others without will.
4.100Sin therefore now exists without will when it is found in those from whom you remove an evil will.
4.101See, then, where your subtleties carry you. You try to persuade us that something does not exist through the very means by which it can exist.
4.102That is, sin exists without will through the very fact that it cannot exist without will.
4.103Thus it is to lose its own condition through its own condition, and exist without what it was defined as unable to exist without! This is denying reality. What comparable thing did Anaxagoras do when he said snow was black? You invent the claim that a thing’s nature is denied by its own fruits. Necessity and will are opposites, so that, as I showed above, they destroy one another by mutual conflict. Yet through a new and impossible alliance and a monstrous relationship, you make one arise as the other’s effect. You say necessity grew from the fruits of will, so that will erased itself by multiplying itself and changed its own condition through its activity. To state the matter in its own terms: after will began to be will, it ceased to be will. What could be imagined, I will not say more stupid, but more insane? Since these two, necessity and will, cannot coexist, and since you have confirmed my statement that an offense cannot exist without will, while also agreeing that infants have no will, you are dragged by the throat into admitting that there is no sin in them, since you professed that sin cannot exist without will.
4.104As for your addition, “Through one man sin entered the world,” I have shown here how inappropriately it was placed, just as I explained in the second book how it should be understood. But now that the present argument is complete, I would like to reconsider your exceedingly sharp statement. You say: “‘Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned’ (Romans 5:12). Through that one man’s evil will, all sinned in him, when all were that one man. For that reason, each inherited original sin from him” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.15). “They sinned then,” you say, “when all were that one man.”
I had already pointed out that you wrote this to Marcellinus (Augustine, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 1.11; 3.14). This testimony convicts you of believing and embracing the propagation of souls, taken particularly from Manichaeus’s very entrails; I quoted his statements in the third book. It is certainly so ugly that, although you imply it, you nevertheless never dare profess it. But let us postpone this for now: it is killed both by the obscenity of its first advocate and by the fear of his successor—that is, you. At present I want to examine the confusion that tosses you about in argument. You say, “Through that one man’s evil will, all sinned in him, when all were that one man.” If all were that one man, how did all sin through his evil will, when all these people whom you say were in him could have sinned by their own wills? Indeed, to turn the argument back, he was unhappier than everyone else, since he alone bears the odium, although according to your doctrine everyone sinned in him.
Infants therefore possessed will not only before they were born but before their great-grandparents were generated. They exercised choice before the seeds of their substance were created. Why, then, do you fear to say that at the time of their own conception they possess free will, by which they do not naturally inherit sin but voluntarily commit it, if you believe that those conceived today possessed sensation, judgment, and an effective will so many ages ago? You did not hesitate to state this in the books issued under Marcellinus’s name, plainly to show the madness that grips God’s enemies. There you say: “These infants sinned in Adam so that they might be created like him” (Augustine, On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins 1.11). What more false, insane, and filthy words could sound than that they sinned beforehand so that they might be created? That is, by acting they deserved to become beings who could act, and their action was older than their substance. It is enough to point out these inventions, more suited to Bacchic revels and ritual wands than to literature.
From this flowed your reply: “All sinned in him, when all were that one man, from whom each inherited original sin.” There is no need to labor here to show that, since will is a person’s act, will cannot exist before the person whose will it is. What I especially want understood is that even on this opinion there is no original sin. For if everyone who sinned was there, they inherited nothing from an original evil, because they all committed it through their own efforts. The inheritance of sin is therefore destroyed not only by catholic truth but by every argument of its own defender. That is indeed the nature of lies: they do not maintain a consistent pretense. Wasteful of shame and greedy for what belongs to another, they are exposed in everything they seize.
4.105After this reply, he tries to wash away another point on which I had struck him. For after asking about infants’ will, I continued: “But you deny this”—that is, that a sinful will is present in newborn people—“and nevertheless say infants are under the devil. Nor do you conceal why you think they live under his power. You say, ‘Because they are born from the union of the two sexes, they are under the hostile power.’” The testimony of his own words therefore made it plain that he claims infants for the demon because they were born from the union of the two sexes. Through this I showed that he had enslaved marriage to the devil, although God instituted it and it cannot exist without union.
4.106He now puts this before himself, beginning with my question: “So you say,” he writes, “that they are under the devil because they are born from the union of the two sexes?” Let us hear what explanation he gives. “I certainly say,” he replies, “that they are under the devil because of an offense. They are not free of the offense because they were born from that union which cannot perform even what is honorable without shameful lust. Ambrose, of most blessed memory, also said this” (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.15). What disastrous perversity in the man! What an unspeakable intention! What shameful falsehood!
4.107Does this man dare to say he does not condemn marriage, to mock uneducated ears with such wickedness, and to claim that he has withdrawn from Manichaeus’s company? By repeated professions he places the union of the sexes, the act of marriage, and the parents’ feeling and sensation within the devil’s kingdom. Adding the help of his own sharpness to these Manichaean inventions, he pronounces the union devilish, located in both the act and the flesh of the married couple. Yet because of it he assigns the innocent to the devil’s kingdom, while acquitting those who perform the act! Always hostile to God in this way, he defends those who, according to him, serve the devil through lust.
4.108But the infants whom he says God makes he assigns to the enemy’s dominion. Thus he accuses not the demon’s work, whose ministers he clears of guilt, but God’s work, which the pleasure conscious of the devil’s gift could not reach. So this accuser of marital activity, yet absolver of lusts, this assailant of innocence and slanderer of divine fairness, did not fear to write: “I certainly say that they are under the devil because they were born from that union.” Seeing the wickedness of this statement laid bare, he tried to defend it by some authority, which he could not produce from Scripture, and added that Bishop Ambrose had thought the same. It is no surprise that he accuses the dead when he also accuses the harmless.
4.109How much more rightly you would say: “Manichaeus said the same thing in his letter to Patricius. He also said it in the letter he wrote to his daughter Menoch, and in many other writings that you have thoroughly absorbed.” Instead, you try to draw the bishop of Milan into your company. Because you cannot obtain a defense, you want to find consolation.
4.110Do disputants’ writings count against God’s law or God’s work?
4.111For the present, it is more than enough for me to prove even from this that you have nowhere read your belief in the sacred writings: in so important a case, you have produced nothing except the bishop’s little sayings, as you call them. If you had been able to find anything more authoritative, you would undoubtedly have left these alone.
4.112But fortunately you first relieved me of the burden of such persons. In the book you composed to Timasius against free choice, holy Pelagius had recalled venerable men, both Ambrose and Cyprian, who had commended free choice in their books. You replied that their authority placed no burden upon you, even saying that if they had thought anything wrongly, they had atoned for it through progress toward a better life (compare Augustine, On Nature and Grace 71). Let your own words be returned to you so that you are ashamed to stir hostility from names alone. Yet the statements of Ambrose and the others whose reputation you strive to stain by associating them with your party can be defended by clear and kindly reasoning.
4.113They may have spoken somewhat simply, or, while examining some other subject, may have had no need to meet questions arising on the side. They frequently praised marriage, thought no bodily feeling had been implanted by the devil, and did not subject God’s works—the members of nature—to the devil’s kingdom. They also explained, as occasions arose, marriage instituted by God and granted his blessing, and free choice. It is therefore humane to judge that they do not stand in fellowship with your wickedness if you find certain things ambiguously or carelessly placed in their writings. Just as the fact that all heresies conceal themselves behind some testimonies of holy Scripture and try to defend themselves by them does not count against Scripture, so I will not allow the reputation of catholic men to be surrendered because of some words poured out less cautiously. They did not intend to condemn marriage, deny free choice, or wound innocence. If they had intended this, they would not have strengthened your doctrine; they would have lost the honor of their office.
4.114I therefore freely infer and pronounce that if any of them survived to the present day and saw the glory of Christian discipline extinguished, free will idle in everyone and trying to impute to necessity whatever it commits voluntarily, and disparagement of God’s works and overthrow of his law whispered into the people’s ears under the name of ineffective grace, he would be stirred against you with all his bitterness. Recognizing also that natural sin cannot be distinguished from Manichaean impiety, he would defend the catholic faith more plainly and more carefully, either correcting you or condemning you.
4.115No one has the right to accept definitions and exclude their consequences. Therefore anyone who says infants belong to the devil’s jurisdiction because they are generated from sexual union undoubtedly condemns that union, in which nature acts, together with nature’s own institution.
4.116Either both are denied together or both are accepted together. Although one can reject both, one cannot choose only one. It is, however, easier for an unlawful union to be burdened with the fault of will while the fruitfulness of its seeds remains defended, than for the sexual act to be vindicated while its fruits are accused. Your wavering between fear and impiety will therefore not establish new rules of argument, allowing you to accept one of two connected things and exclude what belongs to it. “Light-footed deer will graze in the sky” (Virgil, Eclogues 1.59) before a conclusion can be denied after its premise has settled the matter.
The apostle Paul uses this form of argument when he says, “If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen. If Christ has not risen, your faith is empty” (1 Corinthians 15:16–17). But now Christ has risen; therefore it is certain that a day of resurrection awaits the dead (compare 1 Corinthians 15:20–23). To press this same point upon the reader with a shorter example: suppose there is doubt whether what is just is good. I ask whether you acknowledge that everything just is honorable. Once that is granted, I add another question: do you also pronounce everything honorable good? Once that too is granted, whether you like it or not, I conclude: if everything just is honorable, and everything honorable is good, then everything just is good. Anyone who tries to resist this conclusion after accepting the first premises does not shake reason’s structure but exposes himself to ridicule.
To bring the comparison back to the case: the question is whether sin exists in nature. I asked whether you would concede that no sin exists without will. You agreed, as your own words testify. I added whether you thought an infant possessed will. You denied this too. What follows as the third point, if sin does not exist without will? This is so certain that it cannot be doubted even by the Academics, whose wealth consists in holding nothing certain. So when you deny the third point after the first two premises, although it contains their conclusion, you do not overturn the foundations of reason: you reveal your frenzy.
4.117Suppose, then, that the bishops whose words I am now clearing heard it doubted whether marital union was good. I would ask them whether they acknowledged that bodies were formed by God. Once that was granted, I would add whether they agreed that marriage was ordained by God. With that likewise confirmed, I would ask again whether offspring could exist without union. Once this was denied, what would follow? Clearly, if a body exists only through God, union only through a body, and offspring only through union, then both offspring and union belong to the same author as bodies.
4.118Sensible men, catholic bishops, would undoubtedly agree to this conclusion. They would see that no one other than the true God had made anything in the flesh’s sensations or the offspring of the sexes; that God had made nothing evil; and that evil is nothing other than an evil will sinning without any compulsion from nature. They would surely pronounce that Manichaeans and advocates of inherited sin had been shattered by the shining thunderbolts of catholic reasoning.
4.119Stop accusing men of sound mind and leaders of churches. Let less careful remarks not be brought to judgment: a brief hesitation does not deserve anger, but a stubborn intention does. Let us instead imitate the zeal with which they built up their peoples by exhorting, beseeching, and rebuking. Would they have done any of this if, like you, they had believed sins natural rather than voluntary?
4.120Let us proceed to the rest. Your claim that you assign offenses to the devil, not bodies, has absolutely no force. As I have frequently shown, you are simply denying the facts, with no aim except to avoid the odium of Manichaeus while breathing his poison. Bodies—quite plainly, bodies—are what you assign to the ruler of darkness: you profess their union devilish and accuse their reproductive organs, their movements, and their offspring. Following your earliest instruction, you openly accuse members, not vices. You call devilish the very thing that Manichaeus too resents seeing flourish in the sexes, as I showed from his writings.
To give the reader in brief repetition something he can retain: either show that infants possess will or remove the charge from them. When you fail to do this and instead assert that the devil possesses them because they were generated from bodily union, you show that you assign to the hostile power not sins, which do not exist without will, but bodies themselves. So the lust found in both human beings and animals is natural and instituted by God. But this lust you suffer in the inconsistency of your argument, through which you move among various and opposing doctrines, is conceived no less from stupidity than from impiety. I therefore rightly distinguish Ambrose from your company and do not call him a Manichaean, as you request.
4.121You say Jovinian hurled this insult at him (compare Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.15), though I think you are lying here. But let us grant that you may at least be truthful in accusing Jovinian, and that he called Ambrose a Manichaean. That was plainly insane. He could not rightly be called a Manichaean when he preached that nature was good, sins voluntary, marriage instituted by God, and infants made by God. So if Jovinian thought that preferring virginity amounted to accusing marriage, he had no idea what he was saying. Opposition is one thing, ranking another. Praise of a good is a step toward better things; defamation of nature is a road to Manichaeus.
Since Ambrose did not condemn marriage or call marital union either the devil’s work or a necessity for sinning, Jovinian acted wickedly in comparing him with Manichaeus and thinking there was no difference between an accuser and a praiser of marriage. For if Ambrose said that those generated from lawful bodily union instituted by God had lied of their own will after they began to use reason, following the example of upright people, he nevertheless did not intend that union to seem a necessity for lying, but an indication of universality. His statement, “Those born from parents lie,” is like saying, “Every human being who governs his own choice has lied at some time.” (John 7:8–10) For he knew that no one except Christ had existed without the union of parents. Thus this sensible man meant marital activity to indicate not injustice but generality. He declared that Christ had avoided every lie, identifying him by the miracle of the woman who bore him. This thunders powerfully against Jerome, whose follower you are, who specifically tried to fasten a lie on Christ (compare John 7:8–10). Therefore someone who repeatedly praised creatures against your error was not rightly called a Manichaean, if he was called one at all.
4.122Yet although Jovinian is accused of hostility to Ambrose, he is acquitted when compared with you. When will the judgment of sensible people grant you enough credit to place you on the same level as Jovinian? He said there was a necessity for good; you, for evil. He said people were kept from error through the mysteries; you say they are not freed even through grace. He dissolved Mary’s virginity by the condition of childbirth; you transfer Mary herself to the devil by the condition of being born. He equates better things with good things—that is, virginity with marriage. You call marital union diseased and cheapen chastity by comparing it with something utterly foul. You do not insert a difference of degree between them; you change the whole category, preferring virginity not to a good but to an evil. It is the utmost cheapness to be pleasing only in comparison with something utterly disgusting.
Again, what did he do to insult God that resembles what you do? He wanted to weaken the force of God’s judgment on the side of kindness; you, on the side of malice. He says the good and the best will enjoy equal honor before God. You say the good and the impious—that is, the innocent and the devil—will be tormented by one punishment. He wants God to appear supremely merciful; you, supremely unjust. He says people initiated into God’s mysteries cannot sin. You contend that God himself sins: by weakness in the mysteries, by excess in his commands, and by cruelty in his judgments. Since the distance between you and Jovinian is as great as the closeness between you and Manichaeus, Jovinian is proved more tolerable than you to the same degree that Manichaeus is more dreadful than Jovinian.
4.123But let us examine the rest. I think the reader has been instructed more than enough by what we have treated about the strength with which he either attacks anything in my statements or defends his own opinion. It will therefore not be necessary to demonstrate this by repeating all his writings. For he puts before himself scarcely more than isolated, scattered little lines from my book, often praising them and sometimes tickling them with the briefest criticism. Yet what he thinks he should bite at was not said by me in the way he supposes. I therefore direct the reader to my work: he will see that its argument agrees with truth.
This man, who complained that I accused him of attacking nature and seeds, could not endure continuous pretense. After soothing his patron’s hearing with tricks, he puts out his head like a tortoise. He had said that, unless Adam had sinned, people could have generated children as we ordinarily move our joints or trim our nails. Then he added: “But if the seed itself carries no curse, what does this passage in the book of Wisdom mean? ‘You were not ignorant that their race was wicked, that their malice was natural, and that their thought could never be changed; for they were a cursed seed from the beginning’” (Wisdom of Solomon 12:10–11) (Wisdom 12:10-11). He follows the testimony with this argument: “Surely, whoever these words concern, they concern human beings” (compare Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.6.17–2.9.21).
Here is the man who professed to have abandoned Manichaean pursuits! Taking an opportunity from a statement he does not understand, he pronounces the seed cursed, malice natural, and the thought of the unjust incapable of change. It is said that those living beside the Nile’s cataracts have lost their hearing from the roar of the falling waters. Perhaps rumor invented that, spreading larger tales from great things. Still, the example serves to rebuke the deafness of fools who resist the voice of facts like deaf adders, amid the din of mutual intimidation (compare Psalm 58:4–5; LXX Psalm 57:5–6). Augustine cries: “The human race is wicked; its malice is natural; its thought forever unchangeable; its seed cursed from the beginning.” And there are still people who think he has not been stamped all over with Manichaeus’s mark! Let the public followers of that filth be questioned today. If they say anything different, let us be judged liars.
So if malice is natural, how do you pretend not to pronounce nature evil? If the seed is cursed from the beginning, how do you say you accuse the vices of wills, not of seeds? If evildoers’ thought cannot be changed, how do you falsely swear that you acknowledge free choice? Unless the only thing left is for you to say that those Hebrews, Sirach or Philo, who are uncertainly believed to have authored the book called Wisdom, were Manichaeans.
4.124The reader may now be waiting to learn how this testimony should be understood. The very man who appropriated it has shown that it concerns neither inherited sin nor the Manichaean opinion. For he says, “Whoever these words concern, they concern human beings.” (Wisdom of Solomon 11:23–12:2) Surely, if it spoke of natural sin, it would speak not of some unspecified people but of everyone. The Manichaean opinion defames the nature of all mortals generally. But the statement under examination receives testimony even from its own plagiarist that it was pronounced not against everyone but against some. It is therefore clear that it had no business with inherited sin, since the statement strikes not at all but at a number of people.
Having shown that none of it concerns this profane opinion, let the writer’s soundness be defended by the testimony of his own book. He says to God: “You have mercy on everyone, because you can do everything, and you overlook human sins for the sake of repentance. For you love everything that exists, and you hate none of the things you have made. How could anything continue to exist unless you had willed it? You spare everything because it is yours, Lord, who love souls. For your good spirit is in all things. Therefore you correct those who stray little by little, and warn them about their sins, speaking to them so that they may abandon malice and believe in you, Lord” (Wisdom of Solomon 11:23–12:2; Latin numbering 11:24–12:2).
4.125Do you see how hostile this grateful praise of God is to your opinion? It says that he creates souls and loves them. You deny this, swearing that innocent souls are under the devil and hated by God, though they possess nothing except what they received from their author.
4.126Your doctrine also does not admit the repentance that the writer affirms God grants, since it contains the claim that evil is natural and wickedness cannot change.
4.127His commendation of God’s warning sinners to abandon malice and believe in him entirely overturns the belief in natural evil. For it is certain that inborn things cannot be abandoned.
4.128Having explained God’s patience and his most gentle ordering of things, by which he does not desire the death of the dying person but rather that he turn back and live (compare Ezekiel 18:32; 33:11), the writer continues to prove what he said by examples. He mentions those whose terribly wicked lives in the land of Canaan had kindled the Almighty’s anger, so that the land would be granted, through the most just punishment, to the victories of the Israelites, now living under God’s law. “Hating those ancient inhabitants of your holy land, because they did hateful deeds before you through spells and unjust sacrifices, and were merciless killers of children, you willed to destroy them through our fathers’ hands, so that the land dearest to you of all lands might receive a worthy settlement of God’s children” (Wisdom of Solomon 12:3–7) (Wisdom 12:3-7).
He testifies why God wished the seven nations to perish, after whose destruction for the most part the promised land was given to the Israelites (compare Deuteronomy 7:1–2). Lest God appear to distinguish persons by partiality within one human nature, he explains why the Canaanites deserved to be killed. “You hated,” he says, “those ancient inhabitants of your holy land.” (Wisdom 12:3) Why? According to you, he should certainly have added: because they were generated from a devilish union; because the ruler of darkness possessed them; because Adam infected everyone who would come from his stock. But he says none of these things. What reason does he give for the hatred? Only deeds committed through free will. “You hated them,” he says, “because they did deeds hateful to you.” (Wisdom 12:4)
But so that we would not be ignorant of the deeds, and so that you could not call these acts of the nations reproductive desire, he details the kinds of action themselves. “Through spells,” he says, “and unjust sacrifices; and they were merciless killers of children.” That is, they served sorcery and sacrifices that were unjust because they were offered to idols, after worship of the Creator had been abandoned. To these sacrileges they devoted their own relatives, appeasing demons even by the enormity of murdering their children. See, then, how far he is from speaking of the crime Manichaeus invents, a crime naturally adhering to every mortal. He recalls that their chief offense was that they did not refrain even from destroying their own little children. Those children’s deaths would not bring odium on the killer if both the murderer and the child displeased God because of one and the same sin.
4.129“Yet even these,” he says, “you spared as human beings, and sent wasps ahead of the army—not because you lacked the power to subject the impious to the righteous in battle, but, judging little by little, you gave them room for repentance” (Wisdom of Solomon 12:8–10) (Wisdom 12:8). “You pricked even those sacrilegious people,” he says in effect, “with the stings of flies, so that from the trivial instrument of their affliction they might recognize the avenger’s power.” After God’s purpose and the form of punishment made clear the voluntary sins whose rejection was awaited and sought, only then does the writer’s rebuke rise against the stubborn impiety of those punished. He says they had entered into such familiarity with crimes that these seemed in a way inborn. “You were not ignorant,” he says, “that their race had been most wicked, that their malice was natural, and that their thought could never be changed; for they were a cursed seed from the beginning. Nor did you grant pardon for their sins out of fear of anyone” (Wisdom of Solomon 12:10–11).
He means: “Although you so kindly and patiently granted time for repentance and set up a watchtower of warning, to defend your justice and mercy against every slander and every suspicion of cruelty, they nevertheless despised your warnings after despising your earlier benefits.” They acted as though wishing to prove that they came from the seed of Ham, against whom blessed Noah, after his nakedness was mocked, had hurled curses in fatherly judgment (compare Genesis 9:20–27). Why be surprised, then, that the writer recalled the severe sentence that had struck their ancestor for his insolence, to disgrace descendants who did not cease imitating him? In the Law, imitation by descendants is frequently rebuked using terms of kinship. Thus the Lord says to the Jews in the Gospel, “You are from your father the devil” (John 8:44). Daniel is also read rebuking the filthy elders, though they came from Israel’s stock, in the same way: “Seed of Canaan, not of Judah” (Susanna 1:56; Susanna 56). The prophet Ezekiel likewise reproaches the people of Jerusalem: “Your mother was a Hittite and your father an Amorite” (Ezekiel 16:3, 45).
This is therefore an established usage: defamation of ancestry is added to blame of the will. A person appears to cling excessively to crime when, because of that crime, even his seed suffers insult. The same custom is also observed on the side of good people: when a man appears upright in every way, he is said to flourish with inborn virtues. Thus blessed Job affirms that he drew from the breasts the compassionate feeling with which he helped the needy, or rather that it came with him from his mother’s womb (Job 31:18). No comparison, exaggeration, or ambiguity can therefore count against plain facts. It is certain that mortals are never required to correct natural properties, yet God commands human beings to desist from evil. It is thus proved with the utmost truth that natural sin cannot exist.
4.130Wisdom continues: “Who will accuse you if nations you made perish, when there is no other God besides you, who cares for all? But since you are just, you order all things justly. You consider condemning someone who should not be punished foreign to your power, for your power is the beginning of justice” (Wisdom of Solomon 12:12–16). This certainly agrees with the common reasoning of sensible people that justice is the greatest mark of God—a justice that Manichaeus and the advocate of inherited sin deny with every effort of their fables.
4.131A little later it continues: “By chastising them you made your children full of good hope, because when you judge you give room for repentance amid sins. For if you delivered the enemies of your servants, who deserved death, with so much affliction by way of warning, giving time and opportunity through which malice could be changed, with what care do you judge your children, to whose fathers you gave oaths and covenants containing good promises? Therefore, when you discipline us, you scourge our enemies many times over, so that we may reflect on your goodness in judging” (Wisdom of Solomon 12:19–22).
4.132You see, then, what a distinction the surface of the words makes between the natures of the two peoples: it calls the Israelites God’s children and the Canaanites a cursed seed. If the sound of these words referred to generation and birth, one would have to say that the generation of the devout differed from that of the profane.
4.133Yet even according to this nonsense, it would still be clear that the first sin was not inherited, since the seeds of so many nations together would plainly show that its transmission had been interrupted.
4.134But just as the praise spoken of the Jews does not mean that anyone should be believed to shine with inborn holiness, so calling malice natural does not mean that the seeds are being declared defective. The constitution of nature is unshakable, and whatever it possesses it receives from God its author. Without counting against that nature, this variety of words marks either the force of rebuke or the work of praise.
4.135Just as the seed is called cursed here, elsewhere, in a reading of greater authority, it is called blessed. For the prophet Isaiah says of the Israelites: “They will build houses and inhabit them themselves; they will plant vineyards and eat their fruit themselves. They will not build for others to inhabit, or plant for others to eat. For the days of my people will be like the days of the tree of life. The works of their lips endure. My chosen ones will not labor in vain or beget children under a curse, because they are seed blessed by God” (Isaiah 65:21–23).
4.136Let little children wrestle with a question arising from these contradictions of words, and, capable of nothing greater than sounds, fight over the cups that amuse them. The catholic faith does not believe God’s law quarrels with itself, nor does it admit any authority that destroys reason. It listens to no opinion or flattery that stains divine fairness. Rather, it not only believes but knows God to be creator of all natures; it imputes sin to nothing other than free will. Through all these things it has no doubt that the inheritance of sin is false.
To Florus — Book 5
5.1The dangers of every age have shown that respect for uncorrupted judgment flourishes among few people. Devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and eager for virtue, they can investigate the truth or dare to defend it once found. Or, as the apostle says, ‘They have their senses trained to distinguish good and evil’ (Hebrews 5:14). No storms of adversity break them, for they hear from the same teacher that they must resist sins to the point of shedding blood (Hebrews 12:4). These wise people, whom crowds of fools make appear few, therefore pursue knowledge and courage equally. Neither without the other attains either fruit or honor. Courage, unless directed by knowledge toward the best things, breaks out into contemptible madness. Conversely, the thoroughly tested laws of justice, unless enclosed by the wall of greatness of soul, will immediately lie open to plunder and be carried off into slavery to crimes. In different ages, therefore, very few have existed who cultivated, yoked, and drove this two-horse team, without which the world’s errors cannot be conquered. The pursuit of knowledge is impeded both by avoidance of labor and by the variety of worldly cares; steadfastness is shaken by fear of the troubles wicked people stir up. Faithful and wise minds indeed overcome these forms of assault. Yet they are so rare that among crowds of the insane they seem insane because they do not rage.
5.2The book called Wisdom also shows this, expressing the words of the ungodly who, after the shadow of present things, see the merits of the blessed laid bare: ‘We considered their life madness; and how have they been counted among God’s children (Wisdom 5:5)?’ (Wisdom of Solomon 5:4–5). This is why the perseverance of the faithful, resisting the wickedness of the times and choosing ‘to suffer with God’s people rather than enjoy the passing pleasure of sin’ (Hebrews 11:25), is accused of stubbornness and contentiousness by those who say, ‘Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die’ (1 Corinthians 15:32; Wisdom 5:5) (Psalm 145:13, 17). Nothing is thought more consistent with prudent planning than buying the servitude of a degraded soul, or the unreliable peace of passing moments. It is chiefly this baseness of cowardly hearts that has allowed the filthy Manichaean doctrine to sail amid the churches’ shipwrecks. If a free and manly authority had stood firm in those exercising the priestly office, public agreement would have crushed the inventions of the advocates of inherited sin just as invincible reason overthrows them. But since lovers of present things value nothing less than religion, they have advanced into accusations against God. We have thus been forced to prove through such lengthy arguments that our God, who is the true God, is faithful in his words, just in his judgments, and holy in his works (Psalm 145:13, 17; LXX/Vulgate 144:13, 17).
5.3The defender of natural evil attacks my books’ labor devoted to these matters. With what strength and how consistent an answer he does so, I have taught more than sufficiently in the preceding volumes’ discussion. I do not doubt that reading them makes this plain to every discerning person—the sort of person I have testified in this preface is rare: truth’s enemy strives only to make sport of simpler people’s ears, and thinks he has escaped if he merely appears to have answered somehow.
5.4Although it is established that we have achieved this abundantly, our work nevertheless grows long. Let the wise reader understand that brevity was indeed desirable to us, but the needs of the case demanded that error spread more widely by the world’s favor be defeated by a broader battle line of truth. Our discourse therefore extends for a reason. With Christ’s help, I trust that no part of the impiety against which we contend will be judged carelessly investigated, insufficiently discovered, or only moderately battered. We therefore neither can nor should despair that, as time advances, the storm that has arisen may subside and the authority of the wise correct the cowardly crowd now making its uproar. But our wish matters less than our settled judgment. Whatever outcome the state of affairs receives, our grounds of goodwill and faith will stand. We do not depend on the outcome of popular success. We know the declaration of the three young men in Babylon. When a most arrogant king tried to compel them to worship a statue, they resisted with complete faithfulness, undeterred by the panting furnace lit to devour the devout. They answered as faith and steadfastness required: ‘Our God is able, O king, to free us from this furnace. But even if he does not free us, know that we do not worship your gods or adore the statue you have set up’ (Daniel 3:17–18). How reverently they mingled desire with judgment, without letting desire weaken the weight of their resolve! They neither cast faith’s courage down through despair nor suspend it on craving. They include their wishes, but do not abandon the proper order; they comfort endurance, but subordinate gentler outcomes to just ones. ‘It is certain,’ they say, ‘that our God can free us; whether he wills to do so is uncertain. Therefore, amid the uncertain outcome of events, the devout hold to a certain resolution: to reject idols and endure punishments. Let God consider what good our deliverance may bring to others. Meanwhile,’ they say, ‘let undefeated faith preserve our true happiness.’ One whose adversity trades for his glory has no excessive need to indulge easier outcomes. From this discipline left by illustrious teachers, we too understand that we must maintain moderation in our wishes for prosperity, but permanence in our decisions about the doctrines of faith. We desire, with the swelling of persecution restrained, to help the peoples too. But if that does not happen, our resolution stands: to endure every bitterness of insult and danger rather than fail to reject Manichaean filth and pollution.
5.5But let us now approach the case. In both my earlier work and the present one, it has become clear that natural sexual desire, without which the union of the sexes cannot occur, was instituted by God, the creator of both human beings and animals (compare Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.25). Even by my opponent’s admission, this is so decisive that natural sin cannot possibly be maintained without blaming that desire—bodily sexual desire—and slandering sexual union.
5.6Since we have demonstrated this with the ability truth supplied, the discerning reader should have no further doubt about it. Wherever this appears in the writings of the advocate of inherited sin—who nevertheless cannot open his mouth without it—let it neither disturb listeners nor do anything except testify to its author’s shame. We will henceforth touch on it, if the matter compels us, with the brevity required. He attacks my statement: ‘This union of bodies, created by God with its heat, pleasure, and seed, is shown to be praiseworthy according to its own measure’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.25). But he passed over what I added: ‘Concerning something instituted by nature which sometimes also becomes a generous gift to the devout, even the devil does not dare to claim anything for himself with your effrontery.’
5.7Passing over these points, then, he accuses me of not saying ‘with lust.’ He adds, as befits his doctrine’s sharpness: ‘The fruitful production of children is a gift to the devout, not the shameful union of bodily parts. A healthy nature would not have had this in begetting children, but that same nature, now corrupted, does have it. Consequently, the one born from it needs to be reborn’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.25). How consistent it all is! He calls children’s existence a gift to the devout, but places under the devil what he affirms God gives: the children. Sexual desire, however, which is in the shameful union of bodily parts, he calls diabolical. He does not deny its presence in the parents, yet acquits them of guilt. Would you say this man was born of a human being? What the parents do, he says, is diabolical, yet they are not guilty. What the children are by being born is God’s work, yet they are guilty. And he still thinks he has fought the demon rather than God! Those who think sin is natural thoroughly deserve to suffer this madness.
5.8That Adam was to unite with his wife in no other way than the practice that developed is testified by the form of the organs, by God’s blessing pronounced no differently upon animals than upon human beings (Genesis 1:22, 28), and by the history itself, which shows bodily nature formed but does not declare it altered. Nothing against this universal testimony is found in God’s law—only in Mani’s books, which invent the claim that this sexual desire was poured in by the prince of darkness (Genesis 1:22) (Genesis 1:28).
5.9By both our practice and our speech, we testify that everyone must be reborn through baptism. But this benefit is not bestowed so that people seem to have been kidnapped from the devil’s rightful possession. Rather, those who are God’s works become God’s children; those born in a lowly condition, but not a guilty one, are reborn at great worth, but without a false accusation. Those who come forth from God’s institutions are advanced by God’s mysteries; those who bring nature’s works receive grace’s gifts. Their Lord, who made them good by creating them, makes them better by renewing and adopting them. You must therefore confess that it is rightly said that the natural sin Mani invented, which you call original sin with a change of name, has perished. Nor does the catholic faith handed down from ancient times believe it: that faith does not doubt that infants are made by God and that nothing evil is made by him. Consequently, it does not pronounce God’s works guilty or place them under the devil’s jurisdiction, through a prejudgment against nature, before they exercise free will.
5.10After this he passed over the whole continuous discussion of Abraham and Sarah, who received a son as a gift when their bodies were already as good as dead (Romans 4:19; Genesis 21:1–2). Even an ordinary reader, not only a wise one, understands how strongly their example supports the truth. He passed it over by saying it carried little weight against him. At least this statement, framed as follows, should have recalled him from such shamelessness: ‘To bring this argument’s main (Romans 4:19) point to a brief conclusion: if the child whom God promised was given through sexual desire, then what fulfilled God’s pledge was undoubtedly good. If he was given without sexual desire, desire cannot harm the offspring, since it was present neither when he was conceived nor when he was born.’ (Genesis 21:1–2)
5.11This new natural philosopher therefore passes over those points and declares false what we said: ‘Just as the clay taken up at the beginning was the material of the human being, not his maker (Genesis 2:7), so now that power of pleasure which produces and mixes the seed does not perform the role of God’s activity. Rather, from nature’s storehouses it offers God the material from which he deigns to make a human being.’ He testifies that I said this correctly, except for my statement that seed is produced by the power of pleasure. He philosophizes as follows: ‘That pleasure of fleshly desire does not produce seed. The seed is already in bodies, created by the true God. It is not made by pleasure, but is stirred and emitted with pleasure’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.26).
He plainly said this not through fraud but through failure to understand. By ‘the power of pleasure’ I meant the very constitution of the male body, which I had to call virility. This virility—to use a word we have now made familiar—consists in the structure and health of the genitals and internal organs. It supplies the powers of both appetite and performance, and I called it the power of pleasure and desire. I preferred ‘power of pleasure’ to simply ‘pleasure’ precisely to indicate the whole ardor felt both before and during the act. Those disabled in their genital organs, namely eunuchs, do not possess seed, although certain embers of the extinguished fire still stir them. Because a particular disability has deprived them of the strength of the parts by whose service seed is produced from internal fluids, they are incapable of generation. God therefore established a power in the body which, unfolding at the proper time and provided health is present, reaches the capacity for fertility. Seed is consequently produced in bodies with the help of mature puberty. That is why premature pleasure stimulates the immature, but without the laws of age its kindling spark remains sterile.
That seed is mixed with pleasure, yet that one pleasure floats upon the senses while another lies deeper within the organs and closer to the result, is discussed at great length in medical writers. Hence even the Mantuan poet, more knowledgeable about nature than the Carthaginians’ little philosopher, notes that cattle should be made lean: when familiar pleasure first draws them toward mating, they should be kept from leafy fodder and springs. Often people shake them up by running and exhaust them in the sun, when the threshing floor groans under grain heavily pounded and light chaff is carried away on the breeze. This is done so that excessive abundance does not make the generative field less responsive or clog its sluggish furrows; instead the inner parts should experience a certain dryness, and thus thirstily seize the mating fluid and store it more deeply within (Virgil, Georgics 3.130–137). But it is enough to have noted the man’s sharpness even in these matters, which are not greatly needed for the case.
5.12Yet everywhere I marvel at our debater’s consistency. He declares that seed is created by the true God, who also creates bodies, although it is emitted with pleasure. He therefore confesses that God makes the seed in which he says diabolical evil exists. And he is not ashamed to believe that God makes an evil to be imputed to the innocent.
5.13Sexual desire, he says, has nothing to do with seed, because it was made by the devil. Married people serve this desire, while God makes seed and infants from seed. Yet the parents, who do the devil’s work, are neither guilty nor punished, he says. The infants whom God created, however, are assigned to crime and punishment. What the devil made—sexual desire—goes unpunished; it is thereby shown to be good, since it deserves no punishment. But what God makes is accused and condemned; it is thereby shown to be criminal, since not even respect for its maker can protect it from punishment. Divinity is to be believed to do something which even the most abject slavery could not endure. Such is the end of those who wage war on truth: they say nothing that is not impious and insane. Meanwhile, it is clear that no argument defends the innocent’s condition so well as the irreverence of their accusers does.
5.14After this he tries to attack the point we established through the apostle Paul’s testimony: that God makes a human being from seed. He argues that I acted fraudulently by applying to this subject words admittedly spoken about grain. As though I had either broken the apostle’s statement in pieces there, as he imagines here, or recalled that testimony for any reason other than to demonstrate its conclusion: God must be believed to form every kind of seed. For after blessed Paul supported faith in the resurrection through examples of daily multiplication, he added something applicable to all nature: ‘But God gives it a body as he wills, and to each of the seeds its own body’ (1 Corinthians 15:38). That is, he assigns every seed the body its particular nature requires. I therefore did not intend words spoken about grain to be understood as about a human being. Rather, I seized upon the statement that God the maker gives each seed its own body to destroy your position, since your doctrine denies it. Therefore I certainly did not mention that statement needlessly, as you suppose, or use it fraudulently, as you falsely allege. Nor do you believe, despite your false oath, that God makes a human being from human seed. I affirm this not by conjecturing, but by understanding your creed.
5.15What wise reader could hold back laughter on reaching the examples you next added? You say: ‘The apostle’s own words would refute this man, who bashfully names and shamelessly praises not a devout will but lustful pleasure. The very seeds farmers sow in the fields can refute him. Why should we not believe that God could have granted a blessed human being in paradise, concerning his own seed, what we see granted to farmers concerning wheat seed: that the former could be sown as the latter is, without any shameful lust?’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.14.29). How charmingly this bashful namer and shameless praiser makes utterly disorderly gestures and chants the songs of street entertainers!
But the other point cannot be read without great amusement: if Adam had not sinned, a woman could have been prepared for fertility like a crop field. Perhaps ears of children would burst out through every joint and through the tiny channels of the body which doctors call pores. Fertile in every part, she would sweat offspring instead of lice. But if some burst through her eyes, the mother would lose her sight; and if helmeted swarms emerged from the little globes of her pupils, blindness would undoubtedly pray for childlessness. Offspring not born but sweated out could easily be killed. We would thus have a race, like the Myrmidons in fables, but in Manichaean doctrine a race of lice or fleas. That would be the woman’s production. What could the man do? He would of course apply tools, not organs; deprived of genitals, he would drive in plowshares and hoes. The first human beings’ fault therefore deserves the fullest thanks, because it spared such a blessed nature these torments! Childbirth and a husband treat women more gently than if they felt plows or grew wild with importunate fertility all over their bodies.
‘Let the Manichaeans’ faces be filled with disgrace, and let them seek your name, Lord’ (adapted from Psalm 83:16; LXX/Vulgate 82:17). What monstrous accusers of the innocent and God! What support from arguments and testimonies! ‘Why,’ he asks, ‘should we not believe nature could have been made differently from what we see?’ (Psalm 83:16) As though the question were what God could have done rather than what he established! If this lust for conjecture entitles us to criticize what was made—saying that because things could have been made differently, their actual arrangements do not testify to a good nature—let us declare that God could have made mortals two-headed. Therefore one-headed people who stand on their feet were badly made: they could have been given a head at each end. This shape sometimes appears in little worms, whose belly is enclosed by a head at both ends, so that they begin from either shoulder and are understood to end in the middle. Admit these absurdities, and where will delirium stop?
God, then, could have made human beings sprout from the earth with flowers. As far as his power goes, I do not deny he could. But he willed them to be born only from the sexes. We are asking what he did, not what he could do. On this point it is a mad answer to say: ‘What exists is evil because God could have done it differently.’ (adapted from ) This is to praise God as an insult to himself and proclaim his almighty power as a stain upon his judgment. It is not praise at all, but a great insult, to give to his strength what you take away from his wisdom and say that God possessed power but lacked good judgment. Criticism of his judgment reaches directly into denial of his power: he cannot do everything if he cannot arrange things well. Indeed, if he falls short of supreme wisdom, he retains no claim to reverence as God. Since even to suspect this is utterly impious, we return to the point that cuts your doctrine of inherited transmission’s throat. God, who made everything very good, established nothing in such a way that it can be proved that, within the kind actually made, it could have been made more suitably or reasonably (Genesis 1:31). Equally endowed with wisdom and almighty power, he would not establish something a mere little man could rightly criticize. Whatever is shown to be natural in all creatures whatsoever was therefore made so excellently that a proposed correction of it is shown foolish and impious.
The shape of a horse and the shape of an ox differ when compared with each other. Yet within their own kinds they have received a harmony so suitable in every respect that neither horse nor ox should or could have been established differently from the form we see. This rule can be applied to everything swimming, crawling, walking, or flying, and finally to things of the upper air and heavens: no creature’s form can be proved capable of being better established for the kind for which it was prepared. So too the human being, already included above among walking creatures, is formed throughout in a way no one could improve. Wisely, the human body received both parts for display and parts for modest concealment, so that a person would learn both modesty and confidence within himself. He would look misshapen if veiled all over, but would become idle and careless if always exposed all over. Human fertility therefore should have received no organs in either sex other than those it has, no other arrangement of internal parts, no other sensations, and no other pleasure.
Let us therefore warn the Manichaeans to stop criticizing the works of divine wisdom and correct their own perverse opinions. Saying that human beings would have reproduced differently from the way universal experience attests does not concern the question. Both reason and Scripture testify that they could not have been made better than they were: Scripture proclaims that God made everything not merely good but very good (Genesis 1:31; Sirach 39:16, Latin numbering 39:21). Thus here too, as throughout the whole work, the Manichaeans’ doctrine has collapsed. We do confess that in the future the blessed will have more glorious bodies needing no assistance. But this too was excellently established by the most just and wise God: nature should not displace the condition belonging to reward. There should be a first stage in which natural freedom stands and from which, by the right of free will, a person either descends to the depths of punishment or strives toward the summit of glory by the paths God established.
5.16But let us proceed to what remains. After avoiding Abraham’s example, which I had put forward, he tried to maintain the following about Abimelech. Abimelech is reported to have been healed with his women when Abraham prayed, so that he could return to the work of generation from which a plague had suspended him (Genesis 20:17–18). Augustine says the closing of the women’s wombs may be understood as some pain, rather than removal of sexual desire (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.15.30). As though we were urgently insisting that their natural appetite must appear restored! In those testimonies I was content to prove only this: intercourse, which could not occur without sexual desire, was prevented through God’s anger and restored through God’s mercy, whether by obstacles being removed or by the usual stimuli being restored. It is therefore not shown diabolical, but by this very fact belongs to God’s activity. Among the body’s functions it is an ordinary but innocent instrument, wrong not in its kind or proper measure, but only in excess.
5.17Since enough has been said about this, let us hasten to the arguments Mani once cleverly advanced concerning natural evil—although, as I shall prove, he was deceived by tangled questions. First, however, let us briefly examine what Augustine replied to the apostle’s testimony. I had said that blessed Paul’s testimony proved most clearly that God, the creator of bodies, instituted the familiar activity of the sexes. Denouncing the shameful acts of those whose madness had plunged them even into intercourse with the male sex, Paul says: ‘Abandoning the natural use of the female, they burned in their own desires’ (Romans 1:27). I inferred, with the apostle as witness, that intercourse with the female is shown to have been naturally instituted.
In response this man writes: ‘The apostle did not say “marital use” but “natural use.” He meant that which takes place with organs created so that the two sexes can unite through them for generation. Consequently, when someone unites with a prostitute using the same organs, it is natural use, yet not praiseworthy but blameworthy. This term, “natural use,” therefore did not praise marital union. It identified acts more unclean and criminal than if they had used women unlawfully but nevertheless naturally’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.20.35). That is: this intercourse with the female which the apostle called natural is not understood as marital, so as to be shown good and lawful. Rather, he says, it is called natural because it indicates that the difference of sex was instituted to prepare both for union and for birth. Since these exertions gained him nothing, why did he spend so long on them? Certainly only so that his followers might think a point answered merely because they saw it touched. A brief argument will show how he said nothing. The apostle says intercourse with the female was naturally instituted; he did not commend some different union originally ordained. Discussing the intercourse in which he knew sexual desire had flourished at every period, he called it natural.
5.18This is what we understood. Speaking about nature’s institution, we brought forward what the apostle plainly meant. What, then, did you accomplish by replying that he calls it natural rather than marital use? Or with what mouth do you add: ‘When someone unites with a prostitute using the same organs, it is natural use, yet not praiseworthy but blameworthy’ (Romans 1:27)? Let us show here too what we have often disclosed: you utter not even one sentence that does not count strongly against you. If the use involved in fornication is called natural, yet not praiseworthy but blameworthy because it is intercourse with a prostitute, you will undoubtedly confess marital intercourse, because it is honorable and lawful, to be not blameworthy but praiseworthy (compare Romans 1:27).
5.19Where, then, is your diabolical crime, which you tried to attach to it through the argument from shame? Sexual desire itself is no longer being condemned—the desire felt by nature’s own constitution in both forbidden and permitted intercourse—if only its distortion, straying toward what is unlawful, is blamed.
5.20To ask closely and briefly: when the apostle Paul called it the natural use of the female, do you think he indicated both its possibility and its propriety, or only its possibility? In other words, by ‘natural’ did he mean an act that could and should occur, or one that could occur but should not? If you say, ‘One that could occur, although it should not,’ (Romans 1:27) as happens in adultery, then that other shameful act will not be contrary to nature either, since it is performed with natural organs. But if, recoiling in alarm, you reply with the truth—that the apostle called natural an act directed toward offspring, which could and should be performed honorably because naturally, with the bodies of one woman or several as permitted according to the circumstances of the time—you will undoubtedly confess your argument foolish. By ‘natural use,’ blessed Paul indicated not fornication, as you thought, but the honorable and legitimate union of bodies arranged for fertility.
We therefore rightly defend in general what the Manichaean accused in general. You say this pleasurable union of the sexes was instituted by the devil, is the cause of original sin, and necessitates all crimes. You thus accuse nature itself. What could we more consistently have done than, with the Teacher of the Gentiles as witness, defend on the general ground of nature, and assign to God’s work, what you called naturally evil? Thus, to refute you, we proved that what you call diabolical was naturally instituted. This is the proper and learned way to answer: defend in particular what is accused in particular, and vindicate in general what is accused in general. Mani understood this too. You equal him in crime but not in intelligence. That is why he assigns the whole substance of bodies to the devil; you assign not all of it but, as we said in the preceding book, the better part. Truth has therefore triumphed, surrounded by sacred defenses. Proving through the apostle that married people’s activity is natural, and therefore belongs to God as nature’s creator, it has shattered the inventions of you who swear it comes from transgression, not nature (compare Romans 1:27).
5.21With similar sharpness you also try to undermine my use of the Gospel testimony that a tree must be known by its fruits. I used it to demonstrate the obvious: marriage cannot be shown good—nor, indeed, the nature replenished through marital activity—or vindicated as God’s work if crimes are said to sprout from it. You replied: ‘Was the Lord speaking about that, rather than about two human wills, the good and the evil? He called the former a good tree and the latter an evil tree, because good works arise from a good will and evil works from an evil one. If we understand marriage as a good tree, we must certainly place fornication opposite it as an evil tree. But if he says that adultery should not be put in the tree’s place there, but rather the human nature from which a human being is born, then here too the tree will not be marriage but the human nature from which a human being is born’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.26.43).
You are mistaken. The Lord is speaking there not about two wills but about his own person. Although he conferred countless benefits on the Jews, they never stopped accusing him. They could not condemn his works, which they even glorified; nevertheless they charged him with being a Samaritan, full of a demon, and deceiving them by Beelzebul’s spirit (John 8:48; Matthew 12:24). Then the Lord said: ‘Either make the tree good and its fruits good, or make the tree evil and its fruits evil; for a tree is recognized by its fruits’ (Matthew 12:33) (Matthew 12:24). That is: either criticize my works, whose goodness is attested by illnesses driven away and health restored, so that you establish my wickedness from the evidence of my works; or, if you do not dare condemn these great benefits, give the good tree—that is, me—the testimony of my fruits. You who praise the benefits must love the benefactor. There, then, Christ commanded that a person be recognized from his works. This rightly supported our teaching that nature and marriage too must be assessed from the quality of their fruitfulness. If the poison of crimes flowed from them, the root too should be judged criminal.
See how blind your understanding is. You thought you could lighten my objection’s weight by placing fornication opposite marriage, so that marriage would appear a good tree and fornication an evil one. Then no fertility should arise from fornication, lest it be proved evil if good marriage were proved by good offspring. But whether a human being is born from marriage or adultery, he proceeds not from shameful conduct but from the nature of seed. The shameful act committed by adulterers’ will does not disturb the arrangements of substance. Nature exercises itself through its own materials. The sin remains with the author of the unlawful will, while innocent offspring comes forth through the creator’s work. You too saw that this answer had to be given. But let the discerning reader attend to how you tried to evade it.
You say: ‘If adultery is not to be placed in the tree’s position there, but human nature from which a human being is born, then here too the good tree will not be marriage but human nature from which a human being is born.’ Here, then, is what you tried to express: just as a human being is not attributed to fornication but to nature, so the sin derived from lawful parents should not be attributed to marriage but to human nature, which the devil infected with an ancient crime. In adulterers, then, you blamed the wanton people’s will, but praised human nature, from which a human being was born even through unlawful intercourse. In lawful parents, however, you praised marriage, from which you deny sin comes, but criticized nature, from which you say a dreadful crime is poured forth.
Let my reader be alert here. If you judged human nature praiseworthy in fornication because it provided the newborn child’s origin unstained by the partners’ shameful acts, how do you condemn that same nature in marriage, saying it provided the cause of natural guilt? You have therefore professed not marriage but human nature to be both a great good and a great evil. What could be more wicked than it, if it engendered crime? What more detestable, if it is possessed by the devil? Let nature attend to whatever skill it has in seed. For the moment, in its quality—the sphere to which every good or evil belongs—it is proved utterly evil if it is itself guilty, produces guilt, and is convicted as the servant of diabolical tyranny. Rightly, then, a tree must be known by its fruits, so that what causes evil is most rightly called evil.
5.22But we speak this way to show where your creed ends. The point founded by the preceding discussions remains unshaken: nothing is evil except the act of a will committing what justice forbids; nor can what is natural be proved evil. This tower therefore stands unshaken, and from its height the brigandage of different errors is repelled.
5.23Let us now pursue what the passage requires. It is clear, most subtle debater, that you have exalted one and the same thing—human nature—with great praises, but stained it with still greater accusations. Just as these cannot occur together at one time, in one work, and under one intention, so natural reason cannot admit them even as alternating opposites. Nature always possesses one full valuation, namely goodness. It is never attacked for evil—which its institutions, because of its maker’s dignity, do not admit—except by the utterly filthy teeth of the Manichaeans.
Having completed this point, I ask what wisps of marriage you think you should pursue. If you confess that the cause of a human being is not marriage but nature, and the cause of sin too is not marriage but nature, then the marriage you were praising has entirely vanished. To what effect is it assigned if it is the cause of neither your evil nor my good? You remove the human being from marriage’s honorable activity lest you be compelled to attribute him to fornication too. You remove sin from marriage’s necessary activity lest you appear to condemn marriage. What remains worthy of praise in marriage’s possession? Why fear to violate with a word what you have utterly demolished by argument? Of what will it be called the cause if it shares in neither natural evil nor natural good? Do the name and honor of marriage now accomplish nothing in human affairs?
But you are choking, and painfully. We must therefore help the panting old man. Something remains you can give marriage, without which nothing else is found: say that marriage stands guard at the door, allowing no report of obscenity to burst in upon the partners’ pleasure, but claiming honor and modesty for that activity under its own title. Your attempt to corrupt marriage’s integrity with deceitful praise was therefore pointless. It is more hostile to no one than to you. It drives you utterly away and does not allow Manichaean tongues to creep in and lacerate the union entrusted to its protection. ‘They have brothels worthy of their doctrine,’ it says, ‘where they may satisfy themselves at night.’ Marriage’s watch guards the pleasure of modest people; crimes are barred and the honor of decency admitted. The privileges the apostle granted defend honorable marriage and undefiled beds; ‘but God will judge fornicators and adulterers’ (Hebrews 13:4). Where, then, is the criminal union, if the authority of the marriage you praised serves its activity and privacy?
5.24With these matters resolved, I will briefly show how deeply you lie in ignorance, although until now you were considered most subtle and acute. You say you attribute to nature, not marriage, the crime that passes to offspring, just as, on the other side, you attribute human beings to nature, not to a shameful act. You therefore pretend to praise marriage, to avoid being openly detected as a Manichaean, while criticizing nature, in which you confess evil exists and from which evil is propagated. Could you never hear the rules of argument and the principles of thoroughly sound reason? In every category, genera encompass more than species; subordinate genera also arise in this way. Species encompass more than individuals. Genera contain species, and the lowest species contain individuals. Shaking the lower things, then, does not shake the higher; but the higher things, by their own collapse, carry down everything they encompassed.
For example, ‘animal’ is a genus. In the breadth of its meaning it includes different species, such as human being, horse, ox, and others. If one species perishes, the genus does not suffer destruction. Suppose the nature of oxen disappears from existence: the genus is certainly not destroyed, since the nature of other animals remains. Conversely, if what ‘animal’ means is removed from existence, every species included under that genus undoubtedly perishes. No species of animate creature will remain once animal life is entirely destroyed. The higher things therefore share their fortunes and characteristics with the species they encompass. The reverse does not occur: the higher are not altered by the variations of their species as though by binding relationships.
To apply the example to the case: human nature in its generality is a kind of genus for the arrangements situated within it. It has, as it were, species in bodily position, organs, orders, movements, and other such things. It therefore shares its quality with all its subordinate species, but does not bind itself so as to share the risks of things lower than itself. If nature, then, is condemned and believed guilty and subject to the devil, marriage beneath it, fertility, and the whole substance will also be condemned. Marriage, which follows nature, cannot therefore be praised if nature itself is criticized. The beauty of severed shoots must die together with its root. To put the thing more plainly: the business of marriage cannot be called good if natural union is accused, since what is devalued in the genus to which it inseparably belongs cannot be honored in the species.
But when an evil will uses natural instruments for shameful acts, that power of pleasure and seed—which never varies according to the partners’ will—shares no part in the crime. It supplies material to God as he works, and the shameful act condemns only the adulterer’s deserving conduct, not nature’s. Since we were discussing natural things, your condemnation of nature alongside praise of marriage was exceedingly dull-witted. It is irrefutably established that a genus shares whatever it receives with its species. Therefore either the use the apostle calls natural will be judged good and legitimate, marriages will be honorable, and there will be no natural sin; or, if nature is believed diabolical so that original sin can exist, marital intercourse too will be declared condemnable. This is to embrace the Manichaeans’ doctrine, not soberly, but openly. Since that doctrine is deadly, and they possess nothing of truth, honor, or faith, while the theory of natural sin can belong to no others, it is established that we are catholics and you Manichaeans (compare Romans 1:27) (Romans 1:27).
5.25To avoid the odium of this name, your mention of various heresies is entirely futile. You say: ‘Just as Arians call catholics Sabellians, although catholics distinguish the persons clearly while preserving their common nature, so you impose the Manichaeans’ name on us, although we do not say marriage is evil, as Manichaeans do, but say evil passes into all human beings as a condition of nature’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.23.38). I have no doubt the wise will laugh at these arguments. Arians falsely call catholics Sabellians, since we distinguish the persons of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit without any confusion or change of substance, while they very stupidly slander us as though one and three were no different. Likewise, catholics most rightly declare you Manichaeans, because your creed compels us to say so.
Manichaeans assert natural sin; you say it is natural. They say the devil planted bodily desire; you confirm this through extended argument. They contend that evil cannot be avoided through free will because it is natural. With the same words you too invent a free will through which evil can be done, but evil cannot be abandoned. Mani says seed is cursed; you try to prove it by scriptural authority. Mani says wickedness cannot be changed; you shout that it is so. But you say Adam alone possessed a better nature. Mani too, writing to Patricius, says Adam should be believed better than those who followed, as though formed from the flower of the first substance. You say intercourse is diabolical because of its natural movements, and human beings are rightly plucked by the devil like fruit from a shrub he planted. Mani says this too: he is, indeed, the one from whom you learned to believe and affirm it. Mani says both nature and marriage are evil. You say marriage is good but nature guilty. You are not more religious here; he is more intelligent.
Just as it is false when Arians say catholics are Sabellians, then, it is entirely true when catholics say advocates of inherited sin are nothing other than Manichaeans. The illusory distinction between you arises not from your creed but from your ignorance. You and Mani therefore hold one faith, but he proves less shameless than your distinguished self. For one does not readily meet either a Manichaean or another Melitides who says he condemns human nature without slandering marriage.
5.26But enough has been said against these absurdities. Let us come to the exceedingly tangled question I mentioned above, whose subtlety deceived your teacher himself. You tried to meet our objection not by explaining it but by putting forward another, more difficult one. I had taught that in adults who work evil by their own will, nature’s innocent beginnings are praised while the deviations of their actions are rightly blamed. There are two things, therefore, to which opposite judgments can apply. In infants, however, there is only one thing, nature, since there is no will. That one thing must be reckoned either to God or to the demon. I concluded that, if nature exists through God, original evil cannot be within it; but if nature is transferred to the devil through inborn evil, nothing remains by which the human being can be vindicated as God’s work. When you reached these passages, you replied with your usual good faith that my conclusion was true, but that infants too have two things: nature and sin. Yet sin, to recall the previous definitions, is nothing other than the will to retain or commit what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain. With sin thus established as nothing other than the choice of an evil will, you replied, Epicurus of our age, that infants possess sin but no will. How disgraceful that is, the fourth book has already shown.
In these passages I said, ‘If sin comes from will, the will producing sin is evil; if from nature, the nature producing sin is evil.’ You tried to confront me with a question plainly not invented by you. Some years ago, when we were in Carthage, a certain Honoratus, a friend of yours and equally a Manichaean—as your letters indicate—put this same question to me. I mention this only to make clear that this is the question which deceived Mani and Marcion so many centuries ago. Against my statement, ‘If sin lies in nature, the nature producing sin is evil,’ you speak as follows:
‘I ask him to answer if he can. Just as plainly all evil deeds arise as fruits from an evil will as from an evil tree, so whence does he say the evil will itself arose—the evil tree bearing evil fruits? If from an angel, what was that angel but God’s good work? If from a human being, what was that human being but God’s good work? Rather, since the angel’s evil will arose from the angel, and the human being’s from the human being, what were these two before those evils arose within them, except God’s good work and a good and praiseworthy nature? See, then: evil arises from good, and there was absolutely nothing from which it could arise except good. I mean the evil will itself, preceded by no evil—not evil works, which arise only from an evil will as from an evil tree. Yet the evil will could arise from good not because the good was made by the good God, but because it was made from nothing, not from God. Why, then, does he say: “If nature is God’s work, the devil’s work is not permitted to pass through God’s work”? Did not the devil’s work, when it first arose in the angel who became the devil, arise in God’s work? Therefore, if an evil that existed nowhere could arise in God’s work, why could an evil already existing somewhere not pass through God’s work? Are human beings not God’s work? Sin therefore passed through human beings—that is, the devil’s work through God’s work. To say the same thing another way: the work of God’s work through God’s work’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.28.48).
These many words I have quoted from you have fully disclosed the very head and fountain of the ancient error. You have offered nothing sharper in your statements, nothing more intricate in argument. Driven across the whole field of debate, and expelled by hostile truth’s weapons from every place where you tried to stand, you have at last reached the cave Mani dug among the shadows of difficult questions. You testified to this question’s difficulty by saying, ‘I ask him to answer if he can.’ Since we both agree that the point is difficult, I urge the reader to attend with his whole mind. Let him follow the distinctions, subtle as the matter requires—distinctions which I trust Christ’s help will make substantial—first attentively and then confidently. You asked, then, where evil comes from. I ask what evil you mean, since this name is shared by guilt and punishment. Punishment, however, is called evil only in an extended sense, since the gravity of the judgment imposing it justifies it. You reply that you mean sin, not punishment.
5.27You therefore ask where this evil comes from which rightly deserves the name evil: sin. I reply that it is exceedingly unskilled to ask the origin of something whose definition has not yet been established. Let us first see whether it exists, then what it is, and last where it comes from. I did this in the first book of the present work, but there I proceeded with some points already secure. Let us now question whether evil exists.
5.28Repeated vices and severe judgments testify that it does. It is therefore established that sin exists. We ask what it is: whether it is some body visibly composed of many elements, or some single thing, like one element considered in thought apart from its combination with the others. But it is none of these. What is it, then? An appetite of free will which justice prohibits. Or, to use the earlier definition: the will to do what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain. Consider, then, whether sin can be found outside the boundaries of this definition, lest what we suppose contained be wandering elsewhere. Let us consult the judge’s justice, so that its testimony too may establish whether every kind of sin has been properly enclosed by these limits.
Does God impute what he knows cannot be avoided? That would be no justice, but the greatest disgrace. Indeed, if this occurred, sins would not be punished but increased. A just judge ordinarily punishes guilt. If guilt invaded the judge himself through the corruption of justice, it would have taken vengeance upon the judge, not been punished. Justice therefore imputes nothing as sin except what one is free to avoid. But nothing can be called free unless, without any unavoidable compulsion of natural forces, it lies within the authority of a will possessing its own freedom. The definition is therefore excellent and complete: sin is the will to do what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain. With these points resolved, let us ask where it comes from—a question asked in great disorder before these definitions. Where, then, does sin come from? I answer: from the doer’s free will.
5.29Let us see, however, whether what the preceding definition established is confirmed by everyone’s agreement. Certainly no wise person or catholic can doubt this: nothing is sin except what can be avoided, and no justice exists except that which charges a person with what he himself committed by free will, although he could have avoided it.
5.30These points no longer slip from our grasp, but the Manichaean and the advocate of inherited sin reject them with equal determination. Let us see, then, what they themselves say. Mani writes that sin is natural. Augustine agrees that sin is natural. Both therefore dissent from the definition we gave, and form an association in calling sin natural. Let us also see what they say about the kind of sin—what they regard as the sin both affirm to be natural—lest perhaps they disagree at the next step. What does Mani write to his daughter? That fleshly desire, and the pleasure appointed for the work of fertility, is proved diabolical because its act avoids public view. What does Augustine say? Exactly the same: ‘That fleshly desire is the devil’s shrub, the cause and law of sin, which everywhere avoids observation and seeks privacy through shame’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 1.7.8; 1.23.26). Thus they differ neither in their first nor their second account of evil.
What is the third point? When asked where evil comes from, Mani says, ‘From the eternal nature of darkness.’ What does Augustine say? ‘My teacher goes too far in thinking evil never began. It began through the first man’s will—or rather, already through the will of a higher nature, the angelic—but from that time it became natural.’ His teacher naturally beats him and drags him to court with great authority. How will a catholic judge between them? Mani is undoubtedly exceedingly foolish in thinking sin natural; but compared with Augustine’s intelligence, he looks very acute. They agree that sin is natural, confess that this sin is of one kind, and think it possesses the entire human race. Yet afterward the pupil dares to say that in one person alone it was not natural, although he confesses it innate in everyone else! After disgracing him with a schoolboy’s beating, they will place him under his teacher, whose blasphemy is more consistent. But they will expel both pupil and teacher together from the assembly of the devout. See, then, what we allow you. You dislike Mani’s statement that evil is natural. Say, then, that no one is born guilty, and you have escaped—by denying original sin, of course. But you do not say this. You therefore confess that you wish neither to leave your teacher nor to join the catholics.
5.31You thought it a powerful objection to ask where an evil will arose in the first man himself, or in the devil who had been created an angel. Yet you say it arose in God’s work—that is, in an angel or a human being—not because he was God’s work, but because he was made from nothing. Take care, then, that by different paths you too do not say the necessity of evil was eternal. If the cause of evil’s arising in God’s work was that the work had admittedly been made from nothing, then before what exists was made, this nothing always was. That is, before what exists was made, nothing had ever existed; what never existed is said to have been nothing. From eternity, therefore, what did not exist before being made by God—whose substance alone has no beginning—never existed. This emptiness, then, this nothing, always was before the existence of things brought it to an end. This nothing was not made; creatures were made, and the nothing ceased to be.
In a creature made from nothing, however, you invent the claim that evil arose precisely because it was made from nothing. You have therefore attributed the evil arising in a human being to his origin; and you say that origin—nothing—was sin’s cause. For you say: ‘Evil arose in a human being not because he had been made by God, but because he had been made from nothing.’ If evil therefore arose because the condition of the preceding nothing required it, and that nothing was eternal, you have fallen by altered paths and now hang entirely in your teacher’s snare: both of you confess evil to be from eternity. But here too he is more intelligent. Introducing natural sin, he said an eternal substance of darkness existed which compelled this evil to be present without the sinner’s will. He therefore gave an author to the thing he made necessary, so that the evil invading substances would appear to have something forcing it. You, however, with the unbearable leadenness of your mind, affirm the necessity of evil but deny an author of that necessity. As with infants, so with the very first doer of sin, you leave the deed in place, and say that some great mystery can be understood: that this nothing had immense power, although it was nothing.
5.32For you affirm that this nothing, from which all things were made, was sin’s cause. The power of this nothing therefore accomplishes as much for you as the prince of darkness does for Mani. Both of you say that even the first evil arose by necessity. But he supplies something solid, although evil; you supply emptiness, equally evil. He therefore says there is a violent substance; you say there is something equally violent, but nothing. See, then, the conclusion of your syllogism. When nothing had yet been created, ‘nothing’ indicated eternal emptiness. But this very nothing—that is, emptiness—was brought to an end when creatures arose: it ceased to be nothing when something began to be. Thus even when this nothing was, it was not, since it is understood to have been only when nothing yet existed. After things were made, this indication of emptiness—nothing—lost even its name, just as it had never possessed substance. Thus what had never existed in reality lost even its name. You invent the claim that by its violence evil arose in both angel and human being. What could be more insane?
5.33You say that a thing which did not exist possessed great power for the sole reason that it had never existed, but that it began to have immense power just when it lost even its name. This nothing gained a great dominion after even its designation had perished!
5.34Well done for your mighty wisdom! By the rules of a new method of argument first invented by you, you embrace conclusions by denying their premises, and assemble bodies severed from their heads. We do not envy your subtleties. Rather, with Christian kindness we pity you: you have found an ending worthy of your doctrine, departing from accusations against the innocent and arriving at nothing.
5.35What soundness! What elegance in a debater! ‘Evil arose in a human being,’ he says, ‘not because he was made by God, but because he was made from nothing’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.28.48). We have already shown the sharpness by which immense power is assigned to this nothing. Now I point out what the preceding debate also made clear: not even the first evil was undertaken by the sinner’s will if the condition of an origin from nothing required its birth.
5.36You have therefore supplied a nature for even the first evil, emptier than Mani’s, but equally eternal. There is no need to fight further about this. It is entirely clear that a pact remains between you, bound by the chain of natural and eternal evil.
5.37I have certainly proceeded as the honesty of debate required. Careful investigation by reason has crushed what your argument established: that the evil will arose in God’s work because the human being had been created from nothing. It has shown that, with changed terms, you said the same thing Mani invented and believed: that the first sin too was generated by the violence of eternal darkness.
5.38But lest, seeing yourself exposed, you try to break out by replying that you did not say, ‘Evil arose in God’s work because it was made from nothing,’ but rather, ‘Evil could arise because it was made from nothing,’ we must show how much more tightly the snares bind you. If you say that you attributed evil’s possibility, not its necessity, to the powers of that eternal nothing, we reply: the fact that an evil will could arise in a human being is certainly nothing other than free will. An evil will could arise precisely so that a good will could arise too. This is the freedom in which reason exercises itself, on account of which the human being is declared made in God’s image, and by which he excels other creatures (Genesis 1:26–27). If, then, the possibility of an evil will’s arising in a human being is nothing other than freedom of will, and this is so great a thing that its distinction makes him surpass the other living creatures, you who profess that this possibility existed in him not because he was made by God but because he was made from nothing declare, by a new monstrosity of doctrine, that nothing—ancient emptiness—is the cause of so great a good as free will.
To make the matter clear with a brief question: you said, ‘The evil will could arise not because the human being was made by God, but because he was made from nothing.’ This very possibility of the will’s arising, I ask, do you believe it good or evil? That is, do you judge the capacity for a will to arise, which you attributed to nothing, good or utterly evil? If you call it good, then God is not the cause of the good: nothing is. But if, seeing this to be completely insane, you declare it evil—since you say it should be attributed not to God but to nothing—you will testify that we reached no deceitful conclusion against you, but with honest debate overthrew your doctrine’s evil faith. Our result therefore stands unshaken: you and Mani have attributed even the first man’s evil will to the necessity of an eternal origin.
5.39Not content to win in only one way, I will expose the falsehood of the argument whose impiety I have revealed. When you wrote, ‘An evil will could arise in God’s work not because it was made by God, but because it was made from nothing’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.28.48), you should have seen how powerfully the examples of other creatures argue against you. They too were brought forth from nothing, yet are incapable of an evil will. Indeed, the elements themselves, which truly were made from nothing, can have no consciousness of any will, so as to attest through evil movements the necessity of their origin. Living creatures, however, and the other things filling the world, came forth not from nothing but from something already existing. Where, then, is the power of ancient emptiness that compelled an evil will to exist, when it is clear that no being except a rational creature can sin?
5.40Since this great point was so plain, what persuaded you to believe that the violence of ancient nothing was the cause of an evil will? Certainly it was so that we could understand that you believe everything made from nothing guilty and enslave the whole world to the devil. Since it has become clear to me that your ancient doctrinal agreement remains, I now answer you and Mani together. You ask me, who deny that evil has a nature, to answer if I can: where could the evil will itself arise in the first human being? I reply that you do not understand what you are saying. For will is nothing other than a movement of the mind under no compulsion.
5.41You therefore seek a necessity behind something that cannot exist if it is subject to necessity. If a cause older than the movement itself is assigned to this free movement of the mind, active without compulsion from its origin, the will is not produced at all: it is removed. The very name ‘will’ means nothing other than that the movement does not owe its occurrence to matter. Therefore, when you ask where the will arose, seeking something older than the will itself, you seek not its beginning but its destruction. It cannot be understood to exist if it is attributed either to darkness or to nothing. Nor can that be called will which can exist only as a movement of the mind under no compulsion. If someone compels it, there is indeed a movement, but no will. The will’s force is completed by the definition’s second part: ‘under no compulsion.’ If will is nothing other than a movement of the mind under no compulsion, it is entirely wrong to ask the origin of a thing whose defining condition perishes if something precedes it. Weigh, then, what you ask: ‘Whence could the evil will itself, like an evil tree, arise in the first human being?’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.28.48). In asking this you confess that will came about through an origin. But will is a movement of the mind under no compulsion. All natural causes compel what follows to exist. If will is compelled by preceding causes, it immediately ceases to be will: by receiving such an origin, it loses its defining condition.
5.42Since will is well defined as ‘a movement of the mind under no compulsion,’ why do you seek earlier causes which the definition of will has excluded? Weigh what will is, and you will stop asking where will comes from. Will is a movement of the mind under no compulsion. If you try to go so much as half a fingernail beyond this, you immediately overthrow what has been established. What does Mani say? ‘This movement arose because the human being was made from the nature of darkness.’ What do you say? ‘Because the human being was made from nothing.’ Thus one says, ‘The will is evil because the human being was made from nothing’; the other, ‘The will is evil in a human being because he was made from darkness.’ Both of you deny what completes the will’s definition: ‘under no compulsion.’ If nothing had as much power as something, and that power compelled this will to exist, it excluded the will’s own condition, expressed as ‘under no compulsion.’
But it has equally driven away evil’s disgrace. What does not come from a free movement of the mind is not sin. Thus, at the expense of truth, all the odium of evil perished. Evil’s nature vanished when the will’s guilt vanished; the will’s guilt vanished when the definition of will was cut apart. It has therefore become clear that the condition of both sin and will is such that, if attributed to preceding causes, it loses both its freedom and its guilt. Where, then, will evil’s nature be, once it is established that no evil exists?
5.43For what is evil, that is, sin? The will to pursue what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain. What is will itself? A movement of the mind under no compulsion. If sin therefore arose from will, and will from a movement of the mind under no compulsion, neither the condition of nothing nor that of darkness caused this movement to exist. It is compelled by no one precisely so that it can exist under no compulsion. Consequently, there is no natural sin and no original sin. These two names indicate one thing: sin that is not voluntary. But truth has ruled that sin cannot exist unless voluntary. Therefore whoever calls evil what is admittedly innate does not prove that sin exists in nature; he shows himself guilty through a perverse judgment. Here is the answer to what you thought could not be answered. The question you regard as invincible was altogether clever foolishness.
5.44I point out, however, that in your writings you too habitually say darkness is not a creature, but that obscurity remains through the absence of light: darkening is nothing other than the exclusion of brightness. What is excluded you call a creature; what remains you call darkness. This view is indeed widespread among philosophers. I am not now asking whether it should be regarded as true or false. I press this point: you say darkness is nothing other than nothing. Yet you argue that evil arose in a human being, God’s work, because he was made from nothing. You therefore affirm that this nothing was evil’s cause, and you also call this nothing darkness. You thus say the necessity of evil descends from the condition of darkness. Even in this you do not differ from your teacher, since both of you attribute an evil will to eternal darkness.
5.45But just as truth has exposed and overthrown you both, so consideration of our duty requires us to explain what made this now-disarmed question obscure. Everything that occurs is said to arise either from necessity or from possibility. By ‘necessary’ here I mean not what we ordinarily call useful, but what is compelled by stronger causes. We therefore call necessary not what lies within the will’s authority, but what is subject to a force requiring its existence. We call possible what undergoes no necessity on either side, either to exist or not to exist, but in definite ways can exist and can fail to exist. Let our reader hold firmly to what we mean here by necessary and possible.
To begin with great examples: God’s making the world arose from possibility, not necessity. That is, his almighty power made it possible to create what he formed, but not necessary. No one compelled him to make it; he made it because he willed to, and certainly would not have made it had he not willed to. Yet what belonged to the maker as a possibility became a necessity in the work. The world, commanded to exist by the Almighty, did not have the possibility both of existing and not existing: it was compelled to exist, since the Almighty commanded its being.
5.46What came from the creator’s possibility therefore passed into the creature’s necessity. He also made different natures and different species within natures, preserving the order flowing from things’ beginnings: some things were necessary, others possible. Whatever creatures possess naturally, then, they received on the side of necessity.
5.47But what they experience as they go on does not always come from necessity: much comes from possibility. This can be seen in every body, though it would require a longer discussion. Let us give a few examples. Bodies by nature grow together through combination and break apart through division. Those subject to destruction are therefore capable of injury. Their capacity to be wounded comes from necessity; their actually being wounded comes from possibility. Thus the nature of a possibility comes from necessity, although the realization of that possibility is not necessary. For example, a horse, an ox, and similar living creatures have a vulnerable nature, and necessarily possess the capacity for harm. Yet it is not always necessary that they be wounded. If their keepers’ care protects them from blows, they can remain unwounded; if they are not guarded, they can also be wounded. There is therefore a great difference between what arises from possibility and what arises from necessity. Unless this distinction is preserved, countless errors follow.
To make this clear by comparison: some opponents of medicine went astray, arguing that this art has no usefulness. They argue as follows: ‘Does medicine help those who will die or those who will live? If those who will die, it accomplishes nothing; if those who will live, its effort is pointless. Those who were going to die will die despite its labor; those who were going to live could have remained safe without its benefit.’ What a neat and polished conclusion! But medicine’s defenders dissolve it as follows: ‘This art helps neither those who will live nor those who will die by necessity, but those for whom either outcome is possible. Medicine does not help someone who will undoubtedly die, because it cannot make him immortal. Nor does it assist someone who will undoubtedly remain unharmed. It assists someone who can be in danger if untreated, but can be rescued if treated.’ Thus, just as the trained art cannot help someone destined to live or die by necessity, it can help those who may live or die as a matter of possibility. Those earlier critics of medical effort therefore closed with necessity an argument begun from possibility. This form of argument extends to countless matters.
For example, the law forbids homicide. It also forbids providing an occasion of negligence through which people fall into danger, as with a goring bull (Exodus 21:28–32) and the parapets of houses (Deuteronomy 22:8). Someone can say: ‘Does this care help a person who will live or one who will die? If one who will die, it accomplishes nothing; if one who will live, it takes needless precautions’—if these opposite outcomes necessarily follow whether obstacles are present or not. But that is false. Mortals are most rightly protected so that, through the resources of care, they escape what they could have suffered without care. What comes from possibility is therefore one thing; what comes from necessity is another.
Let us now show how these preliminaries help us. God made a human being with free will and a good nature, but one capable of virtues he could acquire for himself through a mind possessing its own freedom. This free will could not stand otherwise than by possessing also the possibility of sinning. A person therefore possesses freedom necessarily, while a particular act of will arises as a possibility. He cannot fail to be free, but cannot be compelled toward either will. A possible effect is thus produced by something necessary. In the possible sphere one can sin; in the necessary sphere one cannot. In the necessary sphere, the one assessed is not the actor but the creator himself: whatever the human being is capable of comes wholly from God. In the possible sphere, however, the actor himself is weighed.
5.48He therefore does both evil and good from his own will. Yet he owes his good to God also, who supplies this side not with a predetermined outcome, but with help.
5.49This distinction has such force that, if through ignorance we conclude in necessity what begins from possibility, every crime returns to God. Mani saw this and invented darkness as sin’s author, since he could not distinguish possibility from necessity. Everything a human being possesses naturally, therefore, he has received on the side of necessity, because he could not be otherwise than he was made.
5.50The evil he does, however, he does from possibility.
5.51Unless the capacity had existed necessarily, its possible result would not have existed. That a person can do evil and good is therefore necessary; his doing evil, however, is owed not to his necessity but to his possibility. Where either side is possible, neither is necessary. Thus sin is nothing other than the will to do what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain. If will is nothing other than a movement of the mind under no compulsion, then just as God possessed the possibility of making the world, while the world itself received existence under necessity, so something similar is understood in God’s image. A person is not compelled to possess the will he chooses; it comes to him from possibility. The evil he has done, however, carries the necessity of guilt. Thus a crime necessarily incurs its abhorrence, although it arose not from the doer’s necessity but from his possibility. The work of possibility therefore testifies to a free living being.
5.52Blame for this does not pass back to the necessary things, because whatever reaches necessity strikes the creator himself.
5.53Just as what comes from necessity cannot be attributed to my possibility, so what comes from possibility cannot be attributed to necessity. That is, the nature of my body and mind cannot be assigned to my will, as though I were this way because I willed it, since I could not will before I existed. Likewise, the will’s evil cannot be attached to nature, mixing the works of possibility into necessity.
5.54Failing to perceive this subtle distinction, Mani produced swarms of advocates of inherited sin for us. He argues as follows: ‘Where does evil come from? From will, of course. Where does evil will come from?’ He answers, ‘From a human being. Where does the human being come from? Through God.’ He concludes: ‘If evil comes from a human being, and the human being through God, evil therefore comes through God.’ Then, as though religiously avoiding making God criminal, he supplies a nature of darkness to which we should attribute evil. Augustine follows: ‘Where does evil come from? From will. Where,’ he asks, ‘does that will itself come from? From a human being, who is God’s work.’ He concludes: ‘If evil comes from will, will from a human being, and the human being is God’s work, evil therefore comes through God.’ As though trying to solve this without appearing to call God criminal—which his doctrine of transmission affirms—he offers us, in God’s place, an equally violent nothing: that is, darkness, to which we should attribute this evil. ‘For evil arose in a human being,’ he says, ‘not because he was God’s work, but because he was from nothing’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.28.48).
As though truth could not answer: with what shamelessness does your God first lie that a human being has a will, and then condemn him, when God knows this evil, sin, arose from the necessity of darkness—that is, ancient nothing? I have declined ‘nothing’ through its grammatical cases to display the prowess of the advocate of inherited sin, who places his hope in nothing. But see the weakness of the God he introduces. He could not overcome even nothing. Having made a human being from nothing, he could not free him from the condition of evil that came from nothing. Instead, embittered by the difficulty of affairs, he accuses the human being for his own faults and condemns nothing’s offenses by destroying his own image. Old Mani treats him more kindly, saying that the race of darkness did not ravage him completely. The advocate of inherited sin introduces so great a weakness in God that he invents the claim that God was defeated by nothing.
5.55All who declare war on truth suffer this disgrace. Let us gather our result. The question is where that first evil will arose in a human being. We answer: from a movement of the mind under no compulsion. The objection asks whether it appeared in God’s work. We agree that this is true. We are asked how we do not deny that, although we deny natural sin. We answer: because this sin exists in God’s work from possibility, not necessity. Natural things, then, are necessary; possible things are voluntary.
5.56Consequently, just as we assign sin to a free movement, so we assign nature to God the creator. Human nature is therefore God’s good work. Freedom of will—that is, the possibility either of wrongdoing or of acting rightly—is equally God’s good work. Both come to the human being from necessity; neither is the cause of evil. But those necessary things extend only this far. Will now arises within them, but not from them. They possess the capacity for will, but are not filled with it. They do not produce but receive the differences in moral desert.
5.57The good capacity for evil and good therefore does not compel will to arise, but permits it. No one is good merely because he is endowed with free will: many people are equally free yet utterly evil. Nor is anyone evil because he has free will: many equally share this freedom yet are excellent. A human being is thus neither good nor evil because he is free, but could be neither good nor evil unless he were free. This capacity, indicated by the name freedom, was so established by the supremely wise God that without it there cannot be what is not compelled to exist through it. Its single capacity for opposites protects it from predetermination toward either. That is, it cannot be called the cause or necessity of either an evil or a good will, since it receives both without compelling either to exist. Necessary things therefore have a single course and, as it were, one thread: like geometry’s length without breadth. Its unity cannot be divided. As long as it extends singly, it retains the force of its own nature; but where it meets something divided toward different directions, that necessity immediately ends. That is: the good God made the human being good.
5.58A substance’s beginning, and its good beginning, are governed by the unity of necessity. The human being also receives freedom of will, still within the line of necessity. But here necessary things end; from this point wills divide into opposites. The nature of division does not belong to necessity’s unity. Thus we are compelled to possess the capacity, but not compelled to use that capacity either well or badly. The capacity to sin is therefore capable of good and evil, but voluntary good and evil, because it could not be capable of a person’s own good unless it were capable of wrongdoing too.
5.59The difference between possibility and necessity is as great as that between fullness and emptiness. A capacity is shown empty of the thing it can receive; if it were not empty, it could not receive it. Who would receive what he already had? Necessity, however, indicates not emptiness but fullness. It cannot receive as though empty what it already compels to exist as though full. Necessary things differ from possible things, therefore, as packed things from empty things. The capacity is protected from predetermination toward either quality, for which it is equally capable, precisely by receiving opposites. It possesses in nature the necessary good that reflects its maker’s honor: innocence naturally mixed with no evil, receptive of its own acts, both the distinct merit of good and the blame of evil.
A sinner can wound what comes to him from his own activity; he cannot discolor what he received from God’s work. The valuation of natural goodness therefore remains even in evil people. It will never be evil to have been capable of doing good and evil. But it will not benefit the person who, without actually condemning the institutions of his necessary nature, has compelled them to be of no benefit to himself. In a human being whose freedom is already developed, therefore, when he sins we assign evil to will, but nature to God its creator. If, however, an infant who has no exercise of will and displays nothing except nature’s institutions is said to be full of crime, possessing by necessity the evil another receives by possibility, the one accused as crime’s author is undoubtedly nature’s author.
5.60But why turn to infants, when the Manichaeans’ question does not allow even an adult to sin by will? If evil arose in a human being because he was made from nothing, and he necessarily received his making from nothing, he undoubtedly received evil from necessity, not possibility. Although lengthy argument has destroyed this, let us discuss the same point a little longer, so that repetition makes it increasingly clear. You ask where the evil will itself existed in the first man. I answer: from a movement of the mind under no compulsion. You ask where that movement itself came from. I answer: what are you asking? Where it could come from, or from what it was compelled to exist? If you say, as you also wrote, ‘From what it was compelled to exist,’ I reply that your words are inconsistent and contradictory. You ask who compelled something that cannot exist except under no compulsion. This dissolves through its own contradiction; a question without order has no force.
You therefore ask with great foolishness where the evil will itself comes from. By ‘where,’ you ask not its occasion but its origin, that is, its nature. Yet, as discussed above, if it receives a nature, it loses its own definition, which says ‘under no compulsion’; if it retains its definition, it excludes predetermination by birth. The human being therefore sinned not because he was made from nothing, not because he was made by God, not because he was made from darkness, and not because he was made with free will. He sinned because he willed: that is, he had an evil will because he willed.
5.61Will, then, which is nothing other than a movement of the mind under no compulsion, owes its possibility to nature and its result to itself. It arose within nature, but from possibility, not necessity. If someone says here, ‘But a nature capable of an evil will is evil,’ I answer, ‘But a nature capable of a good will is good.’ It would therefore be called excellent and utterly evil at the same time. Yet the nature of things does not permit one and the same thing at one and the same time to be filled with opposing moral qualities. If it is thought evil because it could do evil, let it be believed good because it could do good. ‘Why,’ he asks, ‘could the nature that did good also do evil?’ I answer: because this good called virtue could not belong to the person as his own unless it were voluntary. It would not be voluntary if it carried the necessity of good; it would have suffered the necessity of good if it had not possessed the possibility of evil. Therefore, to preserve the right of good, the possibility of evil was admitted.
5.62But this can be twisted in the opposite direction: ‘Nature was suited for evil. Since evil could not be voluntary if evil were necessary, the possibility of good was given so that evil could belong to the person as his own.’ This is indeed clever, but insane. Everything is assessed from its better side. Added to this is the dignity of its maker, God: he did not make a free living being for the things he would punish, but gave the possibility of opposites for the things he would reward. Nevertheless, I do not want to fight over this. I allow something to the false objection by declining to settle anything through the maker’s authority. What necessarily follows, however, is that this capacity to do good and evil must be distinguished from the actual result of either will. It is consequently proved to be the necessary cause of neither virtue nor vice.
Even if we insult honorable things by treating their contest with the wicked as grounds to attribute to this capacity neither the merit of a good will nor that of an evil one, it retains the testimony of its freedom: it is innocent because it is full of neither good nor evil—that is, voluntary good or evil. Attribute the possibility of will to nature, then, but attribute neither good nor evil will to nature. The invincible conclusion is that an evil will indeed arose in God’s work, but from possibility, not necessity. This cannot be imputed to the giver of the capacity, but to the one directing that capacity.
5.63Let the discerning reader therefore hold firmly in mind the great difference between what comes from possibility and what comes from necessity. Let him assign all natural things to the necessary, all voluntary things to the possible, and conclude every question on the same side on which it began. If he wanders blindly through both, almost every word plunges him into countless errors. Since this has been made sufficiently clear, you plainly groped in deep darkness when you concluded: ‘Just as evil which existed nowhere could arise in God’s work, so evil already existing passed naturally through God’s work.’ See the error entangling you. You say sin conceived by the first will, which comes from possibility, was changed into something necessary: just as a free movement of the mind could arise, so without a free movement it could pass into the necessity of natural things.
Understand, however, that God is the author of necessary things. If God does in natures what the mind did in sins, he must be guilty in the same way as the one whose will he accuses. Indeed, more guilty: as necessity exceeds possibility, so engendering sin is more criminal than committing it. Although the nature of things does not admit this, I have shown here that your opinion of God is much worse than Mani’s. At least sudden wars mutilated Mani’s God; ancient and multiplied crimes corrupted yours. Consequently, you differ from catholics not merely over a question but over God himself. You do not worship the one whom we venerate in the Trinity as supremely just, supremely powerful, and inviolable.
A matter of will therefore could not pass through nature. We rightly said that the devil’s work is not permitted to pass through God’s work. The devil’s and an evil human being’s work is sin, which can exist in no one without a movement of free will. This work has come and comes to devil and human being from possibility. God’s work, however, is nature, in which a human being exists not by possibility but by necessity. This nature exists for long periods without will, since will’s power is felt at a particular age. As long as nature exists without will, it is solely God’s work; it cannot possess a sin it has not committed. It was therefore said irrefutably that the devil’s work is not permitted to pass through God’s work.
Your statement, ‘The work of God’s work passes through God’s work,’ is as false as it is impious. It amounts to saying, ‘God sins too, because the human being God made sinned.’ For sin exists nowhere except in a human being’s action. When a human being sins, nothing is added to his substance so that sin can be seen projecting there. The evil deed committed from an evil will simply acquires evil desert for the doer too, so that the one who did evil is called evil. Likewise, if your God made evil in his work, nothing is added to his substance, just as nothing is added to a human being’s; but he acquires the most disgraceful desert and is called evil by doing evil. Even then, however, the infant is proved not guilty, since he possesses evil by necessity, whereas even the devil could not be guilty unless he possessed it by possibility. But the true God of Christians does not do evil. Before the determination of its own will, an infant possesses nothing except what God has made within it. No natural sin can therefore exist. Since we have most carefully broken open the ancient error’s caves and nothing about this question remains hidden, let the attentive reader retain the distinction between necessity and possibility. He will laugh at the inventions of Manichaeans and advocates of inherited sin alike.
5.64From the same dullness you also produced this other statement: ‘God creates evil people in the same way as he feeds and nourishes evil people’ (Augustine, Marriage and Desire 2.17.32), because the Gospel says he makes his sun rise over good and evil and sends rain upon just and unjust (Matthew 5:45). What you supposed connected is utterly opposed. God’s feeding even sinners and being kind to the ungrateful and evil (Luke 6:35) testifies to his compassion, not his malice. He does not wish the death of one who dies, but that the person turn back and live (Ezekiel 18:32). He does not quickly punish those who stray. He does this for no other purpose than that his goodness may grant time for repentance. So the apostle says: ‘Or do you not know that God’s goodness (Romans 2:4) leads you to repentance? But according to your hardness and unrepentant heart, you store up wrath for yourself’ (Romans 2:4–5). He also argues among the Lycaonians and the Areopagites that even in past times of ignorance God did not remove the evidence of his providence (Acts 14:16–17; Acts 17:30): ‘He did not leave himself without testimony, giving rains from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness’ (Acts 14:17; Latin numbering 14:16) (Acts 14:17).
His raining upon the good and the evil is therefore evidence of his kindness, which bears with and awaits those who stray so that they may finally turn from evil and do good (compare Psalm 34:14; Psalm 37:27; 1 Peter 3:11). Far from wishing evil to occur, he feeds even the ungrateful out of love for human amendment. Against this sign of perfect compassion, however, your statement ‘He creates evil people’ is evidence of perfect injustice. See how little you know what you are saying: you wanted to prove cruelty by an example of mercy. It is good to feed even evil people, so that they may be corrected if they will. But it is criminal to make infants evil, so that those who cannot will are nevertheless compelled to be wicked. Generosity exercised toward sinners leads away from evils; it does not compel people into evils. Creating evil people does not lead away from the worst things; it drives both the work and its maker into everything abominable.
You are therefore insane when you say, ‘God creates evil’; more insane when you try to affirm it through Gospel testimony, and specifically a testimony containing a great proof of divine goodness. Observe how much more strongly it is now turned back against you. God feeds even evil people so that through his patience he may make them good. Clearly, then, he does not create evil people. But if he creates evil people, he neither loves nor rewards the good, and finally cannot himself possess anything good. For a power that creates not only possible but necessary evils harms more effectively and violently than any evil will. Since this does not fit the Christians’ God—the one called ‘Father of mercy and God of comfort’ (2 Corinthians 1:3), whose judgments are all proclaimed just (Psalm 119:75; LXX/Vulgate 118:75), and who is said to have made everything in wisdom (Psalm 104:24; LXX/Vulgate 103:24)—you, like the Manichaeans, have no share in our understanding of God. Foolish inventions and sins attached to generation have drawn you to worship an entirely different maker, fashioned by Mani’s madness.
To Florus — Book 6
6.1I do not doubt that until now our dispute has been regarded as concerning an obscure question rather than the heart of the faith. People living far from spiritual pursuits are moved only by passing breezes of rumor. Fearing the hostility of the times and lacking the protection of verified truth—as commonly happens amid alarm, when people trust no one less than themselves—they think the more crowded road the safer one.
6.2At present this happens for two reasons: the Manichaeans’ position has won approval in councils of wrongdoing, and the storms of persecution that have been stirred up frighten feeble spirits away from favoring truth.
6.3Thus one group caters both to pleasure and to fear. Its indulgence travels with the crowds of the arena, circus, or theater, seeking to excuse every disgrace by necessity, which always lightens the blame for what was done, and to avoid the world’s uproar by abandoning its principles. These are the things that win a larger following for the defense of vices. Yet most of that crowd, as I said before, believed that advocates of inherited sin and catholics agreed at least in their account of God.
6.4But both in the earlier dispute and in the present one, Augustine’s argument has made clear that the god of those who teach inherited sin is not the God whom Christians, with one voice, worship as just and as the creator of all things. I already anticipate in my mind that many even of those who fell through blind error will correct themselves once they recognize this.
6.5Against us, Mani believes mortals are driven by nature into shameful acts and crimes. He supposes the origin of darkness supplied the material both for bodies and for crimes; that sexual pleasure is the corruption of the human race, the vindication of the devil’s claim, and the force driving people into every dishonor. The advocate of inherited sin follows him in every way, as his heir and offspring, repeatedly proclaiming natural crimes, an eternal necessity of evil arising from dark nothingness, and an affection assigned to the senses that pollutes all the saints and places God’s image in the devil’s kingdom (Genesis 1:26–27).
6.6They now hurl their accusing weapons at God himself, reaching the same conclusion from different beginnings. Mani says: God is good and does no evil. But he adds that God consigns souls to eternal fire for natural faults—an act of obvious cruelty. Thus, at the end of his opinion, he stains with plain injustice the one he had called good.
Augustine, however, as though trusting the man he addresses as his patron, is bolder. He despises his teacher’s hesitation and does not hesitate to begin where Mani ended. He pronounces that God makes and creates evil—that is, sin. This plainly cannot fit the God worshiped by the catholic faith. Let this above all remain fixed in the reader’s mind: no believer has ever had a greater cause for struggle than ours, and anyone who considers nature itself a necessity for crime has no share in worshiping the Christians’ God. Since this has often been stressed—the usefulness of the central case required repetition—let us now examine the first humans, whose indictment the Numidian carries like a light shield when he meets our battle line.
6.7He presses into all his writings the claim that only Adam and Eve were made good by God—that is, subject to no natural guilt—and that they sinned by free will, but so greatly that they overthrew everything God had established in their nature. He says: ‘The devil planted that sin far greater and deeper than the sins familiar to people. Therefore, through that great sin of the first human, our nature was changed for the worse there, and not only became sinful but also generates sinners. Yet the very sickness through which the power of living well perished is not nature but a defect. That sin which changed the human being for the worse in paradise, because it is far greater than we can judge, is inherited by everyone born’ (compare Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.34.57–58).
See how openly he explained his meaning! Those first humans, he says, had a good nature, but committed a sin so monstrous and immeasurable that they destroyed the power to live well, extinguished the light of free will, and established a necessity of sinning thereafter. No one born from their stock could strive toward the beauty of virtues, turn away from vices, and attain holiness.
6.8He thinks, therefore, that praising those first humans—just two people—helps him maintain a distinction between Manichaeans and advocates of inherited sin. It is hard to encounter anything more outrageous or shameless than this opinion. Freedom of choice, he says, lost its strength once it began to exercise itself.
Let us turn to him and carefully investigate each point. You admit, do you not, that the first human was made with free will, created good by God, and polluted by no corruption of sin at the outset? Yet, though his original condition was innocent, he afterward transgressed voluntarily and imposed on everyone to be born from him an unavoidable compulsion to sin. This is certainly your doctrine, which we testify was drawn from Mani’s mud. For Mani also regards Adam’s own nature as naturally evil, although formed from the flower of the first substance and far better than those who followed.
6.9For the present, then, we must first expose the dullness of your thinking, and then show—as we have often done already—that you never step even one foot away from the Manichaeans’ hovels and brothels. To begin with, it is utterly mad to think an act of choice was mixed into reproductive seed and the operations of wills took root in conceptions. You abolish the clearest and widest distinction between natures and pursuits, and then say the first humans’ will reproduced itself in their descendants. Everything in existence struggles against this error.
Orators’ sons never brought the elegance of their fathers’ art into their infant cries; actors’ offspring did not stretch their hands in trained gestures to accompany words; warriors’ sons did not demand a trumpet from the crowd. We may pursue examples of every kind on this pattern, all sounding together more clearly than thunder. The whole of things answers that nature has one set of boundaries, will another, and the conditions of reproductive seed cannot be penetrated by the desires of chosen pursuits. It has therefore proved a belief of the dullest, most abject stupidity to think that something admittedly voluntary was transformed into nature.
But your other claim is far, far more disgraceful: you say the capacity to act was consumed when action began. Free will is simply the capacity to sin and not to sin, subject to no compulsion on either side, but able by its own choice to stand on whichever side it wants. Yet you say that once it began to will one side, it lost the ability to choose either.
6.10Now let us prove what we said: your doctrine differs in no respect from the Manichaeans’. There is no doubt at all that Adam’s own nature was made utterly evil if it was formed with this condition: a necessity of evil but no necessity of good. A crime, even if conceived by will, would become natural in a nature in which goodness would not become natural. Such a person is falsely said to have sinned voluntarily, since he labored under the prior disadvantage of a thoroughly evil condition. How bound to evil he was is obvious, if he was destined to be filled with inseparable guilt.
What worse substance could I find than one made so that it could fall into injustice but could not leave injustice? If it had suffered this compulsion on goodness’s side, even losing free will, it would still have brought no accusation against its author: no one would challenge him over an abundance of kindness. But when such domination is placed on evil’s side, it accuses no one more than humanity’s maker himself. Flattery from his own accusers—that is, from you—uselessly strokes a god proved the closest friend of wickedness by the ugliness of what he created.
Who can be persuaded that he did not destine the first human for crimes if he deprived him of the capacity for reform; if he gave him so twisted a mind that his own error could not displease him, leaving no return to honor and no improvement through experience; if, to prevent him ever feeling a desire to recover uprightness, he tore out the very possibility of correction? If his condition was such that a single fall cost him the power to reform for as long as he lived, he was plainly established for no other purpose than to fall. Indeed, it is more accurate to say he always lay fallen than that he fell, if he is not allowed to rise in respect of conduct.
What sort of freedom, then, was supposedly bestowed on him at first, if among two contrary qualities he received the worse as necessary and the better as changeable—indeed, if, occupied by the tyranny of guilt, he was stripped of the capacity to come to his senses? The first human’s condition was therefore utterly repulsive from the outset, if God established it so unhappily that his coming fall into crime bound him to perpetual necessity of sinning.
6.11The alliance between you and the Manichaeans plainly endures: they by open profession and you by argument maintain that even the first human’s nature was evil. All this is full of absurdities and lies. Passing over the legions of saints, let us take the first example of righteousness after Adam’s sin: Abel’s wonderful holiness proves it. Born from sinners, he showed through the actual exercise of virtue that he did not lack the power to live well (Genesis 4:4; Hebrews 11:4). Yet, leaving these examples aside, it is useful to press the pronouncements of the party teaching inherited sin.
What do you suppose the free will you acknowledge was given to the first humans was like? Surely it meant they could change their minds: do evil or withdraw from evil, abandon or keep justice. There would therefore have been no will to sin unless the capacity to will came first. You say that after they began using their own will—that is, a movement of mind compelled by no one—they lost free will. What could be imagined more insane?
To state your argument’s force precisely: you say that what was given only for the sake of willing perished because of willing. Sin is simply an evil will. Freedom was given solely to permit the will to arise, not to compel it. Yet you say this freedom lost its condition through an act of will, so it is believed to have died through the very thing that alone proves it alive. An evil will is therefore not freedom’s fruit, but evidence of freedom. Freedom is simply the capacity for good and evil, provided they are voluntary. How, then, could it perish through the very thing for which it is shown to have been instituted, when an evil will and a good will are not freedom’s destruction but its witnesses?
The distance between proper functions and destructive crises is therefore the distance between your opinion and the meaning of free will, whose destruction you think was supplied by its own grounds for praise. What new or unforeseen thing happened when humanity sinned, to overthrow God’s arrangements? A being was made who could sin and not sin. When he sinned, he did what he ought not to have done, but what he nevertheless could do. How, then, would he lose that capacity, instituted precisely so that he could will something and could refuse what he willed (Genesis 4:4) (Hebrews 11:4)?
6.12Next, to follow the precipices of your opinion, you argue that free will was arranged on this condition: it would lose its power as the consequence of the will that followed, and thereafter endure the necessity of the quality it chose. Attend, then, to our reply. Do you think humanity was created to suffer this necessity of the chosen quality on both sides? If someone willed good, could he thereafter not sin; and if he chose evil, could he no longer reform? Or would necessity of evil follow only the evil choice, while nothing similar happened on the good side, which would always remain exposed to the dangers of change?
Take whichever of these alternatives you please. If you say nature was made to suffer only the necessity of evil, no one will doubt that a nature assigned compulsion solely toward the worse side is being defined as utterly repulsive. Adam too is proved to have possessed an evil nature, and no shadow of a voluntary offense will remain for you to hide beneath.
But if you profess that the same consequence would have followed on goodness’s side—if he had willed good he could no longer sin—I reply: Why, then, did he sin? Why did no necessity of good make him impervious to the devil’s plots, when he is found to have obeyed God for some time before sinning? The instant the clay grew warm with the soul’s entrance, he did not immediately blaze into the desire of an evil will. Rather, we read that he was placed in paradise to cultivate and guard it and received God’s command to eat all its fruits but obediently abstain from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
Before his wife’s body was formed from his side, he therefore remained obedient to the command, an innocent cultivator of that delightful countryside. Afterward he received the help of a companion like himself. Scripture’s truthful account emphasizes these distinctions of time. Once he saw the woman prepared for him, he served God’s command with such diligent devotion that he also informed her of the law he had received. Thus he not only kept but also proclaimed the divine command, teaching Eve reverence for the one commanding, the kind of obedience required, and the reason for fear.
That is why the woman, to whom God had given no command, resisted the devil’s approach attentively. At first she refuted the serpent’s lies. She said abstinence from all trees had not been commanded, as he invented; rather, permission to enjoy all their fruit came with a warning about just one little tree, and the fear of death was set before them as the rightful consequence for transgressors. It therefore appears that Adam kept the command for no short time. Eve too cared about devotion, although she fell through love of knowledge and divinity.
Why, then, did the justice and devotion that flourished a long time in Adam and for some time in Eve not remove their ability to do wrong, so that a necessity of good made them impervious to guilty persuasions? They were obedient for as long as they wished, yet the merit of their devotion did not cost them their ability to transgress: in the end they fell (Genesis 2–3). Therefore, even after sinning, it is clear that they could not have lost the power to reform. Here, as everywhere, you have lost everything you invented. That sin of the first humans neither created necessity for any crimes nor passed into nature, just as their previous justice neither imposed necessity for virtues nor claimed the pathways of reproductive seed (Genesis 2:7) (Genesis 2:15–17) (Genesis 2:18–23) (Genesis 3:1–6).
6.13What, then, has been established? One of two alternatives is necessary. Either you acknowledge that Adam was made with a good substance, that his nature was not destroyed by a voluntary quality, and you abandon natural sin; or, if you insist as before that he is the cause of natural evils, you must pronounce him too to be of an utterly evil substance and to belong to your god—that is, yours and Mani’s.
6.14So far I have argued as the practice of our faith required. But I will not be content with this approach alone. I shall deal generously with you and deliberately take on a role that seems to favor your teacher’s position. The purpose is to force you to attack Mani, if you disagree with him. The absence of trickery in our argument will be shown by the very fact that the advocate of inherited sin can find no way to oppose Mani. Thus the extent of your conspiracy and the mutual advantages by which you manage everything will appear when no quarrel can be stirred up between you. Let the reader keep in mind the purpose I have explained for taking this course. Now let us speak in the role we assume.
[Julian argues in an assumed Manichaean voice:] ‘Those who think this bodily formation capable of justice are completely mistaken. The lowly nature of flesh and blood opposes every good pursuit. Every stimulus, through the seduction of the senses, slides into disturbing—indeed overthrowing—the mind. Cast into this mire by some unknown misfortune, the mind loses its noble flashes of light through mixture with clay. Of itself it strives toward its own place, toward the heights, but it is crushed in an earthly prison. When it wishes to fly upward to chastity, it encounters the glue and birdlime of obscene pleasure rising from burning inward parts.
‘If it desires generous liberality, it is bound in the tightest shackles of greed, disguised as thrift. If it wishes to stand in a balanced serenity of steadfastness, it is immediately overwhelmed by a hailstorm of fear and tempests of pain. Turning bloodless before every uncertainty, it cannot remain master of its own judgment. Add the night of ignorance, whose filth surrounds it. What praiseworthy quality shall we suppose in a living being that has neither keen eyes to choose useful things nor the ability to count its shipwrecks among the storms of desires and dangers?
‘Let no one falsely claim these things happened to a substance voluntarily corrupted. The original making of the first humans is found subject to these miseries. To prove this even from Moses, whom catholics revere: the first humans experienced fear’s torture (Genesis 2:17), terrified by the threat of danger unless they obeyed. So far as comparison allows us to judge, we think them more fearful than their descendants, since a punishment as yet experienced by no one tormented them. Why should the threat of death shake people who did not know what harm death would bring? Mere suspicions of evils plainly troubled them. In what tranquility could a mind stand when such a bitter winter of fear disturbed it?
‘And how profound its ignorance, how harsh the condition of enduring it, when it could be freed only by transgression! It would obtain knowledge of good and evil only through an act of condemnable daring. This living being, already so blind and miserable, was made restless too by inborn desire, provoked by the beauty and sweetness of the forbidden thing. As though all this were too little to express its unhappiness, it was exposed to attack by a higher nature. Who, then, could be foolish enough to suppose any good existed where he acknowledges so many instruments of misery were established?
‘This flesh, then, of the worst condition and worst nature, displayed in those first humans what it had possessed from the beginning. The good God could not have made so evil a substance. What remains except to acknowledge one giver of the soul and another creator of creatures of clay?’ (Genesis 3:6)
Mani’s battle line, whose role I had adopted, now stands in formation. You understand what we await: whoever opposes him must demonstrate it through a consistent attack. Let your doctrine fight him, then; it will appear whether it can make even a slight movement without destroying itself. He has certainly pronounced not only that everyone born from bodily union is criminal, but that Adam himself brought the necessity of faults from the formation of his inward parts and from the dirt of the clay from which he was made. He says: ‘Flesh’s nature was harmful in the first humans. It shut in, drenched, and extinguished the very spark of mind that glimmered with the pursuit of honor. Catholics are utterly foolish: they resist sinners’ testimony and will not accept even their own evidence. They see themselves not doing the good they want but performing the evil they detest (Romans 7:19), yet think there is no necessity of evil in the flesh.’
Let the advocate of inherited sin meet these highly prejudicial claims, if he can. For now I stand as a spectator and await the outcome of your conflict. What will you answer someone swearing that nature was evil even in the first humans? Undoubtedly you will reply that God, humanity’s maker, could not create evil in what he made. Therefore, since God, who does no evil, made humans, they cannot be proved naturally evil. You have said something, and truly. But consider whether you should have said it within my hearing. I care little how forcefully you shook Mani; meanwhile you have passed entirely into my jurisdiction.
Now that you are captured, I enjoy teasing you. I greet your profession with great applause and remind you to remember it. From the dignity of its author—that is, God, who does no evil—you pronounced that his works must be affirmed good. Do you think, then, that all humans generated by the sexual union God established are made by God or by the devil? If by God, how dare you pronounce them guilty and evil, when you said the decisive proof that Adam could not have been made with an evil nature was that he was created by God, who is perfectly good?
If this is a strong argument for believing the first humans’ substance was not established guilty—precisely that God, whom we acknowledge good, created it—then the same argument remains to destroy inherited sin. It proves that everyone born from marriage cannot be created unjust, because God, whom we acknowledge good, creates them. But if, even after this, raging shamelessness persists in swearing both that infants are made by God and that they are naturally evil, these lies bring no prejudice against a catholic or our God. Yet plainly you have not attacked Mani. He gladly embraces your accusation against God, content that you have lost the argument through which you tried to establish Adam’s good condition (Genesis 2:7).
6.15But let us not press the first part of the contest too hard. Let us allow you to proceed in your opinion and prove Adam’s nature good. You surely say: A just God would not impose a law of devotion on a human being if he knew that person suffered a necessity of sinning. If he demanded justice of will from someone he knew to possess an evil nature, he would not prove the transgressor guilty, but publicly show himself an enemy of justice. Yet the just God imposed a law on humanity and promised punishment for transgression. It is therefore established that the human being, good by nature, could sin only by will alone.
You see how sound a conclusion I have offered in your name? It is precisely the sword that flashes in catholic hands and lays waste both Manichaeans and advocates of inherited sin. But I too quickly brought in your party’s name, though for now I wanted my reply taken as yours. The solid response has therefore shaken Mani. I accompany this august reasoning with fitting praise, but notice that the oil of this praise sharpens the sword against you.
Repeat, please, what you said. ‘The just God would not impose a law on humanity if it were evil by nature. But he, being just, imposed a law. It is now clear that humanity could keep what the perfectly fair God commanded, because without the power to obey, the one commanding could never have a reasonable basis for his order.’ What a delightful little argument! Before me, with me as spectator, he establishes the goodness of the nature receiving law from the justice of the lawgiver—and does not see that before Mani feels even a small wound, he has brought destruction upon the advocates of inherited sin.
To make you understand that I seize your bloody weapons while you lie half-dead, and that your dying eyes must bear the sight of victorious truth, I will drive you onto your own weapons. [Literary echo: Virgil, Aeneid 10.462–463.] If the just God could not give Adam a law unless he knew him free to observe justice without any compulsion toward evil, then without doubt the law of later times, carrying the same weight of justice, could not have been given to people if they were born from the womb either weak for good and incapable of justice, or guilty—that is, evil. That later law was also put in writing, more extensive through multiplied provisions, more precise through distinctions, and more fearsome through increased punishment.
For just as the plea of necessity would excuse these people in every transgression, the excessive commands, uncontrolled decrees, and unjust judgments would return as a stain upon their author. Thus this second part closes in the same way as the first. Either you acknowledge that God’s justice could command only what he judged those subject to him could do—in which case the first command destroys Mani, while the later laws destroy Mani and the advocate of inherited sin together—or, if impiety abandons this argument, Mani has not suffered even a slight blow from you. With the world as witness, he will show that he is your father and leader, and that he and you have one single contest against us.
6.16I do not know whether, now driven by lack of resources, you might attempt something so foolish and weak as saying you cannot prove by any reasons that God created Adam good, but are satisfied to believe it solely on the authority of the reading. After humanity was formed on the sixth day, it says of all creatures together: ‘God saw everything he had made, and behold, it was very good’ (Genesis 1:31). You would thus judge Adam to have been established without injustice, not because of the maker’s dignity or a weighing of his justice, but because of the testimony calling all created things well made.
Yet although this strikes Mani so lightly that he laughs, it exposes the advocate of inherited sin bound before us. We need gather no crowd of divine testimonies here. The apostle’s authority alone supplies our ruling: foreseeing this foul error, he thundered against you in lofty speech, ‘Every creature of God is good’ (1 Timothy 4:4).
If Moses’ statement that God made everything well suffices to prove the first human was formed with a good nature, and you therefore insist Adam could not have been created by God with sin because he is read to have been made good among the rest, we will answer along exactly the same lines: no one can be born with sin, because the apostle defends every creature of God as good.
What have these arguments accomplished? The choice offered you in the contest declared between you and Mani has publicly revealed what reason discovered. Once the contest was proposed, you could not hurl even one weapon at your teacher without destroying yourself. Thus it shines still more clearly that you and the Manichaeans have fused through obscene agreement into a single body of impiety. What could be more closely joined than what not even the arrival of danger can separate? In every destruction of Mani, the doctrine of inherited sin dies with him. Nothing strikes him and leaves you intact. Your principles, mysteries, and dangers are one—and you resent being called old Mani’s offspring?
6.17See, by contrast, how real our struggle is against you and Mani, whose downfall always entangles you, and how swift our triumph over him. We immediately draw the plow of our first definition around everything he vomited out to defame God’s work. We force him to explain what he thinks sin is. It plainly is nothing other than a will seeking what justice forbids and from which it is free to abstain. Once this is established, all the thornbushes of objection that pricked bodily existence are, as the writer says, shown torn out by the roots. [Literary echo: Cicero, On Ends, Book 2.]
As for the feeling of fear and the sensation of pain, through which he thought a storm arose to shipwreck humans, they are shown not merely to compel no evil, but, when checked by a good will, to assist and carry forward justice. Who would fear judgment without fear’s warning? Who would benefit from repentant groans without the cleansing of pain and inward distress? Finally, what power would a judge’s severity have unless it punished voluntary sins by the suffering of inflicted torment?
All these things testify that sin is nothing other than a free will despising justice’s commands. Justice can stand only by reckoning as sin what it knows could freely have been avoided. Consequently, no law can count natural things as faults, and no one takes on guilt for a crime he did not himself commit while able to avoid it. This argument’s power destroys both Mani and the advocate of inherited sin, who, with all the eyes of understanding gouged out, tries to attach an act of will to reproductive seed.
6.18But by the faithfulness of our God and of humanity! Could such monstrous inventions really have been devised, deliberately and laboriously trying to assert everything upside down? What could be more monstrous than what the Carthaginian says? Things that were natural, he says, did not endure; things adopted by choice adhered to the first formation of the bodily members.
Adam, he says, was made good and possessed natural innocence. Raised above other creatures by a special nobility, he shone with his Creator’s likeness (Genesis 1:26–27). He received free will in his created condition, to move by his own judgment in whatever direction he wished. Through the very condition of his making, which set him above the rest, he obtained the ability to approach either good or evil and withdraw from either. But because he used his independent judgment to adopt a corrupt inclination of the free mind, he overthrew all those admittedly inborn things; only sin and the necessity of sinning clung to him inseparably.
This is what I called a monstrous invention. It is an unheard-of disgrace to say: A living being was well made in whom even natural goods could be lost, while even voluntary evils clung inseparably.
6.19Someone may say here: What then? Do you deny that the innocence in which he was created was corrupted by committing a voluntary sin? Even if committing injustice does not destroy the possibility of returning to good, it is still certain that the standing of innocence with which human life begins perishes through a fault of will. I do not deny that this is so. But what I want these examples to illuminate is this: the qualities by which we are called good and evil were made to operate under the will’s authority. This was established so firmly that even innocence, which precedes the will’s activity because of the author’s dignity and is natural, has no power to preserve itself in a resisting mind. Therefore this principle must apply far, far more strongly on evil’s side: a fault adopted voluntarily must acquire no tyranny that destroys reason.
If the good quality with which humanity was made was not unchangeable—for someone unable to vary his own movements would falsely be called free—much less could an evil quality become unchangeable in a rational being. Otherwise the principle of freedom would suffer from evil’s side a restriction that, to preserve its condition, it had not suffered even from goodness’s side.
6.20What parasite ever flattered a boastful soldier’s strength as the advocate of inherited sin flatters the devil’s? This can be recognized by weighing their respective influences. God made the human being, handling the very material of clay with an awe-inspiring condescension, as it followed its author’s hand into human shape. The completed image stood there, still pale and cold, awaiting the breath through which it would shine and live. Then the soul, created and breathed in by the author’s most august breath, stirred the inward parts it filled. Every sense awakened to prepare for its own tasks. The entering inhabitant gave color to the inward parts, warmth to the blood, vigor to the limbs, brightness to the skin. See the work divine goodness undertook in forming and animating humanity (Genesis 2:7)!
Yet the Creator’s closeness did not abandon him once complete. He was transferred to a more delightful place; the one God had mercifully made he generously enriched. Nor, content with this, did God stop there: he enlightened him by sharing conversation. He gave him a command so that, understanding his freedom, he might see the means at hand to become closer to his Creator. The command was not stretched into many provisions, lest a multiplied law impose a burden. The prohibition of one small fruit sought evidence of devotion. Later, so that he might have a companion through whom to become a father, he was ennobled again by the touch of the hand that made him. Divine conversation continued to cherish and honor him (Genesis 2:8–25).
These divine provisions—so prolonged, so many, so great: arrangements, gifts, commands, conversations—created no necessity of good in humanity. On the other side, however, the devil, as timid as he was crafty, exchanged a few words with the woman. Those words are said to have had such power that they immediately became a natural condition—indeed, overthrew every inborn thing, created perpetual necessity of evil, and imposed the devil as lord and possessor over God’s image.
What, then, is stronger, more excellent, more magnificent than the hostile power, if with a slight conversation it accomplished what God could obtain neither by his works nor by his gifts? Plainly you stand on the side of the one whose power you proclaim so excessively. You have no share in worshiping our God, whom we acknowledge as both perfectly fair and all-powerful: ‘He is mighty, and truth surrounds him’ (Psalm 89:8); he humbles the proud one as a wounded man—that is, the devil and Mani, and you their followers, who slander nature to avoid admitting that you sin voluntarily. Our God, then, ‘scatters his enemies by the strength of his arm’ (Psalm 89:8, 10; LXX/Vulgate Psalm 88:9, 11) (Psalm 89:10). Thus neither you nor the Manichaeans could bring forward anything that the thunderbolt of his truth did not shatter (Psalm 89:8, 10).
6.21It is therefore perfectly clear that Augustine differs in nothing from his teacher. His arguments define Adam’s nature as utterly evil no less than everyone else’s. To discuss further with him what we have treated, it appears that you do not even consider the first sin the same kind as other faults. You say later ages’ crimes cannot pass into nature—for example, that children born from an embezzler, a parent-murderer, or an incestuous person are not born liable for their parents’ sins—and that no crime except that one is mixed into reproductive seed. You therefore show with complete openness that you do not consider that disobedience of the same kind as the rest.
See how brief and clear our question is. If Adam’s sin was adopted voluntarily and could become natural, why are the sins committed every day by a criminal will not piled into the deformity and prejudicial condition of reproductive seed? If these sins, no less atrocious and more numerous, cannot be implanted at birth, by what law, condition, or special privilege is that one alone claimed to be inborn? If the sins we know, which law condemns and fairness punishes, are of the same kind as the first human’s sin, committed voluntarily and punished justly, why do we not understand these from that one, or that one from these? If they cannot testify to one another, how can anyone shamelessly deny that the first transgression was of another condition—produced not by will but by natural corruption?
Finally, while maintaining inherited sin, dare to define any sin. I do not mean the first; for now take one committed today—sacrilege, a shameful act, or some evil crime. Explain the definition of these sins. You will undoubtedly say: It is a will seeking what justice forbids and from which it is free to abstain; if there were no evil will, there could be no sin. Observe how reasonably we rise against this. What dullness, what intolerable shamelessness! You define sin as nothing but a free will forbidden by justice, while the theory of natural evil lays down that there is an involuntary sin with which a human is born. Then it is not true that only what is freely committed is a fault, since there is a crime—and the greatest one—received not voluntarily but by birth.
Give back, then, the definition of sin that is friendly to catholics and does not turn aside to lodge with you even as a guest. Having relinquished it, prove that you are not a fellow soldier of those who attack substance itself with the stigma of wickedness. To gather our conclusions: either no sin will be shown voluntary if any sin is natural, or none will be natural if every sin is defined as voluntary. Consequently, either deny that sin can be born and come over to catholic faith, or, if you persist that not merely some sin but the greatest crime is received through nature without will, give your name too to Mani, whom you obey in everything.
6.22Time urges us to move on, but indignation forces me to linger here a little. Do you dare say Adam sinned voluntarily? Where did this dream come from? ‘Because,’ you say, ‘it would have been unjust for God to count something as sin unless he knew the person was free to abstain.’ What then? Did the prince of darkness whom you worship lend him this justice for a moment, then soon demand it back and strip this god of all fairness? At the beginning he understood that nothing should be counted as sin except what could freely be avoided; afterward, through all remaining time, he knew that every newborn lacked freedom to abstain.
Finally, how do you know that the only just course in Adam’s case was to punish voluntary guilt, unless you know it unjust to charge anyone with a crime admittedly received without will? Either you will consider inherited sin just, so that it can fit God’s judgment when he charges an infant with a sin committed without any will of the infant. Then you will be forced to profess it equally just and fitting for God’s judgments to have charged Adam with a sin he knew arose not from Adam’s will but from the deformity of his substance. In that case there will be no transmission of sin: the nature condemned will not have been corrupted by its agent’s choice, but badly established from the beginning, and you will confess yourself a Manichaean.
Or, coming to your senses, you will say it would be unjust to hold Adam guilty for his nature’s faults. Then it follows irrefutably that it would be utterly wicked to judge Abel, Enoch, Noah, and the whole human race liable for original guilt. If you attach this crime of judgment to your god, he alone will remain guilty in place of everyone. It will appear, as always, that he is not the God whom we catholics worship as perfectly just in the Trinity. But if you stop accusing God, you will condemn the doctrine of Manichaean inherited sin that has pierced you until now, as though returning to life.
6.23‘That sin which changed the human being for the worse in paradise, because it is far greater than we can judge, is inherited by everyone born’ (Augustine, Marriage and Sexual Desire 2.34.58). Who told you Adam’s sin was far greater than Cain’s? Far greater than the Sodomites’? Far more monstrous, finally, than yours and Mani’s? Certainly the history supplies no occasion for this empty claim. He had been commanded to abstain from eating the fruit of one tree. Inexperienced, unskilled, unwary, without experience of fear or an example of justice, at the woman’s suggestion he took food whose sweetness and beauty had enticed him (Genesis 3:6). Recognize here a transgression of a command.
A transgression was committed, one among the rest that sinners’ pursuits have perpetrated at different times. It was no greater than when the people of Israel ate forbidden animals (compare Leviticus 11). The cause of sin lay not in the fruit’s quality but in violating the command. What, then, did Adam do to justify your accusation that his sin exceeded human estimation? Unless perhaps, following Mani’s mysteries—he keeps his hands from plucking fruits and growing things, lest he tear a part of his god that he imagines enclosed in bark and plants—you too think Adam sinned gravely because by eating the fruit he tore your god’s substance. What madness!
‘Because that sin is far greater than we can judge,’ he says, ‘it is inherited by everyone born.’ So eating forbidden fruit was a greater crime than stabbing holy Abel out of murderous envy (Genesis 4:8); than violating the rights of guests and the order of the sexes in Sodom (Genesis 19:4–9); than sacrificing one’s children to demons even under the law (Psalm 106:37); than subjecting innocent children, aware of no exercise of will and newly made by God, to the devil’s kingdom and joining them to his deserts; than accusing God of injustice; than assigning honorable marriage to the prince of darkness; finally, than to regard infants as worse than all the ungodly, worse than all pirates, because they are born through their parents’ sexual pleasure?
I do not invent this; I draw the conclusion. You called that sin greater and weightier than all crimes, such that no guilt could equal it. And you assert that infants arrive full of this great evil, which outweighs all vices. We have therefore understood correctly: the greater the sin they share, the more they take precedence in condemnation over all criminals.
6.24But why should hostility toward innocence arouse indignation against you, when the insolence and fury of your obscene mouth are not restrained even by reverence for divinity? You accuse infants, but God with them; you attack innocence, but also wrong fairness; you deny truth, but accuse the one you acknowledge as your god. Consequently, although we would not lack the help of reason, the transmission of sin would collapse more than sufficiently through its advocates’ deformity.
6.25But why do we stubbornly think only truth’s reasoning should be followed, when our enemies’ battle line relies on the very dangers of life and rises against us fortified by miseries’ support? It wants to prove the transmission of faults and punishments into reproductive seed through the shame of intercourse, the pain of childbirth, and the sweat of labor. These signs—difficult births, sweating farmers, and thorny fields—are meant to make us believe in a natural crime for which the human race is exercised by so many troubles. Some think Adam’s sin made the race mortal.
I said ‘some’ because their leader Augustine was ashamed to say this. Writing to Marcellinus, he says Adam appears to have been made mortal. Yet with his usual elegance he adds that death was the wages of iniquity (compare Romans 6:23), and pronounces that the one he admits was established mortal according to nature could not have died. Those pronouncements in Genesis which afflict Adam and Eve are therefore commonly brought against us. It is now time to discuss them.
‘The Lord God said to the serpent: Because you have done this, you are cursed beyond all cattle and all beasts upon the earth (Genesis 3:14). You shall go upon your breast and belly and eat earth all the days of your life. I will put enmity between you and the woman, between your seed and her seed. She shall watch for your head, and you shall watch for her heel.
‘To the woman he said: I will greatly multiply your sorrows and your groaning (Genesis 3:16). In sorrow you shall bear children; your turning shall be toward your husband, and he shall rule over you.
‘To Adam he said: Because you listened to your wife’s voice (Genesis 3:17) and ate from the tree of which I commanded you not to eat from that one alone, the earth is cursed in your works. In sorrow you shall eat from it all the days of your life. It shall produce thorns and thistles for you, and you shall eat the grass of your field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are earth, and into earth you shall go’ (Genesis 3:14–19).
You take these pronouncements as evidence of inborn iniquity and proclaim that women would not have suffered pain in childbirth unless the misery of Eve’s childbearing had passed to them along with her sin. You want the punishment itself to prove sin, so that what the first woman earned through her offense cannot be felt by any woman without the same iniquity. ‘There would be no pain in the woman giving birth,’ you say, ‘unless there were sin in the child being born.’
I can scarcely measure how astonished I am in meeting these claims. Your opinion has supplied so many irritations here that I can scarcely bring myself to contest it. These objections contain more sins against understanding than syllables.
6.26First, how insane is your very claim that childbirth pain accompanies sin! It so plainly concerns the condition of the sexes rather than punishment for crimes that all animals, stained by no sin, undergo these pangs and groans in giving birth. This shows that something found even without sin is not proof of sin.
Then you advance another, far more foolish claim. ‘A woman would not suffer pain,’ you say, ‘unless she shared in crimes.’ Yet immediately you add: ‘But this sin, for which the woman suffers, is found not in the mother but in the child being born.’ Thus, you say, even baptized women live free from sin, yet are afflicted by the difficulties of their childbearing because of the iniquity of the children they bring forth. On this opinion, inherited sin no longer flows from mother to offspring but pours back from the newborn into the parents. If a baptized woman feels pain because iniquities are found in the infant, transmission begins to run uphill rather than downhill.
‘But she is not tormented because her son has iniquity; rather, because she herself brought it with her when she was born.’ Yet you said grace removed this evil from her. If a laboring woman’s pain adhered to sin, removing sin should have cured childbirth’s torment. Or, if this torment cannot exist without iniquity, but is still found in women after baptism, then grace has not removed their iniquity either, and baptism’s ceremony has become worthless.
But if these mysteries possessed the power and truth we believe in, not what you invent, and every sin was removed, yet the pain caused by difficult childbirth remains, it is clear that this groaning indicates nature, not fault. Even you agree it is suffered by women whom you acknowledge freed from the Manichaeans’ sin. So much is clear from examples alone. If we inspect the words of the pronouncement itself, however, it will dissolve your fog with brilliance surpassing the sun’s rays.
The woman was not told, ‘Pains will arise within you,’ or, ‘I will create groaning for you,’ as though these sensations were instituted after her fault. Rather: ‘I will greatly multiply your sorrows’ (Genesis 3:16). God shows that what he promises not to create but to multiply in the sinful person already exists in the natural order. Only existing things are multiplied. Before they exist, ‘making’ is the proper expression; calling it ‘increasing’ is premature.
Lest this seem our own point rather than truth’s, this same order of words is recorded concerning all living beings. Before humanity was made, God said: ‘Let us make humanity in our image and likeness’ (Genesis 1:26). Again concerning the woman: ‘God said: It is not good for the human to be alone; let us make him a helper like himself’ (Genesis 2:18). After they were made, however: ‘He blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply and fill the earth’ (Genesis 1:28). Before their creation he did not say ‘Let them multiply,’ but ‘Let humanity be made.’ Once someone existed who could increase, he appropriately added, ‘Increase and multiply and fill the earth.’
In this same order, childbirth’s groaning, established naturally in human bodies as in animals, was not created in Eve but increased, so that she would suffer a special intensity of heightened pangs. Yet these would reach later women only in the ordinary natural measure, varying with their bodies. Thus sin did not cause the woman to suffer in childbirth, but to suffer excessively. Similarly, we read of bodily infirmities coming upon particular people for sins at different times; but such increased misery did not overturn the smaller natural measure.
Not everything in this pronouncement, however, is confined to punitive severity. One part indicates desert, another specifies a duty. ‘I will greatly multiply your sorrows and your groaning; in sorrow you shall bear children.’ Up to this point comes punishment, earned by the person, not by nature. From here the task of the sex created second is simply described: ‘Your turning shall be toward your husband, and he shall rule over you’ (Genesis 3:16). This plainly does not concern punishment: its absence would concern fault. A woman’s submission to her husband with modest affection belongs to order, not punishment. According to the apostle, ‘the husband is the woman’s head’ (Ephesians 5:23), because ‘man was not created for woman, but woman for man’ (1 Corinthians 11:9). If she reveres her head with fitting modesty, she maintains nature’s arrangements rather than enduring sin’s torments. If she resists that order, she is guilty. Performing something whose neglect is a fault is therefore no misery.
6.27Enough about the woman; let us pass to the man’s tasks. ‘To Adam he said: The earth is cursed in your works. In sorrow you shall eat from it all the days of your life. It shall produce thorns and thistles for you, and you shall eat the grass of your field. In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are earth, and into earth you shall go’ (Genesis 3:17–19) (Genesis 3:17-19). Here he did not say, ‘I will multiply your thorns or your sweat’ (Genesis 1:11–12); they are spoken of as though first created then. Yet this objection is removed with no greater effort than in his wife’s case.
First, it is not the human’s seed but the soil that is cursed: ‘The earth will be cursed in your works.’ What had the fields done to deserve the insult of a curse for the sin of someone else’s will, when they certainly could inherit nothing from Adam? Was it to teach by the very sods that a curse can exist where no fault exists? If sin was in the human but the curse in the crop, plainly guilt does not always attach to loss.
If the earth is cursed to afflict the sinner, while iniquity is not located where the curse is, why could the same condition not apply even if some miseries were shown to have been imposed on our nature after the first human’s sin? It would not follow that newborns are miserable to prove them guilty. Rather, by recalling the first sin, suffering handed down could warn against evil imitation those whom it had not made guilty. The earth likewise would be shown to have endured the insult of a curse to condemn the evil of another’s will, not to generate participation in its own guilt. Unless perhaps we believe soil dearer to God than innocence, so that while he does not allow another’s crime to pollute a clod, he nevertheless permits it to condemn infancy!
The curse is directed at the earth, then, but even this is not left unexplained. The purpose of the pronouncement and the way the soil is called cursed are set out: ‘In sorrow you shall eat from it all the days of your life.’ Notice how he explains himself. The earth is called cursed not because punishment could be inflicted on it, but because this name expresses the opinion of a grieving mind. Knowing it barren because of its cultivator’s deserts, the hungry worker in his distress would blame the soil for what he had himself deserved. Afflicted, he would call it cursed. Its fertility was withheld precisely so that the transgressor should acknowledge neither nature nor earth, but his own will and person, as subject to the curse.
‘It shall produce thorns and thistles for you.’ He was not content to say, ‘It shall produce thorns and thistles,’ but added ‘for you.’ Long before, at the command, the earth had produced thorny bushes among its other plants. Now, to sting the human being, it was promised to be thornier than usual. This could chastise Adam severely: after paradise’s springs and meadows, even one bramble could offend him.
But ‘In the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread’ does not seem to me especially connected with misery. Sweat is even a natural aid, refreshing the limbs of workers. The text itself testifies that cultivation’s labor lay upon him before sin: ‘The Lord God took the human he had made and placed him in paradise to work and guard it’ (Genesis 2:15). Even in paradise, then, God did not want him to receive food with absolutely no labor, but by requiring work stirred the industry he had implanted. What new thing do we believe happened if someone who experienced labor also felt sweat?
It continues: ‘Until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are earth, and into earth you shall go.’ This last part of the pronouncement, like the woman’s, concerns information, not punishment. Indeed, as the matter shows, it comforts the human by promising an end. Above, it had recalled pains, labors, and sweat, whose sensation nature received and whose excess the person received. Lest these seem to extend forever, the announced limit softens the distress—as though to say: You will not always suffer these things, but only until you return to the earth from which you were taken, because you are earth and into earth you shall go.
After saying, ‘Until you return to the earth from which you were taken,’ why did he not add, ‘Because you sinned and transgressed my commands’? That should have been said if bodily dissolution belonged to crimes. What did he say instead? ‘Because you are earth, and into earth you shall go.’ He showed the reason for returning to earth: ‘Because you are earth.’ The earlier words explained how he was earth: ‘Because you were taken from earth.’ If God said the reason for returning to earth was having been taken from earth, and that taking could not concern iniquity, then beyond doubt bodily dissolution in one who was not eternal belonged to mortal nature, not iniquity.
That barrenness of trees, abundance of thorns, and increased distress of painful childbirth were therefore imposed on particular people, not the race. When Cain and Abel were born, both shared one nature but had different wills. Cain, sinning voluntarily, gained nothing from the fact that his father’s sins did not burden him; Abel suffered no harm from his parents’ wrongdoing. Each, by personal judgment, through a different purpose and outcome, publicly showed that neither virtue nor vice carried a natural determination within him.
Performing priests’ work, they offered sacrifices to God their creator. Unequal care distinguished their outwardly equal service. God’s pronouncement made this clear, showing Abel’s gift pleased him. To the offended Cain he explained his displeasure: Cain had offered rightly but divided wrongly. Immediately the impious mind blazed with envy and, burdened by his brother’s holiness, gratified envy with a brother’s murder. Thus at the first occasion it became clear that death is not evil, since a righteous person was the first of all to undergo it.
Yet the guilty mind’s audacity did not escape God’s anger. Cain was questioned about his brother, convicted of his crime, and sentenced to punishment. Besides the terror laid upon him as the mark of his cruelty, he was punished by a curse from the earth: ‘You are cursed from the earth, which opened its mouth to receive your brother’s blood from your hand (Genesis 4:11). When you work the earth, it shall no longer give you its strength’ (Genesis 4:3–12). See, once again the earth’s barrenness is decreed as the cultivator’s punishment. Countless kinds of torments are also threatened in Deuteronomy (Deuteronomy 28:15–68).
What then? Did the thickets in our fields, which the farmer labors to cut back with his billhook, sprout through Cain’s murder? Since you think every owner of thorny land liable for the sin punished by abundant thorns, will all infants now be said not only to have eaten fruit, though born toothless, but also to have shed Abel’s blood? The madness reached by Manichaean inherited sin is clear. Since it contains nothing but insanity, catholics’ sober judgment laughs at your arguments; yet those same people’s affection weeps over your ruin.
6.28What, finally, will be said about the serpent itself? Do you think that curse punished the devil or this ordinary crawling animal? The pronouncement says to the serpent: ‘You are cursed beyond all cattle and all beasts upon the earth. You shall go upon your breast and belly and eat earth all the days of your life’ (Genesis 3:14). Do you think it was fulfilled in the devil’s punishment, or in the beast that spring warmth draws out of its holes?
If in this serpent, whose form stretches into a body without joints, and if you say that fault’s desert made it an earth-eater, then inherited iniquity burdens all beasts too. You think such transmission can occur only through the desire of those coupling. It follows that you must assert the devil planted the desire of serpents and hence of irrational animals. With your position exposed, you will blare Mani’s tune at us.
But if you acknowledge that everything said to the serpent was fulfilled spiritually in the devil, you will undoubtedly agree that the punishment spoken there neither proves present-day serpents guilty nor means the devil bodily eats earth. Even if he then enlisted the serpent’s service, and fatherly severity afterward broke it like the weapon he had used to wound humanity, sin still remained solely in the agent’s will.
Foods, thorns, and sweat were first established naturally, afterward increased judicially in certain cases, and have reached our own age [without that sin itself being passed on]. These matters are so plain that they require no lengthy defense.
6.29Yet lest we seem to have passed anything over carelessly, consider another point. Childbirth pain is known to vary with mothers’ bodies and strength. Women among foreign peoples and shepherds, hardened by exertion, give birth during journeys with such ease that they tend and immediately carry their offspring without interrupting the labor of travel. Not exhausted by childbirth’s difficulty, they transfer the womb’s burden to their shoulders. Generally, poor women’s lack of resources requires no midwives’ services. By contrast, wealthy women are softened by luxury: the more attendants each has, the more she learns and desires to be ill, and she thinks she needs as many services as she has available.
The hands of wealthy husbands certainly never experience the first human’s misery among thorns. Confident in their resources and placed beyond fear even of hunger by extensive estates, they consider it beneath them to spend a moment wishing for fertility. Sometimes, as the poet says, they order: ‘Unyoke the oxen, provided you send truffles’ (Genesis 3:16–19) (Juvenal, Satires 5.119).
If, then, women’s childbirth pain belongs to nature’s arrangements, as shown both by irrational animals’ example and the precise divine pronouncement; if withholding of fruit and the rise of thorns were created among other things but made denser and more troublesome for particular people; if childbirth’s difficulty and soil’s thorniness vary with bodies and regions; if the former pang continues in women’s inward parts after grace, while wealthy luxury knows nothing of the latter; and if the reason bodily dissolution would follow was expressly stated and attached to the manner of making rather than to errors—then here too everything plainly agrees with catholic truth. Neither women nor thorns help you at all.
6.30I certainly will not attack those who think Adam, had he obeyed, could have been transferred to immortality as a reward. We read that Enoch and Elijah were taken away so as not to see death (Genesis 5:24; Hebrews 11:5; 2 Kings 2:11). But nature’s arrangements are one thing, rewards for obedience another. One person’s merit is not so great as to overturn everything established naturally. Inborn mortality would therefore have continued operating in the rest, even if that first human had passed from prolonged life to eternity.
This rests not on a conjecture open to denial but on a certain example: Enoch’s children could not be freed from the condition of dying by their father’s immortality. Nor should anyone perhaps object that, if not sinners, at least all the righteous would have reached immortality without intervening bodily dissolution. Abel, first among the righteous, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and every company of saints in both Testaments displayed their merit through virtues and their nature through death.
Christ’s authority also confirmed this settled matter. The Sadducees put a question to him using a woman married seven times, asking which husband would chiefly claim her if bodily resurrection were believed. He answered: ‘You are mistaken, knowing neither the Scriptures nor God’s power (Matthew 22:29). In the resurrection they neither marry nor take wives, for they will not die’ (Matthew 22:29–30; Luke 20:35–36). Knowing his own work, he explained why he had instituted marriage: reproduction would make up death’s losses. Generous fertility would cease at once when grasping death ceased.
If, then, Christ who created it testifies that fertility was made to contend with frailty, and marriage’s condition was arranged before sin, mortality too plainly belongs not to transgression but to nature, to which we read marriage also belongs. The law promulgated—‘On the day you eat what is forbidden, you shall surely die’ (Genesis 2:17) (Hebrews 11:5)—therefore means penal death, not bodily death. It threatens sins, not reproductive seed; only transgression incurs it, and only reform escapes it.
Its being said to fall on the day of sin follows Scripture’s practice of calling condemned someone still to be condemned. Thus the Lord says in the Gospel: ‘Everyone who has not believed in me is already judged, because he has not believed in the name of God’s only-begotten (John 3:18) Son’ (John 3:18). This does not mean that unbelief denying Christ was already joined to eternal punishment before the time of judgment, since everyone who comes to faith was formerly an unbeliever. Rather, to display the lawgiver’s judgment, sins are spoken of as already punishments. Finally, both the book called Wisdom and many people’s opinion affirm that Adam himself was cleansed through subsequent reform (Wisdom of Solomon 10:1–2).
6.31Enough now about Genesis. Let us turn to the apostle Paul, whom Mani and the advocate of inherited sin think supports their opinion. Discussing the resurrection of the dead, he says: ‘As all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ’ (1 Corinthians 15:22). You, with whom we have our dispute, appropriated this testimony. But because you did not say what you thought it established, I can scarcely confirm it, though I suspect it.
What does it have to do with transmission of sin if everyone is said to die in Adam, when Adam is a human being’s name, while transmission denotes sin and Manichaean corruption? Unless perhaps you acknowledge Adam himself to be and to mean nothing other than sin, so that by this name the apostle seems to have pronounced that everyone dies in sin? But this is obviously insane.
What is strange, then, if, since the Hebrew word Adam means nothing other than ‘human’—as its translation expresses—the apostle said, ‘All die in Adam, and all will be made alive in Christ’: those who die according to human nature are raised from the dead through Christ’s power? Anyone denying this statement is mad. By the power of the same author who established fertility and mortality in this life, everyone will be raised from the graves, ‘so that each may receive what belongs to deeds done in the body, according to what was done, whether good or evil’ (2 Corinthians 5:10).
In the apostle’s saying, then, ‘As all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ,’ do you think he indicates bodily death, common to the just and unjust, or that penal death appointed for the devil and the ungodly? If this ordinary natural death, which in the saints is even precious (Psalm 116:15; LXX/Vulgate Psalm 116:15), and happens equally not only to good and evil people but also to humans and animals—if, I say, the apostle indicates this death—then plainly ‘Adam’ denotes human nature, while ‘Christ’ denotes the power of the Creator who raises the dead.
But if you want ‘All die in Adam’ to mean guilt rather than nature, an explanation is available as plain as it is certain: As all—that is, many—die by imitating Adam, so all—that is, many—are saved by imitating Christ. Either he spoke of common death and indicated nature, or of sin and condemned imitation. So he added shortly afterward: ‘As we have borne the image of the earthly one, let us also bear the image of the heavenly one’ (1 Corinthians 15:49). Certainly assuming the image could not be commanded if it were considered natural in either quality.
6.32But let us examine the whole context of the passage. ‘If Christ is proclaimed as raised from the dead,’ he says, ‘how do some among you say there is no resurrection of the dead? If there is no resurrection of the dead, Christ has not risen either. If Christ has not risen, our preaching is empty and your faith is empty. We are also found false witnesses about God, because we testified against God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise. For if the dead do not rise, Christ has not risen either. If Christ has not risen, your faith is vain, because you are still in your sins. Those who fell asleep in Christ have therefore perished too. If we hope in Christ only in this life, we are more pitiable than all people.
‘But now Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who sleep (1 Corinthians 15:20). Since death came through a human being, resurrection of the dead also comes through a human being. For as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ. But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then those who belong to Christ, at his coming; then the end’ (1 Corinthians 15:12–24).
6.33The outstanding teacher built his argument with great force and gave us hope through our shared condition with the Mediator. He maintained that this man, as regards the substance by which he is joined to us, possessed no exemption, and that the opinion adopted by unbelief could prejudice Christ no less than us. He therefore joins Christ’s case and humanity’s so closely that what is judged in one must necessarily be believed in the other.
At that time people had thought there would be no resurrection of the dead, yet they did not deny that Christ had risen. The Teacher of the Gentiles seizes this and pronounces that both sides must be open to the same judgment: either all humans are to rise, or Christ must be believed not to have risen. The apostle certainly would not have this argumentative force if, according to the Manichaeans and their disciples who teach inherited sin, he separated Christ’s flesh from participation in our nature (1 Corinthians 15:12–17).
6.34He would never say, ‘If the dead do not rise, Christ has not risen either,’ if someone could reply: But Christ rose exceptionally because he was born from a virgin; humans do not rise because they were born from a diabolical union. He would immediately answer: Then what was the empty point of rising, if it served neither our hope nor our instruction? What reasonable teaching or weighty example could there be if a nature unlike ours left us without both the hope of reigning with him and the power to imitate him?
The apostle’s faith stands far, very far from this opinion. Filled with the same Spirit as Peter, he knows Christ died for us to give us an example, so that we might follow his footsteps (1 Peter 2:21). Knowing that sacrifice and example were the purpose of so great a mystery, he does not hesitate to pronounce—indeed, carefully stresses—that Christ the human has reached no place from which any of us is excluded by our nature’s condition.
‘If there is no resurrection of the dead,’ he says, ‘Christ has not risen either. But if Christ has risen from the dead, how do some among you say there is no resurrection of the dead?’ (1 Corinthians 15:12–13). That is: If you acknowledge him, as human, to have possessed the same nature as ours, on what grounds do you either think resurrection occurred in him or will not occur in the rest? Having set out the conditions, he completes the judgment on every side: ‘But now Christ has risen from the dead’ (1 Corinthians 15:20); therefore there will be resurrection of the dead.
6.35Let us turn this force against inherited sin and say: If Christ, who became human, had no natural sin, how do some among you say inborn depravity rules God’s image? If evil exists in nature, Christ too, found in that same nature, is placed under the devil’s kingdom. If he is believed guilty, our preaching is empty and your faith is empty. The apostles are found false witnesses, because they testified against God that he formed his Son innocent and holy, from David’s seed according to the flesh (Romans 1:3), if the crime of cursed seed infected him. Certainly, if we hope in such a Christ, we are more pitiable than all people (compare 1 Corinthians 15:12–19).
But now Christ, no less truly human than truly God, generated from Adam’s stock, made from a woman and made under the law (Galatians 4:4), committed no sin and therefore had no sin (1 Peter 2:22). It is therefore clear that guilt belongs to will, not reproductive seed (Genesis 1:26–27).
6.36The Manichaeans are surely pierced through, both for believing natural sin and for denying flesh’s resurrection. ‘But now,’ he says, ‘Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who sleep. Since death came through a human being, resurrection of the dead also comes through a human being’ (1 Corinthians 15:20–21). Here the apostle speaks not of the general resurrection, which even criminals and impious people will experience, but only of those to be transferred into glory. He indicates blessed resurrection by the unqualified name ‘resurrection,’ passing over the ungodly’s rising as though, compared with it, it were no resurrection at all.
Here, then, as I said, the apostle stresses not simply resurrection, common to good and evil people, but blessed resurrection. Resurrection and the blessedness of resurrection are not the same thing, just as resurrection and the misery of resurrection are not the same. Yet because eternal blessedness does not exist without resurrection, its name also indicates the happiness that makes being raised no cause for regret.
For example, someone praising industry, strength, and diverse pursuits may wish to describe them briefly under the heading of life: calling one person’s life learned, another’s elegant, another’s energetic. This certainly does not remove the distinction, as though life were identical with industry, elegance, or strength. Living is one thing, striving another; nevertheless you cannot strive unless you live. Likewise resurrection is not identical with blessedness—there is a miserable raising of ashes—but you will not reign unless you first rise.
Bodily death and bodily resurrection therefore stand opposite each other. If every death were penal, every resurrection would also be a reward. But the resurrection of all who are assigned to eternal fire is penal; therefore death too need not be punishment, but is natural. Just as bodily death does not in every case make dying regrettable, resurrection does not in every case make returning to life delightful. The good in the latter lies in the reward of those rising, and the bitterness in the former in the burning of those punished; both follow according to deserts.
It is therefore clear that the apostle discusses not natural death but the death of criminals, made unhappy by perpetual punishment; not common resurrection but the resurrection made blessed by everlasting glory. Where he discusses persons he does not prejudice created natures. He always preserves the distinctions and broad boundaries of natures and wills, sometimes combining terms without letting confusion destroy the particular character of things.
‘Death through a human being, and resurrection of the dead through a human being’: he does not announce here that death was created by a human, but appeared in a human. Likewise he does not say resurrection was effected by a human—that is, by Christ as human—but in a human. So the same teacher says to the Philippians: ‘He became obedient to death, even death on a cross. Therefore God also exalted him and gave him the name above every name’ (Philippians 2:8–9).
The apostle Peter’s assertion agrees: ‘People of Israel, listen: Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved by God among you, you killed through the hands of the wicked. God raised him, releasing the pains of the underworld.’ Again: ‘God raised this Jesus, of whom we are all witnesses’ (Acts 2:22–24, 32). There it belonged to humanity to undergo death without injury to divinity, and to divinity to raise that man from the dead. Yet what God is declared to do, Christ himself also does in the person of the Word. For he had said: ‘I have power to lay down my life, and power to take it up’ (John 10:18). Although the Son is one person, a proper distinction attributes one thing to flesh, another to divinity.
Death through a human, then, and resurrection of the dead through a human: manifested, not created. Both were established by God. But death’s condition became evident in Adam, and resurrection’s firstfruits in Christ’s person. Here, where the apostle says, ‘Death through a human,’ if you mean through his will, it concerns no nature; if through nature, it concerns no fault. He placed two human beings opposite one another, one associated with death, the other with resurrection, refusing to subordinate the second to the first.
It follows: ‘As all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ’ (1 Corinthians 15:22). Does ‘All will be made alive in Christ’ include the ungodly, or refer only to believers? If to the ungodly, because everyone is made alive in Christ, no one is punished. If to believers, then not everyone is made alive in Christ’s faith, but only believers, although absolutely everyone is raised by the same power through which they were created.
If he speaks of bodily death—‘All die in Adam’—this name indicates no guilt, since Christ too is found to have died in that same Adam. The reality of resurrection would not have followed unless the reality of death came first. The apostle therefore pronounces that all die in Adam. If this death indicates nothing other than bodily dissolution, it plainly concerns no natural sin and prejudices no innocent people: they are said to die in Adam, in whom Christ also died.
But if you want ‘All die in Adam’ to concern sin of the soul—not mere death, but guilty and miserable death, followed by the punishment assigned to crimes—then neither Christ nor the saints could be in that Gehenna. It therefore prejudices no innocent people either, who possess no voluntary evil just as they possess no voluntary good, but have only this: they were made by God. We consecrate them through baptism’s rite, so that the one who made them good by creating them may make them better by renewing and adopting them. Thus the apostle’s saying, ‘As all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ,’ is as far from the suspicion of Manichaean inherited sin as Christ is from sin: he possessed no iniquity, yet lacked nothing of human nature.
6.37‘But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then those who belong to Christ at his coming; then the end’ (1 Corinthians 15:23–24) (1 Corinthians 15:23-24). Elsewhere the same apostle says: ‘He is the firstborn from the dead’ (Colossians 1:18). ‘Then those who belong to Christ’ (1 Corinthians 15:23): that is, the saints are caught up in the clouds (1 Thessalonians 4:17). After this, the end: these will go into the eternal kingdom, while the ungodly go into eternal fire (Matthew 25:34, 41, 46).
‘When he hands over the kingdom to God the Father, when he abolishes every rule and every authority and power—for he must reign until he puts all enemies under his feet; he has subjected everything beneath his feet—the last enemy, death, will be destroyed. When he says, Everything has been subjected, this plainly excludes the one who subjected everything to him. When everything has been subjected to him, then he himself will also be subject to the one who subjected everything to him, so that God may be all in all’ (1 Corinthians 15:24–28).
The kingdom of God the Father means that, when the number of saints contained in his foreknowledge is complete, every dominion and all the strength of hostile power will perish. The effect of so great a mystery must be to place all justice’s enemies beneath divine feet. This will happen when eternal death sees itself destroyed and defeated by all the saints.
When all those kinds of powers have been subjected to Christ and his body through the kingdom’s manifestation, the whole glorified congregation of saints will most certainly never cease to be subject to God. The entire body worthy of the kingdom of heaven, built under Christ as head, will cling to the divine will with perfect love, so that, with every desire for faults extinguished, God may both embrace and fill everyone.
6.38‘Otherwise,’ he says, ‘what will those baptized for the dead do, if the dead do not rise at all? Why are they baptized for them? Why do we also face danger every hour? I die daily, by the glory I have in you in the Lord. If, humanly speaking, I fought beasts at Ephesus, what does it profit me if the dead do not rise? Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die’ (1 Corinthians 15:29–32) (1 Corinthians 15:29-32).
If, he says, impious unbelief shakes this hope of future glory, in which God will be all in all, and denies resurrection of the dead, what will those baptized for the dead do? From this arose some people’s error: they think the early Gospel period had a custom whereby bystanders made the profession on behalf of corpses and even washed the dead person’s limbs with baptismal water. This plainly arose from ignorance. The apostle’s phrase ‘baptized for the dead’ indicates nothing other than what he said to the Romans: ‘We were buried with him through baptism into death’ (Romans 6:4).
That is: Why do we approach baptism in a spirit of putting our members to death thereafter and living wholly as dead, if there is no hope of living after death? Why, he says, do I submit to daily dangers, constantly encountering the death persecutors inflict, so that I may boast before God of your progress, if the dead do not rise? Why, humanly speaking, did I fight beasts at Ephesus—that is, endure the beastlike fury of rioters—if resurrection of the dead is still uncertain?
‘Do not be deceived: bad conversations corrupt good morals. Some have ignorance of God; I say this to your shame’ (1 Corinthians 15:33–34) (1 Corinthians 15:33). Love of sins, he says, persuades you to distrust future things. People suppose there is no judgment so that they may sin more boldly. Those denying resurrection, he says, completely fail to understand God. You therefore deny not only reward but divine power, and should be deeply ashamed. I say it to your shame that such people can be found among you.
6.39‘But someone will say: How do the dead rise? In what body do they come? Fool, what you sow is not made alive unless it first dies. Not all flesh is the same: human flesh is one kind, animals’ (1 Corinthians 15:39) another; birds’ flesh one kind, fish another. There are heavenly bodies and earthly bodies, but the glory of heavenly bodies differs from the glory of earthly bodies. The sun has one glory, the moon another, and the stars another, for star differs from star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead.
‘It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption; sown in dishonor, it will rise in glory; sown in weakness, it will rise in power; sown an animate body, it will rise a spiritual body. Thus it is also written: The first human, Adam, became a living soul; the last Adam a life-giving spirit. The first human is from earth, earthly; the second human from heaven, heavenly. As the earthly one is, so are earthly people; as the heavenly one is, so are heavenly people. As we have borne the earthly one’s image, let us also bear the heavenly one’s image’ (1 Corinthians 15:49).
He masters the difficulty through examples, saying that nothing is impossible when omnipotence promises the result. Just as he commends bodily resurrection through comparison with seeds, he explains differences among those rising through the variety of creatures. Yet throughout he speaks of the blessed’s resurrection. ‘It is sown in dishonor, it will rise in glory; sown in weakness, it will rise in power; sown an animate body, it will rise a spiritual body.’ This can certainly be fulfilled only in the saints. The ungodly are raised not into glory but into everlasting disgrace, as the prophet declares (compare Jeremiah 23:40; Daniel 12:2).
Here he appropriately distinguishes nature and grace, recalling the old testimony: ‘The first human, Adam, became a living soul’ (Genesis 2:7), then adding in his own words, ‘The last Adam a life-giving spirit.’ He shows that immortality’s gifts belong to the life-giving spirit, while a soul that merely lives belongs to a nature that will one day die. Living, then, he says, is not the same as life-giving. The life-giving one bestows immortality, which he assigns to Christ; the living one enjoys life but does not exclude mortality. He distinguished the two statements for this purpose: to show Adam was made living, but not immortal, while Christ became a spirit not merely living but bestowing resurrection—glorious for his own people, everlasting for everyone.
6.40‘But the spiritual did not come first,’ (1 Corinthians 15:46) he says; ‘the animate came first, and then the spiritual. The first human is from earth, earthly; the second human from heaven, heavenly. As we have borne the earthly one’s (1 Corinthians 15:49) image, let us also bear the heavenly one’s image’ (1 Corinthians 15:46–47, 49). He plainly turns to our pursuits, wanting the difference between our past and present conduct to be as great as that between mortality and immortality. ‘The first human is from earth, earthly; the second human from heaven, heavenly.’ (1 Corinthians 15:47) He uses the names of substances to indicate a difference of purpose.
Christ, whom he calls the heavenly human, did not bring his flesh down from heaven. He received it from David’s seed, from Adam’s seed, and within a woman from a woman’s flesh. ‘Earthly’ and ‘heavenly’ therefore refer to virtues and vices. The next words confirm it: ‘As we have borne the earthly one’s image, let us also bear the heavenly one’s image.’ So also to the Romans: ‘I speak in human terms because of your flesh’s weakness (Romans 6:19). Just as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and lawlessness toward lawlessness, now present your members to serve justice toward sanctification’ (Romans 6:19).
Following the course of his exhortation, he adds something that, unless understood, will seem to overthrow all he has said: ‘I say this, brothers: flesh and blood cannot possess God’s kingdom (1 Corinthians 15:50), nor will decay possess everlasting life’ (1 Corinthians 15:50). In these very passages he has labored only to establish flesh’s resurrection, saying it would be placed in the kingdom’s glory. Now he pronounces that flesh and blood cannot possess God’s kingdom. If flesh cannot possess it and blood cannot possess it, where is the resurrection of the dead whose splendor he has been setting forth above? But, following Scripture’s usage, he calls vices, not substance, ‘flesh and blood.’
He makes this very point clear: ‘Look, I tell you a mystery: we shall all rise, but we shall not all be changed’ (1 Corinthians 15:51). The outstanding teacher understood that above he had reserved the word resurrection for future blessedness alone. Therefore, to remove ambiguity, he explains: ‘We shall all rise’—here is the common raising; ‘but we shall not all be changed’—here is the blessed’s resurrection. Change into glory is owed only to those who deserve God’s love rather than his anger.
‘In a moment,’ he says, ‘in the blink of an eye, at the last trumpet, the dead will rise incorruptible, and we shall be changed’ (1 Corinthians 15:52). Here again he turns to the saints whom that day will find in the flesh. He says that in a moment as brief as the final ending of a sound, those who had died will be raised incorruptible—that is, whole—and those found alive will be changed into glory.
‘For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal put on immortality. When this mortal has put on immortality, then the written saying will happen: Death has been swallowed up into your victory. Where, death, is your sting? Where is your victory? Death’s sting is sin, and sin’s power is the law’ (1 Corinthians 15:53–56; compare Isaiah 25:8; Hosea 13:14).
He shows, as often, that he speaks only of the saints’ resurrection. Passing over the ungodly’s raising, he pronounces it fitting that in the saints’ bodies corruptibility should be swallowed by everlasting glory. When this is fulfilled, he says, it will be possible to taunt the devil and perpetual death, which made this natural corruption seem evil. Then the saints’ joys will rebuke it, seeing that they have crushed death’s sting, and will say: ‘Where, death, is your sting? Where is your victory? Death’s sting is sin, and sin’s power is the law.’
That is: Eternal death, you had sin as a sting with which to wound deserters of justice. Had you not been armed with this sting—that is, voluntary sin—you would have harmed no one at all. You see this sin and this sting broken by faith’s strength. Our reward bears witness, the reward from which you tried to lead us away. Your sting was sin, and the power of your sin was the law, because ‘where there is no law, neither is there transgression’ (Romans 4:15).
Or, certainly, although sin was your sting, it became stronger—only in transgressors’ minds—after the death threatened by the law was brought to it. Yet the law was not given to sharpen it. ‘The law is holy, and the commandment holy, just, and good. But sin, to appear sin, produced death in me through the good, so that sin itself might become exceedingly sinful through the commandment’ (Romans 7:12–13).
This strength your sting gained through the assistance of our voluntary iniquity is now proved defeated and broken by believers’ virtues and believers’ crowns. We therefore taunt you, ‘giving thanks to our God, who gave us this victory through our Lord Jesus Christ’ (1 Corinthians 15:57).
6.41In this passage Augustine thinks death’s sting is that ancient sin, failing to understand what follows: ‘Sin’s power is the law’ (1 Corinthians 15:56). He tries to identify this law as the command given to Adam. But that law was not sin’s power; it was the occasion of sin’s coming into being. Giving strength to an existing thing differs from bringing into existence what did not exist.
Eating from that tree would not have been evil if it had not been forbidden. Once forbidden and then taken through transgression, sin arose there from the encounter of prohibition and contempt. The law was not given for the purpose of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, in doing the same thing—that is, eating from the tree—the human would not have sinned, because the tree was good, unless tasting it had been forbidden by law.
What is wrong in itself—for example, murder of a parent, sacrilege, adultery—and is recognized as evil even without enacted law can rightly be said to gain strength through the law in transgressors whom prohibition makes more eager. But when an act is not wrongfully undertaken unless forbidden, the law’s occasion properly supplies its origin as sin, not its strength.
Since I have been rather lengthy here, I close this book too by reminding my reader to examine carefully and see that God’s law offers no occasion for Manichaean impiety. If any passages are thought ambiguous, let the reader not doubt that they can be explained according to the rules of truth and reason and made consistent with justice. We condemn with the same force, a force fitting God’s law, both those who say there will be no resurrection of the dead through Christ and those who equally oppose the apostle by asserting that Christ did not possess a body of our nature, thereby honoring Manichaean doctrines.
From Via Patrum: https://viapatrum.org/works/julian-to-florus/. Licence: CC BY 4.0. Credit: Via Patrum.