System of Sacred Theology

Syntagma sacrae theologiae

Ludwig Crocius (1586–1655 AD)

Translated from the Latin by Via Patrum.

About this text

Ludwig Crocius's System of Sacred Theology (Bremen, 1636), all four books: theology and its rule in Scripture; man's last end, death and the resurrection; God, the Trinity, creation, providence and sin; and the grace of Christ, the Word and sacraments, faith, the Christian life and prayer.

Ludwig Crocius (1586–1655) taught theology and philosophy at Bremen and sat as a delegate at the Synod of Dort (1618–1619). A Calvinist of the irenic school, he spent his career seeking common ground between the Reformed and Lutheran churches.

His System of Sacred Theology (Bremen, 1636) is a full Reformed dogmatics in the high-orthodox style: precise definitions, ordered questions, objections raised and answered.

Date1636 AD (Bremen; Reformed professor)

EditionSyntagma sacrae theologiae (Bremen: Berthold Villerian, 1636)

English follows the 1636 Bremen Latin (Berthold Villerian), read chapter by chapter from the SLUB Dresden page images, with a machine reading of the same pages as a check. No modern English was copied. The author index at the end of the volume is not translated.

Reference

VD17 14:684303C. SLUB id335860389.

We have not yet re-checked this work against its source. We made this study translation with AI help. No scholar has yet certified it as faithful and complete. Open Latin on any section, or the Latin source link, to see the source text. It is not a critical edition.

System of Sacred Theology — Book 1

Sacred theology is a practical habit that teaches how to worship God and reach eternal life §1.1.1

1.1.1Book I. On the nature and constitution of sacred theology. Chapter 1. On the definition of theology.

Theology is a practical habit of the intellect, fully sealed by the mystical Holy Spirit from the divine disclosure in the Holy Scriptures, teaching a person on the Spirit's way — according to age, calling, and the measure of his own faith — the manner of worshipping God and of obtaining eternal life, unto the glory of God.

Scholion. First it is asked what the word theology properly signifies: whether in Holy Scripture one reads a God-speech or God-discourse — that is, the reason or speech of God by which we are instructed by God — or the reason, speech, or mental conception about God and divine things formed from the Scriptures by the power of the Holy Spirit. It is taken here in both senses.

For most weightily blessed Irenaeus says that no one can truly know God unless God himself teaches; from (John 6:45): It is written in the Prophets, And they shall all be taught by God. Whoever therefore has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me. For it is not left, says Hilary in book 7 On the Trinity, to human eloquence to speak of the things of God by other words than the speech of God. All other things are narrow, shut in, hindered, and obscure. If anyone wants to demonstrate this by other words than those by which it was spoken by God, either he himself does not understand, or he leaves it not to be understood by his readers. From book 1 On the Trinity: When the discourse is about the things of God, let us grant the knowledge of himself to God; let us serve his speech with pious reverence. For he is a fit witness for himself who is not known as to himself. Let the mystery of heaven, says Ambrose in book 5, letter 31, be taught me by God himself who made it, not by man who has not known himself. To whom should I rather trust concerning God than to God?

Yet lest some fanatic abuse Christ's saying in (John 6:45), here is worth considering the exposition which Urbanus Regius, a serious theologian of the past age, has in the body of doctrine to Julius on formulas for speaking carefully, under the ninth title. We, he says, do not rashly produce this place. For by the unskilled it is tossed about as an encomium of ignorance. And here they think they have a word of God by which all the liberal arts and even the studies of theology themselves may be exploded. Christ sufficiently explains this place in John 6: No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up on the last day. And it is written in the prophets: And they shall all be taught by God. Everyone therefore who has heard from the Father and has learned comes to me. Here Christ speaks of that common doctrine necessary for all who are to be saved, by which we acknowledge Christ to be the Son of God made man for our salvation, and believe in him as our only Savior. By this doctrine certainly all the elect are illuminated; and those who lack it will be condemned. But there is also in the church another learning, which is called the gift of prophecy, with which gift not all Christians are endowed, but those who are set over churches for teaching, that they may expound the Holy Scriptures unto edification, exhortation, and consolation, of which mention is made in (1 Corinthians 14:1-5). This gift is not common to all believers — to tailors and cobblers and apostles alike. Those who lack it ought not to teach in the church, but reverently to hear those who teach, as the Apostle says: If there is no interpreter, let him keep silence in the church, and let him speak to himself and to God.

Indeed the word theology is not read expressly in the Scriptures except for its cognate in the title of the Apocalypse, where John the Evangelist is called Theologian in the strictest sense, as one who asserted the divinity of the Word both by the Gospel history and by his Apocalypse. Yet the term is frequented by the ancient fathers, by profane writers, by the schoolmen, and finally by more recent theologians. Nor is it necessary that a technical vocabulary exist in the Scriptures, because they do not propose the formulas of arts and disciplines, but the things to be believed unto salvation.

Theology is called sacred over against profane science, and is a practical habit aiming at faith and eternal life §1.1.2

1.1.2Why is it called sacred? Because as something set apart it is distinguished from the profane — whether from natural theology, which is known under the light of right reason and is a part of true philosophy, or from the superstitious, which is born from the blindness and hallucination of human reason and is a part of falsely so-called knowledge and empty deceit (1 Timothy 6:20; Colossians 2:8).

Is it a practical habit of the intellect? That it is a habit of the intellect no one will easily deny who at least acknowledges it as a doctrine or discipline. But whether it is a practical habit, the opinions of theologians differ, both of the older and of the more recent. And it is worst of all that the papal schools dispute this ineptly and less theologically — though not without sharpness and subtleties — presupposing philosophical disputations and afterward laboring over the accommodation of theology, while they do not have Scripture as companion.

Among the more recent, most follow a middle opinion, some the first, but the chief and leading men seem to embrace the last, by the argument of the analytic order in which they treat theology — as Melanchthon, Luther, Calvin, Bullinger, Ursinus, Keckermann, and lately William Ames the Englishman, professor at Franeker, Dr. Constantijn L'Empereur, professor at Leiden, and others. To this last opinion we cast our vote in this way: first we explain the terms, then we confirm it by reasons. The terms are (1) theology, (2) practical habit, (3) practice. By theology here we do not understand that which is God's own, as is plain from question 1, but that which is prescribed to us concerning the kingdom of God. And a practical habit is so called denominatively, as the intellect itself is, because of its extension to practice.

So we prove it. First, by clear testimonies of Scripture that express the final end both of the Gospel (concerning the doctrine of the law there is no doubt that it is practical) and of the system in which the doctrine of the Gospel is handed down summarily and methodically arranged: (John 20:31; Romans 15:4; 2 Timothy 3:16-17; Ecclesiastes 12:13; 1 Timothy 1:5; 1 Corinthians 8:1-3; 1 Corinthians 13:2; James 1:22-25; Revelation 22:14).

Second, from the first intention and the internal end, which in reality are the same. That discipline whose first intention and last internal end is practical is a practical habit. But the first intention and last internal end of sacred theology is practical. Therefore sacred theology is a practical habit. The major is plain. The minor is proved first from the first reason, because from the testimonies recited it is clear that theology aims at faith, which is effective through love (Galatians 5:6) and produces the fruit of good works that conform to the divine law in the worship of God and the love of neighbor.

Next, that theology also aims at and regards the generation and confirmation of faith, and the amendment of life as the fruit of faith, is proved from the last external end — namely eternal life — to which we can come only through faith as the apprehending means. That act by which alone a person is led to eternal life is first intended by theology. But faith is that act by which alone a person is led to eternal life, as will be proved below in its place. Therefore faith is first intended by theology.

Third and fourth proofs from practical means and the mode of the primary object; theology is a practical habit §1.1.3

1.1.39. Third, from practical means. That discipline whose means do not stop in theory but extend themselves to practice is a practical habit. But the means of sacred theology do not stop in theory; they extend themselves to practice. Therefore sacred theology is a practical habit. The major shines with its own light. The minor is proved because the Word of God and the sacraments, by which the Holy Spirit works and confirms faith, do not stop in bare speculation but are handed down for the sake of something else (1 Timothy 1:5; 1 Timothy 4:1 and following).

10. Fourth, from the mode of the primary object. That discipline which does not know its primary object merely in order to know it, but in order to do something about what is known — that is, to worship God by loving him above all things, to correct and humble itself in order to him, and to love the neighbor in order to the same as itself, by building him up — is a practical habit. But sacred theology does not know its primary object merely in order to know it, but in order to do something about what is known. Therefore sacred theology is a practical habit.

11. From all these things it is indeed plain that sacred theology is a practical habit: for it is known not merely in order that it may be known, remaining shut within the intellect in cognition — which is the specific difference of theoretical disciplines, by which they are distinguished from practical ones — but also so that it may extend itself beyond the intellect, namely so that the will may rest in the object known by the intellect: that is, may by faith apprehend the grace of God offered, may love the offering God above all things and the rest in order to him and for his sake, and may set its hope in him — which is altogether a practical discipline.

And a heap of divine testimonies may be brought forward by which this discipline is praised not only as prudence but also as wisdom, as may be seen in (Proverbs 7:4; James 3:17) and many others, both elsewhere and in the Theological Precognita of Master Alsted and in the Syntagma of Doctor Polanus.

Four objections: theology holds theorems; the practical object is the doable; it treats theory as well as practice; eternal life is cognition §1.1.4

1.1.4Next, someone may object that theology contains many theorems — God is; God is one; God is infinitely perfect — and very many like them handed down by us ourselves in theology, from which he gathers this: the object of a practical discipline is the doable (τὸ πρακτόν), which can be produced by us; the object of theology is not the doable which can be produced by us; therefore theology is not a practical discipline. The minor is proved because the object of theology is God and divine things.

Third, someone may take exception: theology does not treat only of practice, that is, of the worship of God, but also of theory or the knowledge of God. Therefore it is not only practical but also theoretical.

Fourth, someone may bring forward: the eternal life that theology sets forth is situated in the knowledge of God (John 17:3). Therefore theology is rather theoretical than practical. The reason of the consequence is that cognition is an act of the intellect and looks to theory.

Replies to the first and second objections: Hebrew wise for just; theorems ordered to practice; the doable in itself or in another §1.1.5

1.1.513. We reply to the first. First, it is not yet clear whether those places treat of sacred theology as a discipline methodically shaped and arranged — which is the question here — and so a doubt is proved by an equally doubtful thing. Second, even if we liberally grant that these and other sayings of Scripture alleged for this matter treat of sacred theology as such, they still do not prove it non-practical but theoretical, or at least partly theoretical and partly practical — which is what those who differ from us separately desire. For those places more carefully inspected show a Hebraism by which wise is frequently used in Scripture for the prudent and the just, because he is described almost everywhere from just actions. So also the whole book of Proverbs uses the word wisdom everywhere. From chapter 10 verse 11 the most learned Thomas Cartwright says on this place that he who is here called wise appears to be called just, so that he who, justified by faith, does not cultivate righteousness is not truly to be counted wise.

Yet in truth, even if some documents in theology, considered in themselves and by themselves, are theorems of things proposed to be known: still, when related and weighed, as is fair, to their whole as parts of theology and to its last end, all are theorems of manners or practical monuments — for they are handed down not only to be known or contemplated, but to be referred to the worship of God and the salvation of man. Hence by a notable theoretical science of God and divine things hypocrites and the ungodly are made no better or happier. Truly Justin Martyr: our religion consists not in words but in deeds. If that respect is neglected and set aside, no practical discipline at all will be given, because there is no practice that does not include some knowledge.

14. In the first syllogism we distinguish the major. For the object of a practical discipline is the doable, either in itself and its nature, or in another which, though distinct from the object, is so joined to it that the object is known and the discipline treated for its sake. Minor is not true. For although God in himself and his nature is not the doable, yet the simply first and necessary end, and the justification of his name, for which he is proposed to be known in theology, is the doable. John Duns Scotus (on the Sentences book 1 question 4) asserts that even these theological propositions — God is triune; the Father begets the Son; the Father and the Son breathe the Holy Spirit — are practical, because they virtually include the knowledge of the rightness of love tending to the three persons of the Deity, none excluded. As for divine things, some are from God alone, as the works of creation and redemption; others principally from God and secondarily, in a certain respect, also from man, insofar as human actions also concur toward them — as faith, justification, sanctification, and the whole worship of God. The former are referred to the doable in the way God is; the latter are such in themselves and their nature.

Replies to the third and fourth objections; Gerhard on practical theology; orthodoxy and Christian life §1.1.6

1.1.615. To the third, we deny the consequence, because not just any cognition makes a theoretical discipline, but only that which does not of itself direct to practice. But the theological knowledge of God of itself directs a person to the practice of piety.

16. To the fourth, we deny the consequence. Eternal life consists in cognition not as in an end, but as in a means to the end, without which no adult attains the end — namely his salvation and the sanctification of God's name. Doctor Johannes Gerhard, professor at Jena, agrees with us among others in the preface to his Meditations. It is agreed, he says, that theology is a practical doctrine, and therefore those think less rightly who contend that it is speculative, among whom are some of the scholastics. For although not only things to be done, but also things to be believed and hoped, are proposed in this heavenly philosophy, that still does not hinder its still being called practical. For medicine too is occupied with the theory of certain things, and yet is not therefore a theoretical discipline, because it pursues that very theory by reason of practice and in order to practice: the same applies to theology that in those very things to be believed, or in the articles of faith, not bare knowledge but also assent is required, which those to whom this care belongs confirm by arguments to be an act on the will's side. But if theology is a practical doctrine, then surely its end also will not be bare knowledge and subtle theory, but rather practice. If you know these things, blessed are you if you do them, says the Savior to the disciples. The strength of our religion consists not in words but in deeds, says Justin. The sum of religion is to imitate him whom you worship, says Augustine. If therefore the end and perfection of the Christian religion is not bare knowledge but practice, how few will you find today who are truly Christians! Everywhere much science, little conscience. It is most right that orthodoxy is defended by books, disputations, sermons, and every means: but care must also be taken that life answer to the Christian profession. Thus Doctor Gerhard.

Sacred theology is not among Aristotle's five logical virtues; spiritual things differ in kind from natural disciplines §1.1.7

1.1.717. Sacred theology, truly and properly speaking, cannot be referred to any of the five logical virtues that Aristotle explains in Nicomachean Ethics book 6, because the things it considers differ in kind — or by their whole nature and condition — from those things from whose variety and unequal nature those five habits of mind and their ends and aims are deduced.

For the three theoretical perfections or habits turn about necessary things, whose knowledge can be searched out by the keenness of the human mind without the Word of God: the knowledge of spiritual things cannot without the Word of God. Contingent things, of which some fall under our action and others under our making, are placed in our power and were first searched out by human study and industry, so that they can be acquired. Hence civil happiness in Ethics book 1 is everywhere called a human good.

But spiritual things are by no means in a person's power and cannot be acquired at his choice: they either are in us by generation from corrupt seed, as original sin, which is the peculiar disease of the animal human being brought forth into light by natural procreation from the corrupt; or they are God-given (θεόδοτον), that is, they come from heaven by mere grace and mercy — as true conversion to God, faith, remission of sins, regeneration, and so on.

Although this discipline, which must be held most firmly, considers spiritual things, and is therefore diverse in whole kind from the other disciplines called theoretical, practical, or productive: still with those called practical and productive it has no small analogy.

Analogy with practical arts: fixed end, subject, and exact definition of the end as justification §1.1.8

1.1.81. For just as in practical — and even in productive — disciplines a certain end is set forth, which is the measure and norm of all the other things considered in them, by which it can be known what belongs to them by right of property and what is more or less ancillary and foreign to them: so also theology has a certain end, about which none of those who in every age have been engaged in this kind of study has ever doubted — namely righteousness before God, which whether you call it before God, or remission of sins, or the inheritance of eternal life, or salvation, or by whatever other name, so long as you understand the thing itself, nothing more concerns this our design.

2. Just as in practical disciplines it is usual to consider the subject set under the end that comes — namely the human being — so the human being under vice is no less necessary in this discipline than the human body and its parts in medicine, and without doubt a hundred thousand times more necessary because of the greatness of the most atrocious spiritual disease of all human beings, plainly hidden beneath reason.

3. Just as in practical disciplines and arts it is supremely necessary that the definition of the end itself, which is the principle of cognition, be constituted most accurately — whence Aristotle carefully warns both about this and about other principles near the end of Nicomachean Ethics book 1 chapter 7 that care must be taken that they be rightly defined, since they have great force for what follows — so in sacred theology the most exact definition of the end, or of justification and eternal life, must be sought from the sacred letters.

Hence almost a thousand times Doctor Luther and other orthodox theologians inculcate in their writings, nearly to nausea, that if the article of justification is lost, the whole Christian doctrine is lost at once; likewise that whoever deny the article of justification at once take CHRIST out of the midst; likewise that when the article of justification is known we walk in clearest light, and when it is unknown in densest darkness; likewise that when this one article is well constituted and known the papacy is overthrown. The reason of these assertions is twofold. First, because the justification of the sinful human being before God is the end for whose sake the whole of sacred Scripture has been disclosed from heaven, and so the aim of our whole theology, which for this end is learned in the schools, taught in the church, and practiced. Second, because if this end is not well constituted and defined, those things cannot be rightly known which have been ordained from heaven for attaining the end and prescribed to us in theology as the speech of the kingdom.

From the defined end come the means, chiefly faith; theology differs from other disciplines in end, means, and subject §1.1.9

1.1.9Just as in practical disciplines from the notion or well-constituted definition of the end the means leading to the end are elicited and known — and especially those nearer the attaining of the end, as Aristotle teaches (Posterior Analytics book 1 chapter 2; Ethics book 1 toward the beginning of the last chapter) — so also in theology, when justification is well known and accurately defined, that nearest means is more easily known by which alone sinners are made righteous before God, namely faith, which rests on God's mercy and the merit of our Savior Jesus Christ.

I say the nearest means, because there are also others a little more remote, such as the preaching and hearing of the heavenly Word and the use of the sacraments, by which God gathers a Church for himself, the Holy Spirit is effectual, and by the sermon of the law, as by lightning and thunder, strikes consciences and leads them into the acknowledgment of their sins, while he stirs true grief for having offended God. But by the voice of the Gospel he again soothes those struck and as it were raises them from spiritual death and kindles and confirms true faith; by which alone, apprehending God's mercy and Christ's merit, sinners are made righteous before God and are brought into his obedience.

Yet lest anyone be deceived by these analogies and likenesses, our most august sacred theology — of which we dare to pronounce with better right and more truly than Aristotle of his, from Metaphysics book 3 chapter 2, that it is most princely and mistress, to which it is unlawful for the others, as handmaids, to contradict — differs from the others in this: (1) that the end of the others, and the means leading to the end, are of our choice; but by no means are the end and means of sacred theology of the choice of our old Adam; (2) that the subject of the other disciplines also contributes something to the end; but the subject of this one, the sinful human being, contributes plainly nothing. For the Holy Spirit wholly effects the conversion of the sinful human being and kindles the faith by which alone he is made righteous before God.

Although theological learning, insofar as it is common to the holy and the unholy, admits a certain comparison with philosophical habits: yet prophecy, since it is called the gift of understanding and explaining Scripture (1 Corinthians 14:1 and following), rests on its own singular and proper principles and rules.

IV. Whether sacred theology is the same as the habit of faith and piety; science and wisdom §1.1.10

1.1.10IV. Is sacred theology therefore the same as the habit of faith and piety? Faith is a practical habit, and can rightly be called a doctrine or discipline objectively, according to that word of Christ (John 6:45): Everyone who hears from the Father and learns comes to me. For the object of faith is taught by God and learned by human beings: and without this no one is pleasing to God or is saved (Hebrews 11:6; Mark 16:16).

But sacred theology is another habit, which deduces, explains, confirms the articles of faith from their principles and foundations, and defends them against adversaries. Although this habit is not in all the faithful, yet it is uniquely required by the Apostle in a teacher of the Church (1 Corinthians 12:1 and following). Without this habit many please God and are saved, as unlearned believers: and with this habit, if it is without faith and the struggle of the Spirit, many displease God and are condemned, as unbelieving teachers, hypocrites, seditious wranglers, and tyrants (Matthew 7:21–23; Matthew 23:2, 13, 15; Luke 11:52). Compare the illustration of blessed Augustine (On the Trinity book 14 chapter 1) explaining (1 Corinthians 12:8).

The schools wrongly distinguish science from faith, yet with a praiseworthy intention. For faith is knowledge (Isaiah 53:11). And one must glory in this knowledge as in a gift diverse from worldly knowledge (Jeremiah 9:23). The scholastics meant to teach that Christian faith is not produced by demonstrations that produce human science, because faith is of things not seen and does not rest on philosophical principles or things known by nature. And this is not badly but usefully warned, insofar as theological faith is discerned from philosophical science. Yet this also ought to have been observed: that sacred Scripture takes up philosophical science, as collapsing under its own mass in divine things, and rebuilds what has been made vain, new foundations laid under and new stays added, so that, cultivated from a sacred beginning, it may issue in faith vigorous with the strength of the Word because of God its author.

Experience teaches that whatever philosophers seem somehow to weave about God and divine things, the more curiously and accurately they try to establish it, the less at last they reach its end. And the Apostle rightly wrote (Romans 1:21): They became vain in their reasonings. Therefore the wisdom of the wise is abolished, and the understanding of the understanding is taken out of the midst.

Further, from (1 John 2:3–4; 1 John 3:6; 1 Corinthians 8:1–2) it is easily understood that so great a science of sacred things consists in two things: (1) in the truth of a certain common and universal knowledge about the Word of God and the dogmas of the church; (2) and indeed chiefly in the efficacy of knowledge or in the truth of application, by which our mind rightly accommodates common principles and dogmas to things to be done and to singulars and discerns the things that are excellent (Philippians 1:10; Philemon 1:6; Ephesians 5:10) — that is, so that it may form a practical judgment about the things that occur to be done, which is truly consentaneous to the principles. Otherwise it happens that what we confess with the mouth we deny by deeds (Titus 1:16). That common knowledge, when destitute of efficacy, the Apostle calls puffing-up science: in respect of which whoever would think himself to know God is a liar if we believe John — having indeed a form of truth but denying its power (2 Timothy 3:5).

For this reason he is not sufficiently properly called a theologian, just as he is not properly called prudent in human affairs who, when he has understood common principles, rich in theory, either in no way or badly accommodates the same to singular counsels — as the most exact theologian Doctor Conrad Bergius, my most sincere colleague, truly discusses in the Precognita on Loci Communes Theology, chapter on the internal form of theology, and thence wisely gathers two things: (1) that theology can indeed be true even which an ungodly person possesses, as to the truth of common knowledge; but as to application it will not be true but hypocritical; and Scripture in comparison with the science of the saints judges it unworthy of the name of science and therefore also of theology; (2) that one is a better theologian as to the breadth of science, another as to the efficacy of science — who without doubt is more approved by God.

We say that theology is science and wisdom, not speaking philosophically, but in a mode singularly fitted to this doctrine. For it differs from philosophical science and wisdom by principles not known of themselves; it is confirmed by the authority of God the teacher, to whom they are known of themselves; and it is inspired by a peculiar grace and power, yet through the Word. And that there is a difference of theological wisdom and science is plain from (1 Corinthians 12:8): through the Spirit to one is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge. This seems chiefly to be it: that science is taken of the cognition of doctrine, but wisdom of the skilled use of science (Job 28:28; Proverbs 14:8; Proverbs 27:12).

V–VI. Philosophical names of habits are alien if taken strictly; theology's principles are from revelation, method from industry §1.1.11

1.1.11V. Is the appellation of intelligence, science, wisdom, art, or prudence alien from the nature and definition of sacred theology? Altogether, if one prefers to speak of these habits agreeably to their philosophical definitions with Aristotle, the prince of philosophers — except for one spiritual prudence or faith, by which properly there is cognition of things pertaining to the kingdom of God, which is truly a practical habit and the genus of theology — also by the suffrage of him who writes publicly that theology is practical, not speculative, not by that common reason by which all arts and disciplines have their activity for an end, but especially concerning practice. But whoever attributes all these appellations to one sacred theology not popularly but properly in an accurate and philosophical kind of speech, by the same work attributes contradictory differences to the same defined thing, which we taught to be absurd in question 2 number 4. Nor does the contrary reason bind — namely that all these things are in any accurate discipline. For both the nature of disciplines distinguished from one another by opposite differences, and the whole chorus of the best philosophers, refute this. Otherwise, when the object of theology is taken in such breadth that it embraces whatever things are in the nature of things created and ordered by God, insofar as they are to be referred to God as to their principle and end, even Physics, Ethics, Politics, and other disciplines are contained within the terms of theology — as the most celebrated theologian of the Leiden Academy, Doctor Johannes Polyander, observes from Augustine's letter to Volusianus (Synopsis of purer theology, disputation 1 thesis 12).

VI. Whether sacred theology is from nature and human habit of inquiry, as the remaining disciplines, or rather from divine revelation and institution? A distinction must be made between the principles, the things underlying sacred theology, and the methodical explanation, demonstration, and disposition of principles, things, and conclusions deduced from them.

As to the former: the principles of other disciplines, innate to us, can be expressed and brought to perfection by sense, observation, induction, and experience, as among others Verulam shows eruditely in many places in the Great Instauration. But the solid and native principles of sacred theology, which by human study and industry can be advanced to perfection, are not in us by nature, nor are they found by the powers of nature (Matthew 16:17); but they are learned from divine revelation and institution (Isaiah 54:13; Matthew 11:27; John 6:45; Galatians 1:11–12). Compare chapter 2 aph. 5.

As to the latter: it hangs upon human industry and reasoning applied more or less according to the measure of grace, after the manner of the other disciplines, as is abundantly plain enough from the most published methods of sacred theology, of which some are more, others less, exact.

VII. The proper subject of sacred theology is the kingdom of God, and man as subject to God unto beatitude §1.1.12

1.1.12VII. What is the proper subject of sacred theology? Answer. 1. In the schools Thomas (part 1 question 1 article 7) makes God the subject, not taking the word practically, as Lord, prince, and king of the universe, but theoretically, so that the first being is signified: but he rests on the false hypothesis that theology is rather theoretical than practical. Nearer the truth among Gregory of Valencia (disputation 1 question 1 point 3 paragraph 5) are Hugh of St. Victor, who makes the works of reparation the subject; Durandus, who makes God as Savior; Bonaventure, who makes the mystical body of Christ with its head — that is, Christ himself and the Church; and the Riminese, who makes God as glorifier or as rewarder. But they restrict the subject too much. For Bonaventure assigns only the object of evangelical doctrine: the rest act as if someone constituted the prince rather than the commonwealth the subject of politics.

2. But from the sayings (Mark 1:14–15; Matthew 4:23; Luke 9:2; Acts 28:23, 31; Matthew 13:11) it is gathered that most simply and most fittingly to the Scriptures the subject of theological doctrine — what they call the subject of treatment — is said to be the kingdom of God in general, as the kingdom of grace in species is the subject of the Gospel, which Jesus Christ, the fountain of all theology, taught and commanded his Apostles to teach.

3. So the material object is all things that can in any way be reduced to the kingdom of God. 4. But the subject is considered otherwise in practical than in theoretical disciplines: in these its principles and affections are sought for the sake of science; in those, insofar as it is laid under some operation. 5. The formal reason of the object, which is primarily considered in theology, is the same with the form of the kingdom, and they are the very moral acts by which the kingdom of God consists — of which sort are, on God's side, creation, redemption, and sanctification; from which also arise faith, hope, and charity on the human side, and what can be reduced to those, as helping or instrumental causes, as the Church, the magistrate, the sacraments. Whence also the formal reason is sought from the determination of the theological habit or knowledge, so that the object is the kingdom of God: (1) insofar as it is revealed from heaven, which determination is from the principle or efficient cause of knowledge; (2) insofar as it is revealed unto human salvation, which determination is from the end of revelation and knowledge. From which it is concluded that not all things are taught in theology that pertain in any way to the kingdom of God, but those useful to human beings for piety and eternal life (Titus 3:1 and following; 2 Timothy 3:16–17; Isaiah 48:17).

6. But since sacred theology has been granted to us that it may lead a human being under God's rule to the simply highest good and most absolute beatitude, it is clear that its subject also is the human being insofar as he can be subjected to God, made God-minded (θεοῦνουν), conformed to the divine will, and come to eternal life. 7–9. As in theoretical disciplines restriction of the subject is sought from the mode of considering, so in practical ones from the end; and not whatever can be known about the subject need be handed down, but only what makes for attaining the end. 10. Therefore since here the subject is the human being as to be subjected to God his king, conformed to the divine will, and saved, it contributes nothing to the end if he is considered as a natural body endowed with natural principles and affections: but here it is taught how, blessed at the beginning by God Most High unto eternal life, he was deprived of it by the fraud and malice of Satan, what he wholly was after the fall, and into what miseries he was cast headlong, so that we may more easily and clearly know by what means he is freed and saved by God's grace from the dominion of sin and eternal ruin.

11. Therefore, to conclude at last, the proper subject of theology is the human being insofar as he is subjected to God his king, conformed, and beatified by him: but the primary yet partial subject is the human heart or intellect and will, in which God reigns, because the life of God is the spiritual act of the whole human being by which he is borne to God rightly known as his king to be held and to be acted according to his will. That this act is proper to the will freed by the grace of Christ from the slavery of sin is agreed (Proverbs 4:23; Proverbs 23:26; Psalm 110:3).

VIII–IX. Theology does not swallow ethics and politics; metaphysics and ethics do not vanish but serve §1.1.13

1.1.13VIII. Because there is truly nothing in theology that is not referred to the last end, or to means looking to that end, of which kind all things tend directly to practice — does it follow that that practice of life is so perfectly contained in theology that there is no precept of catholic truth in economics, ethics, politics, or jurisprudence looking to living well that does not properly look to theology? Although someone affirms this, we nevertheless do not dare to assent to him in this, because he dangerously confounds and restricts useful — indeed necessary — and in whole kind different disciplines of the light of nature and of grace, as a cook confuses a great cauldron, when it only boils, with a small ladle. Economics, ethics, politics, and jurisprudence are indeed disciplines: even if they contain precepts of catholic truth — or, what is the same, things universally, of themselves, and reciprocally true, and pertaining to living well — yet they were both invented and cultivated under the light of nature, and under the page of this light they attain their proper end: and although they also borrow many things from the sacred letters and under the light of grace and of Christianity attain a greater eminence and are ordered and corrected unto theological perfection: still they are distinguished in whole kind from sacred theology, which under the revealed light of grace promises eternal life above the force and light of nature. The Gospel of Christ does not take away polities, says the pious soul Philip Melanchthon. We in like manner: Theology does not take away philosophy and jurisprudence, but lifts both up and directs them to the service of Christ.

IX. Do metaphysics and ethics, after they have given testimony to the distribution of theology into faith and observance, vanish of their own accord? 1. There is a learned man who publicly teaches that from the remains of those two parts two theologies have sprung up among certain philosophers, metaphysics and ethics, because metaphysics is the faith of the Peripatetics and ethics their observance. Hence, he says, they attribute to each of these disciplines that they hand down the highest human good. About ethics this is known to all; about metaphysics, which they also call theology, Francis Suárez (disputation 1 section 5 number 43): In the most perfect situation of metaphysics, he says, human beatitude consists. It contemplates the highest good and the last end simply. Divine contemplation formally or elicitively pertains to this science.

2. But in truth neither metaphysics vanishes nor ethics, even if both give testimony to sacred theology. For no one of sound mind has accepted that the light of nature is destroyed and extinguished by the light of grace. The natural faculty of reasoning is not killed by supernatural and divine faith but is perfected, ordered to spiritual things, and sublimated. 3. Nor have philosophers properly made two theologies from these disciplines, although they have sometimes called metaphysics theology, because it also treats of the first being, which by the most common concept of all is God. For the rest it supplies principles to dialectical disputations, as the remaining sciences do to analytics and demonstrations: and therefore metaphysics is no more to be called faith than other sciences. 4. The highest moral good that ethics intends with the remaining practical disciplines, and the natural that metaphysics intends with the remaining theoretical disciplines, differs from the spiritual that sacred theology intends, as that which is in a qualified way and in its own kind — that is, in the sphere of nature, in which God as first being and simply highest is known under the light of nature somehow congruently with nature's powers — from that which is absolutely highest, namely God revealed through Holy Scripture or the Gospel, to be most perfectly known and worshiped in the kingdom of grace and glory. 5. From which we gather that sacred theology does not take these noblest parts of philosophy out of the midst, but rejoices in their obedience and service, and feeds, emends, fosters, and sanctifies them into these.

X. The end of sacred theology: internal and external; the life of God; four grades of life §1.1.14

1.1.14X. What is the END of sacred theology? 1. The end of sacred theology is considered as twofold, internal and external. The internal is to teach the sacred mysteries and dogmas from the Scriptures — that is, to explain, demonstrate, and defend them rightly — unto exciting the life of God in the hearers. The external is the life of God, by which we are united, subjected, and obedient to our creator, redeemer, and sanctifier in light (Ephesians 4:17–18), or human beatitude begun, which is of faith, then consummated, which is of vision or eternal life, by which it is well with us in the way and in the fatherland in God, and by him we are nourished, strengthened, and refreshed as by our last real personal end (Genesis 15:1).

2. This life, one and the same as to essence, remains from its beginning unto eternity (John 3:36; John 5:24; 1 John 3:15). 3. And to live to God and to Christ (Romans 6:10–11) and to righteousness (1 Peter 2:24) is to direct all our actions and operations of faith and of life according to God's will unto God's glory, and to serve him in them, God himself acting within. 4. So we are said to live according to the flesh (Romans 8:12–13) — that is, to institute and carry out all our actions at the pleasure of original malice. Contrary to this is to live by the Spirit (Galatians 5:25), to live justly, soberly, piously (Titus 2:12), no longer to live the remaining time in the flesh to human lusts but to the will of God, and to live according to God, that is, by the Spirit (1 Peter 4:2, 6). So Paul (Galatians 2:19–20): that I may live to God, he says, I have been crucified together with Christ — that is, I have been mortified, or my old Adam has been slain and a new one founded in me, that thereafter I may serve God by the Spirit of newness (2 Corinthians 4:10; Philippians 1:20).

5. The life of GOD — not that by which God himself lives, who is life itself, but that by which we are made alive by him, or rather live — can be taken twofold (Ephesians 4:18): either that which is counted before God, as the glory of God (John 12:43), the righteousness of God (Romans 10:3–4, 6) by the grace of evangelical justification; or that which God communicates to us by the spirit of regeneration. 6. Whichever way you take it, the sense is the same. For this common life by which we are human beings, compared to the life of God, is nothing other than an empty image of life, not only because it quickly passes, but also because our souls are dead while living when they do not cling to God.

7. And there occur in this world four grades of life. For one is most common, which consists only in vigor, which belongs also to plants and the vegetable kingdom and by the Paracelsists is stretched also to the mineral kingdom. Another is universal, which consists in motion and sense, of which beasts also are partakers — which Thomas Campanella in his books on the sense of things extends to all parts of the world and the particles of parts. The third is human, by which we are sons of Adam. But the fourth is supernatural, which the faithful alone obtain. 8. All these grades of life are from God, and therefore can loosely be called the life of God. Of the first and second grade there is (Acts 17:28). But the fourth by excellence — the regeneration of the faithful, which is the principle of eternal life — is here named the life of God, because then God properly lives in us, and we enjoy his life, when he governs us by his Spirit, according to that (Romans 8:10–14): If Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the Spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will also make alive your mortal bodies through his Spirit dwelling in you. Therefore, brothers, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh. For if you live according to the flesh, it will be that you die: but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God.

Sacred theology considers principles and parts; a principle is incomplex or complex §1.2.1

1.2.1Chapter 2. On the principles of sacred theology, and specifically on the first and last complex principle.

I. Sacred theology asks us to weigh two things: the principles from which the discipline is drawn, and the parts into which it is divided.

II. By principles of sacred theology we mean those propositions that let us deduce the sacred dogmas of the Christian faith by ordered discourse — and then resolve the deduced dogmas back into the same propositions — so that a sound, modest, God-fearing person may rightly give assent.

Taken generally, a principle is whatever something proceeds from in any way (Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 33, art. 1). Principles are either simple or complex. A simple principle is a simple term, either principal or less principal. The principal term is God himself — which is to say, Christ — of whom (1 Corinthians 1:30) speaks. Fulgentius writes to Thrasamund (p. 108): Christ is the beginning, for as everlasting he goes before; Christ is the end, for as perpetual he closes all things. Christ is the beginning, for he himself began; Christ is the end, for he perfects. The less principal term is the Word of God, the instrument through which the Holy Spirit converts, illuminates, and saves (Romans 1:16; compare 1 Corinthians and related places).

With those two incomplex principles in place, we turn to the first complex principle: a whole proposition from which a conclusion follows by logic. Some therefore call it a logical principle, or a principle of cognition, because our logical deduction of what we believe starts here, and demonstration cannot climb beyond this first and most general point. The complex principle holds together two respects at once — the respect from which, namely God's infallible testimony, and the respect under which, namely the light of revelation — and so is called a principle from which and under which. That sets it far apart from an exterior principle, which only occasions our knowledge of faith and is a necessary condition without which faith does not arise (today, for example, the parental authority that plants saving truth in us: 2 Timothy 3:15), and also far apart from a motive principle, which is only a topical or probable argument, such as a miracle.

A Christian does not depend on those lesser supports. They win only the assent of human apprehension — Bellarmine himself grants as much. What then is our principle? It is apodictic and indemonstrable, worthy of faith from itself, and such that falsehood cannot underlie it in any way. Still, a necessary condition must be joined to it — hearing or reading — which is why Scripture calls it the word of hearing (1 Thessalonians 2:13). I am speaking of the dogmas of faith as they reach us from outside. Dogmas come in two kinds: some for believing, others for knowing. The first kind is known by God's special revelation; the second lies open under the light of reason. The first is believed; the second is known. Our subject here is properly the former. Propositions that do not properly belong to faith — and some such do appear in the Bible — fall outside this account.

The first and last principle of sacred theology is authentic and self-attesting §1.2.2

1.2.2III. Among these principles one stands first and last; another hangs from that first principle and is ranked beneath it.

The distinction matters most under the Smyrnaean, Pergamene, Thyatiran, and above all the Sardian church-condition in which we now live. The Ephesian condition still had one principle alone — the written Word of God (Acts 28:25). Augustine praised that same character under the Pergamene state: Let us use the liberty to which the Lord has called us. As for those men whose praise we dare not equal, whose writings we refuse to set beside many Scriptures, whose genius we love, whose speech delights us, whose charity we admire, and whose martyrdoms we revere — whatever they thought otherwise, we must not receive it as canonical. We do them no injury when we mark off any saying or writing of theirs from the canonical authority of the divine Scriptures.

IV. Sacred theology's first and last principle is the one that, once granted, lets every other dogma of faith be deduced, while it itself is not deduced directly from any other — and therefore deserves to be called authentic and autopiston, self-attesting.

We name it first and last because Christian theological discourse cannot go beyond it without sliding into an infinite regress or a circle, and both paths are vicious. The proof runs in six steps. (1) Whatever is known is either a principle or a conclusion; philosophy already teaches that. In theology's dogmas concerning divine and eternal life, just as in other disciplines, we move from one point to another and prove one claim by arguing from another. (2) Those proofs and conclusions must halt in something first that is not itself proved from elsewhere — otherwise they circle or stretch to infinity, both of them faults. (3) First here means first for the Christian person's knowledge. (4) We are not requiring the principles of being and the principles of knowing to be identical everywhere; theology's own character often refuses that identity. God is author and principle of being for the whole creation. Yet our question is how it becomes established for us that God created all things. (5) Still more: the question is less how the point might be proved to this or that hearer, and more how it stands firm for the Christian — and on what he, who neither spins in a circle nor rushes on like a madman into infinity, is finally founded insofar as he is and is called a Christian. (6) Because we are asking for a principle ordered to our cognition, and for one from which further claims can be deduced by discourse, what we seek is plainly the complex principle that Aphorism 2 already named an axiom: an examined, proposed, authentic, autopiston principle.

Two kinds of discipline; assent in the first rests on the dictate of right reason §1.2.3

1.2.37. Here we take as settled that disciplines the human mind can grasp fall into two kinds. One stands under the light of reason. The other — once reason's light is already presupposed and set in its apt place for use — is known under the light of faith, that is, of divine revelation.

8. In the first kind, the ground of assent is the dictate of right reason. By that phrase we do not mean the rational soul itself, or the human intellect as such. That the intellect can err and be deceived — and often is, even in the wisest of mortals — no one doubts. Nor does it stumble only in matters of faith, where it must trip forever unless the Holy Spirit guides and Scripture holds the torch. It also errs, and often, in civil affairs and in the practical business of this life.

9. So "right reason" here is not an intellect that never errs or strikes against anything. It is only the intellect's right judgment about a matter that is either known by nature or follows by legitimate inference from naturally known principles. That remaining judgment after the fall — however much of it is left in us — is what we call right reason: theoretical when it judges theoretical things, practical when it judges practical things.

10. Whenever people say that right reason teaches this or that, or that something agrees with right reason, they mean that the claim is true and certain — either because it is a principle known by nature, or because it can be drawn from such a principle by sound consequence. Right reason, then, is nothing other than true judgment about what natural principles let us know.

11. Many today misuse the word "reason" on its worse side, as if it meant only human corruption. Scripture regularly takes it in the good sense (Romans 12:1; Romans 2:15; compare 1 Peter 2:1). So Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 2 on theoretical reason: Reason, he says, is given us by God, innate in all, and is so far the first law inhering in everyone that by contemplating what falls under sight it leads us to God. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will II.18: You look at justice, he says — no one uses it badly. It is counted among the highest goods that are in the human being himself, together with all the soul's virtues that make up an upright and honorable life. For no one uses prudence, fortitude, or temperance badly. In all of them, as in that justice you just named, RIGHT REASON thrives; without it there are no virtues; and no one can use RIGHT REASON badly.

Natural light remains after the Fall; theology assents by God's revealing authority from proximate scriptural principles §1.2.4

1.2.412. Nor can it be denied that such reason — such knowledge — still belongs to the human being after the fall. To deny it is to deny the innate notions and the law of nature themselves, and so to contradict the Scriptures, which acknowledge nature's light in theoretical and in practical matters alike.

13. In theoretical matters Scripture confirms that this light and knowledge still remain, so far that what stands first in that order is said to be known naturally in some measure — namely that God is, and that he is cause of all things, just, and the avenger of crimes (see Psalm 19:1; Psalm 19:2; Wisdom of Solomon 13:2; Acts 14:16; Acts 17:26; Romans 1:19–Romans 1:21).

14. In practical matters the sacred writings acknowledge the same light no less clearly (Romans 1:32; Romans 2:14–Romans 2:15; 1 Corinthians 11:14).

15. But in the second kind of discipline — the one named in number 7 — the ground of assent is the authority of God who reveals.

16. Still, both of these grounds are remote. They do not so much enter the discursive chain as stand presupposed before it begins.

17. Philosophers prove their dogmas from proximate principles — physics from physical principles, mathematics from mathematical ones — not from the most general maxim, "Whatever right reason dictates is true." In the same way theologians prove their dogmas from proximate principles, namely from the sayings and oracles of sacred Scripture — not from the remote and most general maxim, "Whatever God reveals is true."

The first principle of sacred theology is divine revelation §1.2.5

1.2.5V. The first principle of sacred theology, then, is divine revelation. By it every doubt about religion ends in the mind of a person who is truly Christian, watchful, and through the Holy Spirit earnestly wrestling with his own errors and sins. In that revelation his faith — the faith that makes him a Christian — at last conquers, stands, and is founded. It frees the assenting mind from every fear and suspicion of being deceived, and makes him so sure that he would rather suffer anything than deny what he has once embraced.

The Apostle calls this first principle of theological teaching the illumination of knowledge — φωτισμὸς τῆς γνώσεως (2 Corinthians 4:6–2 Corinthians 4:7): For God, who said light should shine out of darkness, has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. But we have this treasure in earthen vessels, so that the surpassing power may be God's and not from us. Compare 1 Corinthians 2:4 and 1 Corinthians 2:13, where sacred analytics are set out for us, and a spiritual, efficacious demonstration is preferred uniquely to the persuasive words of human wisdom.

Melanchthon: church doctrine is taken from God's revealed sayings, not from demonstrations §1.2.6

1.2.6And Melanchthon speaks wisely in the preface to the Loci Communes. The doctrine of the church, he says, is not taken from demonstrations, but from sayings that God handed down to the human race by sure and illustrious testimonies — sayings through which, in his immense goodness, he disclosed himself and his will.

Just as philosophy seeks what is certain, separates it from what is uncertain, and names as causes of certainty universal experience, principles, and demonstrations, so in the church's teaching the cause of certainty is the revelation of God, and what must be weighed is which sentences God has handed down.

As any sound mind finds this sentence certain — "Twice four are eight" — because it is natural knowledge, like the knowledge of principles, so let the articles of faith, the divine threats and promises, stand for us certain and unmoved. So let the penitent be certain that sins are remitted, that for the Son of God's sake he is heard, and that he is made an heir of eternal life.

But the causes of certainty differ. The mind sees the sentence about numbers by its own judgment. The articles of faith are certain because of revelation, confirmed by God's sure and illustrious testimonies — the raising of the dead and many other miracles. Yet because these are matters set outside the judgment of the human mind, the assent is weaker: it arises because the mind is moved by those testimonies and miracles and is helped by the Holy Spirit to assent.

Certainty rests on the revelation of the truthful God; analytic method serves theology but does not produce justifying faith §1.2.7

1.2.7Philosophy teaches that we should doubt what sense has not ascertained, what is not a principle, and what demonstration has not confirmed. So here one may doubt — or ἐπέχειν, withhold judgment — whether hollowness alone is why the rainbow is an arc. Yet we know that the church's doctrine, handed down by God, is certain and unchangeable, even when sense does not grasp it, even when it is not born with us as principles are, and even when demonstration does not find it. The cause of certainty is the REVELATION OF GOD WHO IS TRUTHFUL.

The Word of God makes us ἀμεταπτώτους — unshaken — in Christian faith with πληροφορία, full assurance, as so many martyrdoms testify.

The analytic method applied to the disciplines — or, more clearly, didactic syllogisms drawn from each discipline's own principles — makes us learned in every kind, knowing and assenting ἀμεταπτώτως. Not only because they have a βιαστικήν, compelling force that drives and convicts τὸν ἔσω λόγον, the inner reason, mind, and conscience, but also because such syllogisms draw their reasons from the proper nature of their subjects — not from accidents or from some common attributes, but from true essentials.

In other disciplines analysis aims at nothing else than this: from vernacular propositions whose predicates have an essential and defining bond with their subjects, it leads us necessarily into knowledge of a necessary and vernacular conclusion. So too in sacred theology the only end of analysis to seek is that, by the help of logic and especially of analytics, we may gain accurate knowledge of theological questions from theology's own λήμμασι — its proper assumptions — and enjoy similar fruits: accurate distinctions between proper and common reasons, and a way of defining spiritual things that logical precepts can supply.

Not the greater gifts, though. Justifying faith is God's alone to give, and the Holy Spirit kindles it in our hearts; likewise the fruits of the Spirit's faith are good works. See the most learned Joachim Camerarius, in the prolegomena to his notation of figures of speech on the four Gospels.

Divine revelation is general or special; its object and mode must be considered §1.2.8

1.2.8VI. Divine revelation is of two kinds. One is general, coming from nature (Romans 1:19). The other is special, granted above nature (John 17:6).

VII. Of this revelation, both the object and the mode must be considered.

Some revealed things are known only supernaturally; Scripture also presupposes truths known by nature §1.2.9

1.2.9VIII. That object is the things revealed — either had purely and uniquely from supernatural revelation, or also knowable from elsewhere.

Those called revealed κατ' ἐξοχήν, preeminently, stand apart from other dogmas Scripture contains that the light of nature also knows (Romans 1:19–Romans 1:21; Romans 2:14–Romans 2:15; Acts 14:17; Hebrews 11:6). So Theophylact on Hebrews 11: That God is, he says, we hold by faith. Others, following Thomas (Summa I q.2 a.2 ad 1), call that other truth a presupposition of faith and a preamble to the articles of faith.

Scripture presupposes this and the other dogmas of this clause — and the weight of such matters — as known from elsewhere and also to be drawn from nature's light. So they wrong the truth who claim that nature's light conflicts with Scripture, or who think anyone can explain Scripture rightly and sufficiently without secular learning. Otherwise even the unlearned, once they had read and reread the Scriptures, would be great theologians — as certain Anabaptists believe.

The Apostle of the Gentiles himself condemns such men when he expressly appeals to what nature teaches (1 Corinthians 11:14): ἢ οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει ὑμᾶς; — Does not nature itself teach you this?

As to mode, revelation declares or proves §1.2.10

1.2.10IX. As to mode, divine revelation is either declaring or proving.

The Apostle says in Hebrews 1:1 that God spoke 'in many portions and in many ways' — polymeros kai polytropos — to the fathers of old, and in these last days has spoken to us in the Son. The modes of divine revelation cannot, it seems, be known with exact precision. On them see Peter Galatinus, On the Secrets of Catholic Truth II.12; Paul Fagius in the Chaldean paraphrase on Exodus 28; and Drusius at the opening of his Commentary on difficult places in Genesis.

X. Declaring revelation is that by which God's will is signified nakedly. Proving revelation is that by which the truth once declared is demonstrated.

Revelation is immediate or mediate; immediate revelation is given to God's messengers by secret inspiration §1.2.11

1.2.11XI. Revelation is also immediate or mediate. Immediate revelation belongs generally to the ambassadors; mediate, to those to whom they are sent. I say "generally," because sometimes even those who are not ambassadors receive it for their own instruction — as Joseph did (Matthew 1:20; Matthew 2:13; still more, Matthew 2:12).

XII. Immediate revelation is that by which God disclosed his word to his ambassadors through secret inspiration and set it on their mouth to be announced to others.

Immediate revelation without messengers has modes and grades; it comes by signs, spirit, or species §1.2.12

1.2.12Sacred history establishes that God has spoken either through human messengers or without them — that is, without those he himself appointed as messengers — and not in one mode alone (Numbers 12:6-Numbers 12:8): "Hear now my words: if there is a prophet of the LORD among you, I make myself known to him by some VISION, or I speak with him by a DREAM. Not so my servant Moses, who is faithful in all my house: mouth to mouth I speak with him, and I show him, not in riddles; he beholds the likeness of the LORD." Compare Augustine, On Genesis according to the letter, book 12, chapter 7 and following.

XIII. Divine revelation given to human beings without messengers has diverse modes and grades. Whenever those recipients are so affected that it becomes plain something is being said from God, the spectacle binds them to believe what is said — so strongly that it often drives them to publish it. Compare Amos 3:6-Amos 3:7; Jeremiah 20:9.

XIV. This revelation comes by signs, or by spirit, or by species.

XV. By signs: they seize the senses of people asleep or awake — as in a kind of imperfect ecstasy, carried off from ordinary objects — and affect them outwardly or inwardly. This grade may be called sensual. See the scholion on Aphorism 9.

By spirit and by species; these two grades may be called intellectual §1.2.13

1.2.13XVI. By spirit: speaking within or without, it teaches the intellect. For examples see Acts 8:29 and Acts 16:7.

XVII. By species: it immediately transforms the mind once a perfect ecstasy has opened that mind and withdrawn it from the senses. Paul the Apostle supplies a famous instance (2 Corinthians 12:2). Compare our epilogism On the true religion and the Catholic Church, disputation 10 on prophetic light, and disputation 12 on divine prophecy. These two degrees can be comprehended under one, which we may without inconvenience call intellectual.

Mediate revelation; it is manifest or occult; manifest needs no added signs §1.2.14

1.2.14XVIII. Mediate revelation is that by which God, through his ambassadors, signifies to others something that must be believed as divine.

XIX. Mediate revelation is either (1) manifest or occult.

XX. It is manifest when God, through his ambassadors, signifies something as divine to others in such a way that the very mode of the revelation and its circumstances — without any further signs added — make it evident of themselves that God is speaking. So God promulgated his law to the people through Moses (Exodus 20 and following). The equity of that law is so plain that, even if no signs were added, a holy voice would still cry aloud its divine origin.

Occult mediate revelation binds by accompanying signs §1.2.15

1.2.15XXI. It is occult when God, through his ambassadors, signifies something as divine to others and also employs certain signs — signs whose force drives the messengers to announce and binds the hearers to believe. So God, through Moses, confronted Pharaoh with various signs (Exodus 7-Exodus 10); through Jeremiah he foreshadowed his people's coming ruin by a girdle (Jeremiah 13). Such is the barber's razor (Ezekiel 5:1); such the marriage with a harlot (Hosea 1:2).

Revelation is unwritten or written; one Word in substance, dual in mode; against a real pontifical distinction §1.2.16

1.2.16XXII. Second: divine revelation is either unwritten or written. Divine things can be known only through God and his word — whether that word is ἄγραφον, unwritten, or ἔγγραφον, written. Whatever is known from it returns to this principle: Whatever God has said must be believed; or, The mouth of the Lord has spoken, therefore it must be believed.

As to the substance of doctrine this Word is altogether one; as to the mode of revelation it is, as it were, twofold — unwritten and written. That mode of revelation is what chiefly needs explanation. Although everything revealed proceeds from one and the same Spirit, not everything is disclosed in the same way. Some things are written; some are gathered by inference — as Gregory Nazianzen teaches in book 5 On Theology, Basil the Great in On the true faith, and Augustine in On Baptism against the Donatists, book 2 chapter 14 and book 4 chapter 23.

Some things are not, and yet are said to be in the Scriptures — that God sits, that he has ears and eyes. Some things are, and yet are not said expressly and in so many words — that the Holy Spirit is God — though something is said from which the point follows of necessity, as when one who says twice five says ten, and one who says twice two says four, even without using those exact words. Some things neither are nor are said. Finally, some both are and are said.

Those who join the papists in setting a real distinction between the written and the unwritten word of God go badly astray. Irenaeus speaks wisely (Against heresies, book 3, chapter 1): We have known the disposition of our salvation through no others than those through whom the Gospel reached us — which they first heralded, and afterwards, by God's will, handed down to us in the Scriptures as the foundation and pillar of our faith to come.

Unwritten revelation by living voice; corruption; writing for stability; do not require the unwritten when Scripture is given §1.2.17

1.2.17XXIII. Unwritten revelation is that by which the divine things we must believe are signified by the word handed down with a living voice. By living voice — of God himself, or of angels, or of the holy fathers, prophets, and Apostles — the word of God was once delivered. Human carelessness and Satan's malice corrupted and depraved it in many ways. So God restored and confirmed the purity of his word by fresh revelations from time to time, and at last, for greater stability and certainty, also willed it to be committed to writing.

Here a rule must be noted: once written revelation has been given, the unwritten is not to be demanded rashly, nor forced on others by tyranny — against Coster, Enchiridion of controversies, chapter 1, where he claims Christ willed neither that his Church hang on paper writings nor that mysteries be committed to parchments. See also Bellarmine, On the unwritten word of God, book 4, chapter 3; and Sadeel, Whitaker, and Nigrinus on the papistic contempt of sacred Scripture — indeed Christ himself (John 5:39; John 17) and Paul (2 Timothy 3:15-2 Timothy 3:16).

Written revelation is sacred theology's first principle; it is called Sacred Scripture §1.3.1

1.3.1CHAPTER THREE On Sacred Scripture

I. What the prophets and Apostles committed to the sacred letters is written revelation — sacred theology's first principle. From that written deposit the dogmas of the faith and of Christian life are first drawn, and every dispute about revealed things is finally resolved back into it. In that sense we call it Sacred Scripture.

Scripture is the analytic, proper, spiritual principle that settles controversy; without analytic ministry no spiritual proof §1.3.2

1.3.2This is an analytic principle — proper (οἰκεῖον), native to the discipline, and spiritual — by which every theological and spiritual controversy is to be decided. For just as from the analytics, or even from the whole philosophy of Aristotle, Plato, and others, though you pound such learning in a mortar, you still cannot draw out and elicit a single spiritual proof to confirm the articles of faith, nor solidly refute the spiritual errors of the Arians, the papal party, and other sectaries — so, on the other side, it is most truly said that without the ministry of analytic doctrine, which admits into theology nothing but what is proper (οἰκεῖον) and native, or what theology itself presupposes in other disciplines as agreeing with spiritual things and analogous to the faith (for this is to analyze, ἀναλύειν, in theology, 1 Corinthians 2:13), no controversy's truth can be accurately and solidly proved, taught, or known, nor its falsity struck down and confuted — whether the dispute has been raised in philosophy or in theology.

That analytic gift either falls to excellent natural talents — though only to a few, and imperfectly — or more firmly, from a stronger principle, is granted by the Holy Spirit to some, as to the Apostles, in a more divine mode, or finally is acquired by precepts and teaching; and that teaching is a surer guide than nature. On both sides we are warned to use proper principles for proving the proper theorems of a discipline — philosophical principles for philosophical things, theological for theological. Only so can and should philosophical matters be treated philosophically, and theological matters theologically.

Analytic doctrine is handmaid not mistress; ignorance of analytics breeds false spiritual proofs and obstinate heresy §1.3.3

1.3.3So if to the analytic doctrine Aristotle hands down in the Organon we assign not a magisterium but only a ministry and service in seeking the truth of controversies — and if, with Jacopo Zabarella, who holds that the analytic species of logic, when applied to the disciplines, migrates into them, we still concede no metamorphosis of analytics inside theology — no one may fairly object that we are hunting analytic doctrine as mistress of knowing heavenly truth. It is only a handmaid; even when applied to theological matters it remains handmaid of the prince and Lady Theology.

But want of training in the analytics (ἀπαιδευσία τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν) in theology is nothing other than inability to tell apart, on the one hand, what needs proof from what is indemonstrable, and on the other, true proofs from false and pseudographic ones — and likewise theology's own proofs from alien and foreign ones. This is the most fertile mother of ψευδογραφήματα, false spiritual demonstrations, which breed ἄγνοιαν κατὰ διάθεσιν — the ignorance of a vicious affection in heretics and sectaries — altogether contrary to true knowledge or science of spiritual things. Just as that true knowledge is drawn from theology's true and proper principles, so by ignorance of a vicious affection we are seduced when we reason from false and foreign principles. Hence sectaries clutch their errors no less tenaciously, tooth and nail, than the orthodox defend the truth of their judgment, and think they certainly know what in fact they do not know. The same want of analytic training is also mother of many other errors in theology.

Mixing philosophical principles into the articles of faith overturns theology; the Word of God is the common rule of faith §1.3.4

1.3.4For when theology's own native proofs are confused with heterogeneous and foreign ones — when philosophical principles and the decrees of human reason are dragged beyond their servant role and twisted to prove spiritual theorems and articles of faith — theology is almost wholly overturned, no less deadly to the human race and to the salvation of souls than any plague, however fierce, is to bodily health. If almost the whole swarm (σμῆνος) of the papal party, whom they commonly call scholastics, had not mixed philosophy with Theology, and had not, through ignorance (ἄγνοιαν) of analysis, transferred the principles philosophy claims by right of property to the proving of spiritual things — and if, leaving philosophical matters aside, they had rightly fitted spiritual things to spiritual theorems — there would have been less to this day of execrable errors and of collisions (συρράξεων) ruinous to the church and to be mourned from the deepest vitals; and God's glory and Christ's most precious merit would have been less obscured, as all the orthodox earnestly complain.

But if this first principle is not settled, whatever is done and disputed is in vain, as Nicephorus Gregoras rightly holds (Roman History, book 10, p. 236). For no dispute can go forward unless we first agree with our adversaries in some common principle. And among us and all heretics whatsoever it is agreed that the Word of God is the rule of faith from which dogmas are to be judged — a common principle conceded by all, from which the arguments are drawn, as Bellarmine says in the preface to Disputation 1. In every theological discourse we teach that the first, proper, native, and unmoved principle on which a mind endowed with a sense of piety should rest today, against the papal party and others, is this: Whatever Sacred Scripture teaches is infallibly true.

Against the papal first principle: whatever the Roman pontiff determines is not primary, for they prove it from Scripture §1.3.5

1.3.5Reason 1 compares our principle with the papal party's first claim: Whatever the Roman pontiff determines is infallibly true. Bellarmine and the other Jesuits treat that claim as the only principle. Whatever authority others in the papal Catholic Roman Church still distribute, the Jesuits today gather onto one Pontiff alone.

Yet that claim cannot stand first. They themselves try to prove it from elsewhere — from Sacred Scripture (Matthew 16:18; John 21:15-John 21:17; Matthew 10:2); they ground tradition on John 16:12, 1 Corinthians 11:23, 2 Thessalonians 2:2 and 2 Thessalonians 2:15; and they ground the Church or bishops in a universal council on Matthew 23:2, Matthew 28:20, and Luke 10:16. Clearer than day, then: their slogans — Whatever the Roman pontiff, traditions, Church, or council hand down is infallibly true — are dragged back to our principle as something prior, though by a false reading, and so cannot be first.

Circular reasoning when Scripture's authority hangs on Pope, Church, traditions, and councils §1.3.6

1.3.62. From inconvenience or absurdity. Refuse our principle and you either circle or beg the question — the papal party's habit. They hang Scripture's authority on Pontiff, Church, traditions, and councils as far as our knowing goes, and then prove those very authorities from the Scriptures. That is nothing but driving their own proofs around a circle.

They hold Scripture true because Church or Pontiff delivers it; then hold Church or Pontiff true because Scripture says so. Call it what you will: it is not a regress. It is a circle. On that circle's nature see Jacopo Zabarella, book 1, preface to the Analytics, controversy 23.

The Bereans; Moses, the Prophets, Christ, and the Apostles prove from Scripture §1.3.7

1.3.73. Take the Bereans. Day by day, and with praise, they tested against the Scriptures whether Paul's and Silas's preaching held (Acts 17:11). If Paul's doctrine could lawfully — and praiseworthily — be examined by Scripture, how much more may the Pope's determinations be brought to that same test? In the order of our knowing, then, it is plainer that Scripture does not deceive than that the Roman Church or the Pontiff does not.

4. Moses, the Prophets, Christ himself, and the Apostles show the same proving practice, and Scripture itself presses the same warnings. Moses: do whatever the priests teach you according to the Lord's law (Deuteronomy 24:8). Isaiah: to the law and to the testimony (Isaiah 8:20). David in Psalm 119: blessed are those who search God's testimonies. Christ answers the resurrection-denying Sadducees from the sacred letters alone (Matthew 22:29; Mark 12:24), and the Pharisees likewise (Matthew 22:43-Matthew 22:44). John the Baptist points to Isaiah as witness of his calling (Matthew 3:3). Across their epistles the Evangelists and Apostles both allege law and prophets for the articles of faith and proclaim Scripture's authority as a whole (2 Peter 1:19; 2 Timothy 3:15-2 Timothy 3:17).

These witnesses — and countless more that could be stacked here — seal the analytic proving we press against the papacy and other sophists. The whole method is this: theologians confirm theological and spiritual theorems, and the articles of faith, theologically — from Sacred Scripture's own principles — as the Apostle, teacher of the Gentiles, required in 1 Corinthians 2:4 and 1 Corinthians 2:13. No one is more analytic (ἀναλυτικώτερος) than he. First, he names the kind of proof by which he fixed the Corinthians' articles of faith: ἀπόδειξις, a spiritual demonstration that works in the soul. Second, he names what kind of conclusion and principles that demonstration must have: he fits spiritual principles to the spiritual or theological theorems that hold the articles of faith — not λόγοις ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας, the reasons of human wisdom that deceiving philosophy hands over.

Analogy with naturally known principles; Scripture's spiritual efficacy; affections and parts to be considered §1.3.8

1.3.85. From the analogy of principles known by nature. (1) Principles are such that everyone who knows the terms also knows them to be true. Picture it this way. Admit the light of reason — as child or elder, scholar or unlettered — and you also admit the principles known by the habit philosophers call νοῦν, intellect. Admit the light of divine revelation, and confess under that Author some divinely inspired discipline, and you also admit Sacred Scripture. No Christian, learned or unlearned, denies our principle or puts it in doubt. Doubt Scripture's truth and you forfeit the name of a true Christian — just as the man who denies nature's known principles hardly deserves the name of a sound, reason-using human being.

(2) Those natural principles are not demonstrated and cannot be. They are grasped as true without arguments, from bare consideration of the terms, by their own evidence. So too our theological principle must not — and cannot — be directly demonstrated. The Christian, lit by Christian faith, assents by the Holy Spirit's power, persuaded in the struggle by Scripture itself as he reads it or hears it opened, and with a learner's zeal weighs it attentively according to his spiritual age. Scripture carries an inward force, planted by its Author, that draws and convinces human minds according to each one's age (1 Thessalonians 2:13; Matthew 7:28-Matthew 7:29; John 6:68).

What evidence is for principles known by the intellect's habit, that spiritual efficacy is for Christ's words and the sacred Scriptures — an efficacy that shows itself in the struggle of spirit and flesh according to each attentive, pious reader's spiritual measure and age (1 Corinthians 2:4-1 Corinthians 2:5, 1 Corinthians 2:12-1 Corinthians 2:14; Ephesians 4:11-Ephesians 4:25).

II. Sacred Scripture's affections and parts are to be considered.

Scripture's affections; authority is the dignity that merits faith because God is Author §1.4.1

1.4.1CHAPTER FOUR On the affections of Sacred Scripture, and specifically on its AUTHORITY

I. By affections of Sacred Scripture we mean the properties that belong to it properly speaking — the qualities that declare its divinity enough: authority, perfection, clarity, sense together with interpretation, and efficacy.

II. Authority here means that dignity on account of which, God being Author, every statement Scripture makes deserves to be believed. Scripture is self-attesting, authentic, and infallible; consistent throughout, and stands as the unmoved, God-appointed rule of our faith and life (2 Timothy 3:16). Augustine puts it rightly (City of God 11.3): if the divine Scriptures lose their authority, faith itself will stumble.

Against Eckhardus twisting Beza and Piscator; Moses' seeming contradictions are not two wills in God §1.4.2

1.4.2Henry Eckhardus unfairly foists a contrary opinion on our teachers (Fasciculus 1.q.2), twisting Beza's words and Piscator's — that God sometimes by the Word signifies He wills what He does not truly will, or refuses what He truly wills.

Those great men took occasion from Moses' words (Genesis 22:2, Genesis 22:12; Exodus 9:1, Exodus 9:12; Exodus 10:20; Exodus 4:21) — not to ascribe truly contrary wills to God. Far be it from our doctors to charge the Scriptures with that! There is only an apparent opposition (ἐναντιοφάνεια) in Moses' words: God always signifies by the Word that He wills something He truly wills; He does not always signify that He precisely wills what we first imagine Him to will. If Eckhardus wants to be a fair interpreter, let him learn candor.

Authority absolute or compared; absolutely it is divine because from God; Raymond of Sabunde §1.4.3

1.4.3III. That authority is viewed either absolutely in itself, by its own nature as it is, or comparatively by reason of our cognition.

IV. Absolutely and in itself, by the reason of its nature, it is divine, because it is from God. So Paul testifies (1 Thessalonians 2:13; 2 Timothy 3:16; 1 Peter 1:21). Raymond of Sabunde (Natural Theology ch. 209) writes truly: Since it is an honor to believe someone on his words, a human being ought to believe God — first of Himself, without another witness, purely on His bare word. If I refuse to believe God's words because He says them, and hunt another proof, then I trust someone else more than God.

Bible rests on God's authority alone; Valencia and Soto: the Church is subject to Scripture §1.4.4

1.4.4Raymond continues (ch. 211): Creatures are founded in nothing except God alone immediately. So too the Bible is founded in nothing except God's authority alone immediately. The certainty of the holy Bible's truth arises infallibly from God's authority alone, because He speaks.

So Gregory of Valencia: Scripture's authority is utterly divine and therefore entirely infallible. Peter a Soto: We show sacred Scripture was written by the Holy Spirit; therefore it is not to be doubted that the Church is subject to it. The Holy Spirit reveals and gives sacred Scripture to the Church; therefore the Church cannot but be subject to it — witnessing and interpreting not as superior to Scripture, but as subject.

Compared to our cognition: against atheists and against papal suspension of Scripture on the Church §1.4.5

1.4.5V. Comparatively, and by the reason of our cognition — insofar as its truth is persuaded to a sound person endowed with a sense of piety by certain arguments.

Here the question is: whence is it established that Sacred Scripture is θεόπνευστος and αὐτόπιστος — divinely inspired and of itself worthy of faith? That must be settled both against atheists who, with Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian, call Scripture's divinity into doubt, and against the papal party, who hang its authority on the testimony of their Roman Church — Cusa, Prierias, Verratus, Eck, Rutland ("no Scripture authentic without the Church's authority; therefore the Church's is greater"), Viguerius (Scripture to Church as body to soul), Hosius, Andradius, Bozius, Pighius, a Soto, Tapper, Stapleton, Salmeron, Gordon Huntly.

Divinity persuaded by human or divine arguments; human ones are occasions or inclinations §1.4.6

1.4.6VI. Its divinity is persuaded by human or divine arguments.

VII. Human arguments are either occasions of believing, or inclinations toward believing. The former may be called monitory, the latter motory.

VIII. Occasions are conditions and essential causes ordinarily required before someone is moved to assent.

IX. Occasions of believing are either persons (doctors, parents, equals) by whom the sacred letters are commended, or things (favorable or adverse, ordinary or miraculous) without which faith in the Scriptures would not be had — though faith as effect does not of itself depend on those occasions. For Augustine the occasion was the Church's authority (Against the Epistle of the Foundation 5): "I would not believe the Gospel unless the catholic Church's authority moved me" — or rather, as the old Amerbach folio reads, "reminded me" (commoneret). For Constantine, the cross in the air: IN HOC SIGNO VINCES. For most of us today, parents' authority, as with Timothy (2 Timothy 3:15).

Inclinations as persuasive arguments; variety and use; occasion can also serve as argument §1.4.7

1.4.7X. Inclinations toward believing are arguments by which unbelievers are moved to acknowledge the Christian religion as credible and, by human persuasion, more probable than all others. Elsewhere they are called motives.

XI. Their variety and use must be considered. Often an occasion is not only in the place of an occasion but also of an argument. So the Church, proposing the Scriptures, moves as an argument when I consider so many cultivated nations embracing them with one consent as divinely revealed. The same holds for miracles and martyrdoms: A religion confirmed by miracles, and for which people face death, cannot be empty.

Use of human arguments against unbelievers and atheists; philosophical preparation then providence §1.4.8

1.4.8XIII. The use of such arguments is properly to convince unbelievers and atheists. Against true Christians who watch for their souls there is no need of them.

1. The unbeliever either denies that God is, that He is one, truthful, just and good, that the soul is immortal, and that there will be another life — or he grants these. 2. If he denies them, the theologian can do nothing in the theological habit. 3. Therefore convince him in the philosophical habit from nature's principles. 4. If he grants them, first show his religion's vanity. 5. Second, propose that God of infinite goodness takes greatest care of the human being — and that it would clash with that goodness never to reveal His will concerning salvation. 6. Politics makes it plain: providence is credited with kingdoms' preservation; it would be absurd to supply earthly life richly while neglecting eternal life for an immortal soul. 7. Third, once God's care for salvation is proved, some divinely revealed doctrine showing the way to eternal life must be given.

Inspect nations' laws and religions; the Jewish people and Moses; Christian religion true or none is §1.4.9

1.4.9First, inspect kingdoms' laws, whose only purpose is temporary worldly benefit. Second, inspect all nations' religions: though they promise ing shown absurd from reason itself. Whatever right reason plainly teaches false is false also in theology — the same thing cannot be true and false at once.

Third, come to the Jewish people, whom even pagans acknowledge as most ancient, and whose Moses leaves Greek historical memory behind. Fourth, from Moses demonstrate how God revealed Himself and the way to eternal life. Fifth, prove that what Christians teach is founded in Moses — as Grotius, Justin Martyr, Ficino, and Mornay did. Sixth, argue: Either the Christian religion, whose principle is Sacred Scripture, is the true religion, or there is no true religion in the world. But it is false that there is none (from providence, nn. 5–6). Therefore the Christian religion is the true religion.

Christian religion alone free of falsehood; antiquity with humankind; preservation through persecutions §1.4.10

1.4.10The major rests on two foundations: what cannot be absent from the true religion belongs to no pagan religion; those marks belong to the Christian alone. False, absurd, and shameful things can be shown of Greek, Persian, and Roman superstitions, not of the Christian. The true religion has such antiquity that it has been as long as humans have (Genesis 1; Eusebius), and pagan gods' very birthdays are known while the Hebrew-Christian religion began with humankind.

It is certain the true religion will last to the world's end. Yet pagan superstitions have perished. Ours endures through Egyptian bondage, Babylonian captivity, Alexander's wars, Antiochus Epiphanes (Josephus Ant. 12.7), Rome before Daniel's period (Daniel 9), the polity's overthrow, emperors' fury, and Julian's temple grant (Ammianus 23.17). We conclude our religion rests on God's providence from the world's founding — which can be shown of no other. Therefore the Christian religion alone is true, or there is no true religion in the world — which was to be demonstrated.

Human persuasion is weak without the divine argument; Spirit's efficacy; Christians would rather die than deny §1.4.11

1.4.11Proceed against atheists this way. Yet these proofs mostly rest only on human authority and produce only human persuasion — far weaker than Christian faith, unable to persevere in serious contest unless the divine argument from the sacred letters is added (Bellarmine, Bullinger, Valencia, Ficino, Mornay, Grotius).

XIV. So much for human arguments. Next the divine argument: the Holy Spirit's efficacy implanted in Sacred Scripture, by which its persuasive power is raised and breathed into the reader's heart — for which Christians receive it in the spiritual struggle with firm, unmoved, world-conquering, utterly divine assent.

1. Christians who watch for their soul's salvation assent so firmly that they would rather die than deny Scripture's divine truth. 2. This assent depends proximately on nothing else than Scripture itself as self-attesting (αὐτόπιστος), as 1 Thessalonians 2:13 shows: they received the word not as a human word but as the word of God.

Early believers were moved by the Word's luminous power, not by Church authority or the preachers' fame §1.4.12

1.4.12What moved the "barbarians" the Apostles taught to prefer death to deserting the faith? Not the human arguments (they produce only human faith); not the Church's authority (then unknown to them — and if proved from Scripture, circular); not the preachers' authority (unarmed fishermen and obscure weavers). Therefore they believed moved by the luminous power and spiritual efficacy of the Word itself, handed down to us through Scripture.

No effect that depends on a cause cannot exist without that cause.ent to Scripture sometimes exists without the Church's known authority. Therefore this assent does not depend on the Church's authority as on a cause of itself — as history shows of those who believed from New Testament reading alone. Bellarmine himself confesses: no persuasion can compel belief in supernatural articles unless the mind is divinely helped — not even miracles entirely convince.

Divine testimony from Scripture's implanted efficacy and the Spirit's inward work; against Miletus on Aesop §1.4.13

1.4.13This divine testimony is both from the efficacy so divinely implanted in Scripture that its authority does not of itself depend on proofs sought elsewhere, and from the Holy Spirit's inward operation in the reader's heart. That operation, though it cannot alone convince others, vehemently confirms the one who already reads and believes — called the earnest and seal given to believers, the spirit of judgment and of burning (Isaiah 4:4), and fire (Matthew 3:11).

Those who by Aph. VII's monitory and motive arguments have already acknowledged the Christian religion as more probable cannot but admit this testimony's divinity. Therefore Vitus Miletus of Gmünd, a papal man, acts the atheist, not the Christian who knows Scripture's force, when he says: take away the Church's authority and Sacred Scripture will not even be worth Aesop's fables — take away the Church's infallible authority and tradition, and Scripture will have no certainty among humans.

Scripture is first principle with Christians; Walaeus's three argument kinds against the atheist §1.4.14

1.4.14What then, Miletus? If we made this principle simply first against every adversary, your charge would have some color. But ours set Sacred Scripture only as the first principle of theological discourse with one who professes himself a Christian and admits both Testaments. Against an utter atheist — still empty of Christ's Spirit (John 14:17) — the process is Aph. XIII's.

Walaeus wisely reduces convincing such a one to three kinds: (1) historical notes and criteria (Arrian; Josephus against Apion) — far more evident in sacred history than in human writings; (2) the religion's perfection and divinity in the Testaments, by three infallible notes — true God alone worshipped, true way of reconciliation, true duties to God and neighbor; (3) certain divinity-signs — miracles; matter (creation, Trinity, Christ God-man, resurrection, judgment, Decalogue, prayer, prophecies, promises); form (simplicity with majesty); effects (cessation of oracles, conversion of nations); adjuncts of antiquity and duration against Satan's hatreds. From these the books' divinity becomes known to anyone who seriously reads them with a sincere mind eager for salvation.

The divine argument: Word, signs, and senses; Moses and Aaron; Christ the legate of legates §1.4.15

1.4.15XV. The divine argument by which the Holy Spirit through His legates persuades humans that what they propose is infallibly God's Word — which all to whom it is sufficiently proposed must receive as God's Word, so that those who do not are condemned as unbelievers — contains three things: (1) the Word itself, which God or some legate in God's name has spoken; (2) certain signs and testimonies by which humans not wholly obstinate are persuaded this is from God; (3) eyes, ears, sense and reason, by which they can infallibly perceive that Word and those signs.

1. When God sent Moses and Aaron, He gave them the Word and signs, but had already given sense and intellect to His people (Exodus 4:30; Exodus 19:9). Therefore Israel gladly embraced Moses' word as divine (Deuteronomy 5:27).

2. Those signs were efficacious not only among eyewitnesses (αὐτόπται) but among posterity, who have fathers' history and tradition instead of eyewitnesses (Psalm 44:2; Psalm 78:2; Deuteronomy 4:9-Deuteronomy 4:10).

3. Other prophets followed Moses with equal authority, agreeing with the sacred letters already complete and pressing that no new worship be received.

4. The legate of legates, Apostle and High Priest of our confession, is JESUS CHRIST, whom Moses foretold (Deuteronomy 18:15). Testimony: sacred letters (John 5:39, John 5:46; Luke 24:46; Acts 10:43); John the Baptist (John 1:7); God's voice from heaven (Matthew 3:17; Matthew 17:5; 2 Peter 1:16); miracles (John 5:36; John 10:25); resurrection (Romans 1:4); ascension (Luke 24:51; Acts 1:9). As prophets followed Moses, so the Apostles followed Christ.

Apostolic testimonies continue; how spiritual Israel today knows the genuine Word §1.4.16

1.4.16XV (continued). Just as the other prophets followed Moses, so the Apostles followed Jesus Christ. Testimony is given them: first, the sacred letters (Acts 17:2; Acts 18:24-Acts 18:28); second, Christ's doctrine and works then notorious among the Jews (Acts 2:22); third, the Apostles' miracles (Acts 2:43; Acts 5:12; Mark 16:20); fourth, the cloud of witnesses who saw Christ after His resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:6); fifth, the martyrs' constancy, rejoicing in death itself and praying for enemies (Acts 7:60; Hebrews 11:36; Hebrews 12:1); sixth, the clearest fulfillment of the oft-repeated prophecy of the nations' conversion to Israel's God (Romans 15:9 and following); seventh, Jerusalem's ruin and the Jews' rejection so often foretold by the prophets.

But another question must be briefly decided here: From where and how can and ought we who confess Christ today know surely and infallibly the true and genuine Word of God, to which alone we defer?

The answer: (1) We who have succeeded the first Christians and the fathers of spiritual Israel still use with our own eyes the seventh testimony — how God has punished the Jews' contempt of His Gospel. (2) We also experience the sixth: the calling of the nations by God fulfilled in ourselves. (3) The fifth is likewise plain: the constancy of those who rejoice in adversity, pray for enemies, and would rather lose all than Christ. (4) The second, third, and fourth — Christ's and the Apostles' works, and the living witnesses who spoke with Christ after His resurrection — are not indeed seized by our eyes, nor do we see the Apostles annotate this or that with their own hand. Yet just as once for Israel according to the flesh the fathers' constant, concordant, and public testimony (whether of saints or not) was as certain as if they had seen with their eyes and heard with their ears, so for us the perpetual, concordant, and public testimony of the new Israel — of all who confess Christ's and the Apostles' doctrine — is as certain as if we ourselves had explored with eyes and ears what they unanimously attest. And as for ancient Israelites that fathers' testimony stood in place of the autopsy by which the fathers themselves had known, so for us the testimony of all Christians — and even of Jews as to the Old Testament — ought to stand in place of autopsy we could have used had we lived in their age. By that testimony's benefit we are as sure of the Gospel's truth as we surely know from histories that Constantinople and Jerusalem are or were, even if we never saw either. Whoever calls this testimony into doubt will with far better right doubt everything that ancient Persians, Greeks, Romans, and other historians write and attest by unanimous consent, and will believe nothing but what he himself has seen and handled with his hands. (5) The first testimony also still endures among us: the prophets' Scripture of the Old Testament, which Christ and the Apostles praise.

By all these testimonies the Apostles' doctrine and Scripture — never doubted by God's saints — is so confirmed to have come from the Apostles that no one without notable malice and obstinacy can today deny its divine authority and truth.

A third question remains about the present time, when many teachers and legates thrust themselves upon us and boast the Word of God: Which is the true and infallible Word of God? What are we to hold concerning dogmas or opinions some Christians today foster? This is determined in four conclusions, so that it may become plain in which part the fault of schism chiefly sticks.

Conclusion I: what is clearly comprehended in undisputed Scripture must be believed §1.4.17

1.4.17CONCLUSION I. Everything so clearly and plainly comprehended in the undisputed writings of the Old and New Testament that no one of sound mind can call it into doubt must necessarily be believed and confessed. For this rests on all those testimonies we cited concerning prophetic and Apostolic doctrine.

Yet anyone can readily understand that we ought to receive not only the bare letter by which God's Word was once uttered, but also all interpretations, exhortations, and consequences drawn from Scripture that are so conditioned that all Christian parties — and especially those called Papists, Lutherans, and Calvinists — conspire into them by open and unanimous consent.

Indeed the number and mass of dogmas placed beyond all controversy among these is so great that if one first chooses to select them all and express them in deed — so that we do not merely carry God's Word about on the surface of the mouth but receive it in the heart's center — we almost spontaneously forget both superfluous controversies and human additions, whether of those who condemn and persecute others without God's express Word, or of those who without God's plain Word stir unnecessary quarrels against the catholically received articles of the faith.

Conclusion II: Scripture dogma not wholly beyond contradiction yet clear by many testimonies and the saints' unanimous tradition §1.4.18

1.4.18CONCLUSION II. If some dogma happens to occur in the Scriptures that is not wholly beyond controversy and others' contradiction, yet is not only made probable by many Scripture testimonies but also has been so clearly and plainly handed down and believed by all the saints whose writings have reached us, by the strength of those testimonies, that even laypeople of sound mind can easily demonstrate their unanimous consent — concerning that we confess no pious lover of peace ought to raise controversy, but rather follow the Apostle's warning (1 Corinthians 1:10): "I beseech you, brothers, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment." And (Philippians 2:2): "Fulfill my joy, that you be like-minded, having the same love, being of one accord, of one mind."

So we separate ourselves from the Photinians, who indeed sometimes seem to urge the practice of things that are clear and certain, yet meanwhile raise contests even about matters defined from the Church's cradle by very many and most certain Scripture testimonies understood in the simplest way.

From these two prior conclusions, which contain everything each Christian must explicitly know and believe, it is plain we wish to seduce no one: we force on no one our opinions, inventions, subtle interpretations, and consequences, but commend solely this as to be believed which has always been publicly and plainly handed down from Sacred Scripture by God's saints — settling for certain that no one can be in peril for his salvation who exercises himself in these dogmas from the heart and diligently.

Conclusion III: what is unclear or of uncertain unanimous tradition is not necessary as infallible Word §1.4.19

1.4.19CONCLUSION III. If some dogma is not found in the Scriptures so clearly and evidently that it cannot be contradicted, and it is at least uncertain and doubtful whether it has been deduced from the Scriptures, believed, and handed down by the unanimous consent of all the saints whose monuments have reached us — we confess we today see no cause why it must necessarily be believed as the infallible and undoubted Word of God; indeed, why this or that person may not doubt it.

For since all the prophets who followed Moses — indeed the Apostles and Christ Himself — if they handed down anything to be believed as God's Word that was not already altogether plain and written without doubt, demonstrated it both from Scripture by solid consequences and legitimate interpretations and from signs and other undoubted testimonies, so that the Lord dared to affirm that if He had not done among them works which no other did, they would not have sin (John 15:24) — how much less ought others to be believed for what is not contained in the Scriptures, unless they can demonstrate it by the Scriptures or by signs and testimonies worthy of faith? Especially since our salvation can nevertheless stand for us if only we receive in mind the dogmas comprehended in the two prior conclusions.

Therefore we not undeservedly fear lest we corrupt God's Word by unnecessary additions (Proverbs 30:6; 2 Corinthians 2:17), preach another Gospel (Galatians 1:8), and tempt God if we lay a new yoke on the disciples (Acts 15:10), and force as necessary and beyond dispute what has not been constantly, unanimously, and publicly handed down from Sacred Scripture in God's Church in every age. And not undeservedly is Augustine's word against the Donatists objected to us: "Are you alone wise? Do you alone see clearly? Do you count all others stocks and blind? Has no church besides your little synagogue had eyes or mind?"

Conclusion IV: useful doctrine decided among those agreeing on the premises; peace, weight, and necessity §1.4.20

1.4.20CONCLUSION IV. If something is not found plainly in the Scriptures, nor handed down from them by all the saints' unanimous consent, yet does not openly and undoubtingly oppose and contradict them, and is decided by a council or congregation of those Christians who agree with us in the foregoing heads — not, however, as a Gospel or article of faith about which no one may doubt, but simply proposed as true and useful doctrine that may be taught in the Church or school — we acknowledge ourselves bound not to contradict it contentiously, but either to consent especially with those with whom we live (and therefore, so far as in us lies, we are also bound to pursue peace with them), or, if we happen to feel a scruple about it in our consciences, to propose that scruple seasonably and conveniently: so that if we cannot agree on the question of some article's truth simply and in itself, we may at least keep consent on the question of its weight and necessity — namely that although it is not altogether necessary to believe, it may still be usefully taught or at least tolerated in the Church and schools.

Moreover, if someone agreed with us on the article simply and in itself (for example, that the books of Judith, Tobit, and the like were not written by the prophets and accordingly are not of equal honor with the canonical) yet dissented from us on its weight and necessity (namely that for this cause the one who thinks apart and constantly believes otherwise is not to be condemned as a heretic): we acknowledge ourselves bound to side with the one who agrees with us on necessity — namely that neither affirmation nor denial of this article is to be judged necessary to salvation — and to regard as a tyrant or heretic the one who agrees with us on the article simply considered yet dissents on necessity, because he lays an unnecessary yoke on the disciples.

From the last conclusions: not heretics; against false prophets; the pious warned against additions §1.4.21

1.4.21From these two last conclusions it is grasped beyond dispute, as plainly as things seen with the eyes, first that we neither are nor can seem malicious and contentious, nor heretics and apostates: because we desire not only to force on no one our private opinions, inventions, and imaginations, but also in other matters, to avoid all harmful and unnecessary quarrels, to conform ourselves — so far as conscience allows — to the dogmas or opinions of other Christians who agree with us in the foundation.

Nor do we turn from or avoid anyone except the contentious and new prophets who press men's words and say "THE LORD HAS SAID" (Jeremiah 23:21), because they declare: "This is God's Word; this is an article of faith; if you deny it you are a heretic" — and yet cannot prop up these assertions with those testimonies by which the prophets and Apostles confirmed their sermons; but they bring it about that God's commandments, which are certain, are neglected (Jeremiah 23:30, Jeremiah 23:32).

Next, as to the opinions we hint at here: since the things written so clearly and plainly in God's Word that no sound Christian who loves peace and is of ripe age can lawfully doubt their truth, we warn all the pious to whom their souls' salvation is dear to guard themselves as carefully as possible from all other fillings-out or additions. (1) Because such added controversial opinions, if not false, are at least uncertain and doubtful: whence there is danger of falling into superstition, idolatry, even spiritual and abominable pride. (2) Because even if we imagine such controversial opinions neither false nor doubtful but true and certain, this at least remains: they are not necessary — not only because not all Christians need know them, but also because not all Christians need necessarily grant and embrace them after the reasons they seem to rest on have been shown them in the Scriptures — since they are not so clearly and evidently comprehended in the Scriptures that a timid and pious conscience, with all due diligence and careful interpretation, in view of the danger just indicated, cannot with praise or at least without wrong abstain from them. (3) Because there is at least this danger: that on this occasion many pious and innocent people who, from fear of conscience and from considering that a person must give account even of every idle word in the last judgment (Matthew 12:36), avoid those controversial opinions and cannot hold them as God's Word and articles of faith, are unjustly and proudly judged and condemned — against the Savior's word (Matthew 7:1; Luke 6:37) and the Apostle's (Romans 14:10, Romans 14:13; Galatians 6:2; 1 Corinthians 8:2). See the Irenic sermons, with appendix and Apology to D. Nicolaus Hunnius, published by the distinguished D. Conrad Bergius, my colleague and dearest fellow-countryman, where he treats this matter piously and learnedly.

Chapter 5: On Sacred Scripture's perfection and sufficiency §1.5.1

1.5.1CHAPTER FIVE On Sacred Scripture's perfection and sufficiency

So far concerning Sacred Scripture's authority: next comes perfection, which is its property by which the catholic principles of sacred doctrine common and necessary to all Christians, set out wholly and purely partly in the Hebrew tongue and partly in the Greek, are so sufficiently embraced that nothing ought to be added and nothing subtracted (Deuteronomy 4:2; Proverbs 30:6; 2 Corinthians 2:17; Revelation 22:18-Revelation 22:19).

So also Aristotle, On the Heavens book 2 chapter 4, defines the perfect as that to which nothing is lacking and outside which nothing of the things that belong to it can be taken. And this the nature of a canon requires, which Varinus defines as μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον — an infallible measure admitting no addition or diminution.

This perfection of the sacred canon is certain (1) as to the number of canonical books, (2) as to the purity of the authentic text, (3) as to the integrity of the lettering.

As to the number of canonical books: none needful to salvation has perished; against Bellarmine and Becanus §1.5.2

1.5.2First, as to the number of canonical books: none needful to us for salvation have perished. For Bellarmine is false when he says (On the Word of God book 4 chapter 4): "Many truly sacred and canonical books have perished. Therefore we do not have, nor have we had for 1500 years, sufficient doctrine, if the whole of it is seated in the Scriptures."

The antecedent is false, as is plain from considering the eighteen books Becanus brings forward as lost from the canon. For by God's singular providence the canonical books have been so kept that not even a jot, much less a whole book, could perish from the canon (Matthew 5:18).

Of the books Becanus and other papists complain are lost, we note: (1) some still remain in the canon today; (2) some never existed; (3) some were not books but recensions; (4) some are historical works whose prophetic spirit is not established; (5) some are forensic books, as interpreters will have it.

As to authentic-text purity: the Hebrew was not corrupted in the prophets', Apostles', or Jerome's ages §1.5.3

1.5.3Second, Sacred Scripture is perfect as to the purity of the authentic text. Ours have shown this clearly, and against Gordon Huntly's blasphemies the most learned Salomon Glassius especially has solidly proved it in his Sacred Philology.

For the Hebrew text of the Old Testament was not corrupted in the prophets' time: they knew they were not allowed to change or innovate even the least thing in the law (as the Talmudists note at the end of Leviticus 27); nor would they have suffered that crime to be done by others; nor could corruption have been attempted in the authentic exemplar without them.

Nor was it corrupted from the prophets' time onward: because already from Ezra the Masora was added, and because Christ and the Apostles, most sharp-eyed Aristarchuses of false interpretations of the law, would without doubt have noted a corruption of the context if there had been any — as Origen on Isaiah book 8, Jerome on Isaiah 6, and Augustine City of God 15.13 urge. Nor from the Apostles' time: whether we look to the megilloth-sopher (Psalm 40:8) and the Hebrews' handwritten Bibles, or to the Masora, we find nothing but God's marvelous providence and the Jews' stupendous fidelity and most exquisite diligence in guarding the Bibles — of which Josephus Against Apion and Eusebius Church History 3.10 testify that any Jew would rather die a hundred times than suffer the law to be changed in any point.

Nor in Jerome's age (Ribera on Hosea 9: if the codices were then corrupted when Jerome published the Latin translation, the church does not have the true Scripture). Nor in today's Jewish manuscript Bibles — so great is the consent that not even one book of Scripture written by a Jew's hand can be produced that either lacks something the others have or adds what the others lack.

Sixtus of Siena: divine Old Testament Scriptures not falsified; five observations against corruption charges §1.5.4

1.5.4From all this, judgment is made about the printed exemplars we still use, whose typographical slips are known to the learned. Hence Sixtus of Siena (Bibliotheca book 8, heresy 2) says it cannot be said that the divine Scriptures of the Old Testament have been falsified by the malice of Jews or of Christians.

For greater clarity of the matter, let these be observed: (1) Not every change proves corruption. Hence Benedictus Arias Montanus in the preface to volume 1 of the Bibles says the Hebrew books we use were not corrupted by Jewish fraud; and even if some change was made, yet no word or letter or point ever existed that was not observed in the Masoretic tradition. (2) The papists deal with such Old Testament corruption in order that the Latin Vulgate version may flow purer than its source. They will demonstrate that on the Greek Kalends. (3) Corruption asserted by some fathers rests not on demonstration but on suspicion. For they were ignorant of the Hebrew tongue — unless perhaps you except Justin lightly tinged with these letters, and Origen and Jerome excellently steeped in them, who with us vindicate the Hebrew text from corruptions. (4) Many fathers complain of corruption not of the sources but of the versions of the Seventy, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, and others. (5) The suspicion of corruption rests on the papists' false hypothesis pronouncing the Latin version authentic, so that no one dares reject it under any pretext (Council of Trent session 4).

As to integrity of the lettering: the claim that vowel points were added late after Christ §1.5.5

1.5.5Third, Sacred Scripture is perfect as to the integrity of the lettering. Some among the Jews, and those among Christians who follow them in this, think the Hebrew text only some centuries after Christ's birth attained the perfection in which it now shines, by the addition of vowel and distinguishing points — so Bellarmine On the Word of God book 2 chapter 2, Petrus Martinius, the Arcanum of punctuation revealed by Thomas Erpenius, Gordon Huntly, and most others today taught by Jewish instructors, who trust the histories of Elias Levita and certain other Jews.

But this assertion seems wholly to contradict the perfection of the holy tongue, which cannot be worse than all other languages, as if it were thought written by divine men with consonants alone without vowels — vowels that in every language animate and perfect every consonant.

Against late punctuation: the claim is unhistorical, suspicious in time, object, authors, and witnesses §1.5.6

1.5.6Besides: (1) The claim is destitute of historical credit. For if the Masoretic correction and perfection of the points had been made after Jerome's time, as they will have it, some mention of so great a deed would doubtless have been inserted somewhere by the holy fathers — especially by Jerome's disciple-bishops who lived in the East skilled in Hebrew. How great the contests were over the version of the Seventy, Symmachus, Aquila, Theodotion, Jerome, Luther, Piscator, and Castalio is all too well known.

(2) It is suspicious as to time, object, authors, and witnesses. The time is after the New Testament canon was complete, when that Masoretic work is said to have been done — after which, since beforehand neither the Apostles nor their apostolic followers nor those who delivered it to the Church doubted even slightly about itly say that anyone either could or would have attempted so great a crime. The object — namely the biblical codex — was so sacred to the Jews that writing upon it was like a sacrilege. The authors would be rabbis, either bad or good. If bad, perhaps the canon's integrity will waver. If good, they would rather have died than add even a jot to the text. The witnesses are rabbis, whose faith is rather shaky, and they do not agree among themselves, as Münster testifies.

Late punctuation is dangerous: no need, no mandate, and no infallible sense if the points are new §1.5.7

1.5.7(3) It is dangerous. First, because that change of the Bibles would have been made without necessity of the time, if it was made at all: both because God by His providence could have preserved the sacred Scripture He had kept until then into late ages without such an addendum, and because neither God's command nor any reason of necessity drove them to this work. For the author of the Arcanum of punctuation revealed (book 1 chapter 18) shows by many reasons that unpointed Hebrew could somehow be read of old, and today we know from Jewish manuscripts that they read the sacred texts most readily without points.

Second, because for so many ages back that would have stood in the authentic text of the Bibles which is not true in every part and does not belong to authenticity's majesty. For when the anonymous author (book 2 chapter 22) teaches that our judgment cannot finally and infallibly be fixed on those points, and that nothing ought to be concluded infallibly and authentically from the truth of sense that arises today from that placement and form of the points — then what has until now been held as belonging to the authentic text's literary integrity collapses and vanishes into air like an Empusa.

Third, because it will then be doubtful what the Holy Spirit properly intended in each place of Scripture, and we will not be able to know it infallibly. For we may not flee to the points we use today as to authenticity's asylum, because they are new, and the infallibility of the sense emerging from them is denied. Nor would one believe the punctators were prophets, since the rabbis are known to have been the fiercest enemies of the Christian name. Nor is it enough meanwhile to appeal to the letters: since these are formless, from where will they draw an infallible form? One will have to flee to a living or mute master: the former is not given, and if given would be fallible; the latter is wanting to this day. The Chaldee paraphrase is a version, not authenticity; the rabbis' darkness is a gulf of trifles; after Christ's ascension there is no synagogue — on that path the genuine sense would hang solely on the Jewish church, and Scripture would be a dead letter.

Late punctuation is contradictory on cause, place, and time; and contrary to Scripture's witness to points in Christ's day §1.5.8

1.5.8(4) It is contradictory. First, as to the efficient cause — namely the Masoretes. For Buxtorf in his Tiberias and others think the points were added to the Bibles by men of the Great Synagogue — Ezra, Daniel, Zechariah, Malachi, Hananiah, Nehemiah, Zerubbabel, Joshua son of Jozadak, and so on — a council they call the Great Synagogue, in which they chiefly arranged the sacred books by the prophetic spirit they possessed and added the points to them. Others differ much from these and suspect the points were added to the bare bodies of the letters by exiled Jews after Christ's birth (Aaron of Asher's tribe and Jacob of Naphtali's at Tiberias). Finally some assign no certain authors, or are ignorant of them (Elias Levita in Buxtorf).

Second, as to place: this discrepancy depends on the former. Third, as to time: some refer the art of punctuation to what was immediately after the exit from Babylon before Christ was born; others after His birth, who yet themselves disagree (the years 236 / 436 after the temple's destruction, and so on).

(5) It is contrary to the Scriptures, because that the points existed in Christ's time is gathered from Matthew 5:18 and Luke 16:17.

Scripture's witness to points continued: iota and tittle; late punctuation is impossible §1.5.9

1.5.9The Scriptural argument continues from Luke 16:17, where the keraia — the "tittle" or little horn — is distinguished from the jota, which is the least of the letters and therefore does not belong to their bare shape, as Erpenius holds in the Arcanum of revealed punctuation and Capellus in the Myrothecium. Rather it is beyond doubt the tiniest mark: among the vowels the upper holem, the middle segol, the lower hireq; among the accents, rebia. Nor may one take refuge here in the apices of the Samaritan Bibles and Scripture, of which Jerome speaks in the preface to the books of Kings. For besides the fact that that writing too is done without points, as some note, Christ speaks of the Law, and indeed of authentic Scripture which the Jews had received. Erpenius and Capellus deny that the tittle signifies some little body separate from the letters, and the rabbis do have certain keraiai — tagin, or little crowns — set on letters even in unpointed books; yet it is not likely Christ is so taken here, because a letter's flourish in writing often either perishes or is lengthened, and varies strangely at times. Christ's saying stands best if He is believed to have said: No letter, nor point, and so not even the least of them, will be changed in the Law.

(6) It is impossible. For those who assert the novelty of the points are driven either to say that certain points are missing from the letters, or to set up something analogous to them. Johannes Drusius (Animadversiones 2.60) does not deny that diacritical points occur in a codex before Jerome's time — after which the rabbis themselves say they undertook the work of pointing. Schickard, when in Mishpat ha-melekh he treats the writing of the royal Bibles in the Old Testament and explains a rabbinic saying that mentions pointed letters, says: The points it mentions here are not vowels and accents, but certain extraordinary points. For the rest, as those copies lack vowels, so in turn they have something else our codices do not know — namely very frequent apices, not arbitrary but in a fixed number and in due places, which they call tagin or little crowns, because as a beth stands high on kings' heads, so these stand out above the words.

Late punctuation is absurd: doubtful sense; confessors, reason, and examples; authentic versus private Bibles §1.5.10

1.5.10(7) It is absurd. For if the novelty of the points stands, the sense of Scripture is most doubtful — which fights against the truth, simplicity, and immutability of the speaking God, and foists on one simple saying of sacred Scripture several literal senses, and therefore doubtful ones. This is proved in three ways.

First, by the confession of those who defend the novelty of the points. The author of the Arcanum of revealed punctuation (book 2, chapter 22) says: If some places of Scripture are brought forward in which varying pointing begets a varying sense, yet each true, fitting, apt, not badly cohereing with what goes before and after, and not against the analogy of faith — what danger will there be if here one embraces this pointing and with it this sense, another another pointing and another sense with it? Or what danger even if both senses that rise from it? None, he says. And Rabbi Bechai on Numbers 11:15: Consonants, he says, without vowel points have various and ornate understandings; for which cause we have a precept not to add vowels to the book of the Law, because they would then have only one sense — whereas without them they admit various and wonderful significations.

Second, by reason. For as from the determination of subject and predicate by the copula one statement is made, so from the pointing of the words of the Hebrew text there is a determination to one sense, which, that pointing omitted, is often doubtful. Hence Münster: He who does not heed what is written above and below in the books perverts the words of the living God. And from Recanati: It is certain that when a letter is not pointed it can be read in various ways; but when points are added it bears only one sense, according to the form of the pointing. Therefore either the points together with the twenty-two letters are from the Author at once, or else Scripture was once flexible like soft wax, now this way, now that. And if the points were invented by men, it necessarily follows that Scripture in this our time has authority that is not divine — which is most absurd.

Third, by examples, which see in Engelbert's preface to Schindler's Pentaglot Lexicon. For the rest, one must distinguish between authentic and public Bibles and private ones. That the former were of old unpointed has not yet been firmly enough proved; that the latter were not all pointed we grant. For as difficulty made these lack points, so necessity of religion made those not lack them — witness Franciscus Junius in his Animadversions on Bellarmine.

Scripture's perfection as to what it contains: divine revelation and catholic dogmas of the faith §1.5.11

1.5.11II. But it also embraces what is necessary — both insofar as divine revelation is the principal cause of knowing, and insofar as the catholic dogmas of the faith, or revealed propositions, on which religion properly rests, and which have the force of an infallible principle for framing further conclusions, are signified.

It is worth noting here that all who agree in these principles understood in either way are also to be judged to agree in the foundation of religion, and cannot properly be held heretics or unbelievers as far as doctrine is concerned — by the argument of 1 Corinthians 3:15. But those who are ignorant of these principles, or deliberately dissent in them, are no more Christians than those who ignore or deny principles known by nature have commonly been sound.

III. Divine revelation we explained in Chapter 2. But a catholic dogma of the faith is elsewhere taken for a principle, elsewhere for any conclusion truly drawn from a principle — either manifestly and evidently, or not equally manifestly. In the former mode a dogma of the faith cannot be denied by any Christian; yet that can happen in the latter mode.

IV. Catholic dogmas, or the principles and foundations of the Christian religion, are called necessary either with respect to eternal salvation, or with respect to institution, or finally with respect to certainty.

Necessary dogmas: for eternal salvation, for church teaching, and for certainty §1.5.12

1.5.12V. With respect to eternal salvation they are those that are simply necessary for obtaining salvation, and therefore must be ignored by none, but expressly held by all adults. Such are Hebrews 11:6: Whoever comes to God must believe that He is God and that He rewards those who seek Him. Which place Socinus himself in his Prelections refers to those to whom God has somehow made Himself known. For those, he says, unless they believe that God is, show that they have a mind alien from piety and so from the study of just and unjust.

VI. With respect to institution they are those that are necessarily expounded by all who teach in the Church, and therefore must be withheld by none, but handed on by all in the Church. Such are all and each of the heads of the Apostles' Creed. For it is probable that all that is contained in the Apostles' Creed is precisely necessary to salvation for all who are to be saved in the New Testament — at least as to the sense clearly expressed in other places of Scripture — even if they do not hold the Creed's wording and manner of interpreting. Hence these dogmas are also properly called articles of the faith. Yet because the consideration is different, and we cannot determine with sufficiently evident certainty which or how many heads of doctrine are precisely such that without express knowledge of them God wills to save no one, but more rightly commit this whole matter to the secrets of divine judgment — therefore this latter cause of the naming must somehow be distinguished from the former.

VII. With respect to certainty they are all those that have divine and universal evidence, and therefore, though ignored by many, yet once known must be denied or opposed by none, but necessarily granted. Such is every Word of God — not indeed absolutely, but what is catholically revealed, that is, so that the certainty of divine revelation can be understood by all if it is proposed, and once understood can never be denied without evident malice or unbelief and denial of God. And these are of such a kind as, beyond those that are absolutely necessary, and before the revelation of them is made, are said to be believed by the faithful with a certain preparation of mind. For Calvin aptly says (Institutes 3.2.4): But we grant that faith, as long as we pilgrimage in the world, is implicit — not only because many things still lie hidden from us, but because, surrounded by many fogs of error, we do not attain everything. For of the most perfect, whatever his height of wisdom, the sum is to advance, and with quiet teachableness to press farther.

All needful dogmas are perfectly contained in Old and New Testament Scripture; reasons from canon, testament, praises, and Isaiah §1.5.13

1.5.13VIII. We therefore assert that all dogmas whose knowledge is necessary for salvation, for catechetical institution, and finally for certainty are perfectly contained in the books of the Old and New Testament, and sufficiently handed down — either expressly, as to the wording itself, or equivalently, as to likeness, by evident equipollence or by a legitimate and catholic consequence.

The reason for the perfection of sacred Scripture that we assert is, first, from the notion of a canon, because it sets forth a rule of the things that are for us to be believed and done (Galatians 6:16; Philippians 3:16). But a rule is a certain measure to which nothing can be taken away, nothing added, by private authority — which Gerson (tome 1, part 2, in the treatise On the examination of doctrine) wisely applied to the canon of sacred Scripture. And of this rule some parts are essential, some integral, and must be prudently distinguished. In the former the substance of things to be believed and done is looked to; in the latter the mode and manner of application. In the former rather than in the latter the force and nature of a rule is placed. And so the whole of Scripture indeed, yet not the whole of what is in Scripture, is established by us as a rule — just as in a material rule not everything that belongs to the rule is itself the rule.

Second, the same is proved by the notion of a testament, by which appellation those sacred books are designated (2 Corinthians 3:6, 14; Galatians 3:17; 4:24; Ephesians 2:12; Hebrews 9:15–17).

Third, from those praises which it has from its Author and from its efficacy (2 Peter 1:21; Psalm 19:7–8; 2 Timothy 3:15–16).

Fourth, from Isaiah's most weighty warning, calling everyone from human and diabolical inventions back to Mosaic and prophetic Scripture alone (Isaiah 8:20): To the law and to the testimony: if they do not speak according to this word, they have no dawn of light.

Further reasons for Scripture's perfection: Christ's judgment, spoken and written Word, Abraham, and the Apostles §1.5.14

1.5.14Fifth, from the judgment of Christ, who for this cause exhorts the Jews to search the Scriptures — or at least approves that they set their study in searching them (John 5:39) — because in them He presents Himself wholly to be known, and brands ignorance of them as the mother of all errors (Mark 12:24), and sets them far above every other revelation, however miraculous (Luke 16:29).

Sixth, from the equating of the word pronounced and the word written, as equivalent helps which Christ and the Apostles used (Luke 24:27; Acts 17:2; 26:22; Philippians 3:1; 2 Thessalonians 2:15; 1 John 1:3–4; Luke 1:3–4; Acts 1:1).

Seventh, from Abraham's reply (Luke 16:29): They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them.

Eighth, from the testimony of the Apostles, and from their precept by which they forbid us to be wise above what is written, and from their example by which from the Scriptures alone they confirm their doctrine, refute adversaries, and preach nothing beyond what Moses and the prophets had foretold (1 Corinthians 4:6; Acts 26:22).

Ninth, from the less probable. For if the Apostles themselves clung so tightly to the Scripture of the Old Testament, much more we, after that old canon has been enlarged by so lucid an interpretation and addition of the New Testament — we who are endowed neither with an equal measure of the Spirit nor with equal authority. And now the Scripture of the Old Testament is called a perfect law, imparting life (Psalm 19:7; 119), wisdom and prudence (Deuteronomy 4:6; 17:19; 31:11–13).

Final reasons for perfection: Scripture's end, God's counsel, the canon's close, and orthodox antiquity §1.5.15

1.5.15Tenth, from the end of the New Testament, and from the use of all Scripture for the man of God (2 Timothy 3:16; Luke 16:29).

Eleventh, from the sufficient exposition of God's counsel concerning our salvation (Acts 20:27; 26:22; Romans 15:4).

Twelfth, from the closing clause of the whole Christian canon (Revelation 22:18–19), which John Scotus — not the least of the schoolmen, whom Scaliger calls the file of truth — rightly understood not of the Apocalypse alone but of all Scripture.

Thirteenth, from the consent of orthodox antiquity, from which Irenaeus truly and reverently says: The Gospel which they first preached they afterward, by God's will, handed down to us in the Scriptures, to be the pillar and foundation of our faith. And Tertullian: When we believe, he says, this we first believe — that there is nothing beyond which we ought to believe. I omit others. Those who do not hold and defend this strictly and tooth-and-nail, but decide and so propound their dogmas by the authority of whatever church, and finally resolve them into it — they fall from the first line of the Reformation and stand as near as can be to the old leaven of the papists, which they wish to appear to oppose and spit out.

First contradiction: papists equate unwritten tradition with Scripture; kinds of tradition §1.5.16

1.5.16IX. To the perfection of sacred Scripture that we have explained, the papists first contradict, who equate tradition — or the unwritten word — with the written, and decree that the whole mass of their traditions must be received and believed with equal affection of piety together with the undoubted Word of God. See the Council of Trent, session 4, chapter 1; Bellarmine, On Justification 3.3. When James, bishop of Cloches, had called that decree hard, he was ordered by the pontiff to go to Rome to obtain pardon, as Paolo Vergerio reports in a letter to the king of Poland. By unwritten traditions, says Adam Tanner in the Ratisbon Colloquy, we understand certain precepts or constitutions pertaining to faith or religion which, the infallible authority of the Church set aside, are neither openly expressed in Scripture nor evidently deduced from it.

Note here the cover they stretch: (1) faith-dogmas; (2) moral institution; (3) observation of rites. Hence of traditions we can call some dogmatic, some ethical, and others hieratic or ritual. Dogmatic and ethical ones outside Scripture we receive none. For though not every particular of the Apostles was written — because we have neither knowledge nor number of the particulars — yet their common foundation, reason, and proof is contained in the Scriptures, in which the Church of Christ finds and recognizes the genera of particulars, even if not every particular of the genera. For singular narratives of the sayings and deeds of Christ and the Apostles that are read among the ancients, and that can be called historical traditions, must be judged from Scripture and held as human writings. But ritual traditions are either universal or particular. The former have a general foundation in Scripture (1 Corinthians 14:40), and so are called unwritten traditions only by catachresis — and these we necessarily and gladly receive. But the particular ones, as the name itself shows, could and should vary according to the variety of times, places, and persons, and therefore we judge that they do not oblige the universal Church of Christ.

Six reasons unwritten papal traditions cannot equal Scripture §1.5.17

1.5.17The first reason is that they are deceitful and uncertain in many ways. First, as to origin. For many things can happen, as Peter de Soto himself teaches in his Defense of the Catholic Confession against Brenz, from which it may justly come into doubt whether some tradition is apostolic. And Andreas Fricius Modrevius: It is no light error of certain theologians of our time who, under the title of ecclesiastical tradition, do not indeed try to lead us away from the Scriptures, yet give first place to traditions and last to Scripture. As if any strength and firmness could be in that consensus and in those traditions that do not rest on the authority of the Word of God — which yet can be shown not even to have been born from the Apostles by this very thing, if they disagree with and are severed from the divine Scriptures, to which all things must be examined, and which must be ratified and firm in the Church of God.

Second, as to number. For in the Ratisbon Colloquy, when ordered to exhibit a certain number of traditions, the papists would not — indeed could not — because they are doubtful of it and do not agree among themselves about it, since some refer to traditions those heads of doctrine which others try to build from the Scriptures. Third, as to discrepancy: because some of the older fathers referred customs whose origin could not easily be shown to the Apostles, as if handed down by them — which yet Chemnitz proves from other writings of the ancients not to be apostolic.

The second reason is that they were proper to the Pharisees and to heretics, as is plain from Matthew 15:2–7; Mark 7:3–8; Irenaeus Against Heresies 3; Chrysostom on Matthew; Josephus; and Peter de Soto the Dominican in his Defense of the Catholic Confession against Brenz's Prologomena.

The third: because even if it were most certain that some unwritten traditions of Christ or of the Apostles remain, equal authority with Scripture could not therefore be given them. For to things that are from the same author the same authority belongs only when the author put it in and willed it to be in them — who, as an agent acting freely, not of necessity but of free choice, puts more or less authority in his things, and hands some down forever and simply, some for a time and in a certain respect. But God uniquely authorized those things which He handed down to us in writing through the prophets and Apostles, because He handed down Scripture as the perpetual and perfect canon of this our life, in which alone is all that is necessary for the man of God to be perfect (2 Timothy 3:16).

The fourth: because those unwritten dogmas that today set Christians colliding mostly fight openly with Scripture, which all Christians with one mouth confess to be the Word of God — as has been variously and solidly shown by the Protestants, and they are condemned as figments of the human heart (Matthew 15:6–9; Mark 7:7; Galatians 1:8; Colossians 2:8).

The fifth: because no sufficiently fit cause can be given why those things which men desirous of eternal salvation equally ought to know had to be partly written and partly unwritten, since God equally willed the help of Scripture for men's institution and memory in all things — unless perhaps we foolishly affirm that of those things which are equally necessary to salvation some are to be learned and committed to memory more lightly, others more accurately.

The sixth: because those very unwritten dogmas, without the support of some Scripture, neither were kept nor could have been kept, as the papists themselves confess.

Bellarmine's three heads of the tradition controversy; papists as twin rabbis §1.5.18

1.5.18X. But Bellarmine sets this controversy in three heads (On the Word of God, book 4, chapters 3 and 4). The first is that the papists assert that all necessary doctrine, whether of faith or of morals, is not expressly contained in the Scriptures, and therefore besides the written Word of God an unwritten Word of God is required — that is, divine and apostolic traditions. So teaches John of Deventer in The Dart of Christian Truth, or Catapult of the Faith: The Church holds very many things not produced in dead letters, but written by the Holy Spirit in human hearts. To these as firm a faith is to be given as to evangelical Scripture, since it is agreed they were inspired by the same Spirit by which the Gospel was. It is therefore plain as a third truth that not all things to be believed and equally to be kept have been set out in the sacred letters. So Jodocus Clichtove in Anti-Luther book 1, chapter 4; John Fisher, bishop of Rochester; Peter de Soto; Alfonso de Castro of Zamora; Albert Pighius of Kampen; Martin Perez de Ayala, bishop of Guadix; Gregory of Valencia; and countless others. See the refutation in Whitaker and our Chanier, solidly and at length; briefly but with nerve in the Synopsis of purer theology, disp. 6, by the most celebrated D. Polyander, and, Bellarmine being unnerved, by D. Ames and others.

But here the papists are twin brothers of the rabbis, clinging to a double law from Moses — one written, the other by tradition — and branding as heretics those well versed in the Bibles, under the name of letter-men, textualists, biblical men, as Sadducees who, given only to the reading of the Bibles, clung to the written law alone, traditions rejected. But that the Apostles did not openly communicate to all their hearers all that God had revealed to them, but handed some things secretly and to a few as pertaining to the whole Church — Tertullian in the book On Prescription calls that madness.

XI. The second is that we think the Apostles did indeed institute certain things besides Scripture that pertain to the rites and order of the Church, which yet are not necessary for all Christians, nor commanded, but free; but the papists acknowledge apostolic traditions of every kind — that is, not only particular but universal, which are to be kept and handed down to the whole Church, as is to be seen in Bellarmine of the same book, chapter 3. See the refutation in the authors praised and in disp. 4 of our Anti-Bellarmine college, question 2.

XII. The third is that we teach that apostolic traditions, if they ever existed, do not now exist — that is, it cannot be certainly shown that any tradition is apostolic; but the papists assert that there is no lack of sure ways by which apostolic traditions are shown, in Bellarmine of the same book 4, chapter 9. But these are uncertain, obscure, and deceitful, as ours have clearly shown on this book of Bellarmine and elsewhere. Confer the praised disputation of the Anti-Bellarmine college, question 3.

Second contradiction: zealots who demand equal faith for private interpretations and consequences §1.5.19

1.5.19XIII. Second, certain zealots contradict — not in the faith of charity, in which no zeal is too little, but in knowledge, that is, in those controversies in which even the pious can sometimes easily err — who demand that their interpretations and certain consequences, though notoriously not received in the Church in every age, be believed equally with the Word of God.

Such men, though they wish to appear to have made a secession from the Papacy, can scarcely, while this opinion of theirs stands safe, defend against the papists that the Scriptures alone are the clear and sufficient canon of the faith: namely if they will that whatever they themselves, by an interpretation and consequence not that catholic one granted by all, but a controversial one peculiar only to certain doctors, think can certainly be deduced from the Scriptures, must necessarily be believed. For in every consequence something of reason is assumed toward the testimony expressly in the Scriptures. And that natural assumption, unless it is common to all the pious, or even to all sound men, and so among them to the pious too, is not certainly and notoriously divine, equipollent and as it were understood under the Scriptures, but belongs to the στοιχεῖα καὶ κόσμου — the elements of the world (Colossians 2:8). Those who use this therefore add to the Scriptures, and by that very thing open a gaping gate to all for inventing new heresies daily. For there will be no one who does not think some argumentation of his own to be necessary and evident.

Third contradiction: diverting the Church from the Bible to endless volumes; two modes of containing revelation §1.5.20

1.5.20XIV. Third, all contradict by the very deed who, not compelled by duty and the singular necessity of the Church, but stirred by the common itch of writing, already from the time of the Apostles onward, all first love — or the practice of the saints fully described in the sacred letters — set aside, miserably turn the Church of Christ by their πολυλογία from the richest and most wholesome storehouse of the Bibles to the poverty and leanness of their own volumes to this day.

For the sacred Bibles, which we still call so, are that one richest and most sufficient book and canon which, all the rest going into sponge or pyre, alone is more than enough for the worship of God and the salvation of men, even if not the least apex is set to it by a human finger — if only the true and apostolic practice of the saints, and the laborious charity of Christian faith and piety, painted in that book in full colors and graphically enough, is recalled by right of postliminium into use by the bishops and curators of the churches, by Christian magistrates, and by men of every order desirous of eternal salvation, in place of so many glosses, exegeses, interpretations, disputations, commentaries, reconciliations, elucidations, summas, commonplaces, catechisms, Articles, symbols, councils, confessions, postils, and like books, of which there is neither measure nor end, and under whose burden the Christian world groans. For if the pious consult the skill in church histories and controversies which they possess, they will without doubt discover that for no better cause than the omission of first love (Revelation 2:4) the wrath of God, the candlestick moved, so heavily presses upon the church of the New Testament under the Smyrnaean, Pergamene, Thyatiran, and our Sardian condition, that scarcely greater likeness remains between these periods and the Ephesian, in which the Apostles themselves taught, than between lambs and pups — while in place of the true and practical knowledge of God with which the apostolic church was lit, bare heresies and their refutations, fights of words and quarrels of the schools have so prevailed, the efficacy of faith and the practice of piety more and more failing, that the light of the divine letters itself has been judged so dark, obscure, and insufficient, and the foremost of Christians, after the manner of the Israelites over the Baals, almost forgetting the Lord, have mostly begun to seek life from the dead and light from darkness — whether the Pope's or their own.

XV. For the rest, what is revealed in the sacred letters is contained in two ways: one expressly (αὐτολεξεί), according to the thing expressed to us by the signed words; the other virtually (δυνάμει), according to the thing though not expressed in signed words. The former mode, as it has sound words (1 Timothy 6:3), so those words must also be kept and the Apostle's rule held in them (2 Timothy 1:13) — since, though Augustine witnesses (City of God 10.23) that philosophers speak with free words and do not fear offense to religious ears in things hardest to understand, yet it is right for us to speak by a fixed rule, lest license of words also beget an impious opinion about the things signified by them.

But the latter mode has words which, if newly employed by the Church so that by them a thing not so spoken may be expressed, must not be repudiated, provided the thing signified by them is brought into the letters. Of this kind is the Trinity, the Homoousion of the three persons of the Godhead — of which Augustine treats thus (tract. 97 on John): Against the impiety of the Arian heretics the fathers coined the new name Homoousion, but they did not signify a new thing by such a name. For this is called Homoousion which is: I and the Father are one — namely of one and the same substance. But whichever way God reveals some dogma, it makes no difference as to truth and infallibility, since it is agreed that both are truly had from the Holy Spirit. And lest anyone be troubled by the ambiguity of αὐτολεξεί, it is taken in two ways. First, rhetorically, and so it is the same as literally proper, when a certain word is taken properly and not modified and is opposed to tropically. Second, hermeneutically, and so it is the same as literally expressed, when the word by which a dogma or some thing is signed is had in the sacred writings, in whichever signification that is done — which is how we assert that many things must be believed that are not written in so many express words, provided the thing itself is in the Scriptures: to elicit which the fathers long ago judged that a true reasoning is needed.

Chapter 6: On Sacred Scripture's clarity §1.6.1

1.6.1CHAPTER SIX On Sacred Scripture's clarity

So far concerning Sacred Scripture's perfection and sufficiency: next comes clarity. Clarity is Scripture's property by which everything that holds the faith and the manners of living is so openly set down in it, and so found there, that God-fearers — using proper means with careful effort and wisdom, guided by God, and giving no credit to themselves or their own reasoningn's age, know it surely and understand it unto salvation.

Catholic ASSERTIO: saving dogmas are plain and open; Hilary; against the idle and malicious §1.6.2

1.6.2Our assertion — and it is Augustine's own, and indeed the catholic one — is this: the truth of the sentences of the faith, in dogmas supernaturally revealed and necessary to be known and believed unto salvation, stands plain and open. No one can ignore or deny those dogmas except the idle toward inquiry or the malicious toward contradiction. As Hilary says, God does not lead us to the blessed life through hard questions.

Reasons 1–3: Scripture's own witness; internal lamp; Christ's promise of the Spirit §1.6.3

1.6.3The reasons are these.

1. From Scripture's own testimony (Deuteronomy 30:11–Deuteronomy 30:14): that place does not speak of the ease of keeping the law, but of the ease of understanding it — which, with Alfonso Tostado Bishop of Avila, Bellarmine himself (On grace and free will book 3 chapter 6) proves and confesses to seem the most literal and proper reading. And what Moses said here of Old Testament doctrine Paul applies to the dogmas of the New Testament (Romans 10:6 and following).

2. From Scripture's inward property, by which it is called a lamp to our feet (Psalm 119:105), a lamp shining in a dark place (2 Peter 1:19); add Psalm 19:4–Psalm 19:9, Psalm 19:12.

3. From Christ's promise (John 16:12-John 16:13): "I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. When he, the Spirit of truth, comes, he will lead you into all the truth; for he will not speak from himself, but whatever he hears he will speak, and he will announce to you the things that are to come." Likewise 1 John 2:27: "The anointing teaches you concerning all things, and is true and is not a lie; and as it taught you, you will remain in him." By this it is signified that we are most fully instructed in the things needful to salvation — which is wrongly dragged to bishops gathered in a council as if they were infallible, of whom Bellarmine (On the authority of councils book 2 chapter 2) confesses that, existing apart, they are not taught every truth by the Holy Spirit.

Reasons 4–7: Christ's command to search; Bereans; fathers; Scripture's end §1.6.4

1.6.44. From Christ's precept: why would he bid us search the Scriptures (John 5:39) if they could not be understood?

5. From the example of the primitive Church that obeyed this precept (Acts 17:11).

6. From the example of the ancient fathers, who prove the articles of the faith from Scripture. Hence Constantine in the Nicene synod: "Let us dissolve the matters brought into question by the testimonies of the divinely inspired letters." Things brought into question are ambiguous and obscure. If therefore Scripture were equally ambiguous and obscure, those proofs and dissolutions would be ridiculous.

7. From Sacred Scripture's end, which is our teaching (Romans 15:4), to which obscurity is diametrically opposed.

Reasons 8–9: from God who reveals; from prophets and Apostles as God's scribes §1.6.5

1.6.58. From God's side as Revealer. Either God could speak perspicuously, short of unavoidable obscurity, or he could not. If you say he could not, you speak falsely, because nothing here impedes his power (Exodus 4:11; Lactantius, Institutes book 6 chapter 21). Therefore he could. If he could, either he ought to speak perspicuously, or he ought not. That he ought not is hardly granted by his wisdom and goodness. If he ought, either he willed it, or he did not. That he did not is absurd, and it cries out against sacred Scripture's sayings and aim (Romans 15:4; 2 Timothy 3:15; John 5:39; 2 Peter 1:19). Therefore he willed it, and accordingly he spoke clearly — by the argument of Psalm 115:3.

9. From God's scribes — the prophets and Apostles. Either they could write clearly, or they could not. The latter is absurd, because those who before were rude and unlettered became lettered (Acts 4:13), and soon, moved by God's Spirit, spoke (2 Peter 1:21), knowing every tongue that was under heaven (Acts 2:8 and following). If they could, either they ought, or they ought not. That they ought not, the prophetic office and the apostleship do not permit (Romans 15:4; John 20:31; 1 John 2:3); hence they are called the light of the world (Matthew 5:14; Acts 13:46). If they ought, either they willed, or they refused. Not the latter — by the argument of Acts 4:20. Therefore they willed, and accordingly they wrote with the sun's ray, however much Scripture-shunners deny it — as Tertullian (On the resurrection of the flesh chapter 47) names such people.

Reasons 10–11: revealed dogmas can be taught clearly; papists admit it; simple style §1.6.6

1.6.610. From the side of revealed dogmas. Either they could be handed down perspicuously, or they could not. If you assert the latter, you err, because — by the papists' own witnesses — certain things, and indeed those needful to all for salvation, are written so clearly that they can be understood by the pious and industrious. Thomas (Summa Theologiae part 1 question 1 article 9 reply to objection 2): "Those things which in one place of Scripture are said under metaphors are set out more expressly in other places." Costerus (Enchiridion chapter 1): "We do not deny that those chief heads of the faith which are needful for all Christians to know unto salvation are comprehended perspicuously enough in the Apostolic writings." And Gregory of Valencia (Analysis of the faith book 3): "Those truths of the faith which absolutely and simply must necessarily be known and believed by all human beings are truly taught perspicuously in the Scriptures" — as Augustine also noted.

11. From the side of style. For it is simple, open, and most fitting for expressing such great mysteries (1 Corinthians 2:1 and following).

II. Partial obscurity admitted; human causes; hard places in Paul; Spirit's wise mixture §1.6.7

1.6.7II. Next, we do not deny that Sacred Scripture is in some part, somewhere, and for someone obscure — whether we look at sublime matters full of mysteries, or at phrases proper to that ancient time, and also tropic and figured locutions that in this age make some difficulty for us.

That obscurity is increased by human prejudices, ignorance of tongues and of things, vain confidence, negligence, hatred, envy, ambition, avarice, lust of wrangling, and every depraved affection by which the mind is blinded.

Hence Peter also (2 Peter 3:16), concerning Paul's letters, affirms that they contain some things hard to understand (some things difficult to grasp) — to tame pride by labor, and to remove the intellect from distaste, for what is easily investigated often becomes cheap to it.

For magnificently and wholesomely the Holy Spirit so shaped the Scriptures that by the clearer places he meets hunger, and by the obscurer ones he wipes away distaste — as Augustine wisely writes (On Christian Doctrine book 2 chapter 6).

Six reasons God willed some obscurity; Flacius; Augustine; Constantine at Nicaea §1.6.8

1.6.8We therefore distinctly set out several reasons for this assertion.

1. Because God willed that there should be cause to say with David: "Give me understanding, and I will search your law" (Psalm 119:34).

2. That human arrogance might be beaten back.

3. That distaste might be removed.

4. That our diligence might be stirred.

5. That Sacred Scripture itself might be held in greater price — which Theodoret in the preface to Ezekiel declares by various examples.

6. That a keener desire for the other life might be kindled in us, where we will no longer know in part and prophesy in part, but what is imperfect will be done away, and we will see face to face, not through a mirror or in a riddle (1 Corinthians 13:9 and following).

Consult Flacius Illyricus, Clavis part 2 treatise 1 on the way of knowing the sacred letters. Wisely Augustine adds to the words cited above: "Almost nothing is drawn from those obscurities that is not found said most clearly elsewhere." Before all things, therefore, one must be turned by the fear of God to knowing his will. And in the same book chapter 9: to illustrate obscurer locutions, examples are to be taken from the clearer ones, and the testimonies of certain sentences are to remove doubt about the uncertain.

Here also belongs the law of Constantine the Great in Theodoret (Church History book 1), passed with the votes of three hundred eighteen bishops in the Nicene council: the Evangelical and Apostolic books and the oracles of the ancient prophets perspicuously instruct us in the sense of the Deity — that is, what we ought to think about God and divine things. Therefore, hostile discord laid aside, let us take from the divinely inspired Scriptures the solution and decision of the controversies that are to be handled.

III. Not absolute but conditioned and sufficient perspicuity for canonical teaching §1.6.9

1.6.9III. We therefore do not assert an absolute and every-way perspicuity of the Scriptures handed down to us, but a conditioned and sufficient one for discharging the canonical and didactic office for those who read and search them decently.

This is shown from John 5:39 and Psalm 19:12. For here are all things needful, clear, and straight — all necessary, clear, manifest, and right — Chrysostom witnessing (volume 3 on 2 Thessalonians); not needing explanation but only hearing — Justin Martyr witnessing (Dialogue with Trypho). Yet diligent scrutiny and meditation are needed so that they become perspicuous to the reader, according to Cyril of Alexandria (Against Julian book 9): "Nothing is hard for those who dwell in the Scriptures as they ought." And Clement of Alexandria (Stromata book 7): one must examine the Scriptures accurately, not read them casually. And Epiphanius (Against heresies): all things are clear in the divine Scripture for those who wish to approach the divine word with pious reasoning.

Obscurities conquerable for the pious cautious reader; Lambert; Scripture alone God's certain testimony §1.6.10

1.6.10Obscurities, therefore, if any seem to be present, are conquerable when the means are applied, for the pious and cautious reader.

Rightly Francis Lambert, once professor at Marburg, teaches that Sacred Scripture is opened to those who attribute nothing to themselves and to their own judgment. Likewise: if you possess wit, learning, and experience, renounce these when you come to Christ's school. Renounce them, I say — not that you wholly refuse them, but that you trust nothing to them: otherwise you will not be a fit disciple of Christ, and he will neither teach you nor open Scripture's most longed-for door.

For of God's truth and will Scripture alone is the certain and infallible testimony.

Chapter 7: On Sacred Scripture's sense and interpretation §1.7.1

1.7.1CHAPTER SEVEN On Sacred Scripture's sense and interpretation

So far concerning clarity: next comes sense. Sense is Sacred Scripture's property by which its letter agrees most exactly with the Holy Spirit's intention.

Sacred Scripture's letter is like a body, or an outward bodily sign, by which God's kingdom — which is in power or virtue (1 Cor. 4:20) — is declared to our grasp. Sense is like the vital spirit and soul by which the author's mind is set, as it were, in the open and expressed to the life by a spiritual and effectual demonstration (1 Cor. 2:4). Apart from that sense, the letter of Scripture is not God's, but yourss — just as a king's image cast in gold is not the king's but a dog's, if that very gold is melted by fire and cast into a dog's image, as Irenaeus somewhere argues against heretical interpretations.

Here let the Enthusiast be kept far off — the one who utterly spurns Scripture, the sacred letter, and the outward word that is taught, and sets his own speculations and phantasms before it, not without an opinion of singular holiness. Blessed Luther prophesied of such in his Table Talk under the title on fanatics and sects, and the most learned Philip Marnix solidly refuted them.

Against a multiplex sense in one utterance; only the literal sense is the Spirit's §1.7.2

1.7.2Becanus (Manual 1.1 q.3) is wont to say a double sense of Scripture is distinguished — one literal or historical, the other spiritual or mystical. Craftily put. For Protestants are not disputing here (1) whether some of the fathers acknowledged a multiplex sense of Scripture — that is nothing to the point; nor (2) whether theologians busy with interpretation may variously accommodate one and the same place — we do not deny that they may, though we do not assert that they must everywhere; nor (3) whether in diverse axioms and places one word may bear several significations — that we grant with a free hand; nor (4) whether certain things contain a mystical and typical sense — for we grant that some things are written which according to the letter report what is a type of another thing (Gal. 4:24; John 3:14; Matt. 12:40).

The question is this: whether one and the same word — not thing — in one and the same place, in one and the same part of an utterance, from the Holy Spirit's intention (not from a man's ingenious collection or arbitrary application), can have several senses besides the literal, three or four. That the papists affirm; we deny: (1) because only from the literal sense, dug out by the norms of true interpretation (which the scholion on Aph. 2 will soon teach), are true, solid, and firm arguments drawn to confirm any dogma of the faith; (2) because the literal sense alone, explained in the aforesaid way, is the Holy Spirit's sense, as the Jesuits themselves confess in Bellarmine, On the Word of God 3.3 §1.

II. Interpretation defined; Spirit's intent; papal breast-reliquary claim; Vincent of Lérins §1.7.3

1.7.3II. Interpretation is Scripture's property by which its genuine sense — the sense most fitting to the mind and intention of the Holy Spirit as author, however that sense is uttered — is solidly and clearly shown in the earnest struggle between spirit and flesh, when the right instruments and hermeneutical rules are used.

The Holy Spirit's intention is what just interpretation seeks, and what the whole Christian world is busy digging out of the sacred letters; yet it is not obvious to all, for the reason the Apostle gives in 1 Cor. 2:14. The papists seek it in the breast-reliquary and infallibility of the Roman pontiff, to whom alone they finally defer the right of interpreting and determining Scripture's sense. Pistorius in his Guide (p. 76) concludes that no other medium of understanding Scripture is found, or is sought in vain, except in the church. Conrad Kling explains the ambiguity: as Scripture heard from a man teaches, so one must stand by the just interpretation and judgment of a man — that is, of the Church or of Peter's See. Others set other precipices of error before those who would understand Scripture. Vincent of Lérins (For the Antiquity of the Catholic Faith) notes that because of Scripture's own height not all receive it in one and the same sense, but one and another interpret its utterances differently, so that nearly as many opinions seem diggable from it as there are men.

Hermeneutic guides; five norms for proving spirits and true interpretation §1.7.4

1.7.4Therefore, so that neither the Stoa, nor the Peripatetics, nor Plato's porch, nor even the light of sounder reason or the better dictate of conscience in adversaries can deny the true and certain sense of Scripture, that sense must be dug out by true and least-suspect means in the serious struggle of spirit with our flesh, according to the hermeneutical rules in Flacius Illyricus's Key of Sacred Scripture, Hyperius on forming sermons, Martinus on ready meditation of things, and Dannhauer's Idea of a Good Interpreter and of a Malignant Calumniator. Nor is every interpretation to be received rashly amid such variety of spirits who handle the sacred letters. Test the spirits whether they are of God, says the beloved disciple (1 John 4:1).

The tokens of proof — and so the norms of true interpretation — are five: (1) Sacred Scripture (Isa. 8:20; 34:16; Luke 16:29–31; John 5:39); (2) its unique orthodoxy and truth, Jesus Christ, God already incarnate (Heb. 13:8; John 20:31; Deut. 13:1–7; Matt. 24:23; 1 John 4:3); (3) these two not in bare words but in the power that consists in spirit and truth (1 Cor. 4:20; 2:4; 1 John 4:2); (4) from this anointing of the Spirit no lies follow, whether in Christian theory or practice, but the purest truth (1 John 2:27); (5) the event, when prophecies are to be interpreted, noted from history as fulfillments of predictions (Deut. 18:21; Jer. 28:5–9). By these, every mortal's theological interpretations, sayings, and writings about divine things are to be examined and proved — each according to his age, grace, and calling — and each is bound to try his own by them, to prove or disprove.

III–V. Two parts of interpretation; subject, object, medium; the fit interpreter §1.7.5

1.7.5III. Interpretation has two parts: the sense and explanation of what is said, and the use and application to dogmas of faith and manners. Sense is that sentence which is immediately understood from the author through the text (Luther, Wittenberg ed., vol. 6, p. 516). Use is what is understood mediately (Rom. 15:4; 2 Tim. 3:16).

IV. In explaining the sense three things are to be observed: subject, object, and medium. If these three stand rightly, interpretation cannot fail to be just, and the truth is dug from the deep.

V. The subject is a fit interpreter, in whom two things come up for consideration: condition and instruction. The former holds the interpreter's state; the latter, his habit.

VI–X. Interpreter's regeneration; languages; incorrupt judgment; will free of vicious affections §1.7.6

1.7.6VI. The interpreter's condition is his regeneration and illumination wrought by the Holy Spirit, whom the heavenly Father gives to those who ask (Luke 11:13; 1 Cor. 2:10–16; Jas. 1:5, 17; 2 Tim. 2:15). From this one gathers how rare good interpreters are, and how many thrust themselves into this divine office with more boldness than wisdom. Physicians promise what belongs to physicians; craftsmen handle craftsmen's tools; Scripture alone is the art everyone claims. We write poems, learned and unlearned, everywhere. A chatty old woman, a raving old man, a wordy sophist — the whole world presumes upon it, tear it, teach it before they learn it, as Jerome complains to Paulinus.

VII. Instruction is of intellect, judgment, and will. VIII. The intellect must be perfected by knowledge of the necessary languages and of the things that a discipline sets out by a sure method. Knowledge of languages is necessary for the interpreter (1 Cor. 14:13–14), because each has its properties that must be carefully noted in translating. Hence the Egyptians are praised for learning the Canaanites' tongue (Isa. 19:18). It is absurd for the Holy Spirit's language to be to the interpreter like a flute that makes a sound but without mind — and for the prophet to be to a German like a Turk or an Indian, to each of whom the other is a barbarian. Jerome and Augustine knew this of old; among later writers Luther, and Bellarmine himself, affirms that Augustine was deceived by mere ignorance of Hebrew. An encyclopedia of things supplies the needed knowledge and the way of knowing and teaching (Titus 1:9; Col. 2:4).

IX. A good interpreter's judgment should be uncorrupted, aiming straight at the truth (1 Tim. 5:21; Gal. 2:14). Monkish theology, by contrast, sees nothing in the Scriptures but cowls and wooden shoes, as Luther testifies. X. The sacred interpreter's will should be free from vicious affections, lest against the intellect's dictate he calumniate the truth.

XI. Object is the coherent biblical text; Hebrew and Greek authentic norms §1.7.7

1.7.7XI. The object is the biblical text cohering with itself in its whole series. Clement of Alexandria (Stromata 7) calls the text the body and fabric of God's prophecy, in which, as subject-matter, words are considered, and in the words a proper or tropical signification, from which the sense is so drawn that the interpreter permits neither himself to be severed from the text, nor words from the text, nor sense from the words. Sense is one thing, signification another. The former belongs to whole utterances; the latter to single words. Sense is drawn from the nature and order of the words as they regard one another in Scripture's sayings, and is perfected by the Holy Spirit alone — whose alone is true interpretation, just as in civil law the interpretation of statutes belongs to him who constituted them.

Further: the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, furnished and corrected with Masoretic notes as preserved by us Christians in approved copies (even Jewish ones), is so free from all corruption — whether of diction and sentences or of letters and points — that it is the divine NORM, canon, and rule by which all versions in other tongues, and especially the Latin Vulgate, ought to be examined and emended. The Greek text of the New Testament, preserved in approved codices, is likewise so free from corruptions that it is the most exact norm by which all versions and interpretations ought to be examined and corrected. Glassius demonstrates this at length in Sacred Philology, Book 1, tracts 1 and 2.

Versions useful but not ultimate; against Targum prophecy and Trent's Vulgate authenticity §1.7.8

1.7.8Versions may indeed be used in settling theological controversies, but not ultimately. Theodoret notes that the Scriptures have been turned not only into Greek but into Roman, Egyptian, Persian, Indian, Armenian, Scythian, and even Sarmatian — once for all, as I may say, into all the tongues the nations have used — and that for our teaching, as Paul teaches (Rom. 15:4). Yet if a laborious and more solid investigation of the truth is to be undertaken, and appeal is made by due process from versions to the original text, then one must flee to no version, but to the Hebrew and Greek truth alone, as to a citadel and stronghold, with Jerome in his letter to Vitalis. For a prophet is one thing, an interpreter another, as Jerome says in the preface to the Pentateuch, calling authentic Scripture itself the truth.

Therefore (1) the Jews err who ascribe prophetic authority to the Chaldean paraphrast; (2) the papists err who make the Latin Vulgate authentic — Trent, session 4, decreeing that the old Vulgate edition be held authentic in public readings, disputations, preachings, and expositions. Yet Arias Montanus, one of the Tridentine fathers, thinks otherwise in his preface to the Biblical work. To him for instruction we commend Martin Becanus, who too awkwardly praises his party's happiness in following one certain, constant, and uniform edition.

XII–XVIII. Threefold medium: before the thing, in the thing, after the thing §1.7.9

1.7.9XII. The medium of interpretation is threefold: one before the thing, another in the thing, a third after the thing. XIII. Before the thing, first to be regarded in the text under interpretation — and in all Sacred Scripture — is the harmony of the text and the analogy of faith; then the leading of pious and learned interpreters who explained the text before us is not wholly to be despised. Polanus: the analogy of faith is nothing other than Scripture's constant and perpetual sentence in open and least obscure places — such as the articles of faith in the Apostles' Creed, collected from Scripture in so many words; such as are contained in the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer, and other plain texts. Interpretation ought to be made according to this (Rom. 12:6; 2 Tim. 1:13). Nor is the leading of orthodox interpreters wholly to be scorned, as Augustine testifies On the Usefulness of Believing.

XIV. In the thing is the medium that actually enters the explanation of the text and draws its sense from itself. XV. It is either notional or real. XVI. Notional is what turns on the words, phrases, and idioms of the language — here belong criticism, the author's style, and elucidation by metaphrase and paraphrase. XVII. Real is what turns on the thing and its circumstances, on the context and aim, and the rest. For as a building is weak without a foundation, so unless the aim is found Scripture is useless, as Chrysostom testifies. XVIII. After the thing is the comparison of parallel places. From this no small part of hermeneutical harmony emerges. Whoever wants more may see, among other works, Dannhauer's Idea of a Good Interpreter.

XIX–XXIII. Use and application; didactic vs critical interpretation; ordinary didactic §1.7.10

1.7.10XIX. The use and application of things is that by which they are related to the sense and norm of sound words expressed by fallible signs from the Spirit's purpose and will, are set forth; catholic dogmas are properly explained and confirmed; heterodox and false things are solidly and vigorously confuted; corrupt manners are amended; good things are commanded; the sorrowful and faint-hearted are raised up; the secure and bold are terrorstruck — so that the man of God may be made perfect and furnished for every good work. The foundation of this interpretation stands in 2 Tim. 3:16; Rom. 15:4; Jude 20–23.

XX. Next, interpretation is either didactic or critical (judicial). Bellarmine admits this distinction (On the Word of God 3.10, reply to argument 16). XXI. Didactic interpretation is what is done as by a teacher, with fit reasons skillfully applied, according to the catholic and manifest laws of interpreting. XXII. It is either ordinary or extraordinary. XXIII. Ordinary is what rests on equivalence or consequence that has no controversy, or that at least has agreeing and notorious testimony from the primitive Church.

Consequences of Scripture; extraordinary prophetic interpretation §1.7.11

1.7.11Some papists little favor this. Forerus calls consequences futile glosses; Veronius says consequences are not the pure Word of God but something drawn by the intellect's discourse from the Word of God. But these men, as they are absurd, so they also contradict Bellarmine, who notes that when the Nicene council defined Christ to be homoousios with the Father, it was for no other reason than that Scripture says the Son is God — from which it NECESSARILY FOLLOWS that Father and Son are of the same substance and deity. Likewise, as in law what is truly and duly deduced from statutes by good consequence is received by jurists no less than what lies there in formal words, so what is truly and duly deduced from Scripture by good consequence is assumed by theologians as itself intended by the Holy Spirit.

We are secure that the Word of God and consequences differ. Consequences can be considered in two ways: (1) in themselves, abstractly and formally — and so they are human and are judged by Aristotle; (2) in and with the matter to which they are applied, so that they coalesce, as it were, with a sacred and infallibly true thing — and so they are not human. The firm rule is: from two premises, one natural and one revealed, there follows a conclusion that cannot be known naturally. XXIV. Extraordinary interpretation is what rests on some authentic and undoubted knowledge and truth of the interpreter, even of one alone. This is wholly infallible — as when God himself by later words teaches what he meant by earlier ones, and when the Apostles with extraordinary and prophetic certainty explain what the sense of the old prophets is.

XXV–XXVIII. Critical/judicial interpretation; its didactic core; assessor's help §1.7.12

1.7.12XXV. Critical or judicial interpretation is that by which, as by a judge's sentence, law is fitted with authority to a fact, a rule to an example, a universal precept to singular cases. Examples: 2 Sam. 12:5, when David is pronounced guilty of death because every murderer is guilty of death; 1 Tim. 1:20, when Hymenaeus is pronounced a son of Satan because every heretic is a son of Satan. Such interpretation cannot be done by the law, which is not laid down about singulars, but is left to the judge as judge, who pronounces about singulars according to the law.

XXVI. Judicial interpretation is commonly joined with didactic. So when it is asked whether Hymenaeus is a heretic, he is condemned of heresy because he denies the future resurrection. But the Scripture places that speak of the resurrection of the flesh were to be understood not of a spiritual rising from sins only, as Hymenaeus seems to have taken them, but of the resurrection from the dead properly so called. That interpretation was so clear and certain, handed down by the Apostles themselves, that it could not be denied without open malice and obstinacy (2 Tim. 2:17–18).

XXVII. This interpretation that unfolds the sense of the text or rule is indeed required for the judge's sentence and concurs with it, and so by a certain metonymy of the adjunct can be called judicial; yet properly and formally it is not judicial but didactic — which the judge offers not as a judge having power to fit law to fact, but as a teacher understanding the law's sense by equivalence or consequence or some authentic knowledge. XXVIII. But if the judge lacks knowledge and doctrine, this didactic interpretation can and ought to be supplied by another more skilled — namely, the judge's assessor and counselor.

XXIX. Papal claims on councils and Pope; three remaining questions §1.7.13

1.7.13XXIX. Further, judicial interpretation in the Papacy is ascribed partly to a council, partly to the Roman Pontiff, partly to both together. For only the greater prelates — that is, bishops — ordinarily have decisive suffrage in councils; by privilege and custom also cardinals and general abbots of orders, even if not bishops; to laity and to uncalled priests, none; to those and to lesser clerics helping in debate they grant only consultative suffrage, as Bellarmine teaches. On which councils and how far they can err in interpretation, the papists disagree among themselves.

Three questions remain: (1) Can a council err without the Pontiff or before his confirmation? (2) Can the Pontiff err? (3) Is the Pope above a council? Bellarmine (On Councils 2.17) holds that the Pontiff is simply and absolutely above the universal Church and above a general council. But this is a claimed right — indeed pure ambition — the Hildebrandine claim thrust into the church some years ago. From which we gather: about judicial interpretation properly so called (fitting law to fact) there is no controversy, because both sides confess that councils and the Pontiff can err in a question of fact; the controversy that remains is about didactic interpretation.

Infallible didactic interpretation only when Scripture-bound; no new revelations §1.7.14

1.7.14For the papists want interpretation to be infallible and binding on all Christians whenever the Pontiff either decides something with a general council or, without one, teaches from the chair — that is, whenever as Pontiff he defines what is to be believed by all, whether a reason from the Scriptures appears or not. We grant that interpretation is infallible and binding whenever a council, or even any single bishop and doctor of the Church, offers an interpretation that rests on evident equivalence, or on catholic and among Christians undoubted consequence, or on extraordinary or prophetic authority sufficiently demonstrated — as we taught in Aphorisms 23 and 24.

But since extraordinary interpretation is not given in the Church today — for she is not ruled by new revelations but remains in what was once delivered, as Bellarmine himself confesses — therefore one must look to the first two, and because this interpretation is properly didactic, in the ordinary way it is to be followed only so far as reason persuades. So if an interpretation of Scripture is brought without catholic consent, or the Church's consent without the Scriptures, that opinion may indeed be probable; yet not such as ought to be proposed to the church and pressed as catholic and necessarily to be believed.

Reasons against papal sole interpreter; circular argument; triune interpretive principle §1.7.15

1.7.15The reasons for our judgment are these. (1) We must continually fear what is said in Prov. 30:5–6: Every word of God is purified: it is a shield to those who take refuge in him. Do not add to his words, lest he rebuke you and you be found a liar. Therefore no one ought in interpreting to put forward anything there is danger of addition, nor propose as God's infallible word what he is not again and again sure carries no charge of falsehood from himself. (2) Eccl. 5:2–3: do not speak rashly, and let not your heart be swift to utter a word before God; God is in heaven, you on earth; therefore let your words be few. (3) Above all the anathema spoken by Paul against those who evangelize anything beyond what he had evangelized must be dreaded (Gal. 1:8–9).

Against the Jesuits who say only the Pontiff holds infallible authority to interpret the Scriptures, one must proceed thus: their argument in form commits a circle and begs the principle. Let the rule be noted: whatever the Holy Spirit teaches through canonical Scripture in the serious struggle is of infallible and most certain truth, in which the conscience can safely rest as on a rock (Matt. 7:24–25). This is the triune principle of all theological interpretation. Scripture indeed contains the truth by itself, but without the Spirit it is not rightly understood, and without the Spirit's power (1 Cor. 2:4) it is discerned only in the struggle against flesh and Satan (Gal. 5:17; Eph. 6:12), according to each person's age and capacity (1 Cor. 3:2).

XXX. Six illegitimate measures of sense (Vulgate, old Adam, fathers, traditions, pope, no age-care) §1.7.16

1.7.16XXX. From what we have taught so far we rightly infer that an interpretation is weak and not solid enough or legitimate which is made (1) according to the sense as canonized in the Vulgate version — because it strikes against the object of legitimate interpretation: that version is not authentic, nor even the text the interpreter ought first to interpret; (2) according to the sense as it depends on old Adam's reason — because Sacred Scripture's sense stands above that reason and is measured by God's Spirit and the will of its writer; (3) according to the sense as measured by the fathers' sense — because then the text that bears sense from itself would be neglected; because either all the fathers' sense or only some would be the rule — neither works; because it conflicts with hermeneutical laws that acknowledge the fathers as guides, not as infallible; because they often missed the genuine sense; because they not rarely followed erroneous senses; (4) according to the sense as completed by unwritten traditions; (5) according to the sense as determined by the Church or by the Pope, for the same reasons we gave at Aph. 26; (6) without distinguishing childish and mature age, milk and solid food, which the Apostle wisely observes in teaching (1 Cor. 3:1–2; Heb. 5:12–14).

Solid food of Scripture; XXXI–XXXII public and private interpretive power §1.7.17

1.7.17Solid food is contained chiefly in these four: (1) the true and certain accommodation of the prophets to their defined times, places, things, and persons; (2) the exact and full reduction of Levitical shadows to their body and truth exhibited in the New Testament; (3) the fitting application of the divine governance typified through all Scripture to its truth; (4) the neat and undoubted explanation of the whole created universe — which is its Creator's image, and in which the letter, parables, and phrases of all Sacred Scripture lie ready — to its truth described in the same place.

XXXI. The power of interpreting and judging is twofold: public or private. Both rest on vocation and a singular gift. XXXII. The power of privately judging Sacred Scripture's sense in things necessary to salvation belongs to all the faithful, for confirming their own faith and edifying others, according to the law of charity, the measure of the gift received, and the diverse reason of calling. The Leiden theologians rightly draw this from the Synopsis of Purer Theology (disp. 5, th. 29) out of John 10:3; Matt. 7:15; 1 Cor. 10:15; 1 John 4:1. This kind of judging rests on the gift of discernment (1 Cor. 2:15; Heb. 5:14; Phil. 1:10).

The power of publicly judging the truth of interpretation belongs only to those who by peculiar vocation and gift of interpreting are furnished for it. The grades of this vocation are listed in Eph. 4:11; the gift is indicated in Rom. 12:6; 1 Cor. 14:3, 29. And although in every age there have also been other Christians who by prayers and assiduous reading and meditation of Sacred Scripture received the gift of interpreting the sacred letters for public uses and of proving spirits in fuller measure than some pastors; yet that gift is chiefly to be sought among those whom God has peculiarly called to teach his Church publicly (Mal. 2:6–7).

Chapter 8: On Sacred Scripture's efficacy §1.8.1

1.8.1CHAPTER EIGHT On Sacred Scripture's efficacy

So far concerning Sacred Scripture's interpretation: Efficacy is its property by which it is apt by nature to illuminate, move, mortify, vivify, and perfect the man of God who hears or reads decently, by way of an instrument and of a light kindled and elevated by the Holy Spirit — so that he is thoroughly equipped for every good work.

The Apostles magnificently exalt this property of God's word (Romans 1:16; Hebrews 4:12; 2 Corinthians 3:6; 2 Peter 1:19; 2 Timothy 3:16–2 Timothy 3:17) — a property flowing from the Holy Spirit as principal cause, elevating that word as its organ by its own power (John 6:63; 1 Peter 1:23, where toward the chapter's end it is also called immortal seed). That Spirit kills the impure spirit, conquers evil, removes Antichrist from the midst, renews all things under heaven, frees the creature from sin, vanity, and curse, illuminates our darkness with its light, and fills the earth with the knowledge of God (Zechariah 13:2; Revelation 12:11; 1 Thessalonians 2:13; Isaiah 11:4; Joel 2:28; Ezekiel 36:25; Isaiah 32:15; Romans 8:21; Revelation 18:1; Isaiah 11:9).

This efficacy differs from Sacred Scripture's perspicuity, by which it comes about that not only people of sound mind but even evil spirits clearly understand those senses of it needful to know for salvation — without the Holy Spirit's inward illumination — even though they cannot believe or obey them, but rather dissuade faith and obedience. See Whitaker, chapter 1 On Scripture's perspicuity, and Dr. Festus Hommius, Disputation 62 On faith, thesis 5.

Question I: Whether Scripture exerts this efficacy only objectively, or also effectively §1.8.2

1.8.2But here Question I must be weighed: Whether Sacred Scripture exerts this efficacy only objectively, or also effectively?

Answer: in both ways. For (1) it teaches objectively, showing which way of salvation is true and which false, and which faith, hope, and love are pleasing to God. For that reason theologians compare it to a guidepost and a Mercury-statue — who have also pointed out the instrument as 'guidepost,' the sailor's needle at sea, a lamp on the road, and Theseus's thread in this world's Circus gardens — not without Scripture's authority (Numbers 21:8; Isaiah 30:21).

(2) Effectively it confers on those who read or hear rightly what it offers in showing — God, Christ, and eternal life — but exalted and drawn into living operation by the Holy Spirit. For that reason it is compared to an axe cutting when raised by the carpenter for cutting, and to the sword of the Spirit (Ephesians 6:17).

Question II: Whether the bare letter without the Spirit's illumination leads to God — denied; first reason §1.8.3

1.8.3Question II. Does Scripture simply — insofar as it is grasped only as letter, is an outward testimony, and is contained in outward tablets — lead to God, convert, sanctify, and make blessed without the Holy Spirit's illumination? It is denied.

I. Because if the act of conversion, sanctification, and salvation is to be attributed to bare Scripture apart from and beyond the Holy Spirit's cooperation, it follows that even the Devil himself, and those hardened with that second hardening which Calvin, that most eminent theologian, notes at Luke chapter 11 — the hardened and blasphemous, yet thoroughly practiced in the Scriptures — would be converted, sanctified, and saved. But the consequent is absurd. Therefore so is the antecedent. The reason of the consequence is this: because the Devil and the ungodly no less than godly people possess, teach, and dispute from Scripture simply as it stands in the letters, without the Holy Spirit's cooperation (Matthew 4:6); they abound in dogmatic faith, yet tremble (James 2:19).

Question II continued: reasons II–III; seven points on salutary understanding §1.8.4

1.8.4II. What converts, sanctifies, and saves us apprehends our soul, draws it, and possesses it. But Scripture on outward tablets without the Holy Spirit's cooperation neither apprehends nor draws nor possesses our soul. Therefore Scripture without the Holy Spirit's cooperation does not convert, sanctify, and save souls.

III. Those who assert the contrary seem to understand little: (1) how salutary understanding comes about; (2) what the requisites are, given which salutary understanding is given, and denied which it is denied; (3) what that intelligible idea is in which the thing to be understood is intimately represented to the intellect; (4) that the thing to be understood and the intellect become one in knowing; (5) that whatever consists in the mind is spiritual and abstracted from every bodily mass and letter; (6) how all these things are at last comprehended in a certain point as in the mind's eye; (7) that faith, hope, love, and that whole chorus of virtues lie hidden implicitly in that spiritual seed — more penetrating than any two-edged sword — as a great oak in an acorn, are preserved, and by a prolific spiritual power, the Lord's Spirit breathing, unfold their branches in the inward and outward man, so that the whole kingdom of God is within us, which is righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit (Romans 14:17).

Question III: Whether Scripture can be sufficiently understood for salvation without prior grace-light; duplex lumen §1.8.5

1.8.5Question III. Can Sacred Scripture be sufficiently understood for salvation without prior grace-light? Or thus: Is the Holy Spirit's grace-light prior in the order of causes by nature to the salutary understanding of Scripture?

Answer I. Under the demonstration of the truer opinion I lay, as principle and foundation, the distinction of a twofold light, namely of object and of subject, or instrumental and principal.

Scripture's light as object and instrument is nothing other than its sense, which the native signification of the words suggests to us. For the object to be known is not destitute of its inward light. Just as every object radiates with its own light, or is tinted with color by which it presents itself to the eyes through a species, so also Scripture — as may be gathered from Isaiah 8:20; Luke 16:29; 2 Peter 1:19.

(2) Sacred Scripture further shows us another light — namely the subject's and principal light — elevating, applying, disposing, and effecting, both in the human mind and in Scripture, so that its inward light may be known. In natural things this is called the light of reason; in divine things, the spirit of revelation (Ephesians 1:17), the light of preventing grace, which Christ himself is with his grace illuminating every person, and is called the light of the nations (John 1:9; Luke 2:32); on which see 4 Ezra 14:15 and Psalm 36:10 and Psalm 43:3. See Theodoret and Flacius's Key to Scripture. Compare also Psalm 18:29 and Psalm 119:18, Psalm 119:33, Psalm 119:124, Psalm 119:135.

Since therefore it is plain from the Scriptures that a twofold light is required for their salutary understanding — namely the instrumental as medium, and the principal, which not only illuminates the Scriptures but also illumines the intellect so that it can apprehend that medium, Scripture's light — therefore let spiritual people, who judge all things (1 Corinthians 2:15), at last judge whether this principal light, as principal efficient cause, does not operate first — not indeed in time, but in the order of nature — so that Scripture's inward light may salutarily exert itself and be poured into the reader's heart unto salvation.

Reasons 1–4 affirming prior grace-light: object; seeker; exhibition; opening of seals §1.8.6

1.8.6The reasons for the affirming opinion are these:

1. From the object to be known. For Scripture's sense is that very thing which must be known salutarily. Therefore there must be some cause that manifests it, and so is prior to it in the order of nature. And who will deny that this cause is the Holy Spirit's illumination?

II. From the reason of the seeker and finder. For that without which, as principal cause, Scripture's essence, nature, and form — which is its true sense — cannot be found, precedes by nature the finding of Scripture's sense: since a cause is prior by nature to its effect. But now Scripture's essence, nature, and form cannot be found without the Holy Spirit's gracious light as principal cause (John 6:44; Matthew 16:17; Psalm 25:4). Augustine, Soliloquies book 1 chapter 1: "Everyone," he says, "has sought you rightly whom you have made to seek rightly." Therefore the Holy Spirit's grace-light precedes by nature the finding or knowledge of the essence, nature, and form — that is, of Scripture's sense.

III. From the reason of exhibition and offering. For whoever pours Scripture's essence into the heart so that it may be kept there unto salvation is prior by nature to the knowledge of Scripture's essence: since it is not the chariot that draws the horses, but the horses the chariot; and the sower's hand precedes the sowing itself. But now the Holy Spirit by his grace-light pours into the heart Scripture's essence or sense (Matthew 13:11, Matthew 13:23; Jeremiah 31; Joel 2; 2 Timothy 2:7; Zechariah 10:1). Therefore the Holy Spirit by his grace-light precedes the knowledge of Scripture's sense.

IV. From the reason of opening and revealing Scripture's seals. For whatever opens Scripture as a closed and sealed book is, as efficient cause, prior to Scripture opened. For if a barred door is to be unlocked, the key must first be inserted into the lock. But now Sacred Scripture is a closed book to all flesh (Isaiah 29:11). Yet Christ and his Spirit with light bear the keys of the house of David suspended from their shoulders, so that he may open and none shut, shut and none open (Revelation 3:7). Whence Theophylact on John chapter 10: "Because," he says, "in the Holy Spirit the Scriptures are understood and opened, which show us Christ, the Holy Spirit is rightly called the doorkeeper." Compare also Augustine, Tractate 3 on John chapter 1. Therefore the Holy Spirit by his gracious illumination is prior by nature to Scripture opened.

Reasons 5–8: instrument; matter of prayers; our inability; first origin §1.8.7

1.8.7V. From the reason of the instrument that moves and directs. For no instrument acts unless first moved by the principal cause and put to use.d Scripture is an instrument, and the Holy Spirit's illumination is the principal cause of Scripture's opened sense (Job 32:8; Wisdom of Solomon 7:21 and chapter 8:1; 2 Corinthians 3:6; Acts 16:14 and Acts 26:18; Deuteronomy 29:4; Psalm 119:34; Ephesians 4:23; Jeremiah 31:18). Therefore.

VI. From the matter of prayers. For whatever the sons of God ask in order to obtain from God the salutary, living, and inward sense of Scripture precedes by nature the obtaining of that sense. But now they ask the Holy Spirit's illumination in order to obtain Scripture's sense (Psalm 119:18; Colossians 4:3). Compare also the old hymn "Purify the eye of the inward man," &c., and the preface which Luther prefixed to German volume 1 in the year 1539. Therefore we can obtain no living sense of Scripture without the Holy Spirit's prior illumination.

VII. From the reason of our inability. For if by nature a person with no powers can inwardly affirm and effectually will God's word, which proposes its sense to him — which properly, according to Scripture's phrase, is to understand it rightly — then altogether the Holy Spirit's illumination must precede this effectual and inward affirmation in the order of nature, even though they are simultaneous in time. But the former is true (John 15:5: "You can do nothing without me"; and 1 Corinthians 12:3: "No one can call Jesus Lord without the Holy Spirit"; add Philippians 2:13; Acts 16:14). Therefore so is the latter.

VIII. From the reason of first origin. For whence Scripture's sense has its principle, thence it is also known. For what is the cause of a cause is also the cause of what is caused. Whence Bernard in a sermon to the brothers on the mount: "You will never," he says, "enter Paul's sense unless you have drunk in Paul's spirit." And not a few of the ancients otherwise: "No one can find God unless he has first been found by God." So Didymus On the Holy Spirit: "No one," he says, "ever receives spiritual blessings unless the Holy Spirit has gone before." But Scripture's sense has its principle from the Holy Spirit's illumination (2 Peter 1:20–2 Peter 1:21; 2 Timothy 3:16–2 Timothy 3:17). Therefore, &c.

Reasons 9–10: against Photinian error; pious antiquity against the Pelagians §1.8.8

1.8.8IX. From false teaching. For a doctrine that is properly the Photinians' error ought not to be tolerated in God's church. But that Scripture can be understood salutarily without the Holy Spirit's prior illumination is the Photinians' error. For Christoph Ostorodt in his German Institution chapter 1 §3 says: "We judge that all those err most gravely and dangerously who think Sacred Scripture can in no way work faith and obedience without prior inward illumination and a singular revelation of the Holy Spirit." But since this Photinian doctrine is false, its contradictory — which we here defend — is certainly true. It remains, therefore, that although Sacred Scripture scatters and communicates a grammatical light and historical light without the Holy Spirit's singular illumination — which even demons and the ungodly can see — yet no one can conceive in his mind an inward and living knowledge in Scripture unless the illuminating, influencing, disposing, cooperating, elevating light of grace, as principal cause, goes before, accompanies, and follows.

X. From the testimony and consent of pious antiquity against the Pelagians, who acknowledged no other light converting a person than the grammatical or historical, and so by moral persuasion only. Against them see Augustine, On faith to Peter, chapter 32: "Hold most firmly," he says, "and doubt in no way, that a person whom neither ignorance of letters nor any weakness or adversity hinders can indeed read the words of the sound law and Gospel, or hear them from some preacher's mouth: but that what he hears with the body he also perceives with the heart, and wills to do God's commandments — no one can, unless God has gone before him with his grace, a good will and power having been given from heaven." So Prosper of Aquitaine, Against the ungrateful: "Let the Apostle," he says, "run through the world, preach, exhort, plant, water, rebuke, insist, enter whatever way he finds closed by the word: yet that the hearer is advanced by these labors is effected not by the teacher, not by the disciple, but by grace alone — grace that does not merely counsel by kindly advice and exhortation, but also changes minds, reforms inwardly, and by creating power fashions a new vessel from a broken one."

Reason 11: nature's analogy; Orange II; Ambrose/Prosper; Luther; vineyard; ask, seek, knock §1.8.9

1.8.9So the Second Council of Orange, chapter 6: "If anyone," it says, "says that mercy is conferred on those who believe, will, desire, and strive without God's grace, and does not confess that it is brought about in us from heaven that we believe and will, by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit — let him be anathema." So either Ambrose or Prosper of Aquitaine, On the calling of the Gentiles book 2 chapter 9: "Let one come to God with God as guide," he says: "it is necessary that we are not even fit to think what is spiritual except through God's grace." So also Luther on John chapter 16: "The matter," he says, "is not handled that way, nor are there so many who have the Holy Spirit and understanding as many invent for themselves — as is clear from this, that although Scripture is had and heard, still the Holy Spirit's revelation is required, which applies light to such reading and hearing, which the intellect follows: though it is true that the Holy Spirit does not effect this without preaching and instruction." See the same in German volume 4 p. 140 and volume 8 folio 134.

XI. From nature's testimony, which by a certain analogy is offered for our opinion. For (1) if wheat is to spring up in a field, first of all a field is required as patient subject, then a farmer who sows, third God's blessing, which puts vigor into the seed and sends it into the field, removes husks, purifies the seed's little body, and raises the seminal power so that it sprouts in another species and multiple fruit. The same is the ratio of the spiritual field. (2) The same is shown by vineyard culture, where first a suitable place is required, second a vinedresser who plants and tends the vines, third God's blessing, by whose power, as of the eternal Word, the vine once created is still preserved and made fruitful. So, that Sacred Scripture may be known inwardly and effectually and practically, first a human soul endowed with intellect and will is required; second the proposing of Sacred Scripture or the outward word as seed; third, that this living seed may be received effectually and vividly by the human soul unto its salutary change as to the intellect's ignorance and the will's perversion — which properly is to understand Scripture rightly — the Holy Spirit's illumination is needed, which as principal cause precedes, accompanies, and follows Scripture itself in the order of nature.

Hence Gregory the Great: "Unless," he says, "the Spirit is present to the hearer's heart, the teacher's speech is idle: unless there is one within who teaches, the teacher's tongue labors outwardly in vain." For this reason those about to read the Scriptures for their salvation should not neglect the Lord's precept (Matthew 7:7): "Ask, and it will be given you; seek, and you will find; knock, and it will be opened to you."

Inferences from what has been said: Scripture reading most useful for clergy and laity alike §1.8.10

1.8.10II. From what has been said we infer:

1. That the reading of Sacred Scripture is by far most useful unto salvation and the discerning of spirits not only for ecclesiastics but also for those in civil life, and so even for those whom the papacy designates as laity — Claude d'Espence acknowledging this in his commentary chapters 1 and 2: "Chrysostom," he says, "rightly exhorts all to the reading of the Scriptures: God willed that even the most unlearned craftsman of all should gain some usefulness." That study is approved from heaven (Psalm 1:2; Psalm 119:2; Acts 17:11); and therefore the prophets and Apostles recommended their books not to teachers alone but to the whole church (Deuteronomy 17:18; Romans 1:7; 1 Corinthians 1; 1 Peter 1:1; 1 John 2:12–1 John 2:13). Whence again d'Espence on 2 Timothy 3: "Let Origen," he says, "observe that John writes to four ages: children, youths, young men, fathers."

Errors 2–3: forbidding vernacular Scripture; interrupting biblical reading §1.8.11

1.8.112. That the pontificals err who hold that translating Sacred Scripture into vernacular languages is useless, dangerous, even pernicious. So Diego Paiva de Andrade, the Portuguese, in Defense of the Tridentine Catholic Faith book 4 folio 241: "Nothing," he says, "can we now hope from the sacred Bibles made common and turned into vernacular languages except the ruin of piety, the destruction of religion, and the ruin of the faith." And folio 243: "Whoever reads Scripture's bare sentences for the most part drinks deadly poison for nectar." Stanisław Hozjusz, On reading the sacred in the vernacular, p. 664: "Now," he says, "we see it has come about by those translations into the vernacular tongue that women for whom it was more fitting at that time to weave wool have already claimed for themselves also the power of teaching; and if anyone wants to bring them back to duty and sanity, he will have more trouble with them than with the men themselves — since men are not even allowed to be Catholics through their wives, and often the husband is forced to believe what the wife wills." Sixtus of Siena agrees, Sacred Library book 6 annotation 142; Jacobus Ledesma, On the divine Scriptures not to be read everywhere in any language, chapter 3.

3. That those err who interrupt biblical reading. Of this interruption in the papacy Johannes Cochlaeus reports in his Commentary on Luther's acts and writings under the year 1521: "Before," he says, "Emser's book came out, Luther's New Testament was multiplied in a marvelous way by the printers, so that even cobblers and women and any unlearned people who had somehow learned German letters most eagerly read that New Testament as the fountain of all truth — whoever were Lutherans — and by often reading it committed it to memory, carrying the codex with them in their bosom. From which within a few months they claimed so much doctrine for themselves that they were not ashamed to dispute about the faith and the Gospel not only with laity of the Catholic party, but even with priests and monks, and even with masters and doctors of sacred theology."

Errors 4–5: forbidding Bible reading to the laity; hanging Scriptures as amulets §1.8.12

1.8.124. That those err most gravely of all who forbid biblical reading to those they call laity. For this tyranny is exercised in the papacy. For the Jesuit Juan Azor, Moral Institutions volume 1 book 8 chapter 26: "You ask," he says, "whether the books and chapters of the Bible translated into the vulgar tongue are permitted? Answer: at first glance they are forbidden in the fourth rule, namely that Bibles in the vulgar tongue not be permitted to be read everywhere without distinction. Yet in Spain, in the index of prohibited books published there by the General Inquisitor's authority, the sixth rule runs thus: 'Bibles in the vulgar tongue with all their parts are prohibited.' And in the recent index published by order of Pope Clement VIII, the faculty of granting license to read or keep vulgar Bibles or other parts of Sacred Scripture of both New and Old Testament, even when published in the vulgar tongue, has been taken away." Thomas Harding against Jewel, Article 15 section 2 (in John Jewel volume 1 p. 120) holds the same with others; René Benoist of Angers, Biblical Miscellanies book 3 p. 177; Johannes Bunderius in his Compendium of theological matters title 3 article 3; Johannes Molanus of Louvain in his Compendium of practical theology treatise 3 chapter 23 conclusion 2 p. 221.

5. That those err who believe Sacred Scriptures hung from the neck are endowed with various virtues against the world's dangers, diseases, and demons. Alfonso Salmerón does not dare simply to disapprove this custom of the Roman church (Commentary on Gospel history volume 4 part 3 treatise 42), nor Martin Del Rio (Disquisitions on magic book 1 chapter 4 question 4), Juan Maldonado on John 6, Vitus Miletus in Discussion of 600 errors pp. 51–52, or Landulf the Carthusian in Meditations on the life of Christ part 2 chapter 63: "The word CONSUMMATUM," he says, "is reported by the experienced to be of great efficacy in dangers. And it is said to avail specially against an immoderate flow of blood from the nostrils, if with the same blood the same word is written on the patient's forehead." Other examples of pontifical superstition Johannes Weyer noted in On the illusions of demons book 5 chapter 4, and Martin Del Rio in Disquisitions on magic book 3 part 2 question 4 section 9. Refer here also the Enchiridion or Manual in which are found a devout prayer of Pope Leo, likewise some prayers against all the world's dangers, and a prayer of blessed Augustine and Cyprian, published at Venice by Thomas Membruni — from which it will be clearly seen how maliciously the pontifical Roman church abuses Scripture's words unto superstition and magic.

Chapter 9: On Sacred Scripture's parts §1.9.1

1.9.1CHAPTER NINE On Sacred Scripture's parts

So far the affections of Sacred Scripture have been treated: the parts follow — namely the canonical books of the Old and New Testament, written and approved by men inspired and directed by God's Holy Spirit, for authentically declaring the whole will of God that pertains to religion.

They are called canonical as legitimate and regular from the canon of which king David (Psalm 19:8) and the Apostle (Galatians 1:6-Galatians 1:9; Galatians 6:16; Philippians 3:15-Philippians 3:16) make mention — books which by those men who were inspired and directed by the Holy Spirit were written or approved for this, that they might be a perpetual norm and measure of faith and life according to the state and condition of each Testament (2 Timothy 3:15-2 Timothy 3:16; 2 Peter 1:20-2 Peter 1:21), and they are opposed to the Apocrypha, that is, to all those that do not rule and measure the Christian faith.

For certain Apocrypha are also joined to these in the Bibles — irregulars — which for the usefulness of reading, not for their certain divinity, were sometimes called deuterocanonical and Ecclesiastical by the ancients, and can be referred to Sacred Scripture's parts only improperly, of which below at Aph. 13, 14, and 15. Canonical books are also called books existing by confession, testamentary, and by St. Athanasius books received into the canon, as in the variant readings of H. Savile on the Life of St. Antony edited by Heschel. And there is a double criterion from which judgment is made concerning each sacred writing that it is canonical accurately and specially so called — internal and external.

Internal criterion of the thing: inspiration; prophetic holiness and infallibility in writing §1.9.2

1.9.2The internal criterion is of the thing or of the sign. The criterion of the thing is God's immediate inspiration, calling, and instruction (2 Timothy 3:16; 2 Peter 1:20; Luke 16:29; Ephesians 2:20; Hebrews 1:1; Galatians 1 and 11-12, 15-16; Romans 15:18) — of him who wrote the Scriptures with God inspiring, indeed by whose hands God himself wrote, as Alphonsus de Castro speaks, Against Heresies book 1 chapter 2 page 4.

From which we gather: (1) that the prophets or canonical writers have holiness in living (2 Peter 1:21) — not a holiness that means absolute impeccability (1 Kings 8:46; 2 Chronicles 6:36; Ecclesiastes 7:21; Proverbs 20:9), but one that excludes voluntary sins, malice, stubbornness, and an evil purpose — that is, sins against conscience (1 John 3).

(2) The same men's infallibility in writing, because he writes not as a man but as a holy man of God (2 Peter 1:21), led by the Spirit of truth into all truth (John 14:17; John 16:13; 2 Peter 1:21) — by the example of converted David (Matthew 22:43; Psalm 45:2; 2 Samuel 23:2). For if error and falsehood were admitted into so high a summit of authority, no particle of these books would remain that could not be called into doubt, as Augustine well warns in Letter 8 to Jerome.

Therefore, that the Evangelists' writings may stand as canonical and authentic and their authority remain safe, every falsehood ought to be absent from them — not only what is put forward by lying, but also what comes by forgetting — as the same teaches in On the Harmony of the Gospels book 1 chapter 12. Yet judgment about the prophets' infallibility is to be made from the truth of God which they reveal dogmatically, not from the history of a deed and of a speech which they sometimes recount as in character, as Genesis 3:1, Genesis 3:4-Genesis 3:5; John 8:44 — according to Ruiz's rule 219: an evangelical narrative, though most true, yet not all things said there are believed to be true, from Augustine, Against the Priscillianists chapter 9.

Prophetic divinity; criterion of the sign (Hebrew and Greek); external catholic testimony §1.9.3

1.9.3(3) The divinity, majesty, sharpness, and wonderful force and efficacy of prophecy (Hebrews 4:12; James 1:21; 2 Timothy 3:15; Romans 1:16; Luke 24:32; John 6:68) — which even Stenius from the papal flock acknowledges in the opening of his Cosmopoeia.

The criterion of the sign is one thing for the Old Testament, another for the New. The Old Testament's is the Hebrew tongue, by Justin's witness in Apology 2 for the Christians — except a few pericopes in Daniel, Ezra, and Jeremiah written in the Chaldean idiom. Whether Arabic and Syriac words are sometimes mixed into Job — to say nothing of Greek words — is a deeper inquiry; on which see M. Mayer's Sacred Philology page 151. The New Testament's is the Greek tongue, in which the whole is written — though Baronius, Annals volume 1 at year 45, holds that Mark wrote not in Greek but in Latin, and wins assent from Kirsten in the preface to his Arabic Grammar page 36; and concerning Matthew's Gospel the matter is more tangled — consult Flacius Illyricus in the preface to the Gloss on Matthew, Isaac Casaubon Exercises 15 chapter 1 page 279 and 16 chapter 15 page 485, Johannes Drusius Observations on the New Testament chapter 1, and others.

But the external criterion is the catholic testimony of the primitive and true church concerning each Testament's autograph — from which, in the time of Ezra and Malachi, the Old Testament canon was constituted, and the New's in the time of the Apostolic men and was finished by John the Apocalyptist. For that reason, if there are any sacred books that lack testimony from the autograph and against which the church that flourished when the canon was set has catholically contradicted, they are not trustworthy.

Inferences 1-2: canonical authority for each listed book; one unchanging canon reason §1.9.4

1.9.4From which we conclude: (1) That canonical authority belongs to each of the Old and New Testament books enumerated by us below — from Moses to Malachi and from Matthew to the Apocalypse.

(2) That the Old and New canons' reason is one and the same, which no antiquity obliterates and no novelty varies. Hence the papal distinction between a Hebrew and a Christian canon as to the Old Testament is null — as is also the doubling of the Hebrew canon so that one would be of the Hebrew prophets and another of the Seventy interpreters, which Genebrard has in the preface of Chronology to Arnold Pontanus.

Stapleton also errs, Principles of Doctrine book 9 chapter 6, asserting that certain non-canonical books can become canonical — namely those written in the Apostles' time. And Tanner, Disputation 1 on Thomas part 1, Disputation 5 on the written and unwritten word, thesis 37: "It is not," he says, "altogether improbable what some say, that the Church can even now receive some book newly into the canon." Whom Bellarmine rightly contradicts, On the Word of God book 1 chapter 10: "We confess," he says, "that the church can IN NO WAY make a non-canonical book canonical: but only declare which is to be held for canonical."

Inferences 3-4: canons judge controversies; adequate sufficiency against unwritten word §1.9.5

1.9.5(3) That all canonical books can judge and determine controversies of religion. For this is the canon's force (2 Timothy 3:15-2 Timothy 3:16; Psalm 119:9; Romans 2:16; Hebrews 4:12; John 3:18; John 12:48; John 16:8). And Sacred Scripture judges and determines as a rule, with the Holy Spirit speaking through it president in it — this one or that with his assessors — by way of the person to whom it falls; who if he is an uncorrupted judge, the judgment of all these becomes one and the same, and so divine and infallible — on which Cornelius Martinius among our philosophers teaches more rightly in Analysis part 2 chapter 3 than Bellarmine in On the Word of God book 3 chapter 9.

(4) The sacred canon's self-sufficiency and its adequate sufficiency for Christian faith and manners — by which all things necessary for Christians to believe and do are contained in it in due manner — so that today, after God's word has been committed to letters and entrusted to the Church, we are in no way bound to receive with equal pious affection, together with the written word of God, another unwritten word of God, or one not written in the Bibles but handed down from the Apostles in Cabbalah-fashion, as necessary for salvation and for establishing other dogmas of faith that stand in the Bibles neither as to letter nor as to sense. For both the name "canon" by which Scripture is marked (Psalm 19:5; Galatians 6:16) and the thing itself teach this (Psalm 19:8; 2 Timothy 3:15-2 Timothy 3:16; James 1:21; John 20:31; John 5:39; 1 Corinthians 4:6; Galatians 1:8).

Against the sophistic charge of imperfection from John Fisher Bishop of Rochester, John Eck, Conrad Kling, Wilhelm Lindanus, Melchior Cano, Martin Perez de Ayala, Rene Benoist, Alphonsus de Castro, Franz Agricola, Gregory of Valencia, Robert Bellarmine, Francis Coster, Thomas Stapleton, Heinrich Lancellot, Vitus Miletus, Adam Tanner, James Gordon Huntly, and Martin Becanus — against which false prophets and their whole papal examination read the most learned Dr. Antonius Thysius, Leiden theologian, succinctly and learnedly treating of canonical and Apocryphal books in Synopsis of Purer Theology Disputation 3, with others praised there by us.

Aphorisms 2–4: Old Testament canonical books; historical, poetic, prophetic; the books of Moses and the groups of three and eight books §1.9.6

1.9.6II. The canonical books of the Old Testament are no others than those of which it is catholically established that they were written in Hebrew and partly in Chaldean, and were acknowledged as divine by the ancient Jewish Church.

III. The canonical books of the Old Testament are partly historical, partly poetic, partly prophetic.

IV. The historical are the Pentateuch, the Triteuch, and the Octateuch. The word Pentateuch is commonly known; Triteuch stands in Athanasius's Letter to Marcellinus page 581; Octateuch in Procopius of Gaza the sophist's commentary on the eight books of the Old Testament.

Aphorisms 5–8: contents of the books of Moses and the groups of three and eight books; poetic books §1.9.7

1.9.7V. The Pentateuch contains Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy — see Contracted Theology, Book 1, Chapter 9, Aphorisms 6-10.

VI. The Triteuch embraces three books, namely Joshua, Judges, and Ruth. See Aphorisms 11-13.

VII. The Octateuch is that which contains the eight following books: the two of Samuel, the two of Kings, the two of Chronicles, the book of Ezra and Nehemiah, and the book of Esther. See there Aph. 14-15 and following through 23.

VIII. And these are the historical books of the ancient Hebrew canon. The poetic follow, which are the most elegant practice and epitome of the law and the prophets — as Job, the Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs. See Chapter 11 on the poetic books.

Aphorisms 9–12: prophetic books; major and minor prophets §1.9.8

1.9.8IX. The prophetic books are those that, besides manifold predictions, comprise an accurate interpretation of the Mosaic law, a prudent and exact application of moral doctrine, of divine promises and threatenings — especially of the gracious covenant whose foundation is Christ — and the true use of the divine law.

X. And some are major, others minor.

XI. The major are Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel. See Chapter 12 on the prophetic books.

XII. The minor are twelve, who comprised their sermons in shorter booklets than those: Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi. On which see Sirach 49:11 and our Chapter 13 on the twelve prophets.

Aphorisms 13–15: Apocrypha defined; historical and didactic Apocrypha §1.9.9

1.9.9XIII. These are the canonical books of the Old Testament, to which the Apocrypha are commonly added — not on equal thread — books written indeed by pious and skilled authors, of which it is not yet catholically established whether they were inspired by the Holy Spirit and directed to this, that by them they should enlarge the canon of faith and life; finally inserted among the canonical books for the usefulness of reading. Apocrypha are here so called from a hidden disclosure; they are opposed to the testamentary books — Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith book 4 chapter 18. And since the history and reason of this first name's imposition almost escapes us, we judge it safest that the Apocrypha be described from opposition to the canonicals — seeing they are not equal to them in thread.

XIV. These are partly historical, partly didactic. The historical are the book of Tobit, the Prayer of Manasseh, the book of Judith, Baruch, the Letter of Jeremiah, the additions in Daniel, Ezra's third and fourth books, the additions to Esther, the book of Simon the high priest commonly called Third Maccabees, and First and Second Maccabees. See there chapter 14 on the Apocryphal books from the beginning through Aphorism 14.

XV. The didactic are the book of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus.

Aphorisms 16–18: New Testament canonical books; four integral parts; evangelical part §1.9.10

1.9.10XVI. And thus far the Apocrypha also. There follow the canonical books of the New Testament, which are the tables of the most holy contract between God and the human race, established by the blood of the Lamb of God already slain — written by eight scribes, most excellent men, witnesses beyond all exception, inspired by the Holy Spirit.

XVII. And the integral parts of the New Testament are four: one Evangelical, another practical, a third epistolary, and finally a fourth Apocalyptic.

XVIII. The Evangelical part was written by the four Evangelists — Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John — concerning the conception, birth, teaching, life, wonderful works, passion, death, departure to the Father, and return of Jesus of Nazareth, with great agreement in the matter, to demonstrate that this one is the promised Messiah.

Aphorisms 19–22: practical part (Acts); epistolary part; Paul's fourteen letters §1.9.11

1.9.11XIX. The practical is the second part, written by Luke at Rome by the will of Paul the prisoner — concerning the birth and infancy, growth, and just, gracious, and most simple face, teaching, strength, and whole form of government of the optimally constituted primitive Church of Christ and of reunion, and concerning the deeds of the Apostles fighting against false doctrine, described under the face and condition of the Ephesian Church (Revelation 2:1).

XX. The epistolary is the third part of the New Testament, written by the Apostles in epistolary character concerning the chief heads of Christian religion and the very practice of Christian faith and life in truth, according to the measure of each one's gift and calling, to be exercised by anyone in the course of this pilgrimage until the world's end — written to those absent from the Old Testament, Christ's sermons, and the Holy Spirit's suggestion.

XXI. The Apostolic epistles were written partly by Paul — namely fourteen — partly by James — namely one — partly by Peter — namely two — partly by John — namely three — partly by Jude — namely one.

XXII. Paul wrote these by name: one to the Romans, two to the Corinthians, one to the Galatians, one to the Ephesians, one to the Philippians, one to the Colossians, two to the Thessalonians, two to Timothy, one to Titus, one to Philemon, one to the Hebrews.

Aphorism 23: Apocalyptic part §1.9.12

1.9.12XXIII. There remains the Apocalyptic, the fourth part of the New Testament, written by the Apostle John concerning those things which Christ himself revealed about the state of the New Testament churches — from its beginning through seven distinct periods and faces portrayed in the Ephesian, Smyrnaean, Pergamene, Thyatiran, Sardian, Philadelphian, and Laodicean, unto the world's end — and concerning their gifts, dangers, calamities, Antichrist's persecutions, deliverances, the last judgment, the dreadful damnation of the impious, and the supreme glorification of the churches and the godly in it — lest, ignorant of their own fates and future lot, like Gentiles or brute beasts, they should be overwhelmed and perish by sudden chances; but taught little by little by the experience of predicted events, they might acknowledge that they are always Christ's care.

Chapter 10: On the principle of sacred theology dependent on the first and ordered to it §1.10.1

1.10.1CHAPTER TEN On the principle of sacred theology dependent on the first and ordered to it

So far we have explained the first principle of sacred theology.

There follows that which depends on the first and is ordered to it.

By directing some believable matter to Sacred Scripture as the first principle, it makes that matter credible.

By disposing the hearer through declaration or proof, it invites him to believe.

II–IV. Church testimony pure or mixed; themes known from Scripture and nature §1.10.2

1.10.2II. And it is either the Church's testimony, or that of those who are outside the Church. III. The Church's testimony is first pure or mixed. IV. Pure is that which by the Church's voice defines the matter to be believed from the Scriptures alone. V. Mixed is that which by the Church's voice determines the matter from Scripture and nature together.

For there are certain things in theology which become known partly through Scripture, partly through nature: for example, that God is; that there is providence; that there is a magistrate; that there is marriage. Here faith can also be confirmed by natural principles, according to that saying: Turn your eyes to the birds of the sky, and consider the lilies of the field (Matthew 6:26) — of which things Paul also makes mention (Acts 14:17; Romans 1:19).

What then, you ask — are not both theological themes and arguments sought from Scripture alone? Reply: Arguments that found the Christian faith, on which we rest, are rightly drawn from Scripture alone; but illustratives, which we use and are helped by in any way — especially in refuting heresies and human additions, which we necessarily contradict — can also without inconvenience be sought from nature, right reason, and human testimonies ad hominem. See Chemnitz, Theological Commonplaces part I, on creation, chapter 3.

Nature as proof or explanation of what Scripture teaches §1.10.3

1.10.3VI. And this principle is proof or declaration. VII. Proof is that by which something is shown to be both from nature and from Scripture — thus that God is, nature as well as the free Scripture asserts (Isaiah 41:22; Psalm 19:2).

VIII. Declaration is that by which something proposed by Scripture is declared from nature. Thus Damascene declares the generation of the Son of God from nature (On the Orthodox Faith book 1, chapter 9): Just as, he says, light is always begotten from fire, and always is in it, and is by no means separated from it — in this way also the Son is begotten from the Father, and is by no means separated from him, but always is in him.

Rules 1: Mysteries from Scripture pages; analytic vs dialectic; the solid theologian §1.10.4

1.10.4IX. And here rules are to be noted. 1. The mysteries of faith are to be dug out not from nature's storehouses, but from the pages of the Scriptures — such as the most holy Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, election to salvation, redemption, baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the like. For in these saying has place: Athens has nothing in common with Jerusalem; and that of Paul (Galatians 1:15), I did not immediately confer with flesh and blood; and (2 Corinthians 10:5), we take every thought captive to the obedience of Christ.

For we do not side with Raymond Lull and Albertinus — of whom the former strives to deduce all articles of faith, the latter all conclusions, from philosophical principles — much less with the Photinians, who seem everywhere to hold human reason in controversies of faith before Sacred Scripture, however much some try to rub this itch onto us.

For we rightly and deservedly observe the distinction of analytic and dialectic treatment: and we call analytic proof in theology the spiritual principle proper to theology, theopneuston, divinely revealed, accommodated to the demonstration or confirmation of the articles of faith in which our salvation is contained. And we judge that he alone can truly be called analytic in theology — that is, a true and solid theologian — who draws his proofs and the principles of his proofs from the clearest springs of the sacred letters, or from those things which have been demonstrated through the Sacred Scriptures, and does not allow anything alien or foreign from philosophy or human traditions or the fathers' testimonies to be mixed in, unless these entirely agree with the sacred letters or pertain to the true interpretation of Sacred Scripture — and that especially when spiritual demonstrations are needed.

Dialectic proofs: common topics, councils, common spiritual nature; two uses §1.10.5

1.10.5I add this because, when solid and firm foundations have been laid, or even when the wholly uninstructed are to be taught, Christ himself and the Apostles also employ dialectic proofs and oratorical arts — as may be seen in Andreas Hyperius of Flanders, formerly professor at Marburg, in his Theological Topics — such as: (1) topical places common to several disciplines; (2) proofs sought from the decrees and judgments of councils, from the Church's custom, from human traditions, from the opinions and sentences of the Latin as well as the Greek fathers — for the authority of all these is only probable, and rests on the authority of canonical Scripture, which the Protestants with one mouth testify and Bellarmine also somewhere does not deny; (3) proofs sought not from the proper but from the common nature of the spiritual things under discussion, which are called dialectic and logical only by analogy, even if their terms are merely spiritual.

And they are used chiefly for two causes. (1) For hearers ignorant of the divine mysteries and unskilled in Scripture's language. Thus Paul in Acts uses the authority of Aratus to refute the Stoics and Epicureans, who would not have admitted the Scriptures, just as Mohammedans do not today; likewise the poet Epimenides against the Cretans; and Menander to correct the Corinthians. Thus Christ, in teaching the people, for the most part uses common and dialectic arguments from likes and other such things customary then in Syria. This is useful for instruction. But acroamatically Christ teaches his disciples and analytically disputes against the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Satan. (2) For illustrating those things which were first demonstrated acroamatically or analytically.

Two legitimate proof-genera; analytic force; justification syllogism; progymnasmata §1.10.6

1.10.6For what is also customary in other disciplines — that sometimes dialectic syllogisms are premised to analytic ones, sometimes postponed according to the variety of controversies — nothing forbids the same in sacred theology, in which, as I said, there are two genera of legitimate proofs, just as in other disciplines too. The former contains analytic, didactic proofs, which can also be called with the Apostle merely spiritual and theological, proper, vernacular, and likewise of the Spirit and power of God — spiritual and effective demonstrations. The latter has common and dialectic proofs, which we have already briefly indicated as threefold.

But analytic proofs, which are merely spiritual, are either drawn from the written and divinely revealed Word of God — or handed down by Christ from the Father's bosom, by the prophets through whom the Lord's Spirit spoke, and by the Apostles, to whose authority, since they had a certain promise of the Holy Spirit not only in kind but also in individuals, no human authority of synods or even of fathers, Latin or Greek, is to be equated unless they speak with Scripture — or they are drawn from the proper nature of the spiritual things under discussion, which itself is gathered from the Scriptures by the benefit of analytic doctrine. The former proofs for proving the articles of faith are of all the most effective and powerful. For God is the author and fountain of all things, and truth itself. From Plato, Republic book 2, in the second formula for constituting religion: God, he says, is simple and truthful in work and words; he neither changes himself nor deceives others — neither by objects of images, nor by speeches, nor by signs sent in, nor through waking, nor in sleep. To God's truth in the Word is added omnipotence — to which two springs of certainty our Savior looked in confuting the Sadducees (Matthew 22:29).

But the later analytic proofs also have the greatest force for acquiring solid science of spiritual things, because they too are drawn from Israel's saving springs — as when one treats of original sin, faith, justification, and other spiritual things, proofs are sought from their proper nature; but they have more of art and skillful industry. For example, if someone wishes to prove analytically the Pauline saying: That those justified by faith have a pacified conscience. For one must first of all know beforehand what justification is, what faith, what peace, what conscience — which can hardly be done without analytic doctrine applied to the sacred letters. But once definitions of these extremes of the conclusion are constituted, partly perfect, partly also nominal, analytic proof becomes easy: Whoever rests on trust in divine mercy for Christ's merit has a pacified conscience. But the one justified by faith rests on trust in God's mercy for Christ's merit. Therefore the one justified by faith has a pacified conscience.

All the other proofs whose legitimate use is in our theology are only dialectic, of which we spoke a little earlier, together with their use. And although the whole of topics has much weight in theological study, yet first of all there are to be learned from the four progymnasmata set out at the end of the first book of the Topics the precepts of distinguishing things said in many ways, of finding differences, and of discerning likenesses of things — because unless ambiguities are distinguished (as the word justice, Gospel, faith, and the like) and things that are alike are separated by certain differences found (as law and gospel, active and passive righteousness, justification and regeneration, faith and good works, charity, faith and hope), doors are opened to various word-fights and dangerous disputations which Paul everywhere bids us avoid. Here also pertain Topics books 6 and 7, by whose precepts definitions constituted by others are examined — for example, whether the gospel is a sermon of repentance — and the springs and likenesses of differences are shown. From which it is clear that a double mode of treating spiritual things — acroamatic or analytic, and exoteric or dialectic — is not alien to our religion and the sacred letters, but rather is proper; and that it is most fitting for the solid — and to expose the false — theologian as such in theological treatments.

Sophists' three false proof-genera: pseudographic, sophistic, heterogeneous §1.10.7

1.10.7But sophists and false theologians, as such, use almost a threefold genus of proofs. The first is pseudographic — when for proving a spiritual theorem proofs are indeed assumed from the sacred letters, yet not true ones, either because of perverse interpretation or because of sinister application to the proposed question — of which pseudographemata countless occur among the Arians and Photinians, as also among Paracelsists and Weigelians and many Jacob-Boehmists and the like, who twist many Scripture testimonies to absurd and blasphemous opinions, as when they attack the deity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, the truth of the human nature assumed from the virgin Mary, the personal union, and things connected with these. This first genus is opposed to true proofs proper and vernacular to theology, because it constructs a syllogism from vernacular premises that are not true, as the philosopher speaks (Topics book 1, chapter 1).

The second is sophistic, which is opposed to dialectic and common proofs and commits some fallacy either in conjoined words, or in simple ones, or outside diction in things. The third is interposed between the two prior ones, which assumes some heterogeneous principle — alien or foreign — true indeed in its own genus, but transferred to another genus ineffective for what is proposed. Aristotle sometimes calls this logical, sometimes absurd and fictitious, forced toward the proposed question (Metaphysics book 13, chapter 7). This third genus of vicious proof was too familiar to the scholastics, who fitted philosophical principles to proving spiritual theorems, crossing from one genus into another against the analytic laws that demand all terms be related. The Photinians, unlearned and ignorant of analytics, abuse this when they try to destroy the eternal and hyperphysical generation of the Son of God with physical little reasonings.

Moreover, as analytic proofs beget accurate knowledge of things, so pseudographic proofs produce ignorance and a disposition — ignorance of a depraved affection contrary to solid cognition. Sophistic proofs make a show and as it were mock with certain juggling tricks. Heterogeneous foreign proofs bring forward some opinion for science. Hence blessed Luther rightly writes of Scholastic Theology that it is only opinion, or a shadowy and thin cognition of spiritual things, because it constructs spiritual theorems not from proper but from alien or diverse-genus principles.

Solving pseudographic proofs; rule 2: where reason fails, faith's edifice begins §1.10.8

1.10.8But the mode of solving pseudographic proofs is not one. For sometimes they are solved by applying a sound interpretation of the principles and showing the sinister application to the proposed question; sometimes by denial or even by opposing true principles from diverse Scripture places that agree best among themselves, and by showing the harmony and connection which, agreeably to the nature of the words and things signified, confirms the truer sentence and is destroyed and weakened by the weaker; sometimes by some limitation and distinction; sometimes even by deduction to absurdity, which rests on the negative principle of contradiction and has the greatest force for vigorously weakening such proofs and whatever conflicts with the articles of faith — as may be seen in 1 Corinthians 15, where the Apostle leads those denying the resurrection of the dead to as many absurdities as possible.

2. Where reason fails, there faith's edifice begins. Divine mysteries are not to be pried into, but to be wondered at. Hence St. Athanasius to Serapion: The knowledge of God, he says, is to be comprehended by faith, not sought out by human reason. Let faith preside; let reason sit under.

Faith forms reason under Scripture; Lesbia rule; Durandus; Richard of St Victor §1.10.9

1.10.9Note here, however: when the proper and interior truth of the mysteries brought into controversy comes to be explained by God's Word, the canon is by no means to be formed according to the natural measure of human reason and that hitherto described by the philosophers, but according to the genius and dictate of faith, which under a new light subjects reason in its mysteries to God's Word, even against blind reason's blind judgment. For example, Scripture teaches that Mary's only-begotten is God's only-begotten Son, and that this man begotten from Mary is the eternal God; likewise, that God suffered, and things like these. Which words by their native signification do not yield that sense of which reason by its natural light is capable, and which can be measured and grasped according to that norm delineated in the genera of logical predications.

Nor is it needful here that the significations of these words be turned so long by artful translations until they yield such a sense as can be comprehended by reason's natural capacity according to logical rules — because the truth of the divine mysteries and institutions exceeds the natural capacity of human reason, and does not temper itself to human wisdom and logical rules, as things and actions subject to reason are customarily disposed and treated according to logical rules. For logic is like the Lesbian rule, which ought to accommodate itself to things as they are; nor are things and their necessary and contingent connections, known by nature or divinely revealed, to be twisted to rules found by logicians from considering natural and moral things. Where therefore the truth of a statement is revealed in the Scriptures as singular and unusual, there the logician ceases; if he is a Christian he believes God revealing, and gladly confesses that his rules fail, and heartily rescinds his own decrees in God's honor.

But whatever right reason demonstrates to be alien to God's wisdom, goodness, equity, and justice — so far that it is alien even from the human — that is to be flatly rejected and spat out. Indeed whatever is absurd, false, and foolish according to right reason is absurd, false, and foolish before God and everywhere — as if someone should say that one is two, that one and two do not make three, that three are even, four odd, and that if we take equals from equals what remain are not equal, and if anything else truly implies a contradiction. For it cannot be that two contradictories are true at once. Let faith be present, and there will be no question. For to scrutinize mysteries is rashness; to believe is piety; to know is eternal blessedness.

Yet here too there is a grave stumbling-block: how does Christian faith prevail over philosophical science? Durandus says: To every knower it can be established concerning his conclusion that it is true, and that it is impossible for it to be otherwise. But concerning a conclusion deduced from principles only believed, it cannot be established for the one deducing that it is impossible for it to be otherwise, nor that it is true. For no more can be established concerning the conclusion than concerning the principles, since knowledge of conclusions depends on knowledge of principles. But we reply that God's Word is indeed the firmest principle of faith, yet one that has its own tokens which argue that the sacred Bibles are the true Word of the most true God; and although in these themselves the human mind acting in a human way now and then wavers, yet God, by illuminating it through that very Word and drawing the will into obedience, so confirms the certainty of the principle that the believer with joyful breast does not hesitate to seal it with his blood. With the principle thus established and unmoved, whatever is comprehended in it is believed with equal firmness, so that thus an infallible full assurance of both the principle and the conclusions drawn from it is given.

For if one proceeds so that to the deduction of tokens by which a persuaded man at first believes that the prophetic and Apostolic Word is the most true Word of the most true God, there is joined that Word's power and efficacy in illuminating the mind and strengthening the hearer's assent perpetually depending on the Word — then what otherwise perpetually fluctuates is set most firmly in our souls. And on this depends the conclusion of Richard of St. Victor, called a solid Doctor: As many of us as are truly faithful — that is, gifted with true faith kindled by divine illumination through the mediation of God's Word — hold nothing more certain, nothing more constant, than what we apprehend by faith. Would that the Jews would attend, would that the pagans would notice, with how great security of conscience we shall be able to approach the divine judgment. Shall we not with all confidence be able to say to God: Lord, if it is error, we have been deceived by you yourself? For these things in us have been confirmed by such great signs and wonders and such as can be done only through you, which also have been handed down to us by men of highest holiness, proved with highest and authentic attestation, you yourself cooperating, confirming the word with following signs? Note here the Lord's cooperation with God's preached Word, besides external miracles — as Christ (John 5:20) reckons the vivification which he performs through the gospel among works greater than visible signs.

Limits of natural reasoning and the authority of Church councils §1.10.10

1.10.104. Natural things are not to be confused with supernatural. Hence St. Athanasius, Disputation 2 against the Arians: What is said of men, he says, is not to be thought of God. Compare what was said at the first rule. 5. From civil government to spiritual administration the inference is weak. Hence Christ: But you not so (Luke 22:26); compare Casaubon, Exercitationes 14, disputation 5, and Exercitationes 18, chapters 11–12.

IX. Secondly, the dependent principle is public or private. X. Public is that which has been sealed by the consensus of the universal Church. XI. And it is of social collation or of faithful relation. XII. Social collation takes place either in a council or synod, or in some similar assembly, over which the Holy Spirit presides as judge in the choir of prophets and Apostles, by the written law. This is gathered from Acts 15:28; John 16:8, John 16:13; John 5:45; 2 Kings 17:20; Galatians 6:16; Matthew 10:20. See Luther, Jena German volume 7, On Councils and the Church; Calvin, Institutes book 4, chapter 9, section 13; William Whitaker against Duraeus, On Councils book 4.

Public confessions of the Church and private writings of its teachers §1.10.11

1.10.11XIII. Faithful relation takes place through a public writing of the Church. Here pertain the three catholic symbols — the Apostolic, Nicene, Athanasian. Then here can be referred the Augsburg Confession, the Gallican, Anglican, Helvetic confessions, the Harmony of Evangelical Confessions, the Heidelberg Catechism, with similar public writings.

XIV. Private is that which some orthodox doctor has made of public right, not in the Church's public name, but in his own. Of this rank are most of the writings of Luther, Melanchthon, Calvin, Bullinger, Musculus, Chemnitz, Hemmingius, Martyr, Beza, Ursinus, Zanchi, Benedictus Aretius, Franciscus Junius, David Pareus, Whitaker, Perkins, Polanus, Piscator, and the like — indeed also of the ancient fathers, Latin as well as Greek.

Rules on testimony 1–4: Scripture vs Church phrase; authority ranks; Nicephorus §1.10.12

1.10.12XV. And here too rules are to be noted. 1. Between the testimony and phrases of Scripture and between the testimony and phrases of the Church one must accurately and carefully distinguish — as: the bread which we break is the communion of the body of Christ (1 Corinthians 10:16); and the bread is the body of Christ. The former is Scripture's phrase, the latter the Church's. Both indeed true: yet the former proper, the latter improper.

2. In public testimony, although there is one and the same truth, yet there is not always one and the same authority. For greater is the authority of the Apostolic Symbol, but lesser that of the Augsburg, Gallican, Helvetic, Belgian, Anglican confession and the like. 3. Public testimony, other things equal, is deservedly to be preferred to private. Thus the confession of the whole Church surpasses the confession of some one doctor — even if there as here there is one truth.

4. Of testimonies taken from the fathers the unique norm and touchstone is Sacred Scripture. Thus Augustine, On the Unity of the Church chapter 5: It is not to be heard in the Church, he says: I say this, you say this — but the LORD says this. Worthy of observation here too is the warning of Nicephorus Gregoras, Roman or Byzantine History book 10, page 235: Moreover, he says, it is also worth knowing that the writings of the holy fathers are not to be understood simply nor in one way. Of which some look to teaching and admonishing — are accommodated to teaching and admonishing, persons and times being considered, yet all religiously. For some contain decrees dogmatically; others praises encomiastically; others disputations combatively. Nor indeed are the ancients' disputations to be transferred elsewhere. For if someone fighting with enemies, and with whole mind intent on sword and shield, should strike down a fellow-soldier standing before his feet, neither is that to be thought a law, nor is he to be accused who did it, necessity drawing the thought from the struggle, by no means allowing that what was done should happen otherwise. Therefore neither is this to be so done, nor are praises to be used in place of laws. For art has given to those praising license to say anything. But those dogmas which they sanctioned and promulgated — in those alone it is right and safe to use them as canons and the plumbline of religion. Thus Nicephorus — which yet by our rule are always to be tested against Scripture's Lydian stone, as was demonstrated above.

Rules for drawing doctrine from Scripture and the limits of logic §1.10.13

1.10.135. Certain things in Sacred Scripture are explicitly stated; others are present, even if not directly mentioned. Hence Nazianzen, Theology book 5: For, he says, in Scripture re set down as to words and sense together; some as to sense only. 6. Mutual collation should attend that some things are contained in Scripture explicitly; but some only implicitly. 7. Testification is twofold — dogmatic, which is made concerning the heads of our faith; and historical, which is made concerning the divine books.

8. Even if some heresy has not been condemned in a public council: yet it ought to be judged and refuted from God's Word, according to that of 1 John 4:1. Hence Athanasius, letter on the Synod of Ariminum: In vain, he says, those running about pretend that they demand synods for the faith, since divine Scripture is more powerful than all. 9. Carefully beware lest the conclusions of doctors after the Apostles' age rashly pass into norms of faith. For the Apostle teaches (1 Corinthians 2:4) often that my speech and my preaching were not in persuasive words of human wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power or virtue — that is, confirmed (1) by testimonies already long ago brought forth by the Spirit and power of God (2 Peter 1:20-2 Peter 1:21); (2) peculiarly then also by the visible outpouring of the Holy Spirit, and by various miracles of divine power — all of which he opposes to the demonstrations of human philosophy; (3) by the affection of charity and the strength of patience, from which the speech arose, with which it was spoken, and to effecting which powerfully it uniquely tended — which he opposes to affected eloquence and human persuasion. Compare 1 Corinthians 4:19; 1 John 3:4, 1 John 3:24; 1 John 4:7; Colossians 1; 1 Timothy 1:5.

He therefore, proving his words from the Scriptures, with such signs and such affections evidently added, and so fitting spiritual things to spiritual that (1) both God's presence of which he spoke, and the speech by which he spoke, was rather spiritual and powerful than outwardly specious to the age's sense; (2) the proved conclusion and the proving testimony breathed the same force — further deduced such conclusions from principles as are themselves principles for us. But we, speaking neither with such signs nor with like affection, content with the principles necessarily set in Scripture, gather conclusions firm only insofar as, compared with the said principles, it has been made evident that they conform to them and flow from them.

10. Doubtful, obscure, difficult, or false consequences are not to be turned into axioms beyond all exception, nor all controversies into necessary dogmas. 11. Although second notions ought not to be plainly proscribed on account of the other genus of legitimate common and dialectic proofs: yet the true and sober use of the organon and the perfection of logical judgment even in theological controversies consists more in distinguishing analytic and dialectic proofs — to which rhetorical ones are also akin — than in abusing either of the opposed deceptive, pseudographic, sophistic, and heterogeneous proofs. For since most mysteries, and certain spiritual and divine things, plainly reject the voices of genus, species, difference, accident, subject, form, and other like second notions — if you wish to use them in such mysteries only analogically against heretics, it can easily happen that you open them hiding-places of refuge in which to conceal their errors.

Pagan witnesses to the faith, and doubts about the Sibyls and Trismegistus §1.10.14

1.10.14XVI. Outside the Church is the testimony of gentile philosophers, poets, historians, and legislators, of Mercury Trismegistus and the Sibyls, by which the truth and equity of the Christian faith is sometimes asserted by the fathers. By this testimony, as an argument ad hominem — not truly that I might confirm faith and doctrine revealed from heaven by human testimonies — the Apostle Paul sometimes did not blush to use (Acts 17:23-Acts 17:24, Acts 17:28; 1 Corinthians 15:33; Titus 1:12). This the most learned fathers have not rarely used — Clement of Alexandria, Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Gregory Nazianzen, Lactantius, Augustine, and others — whose business was chiefly with atheists and gentiles.

Concerning Mercury and the Sibylline oracles which are still read today, I gladly assent to that highest man Isaac Casaubon (Exercitationes 1 to the Apparatus of the Annals, Numbers XVIII and XIX), concerning which it cannot be denied that in them not a few heads of religion — for example, concerning one God, the most holy Trinity, the Word the Son of God through whom the world was made, Christ to be born of a virgin, his passion and cross, regeneration through baptism into eternal life, the future judgment, and likewise other things — are found so clearly and in perspicuous words set forth that scarcely, indeed scarcely at all, anything similar can be brought from the whole law of Moses and the prophets. But the excellent man frankly professes that all oracles of this kind, whether of this Mercury or of the Sibyls announced beforehand, the more open they are, the more suspect they become to him; and he demonstrates them to be spurious by candid refutations: (1) because Christian mysteries were hidden before Christ (Colossians 1:26; Romans 16:25; Ephesians 3:9), which yet are most plainly explained in Mercury's book and the Sibylline songs, which even indicate JESUS CHRIST by acrostic, without circumlocutions or enigmas, by the very name, and narrate his deeds. For it seems contrary to God's Word to think that such deep mysteries were proposed more clearly to the gentiles than to God's people, whom God so instructed by the prophets' voice that through obscure types of future things he led them to Christ as by a pedagogue's hand (Galatians 3:24).

(2) Because the ancient Greeks — Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and so many other most curious scrutinizers of all disciplines — show absolutely no vestige of those things which today we marvel at in this Mercury and the Sibyls. (3) Because it was solemn in the first times of the church, with a good end, to invent false books, that the new doctrine might more easily be admitted by the gentiles' wise men — of which Pope Gelasius in his decree and that of the Roman council enumerates and by best right condemns very many. And into this census are to be referred those Sibylline oracles which explain the secrets of our religion more openly than was ever done by God's prophets; likewise the whole book which under the name of Mercury Trismegistus began some centuries ago to be circulated, pseudepigraphically falsely inscribed — for it is the mere fiction of some Christian or rather semi-Christian, as our Casaubon from the matter and diction solidly demonstrates in many places. (4) Because writings of this sort, as soon as they came forth, were suspect to very many. For most truly blessed Augustine (City of God book 18, chapter 47): Whatever prophecies of others concerning God's grace through Christ Jesus are brought forth can be thought to have been fabricated by Christians. Therefore nothing is firmer for convincing any aliens, if they contend about this matter, and for supporting our own, if they have thought rightly, than that those divine predictions concerning Christ be brought forth which are written in the Jews' codices.

Against ranking pagan learning above Scripture, with Eusebius on the Artemonites §1.10.15

1.10.15But those who still today defer somewhat more to gentile writings in the business of faith, with the Scholastics and Jesuits — to these ought to be opposed what Eusebius (book 5, chapter 28) reports concerning the Artemonites: They have corrupted the divine Scriptures, he says, without any reverence of the fear of God; and they boldly and impiously reject the rule of the ancient faith, being ignorant of Christ, whom therefore they do not find, because they have not sought rightly. And they have so far slipped into folly and impiety that, if someone proposes to them a discourse from the Scriptures, they on the contrary oppose: whether this discourse under discussion makes a conjoined or a separated genus of syllogism; and abandoning God's holy Scriptures they treat geometry — as those who truly are of the earth, they speak of the earth; and therefore they are ignorant of him who is from above.

Finally Euclid among them flourishes especially in the disciplines of Geometry. But Aristotle and Theophrastus are held by them in admiration. And Galen by some of them is even adored. Who strive to assert the impiety of their heresy by those arts and doctrines; and by deceiving men ignorant of God they undermine the simplicity of the divine Scriptures and the sincerity of faith. But they do these things because they have not even become neighbors to the faith; therefore they also violate the divine Scriptures without any fear, and corrupting them say that they are emending them.

Chapter 11: On the distribution of sacred theology §1.11.1

1.11.1CHAPTER ELEVEN On the distribution of sacred theology

So far we have seen the definition, nature, and principles of sacred theology.

The parts follow, of which there are two: the common and the proper.

Since sacred theology is a practical discipline of its own kind, as was shown above in chapter 1, section 3, it is to be treated, by the common judgment even of the philosophers who are masters of the best order, in the analytic order.

According to that order both the whole doctrine itself and all its parts will be treated from its chief end, and each head will occupy the place that suits it by its primary relation to its own whole and to the end of the whole

II. Various tractations; Conrad Bergius's five modes — history and prophecy §1.11.2

1.11.2II. Among outstanding theologians there are various treatments and divisions of it.

Doctor Conrad Bergius, in his praised Precognita, refers the tractations of sacred things to five modes.

The first is HISTORY, which is discourse about singular past deeds; in it the order of time is chiefly to be observed.

The second is PROPHECY, which is discourse about singular future deeds; in it partly the order of time is observed, partly the prudence or fitness to the particular end that God or the prophet intends.

Invocation and exhortation (precept, persuasion, congratulation) §1.11.3

1.11.3The third is INVOCATION, which is discourse either proclaiming God's past benefits or asking for future ones; and it uses the order that affection, place, and time nearly dictate.

The fourth is EXHORTATION, which is discourse not so much declaring some deed done or to come as wanting and requiring something to be done by a human being.

It includes (1) a precept about doing or omitting; (2) persuasion, which works by promising and threatening, or by foretelling the goods the obedient will obtain and the evils the resistant will run into; (3) congratulation, complaint, consolation, and the like, which call for joy or patience or sorrow by praising present goods and lessening or enlarging evils, and so on.

And this mode of sacred speech again uses chiefly the order of prudence, or fitness to the affection that is to be stirred or calmed in the hearer.

Didascalia: positive, free, particular, universal, catechetical, systematic §1.11.4

1.11.4The fifth is DIDASCALIA properly so called, which is either bound to the text it interprets — and from that text its order chiefly depends — whence it is called positive theology, because by interpreting Scripture it lays down the principles and foundations of theological dogmas;

or it is free, and that particular, about a certain argument only: if it is taught in a popular manner, it is fitted to the time, place, and capacity of the hearers; if by the rule of art or scholastically, it nearly follows the laws of treating a theme logically;

or it is universal, and that either compendious or catechetical about all or at least most things necessary to salvation, or full or systematic about all or most things revealed from heaven.

And this can be twofold: historical and logical.

The historical method of didascalia; the text of Scripture §1.11.5

1.11.51. The HISTORICAL is that which narrates in order what has been given, commanded, and done by God and by human beings.

It inserts prophecies, prayers, and exhortations partly into the narration itself, as the order of events allows, and partly sets them apart like certain special acts and documents of the kingdom.

This method is not only popular but also especially fitting to the nature of the subject, which is the kingdom — and a certain and singular one — by which God chiefly governs this world and the Church.

It has therefore been used in the sacred letters, useful and necessary for the learned and the unlearned, for whom no study ought to be preferred to grasping the TEXT OF SCRIPTURE with understanding and memory as far as can be done (Second Timothy 3:15; First Timothy 4:10).

The logical method; two ways of arranging; differences from subjects, objects, ends §1.11.6

1.11.62. The LOGICAL is that which aptly distinguishes the parts of the divine kingdom and their acts recalled to certain genera, and brings together under one head the parallels that occur scattered in the Scriptures, so that the joining of both methods may give greater light and help to understanding and memory alike.

It can be instituted in two ways.

First, when the end of the doctrine is known beforehand and the subject is set, the acts that are certain means to the end are enumerated nearly in the order in which they follow one another — the method we most approve in compendia and summaries of Christian doctrine, and which we follow in this handbook and idea of theology.

Second, the acts of God's kingdom can be so enumerated and divided that differences are taken chiefly from the subjects or matter of the kingdom; for habits and acts are specified chiefly by subjects and ends, as we taught in chapter 1, section 7.

Remote differences are taken from acting subjects (for example common-place classes about the acts of God and of man, and specifically about the acts and offices of pastors, parents, children, magistrates, subjects, and so on); nearer differences in the acts of each subject are taken from the objects toward which the action tends (for example man's acts and offices toward God, himself, neighbor, friends, enemies, the poor, the rich, and so on); nearest differences are taken from the end or good the action intends and introduces from subject into subject (for example man's acts and offices toward the neighbor as to the good of intellect, will, body, outward worship, and so on).

Memory and intellect served by the method; DIVISIONES of theology 1–5 §1.11.7

1.11.7A method of this kind most agrees with a full syntagma of common places, and is most useful to memory and understanding (which alone is to be looked to in method).

To memory, because when a few elements — subjects, objects, ends — are known, from their varied combination as of letters one may see and number in order many classes of acts as of words.

To understanding, because this method will keep more exactly and set out more clearly the analogy of the Church, household, and commonwealth of God, of father and prince; of the Christian as son and subject; of pastor, steward, legate, and the like.

The DIVISIONS of theology vary no less.

1. Some divide into doctrine concerning God and concerning God's actions or works.

2. Others, with doctrine of principles, end, and efficient cause first set down, divide into the methodological and the therapeutic.

3. Others, with principles first — the Word of God and God himself — set as parts the causes of our salvation, and so God's works and effects, and its subject, namely man.

4. Others divide into the knowledge of God and of ourselves.

5. Others into doctrine concerning God and the Church.

Divisiones 6–10; Polanus on faith and good works §1.11.8

1.11.86. Others divide concerning God and the motion of the rational creature toward God.

7. Others into doctrine concerning God, concerning creatures and especially concerning man and his fall, concerning restoration through Christ, and concerning the sacraments and the life to come.

8. Others into doctrine concerning faith and good works, as Doctor Amandus Polanus does in his Syntagma Theologiae, book 2, chapter 1, where he gives the reasons for that division and confirms it by the authority of older doctors — Ignatius, Irenaeus, Lactantius, Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, the Council of Toledo, and the Historia Tripartita — and of more recent ones: the Helvetic Confession, Theodore Beza, the Irenaeus of our age, Lambert Daneau, Zanchi, Ursinus, and Kinedoncius.

9. Others concerning God the testator, Christ the mediator, and the Church the heir.

10. Others finally distribute into theory concerning God, sin, and Christ, and into conversion and its fruits.

III. Analytic distribution into the common and proper parts §1.11.9

1.11.9III. All treatises and partitions by which the body of sacred theology is explained easily please us, provided that at least in the chief foundations of faith and salvation they agree with Sacred Scripture.

And without taking anything from anyone, we gladly and with thanksgiving give each theologian his due praise; yet with the good leave of others whose gifts we admire and revere, for easier knowledge and practice, as we set out to sketch theology as a practical discipline, we will now follow the analytic order and not inconveniently distribute it into the TWO aforesaid PARTS, the COMMON and the PROPER.

We do so because theological dogmas stand in a twofold difference.

Some contain those acts of God's kingdom that somehow belong to all who desire to be saved — namely the chief heads of the Christian religion as articles of faith and foundations of our salvation, which no one may ignore — and their interpretations, illustrations, religious determinations, and conclusions formed jointly from Scripture's dictates as theological principles by a disciplinary method and order mixed together and treated scholastically for the use of learned youth; once rightly known, these are not to be denied or attacked but approved and received and practiced by anyone according to the measure of his grace and age.

Others embrace those acts that belong not to all but chiefly to those who ought to save themselves and others and who hold ecclesiastical office first of all, or scholastic, political, or economic office, or are at least some part of such orders, whether they preside over others or are under them.

The former we will treat under the common part, the latter under the proper part, with the help of God Most High, mindful as to manner of treatment of that Augustinian precept that theology rather requires foundations than ornaments, and as to the matter itself of that saying of Ambrose or Prosper or Eucherius in On the Calling of the Gentiles, book 1, chapter 7: What God willed to be hidden is not to be searched out; what he has made plain is not to be denied — lest in the former we be found unlawfully curious, and in the latter damnably ungrateful.

Close of Book 1: six requirements of the theology student; theodidaktos close §1.11.10

1.11.10And so that I may seal this first book of our theology with some closing mark, I will here show under the image of a well-born disciple the divine craft and the short way by which the sacred scriptures, as the tables of the Christian kingdom and the roots of true theology, may be read with fruit.

Six things especially are required in a disciple who is to advance far and happily by great daily journeys: (1) age, (2) talent, (3) a faithful teacher, (4) study and labor faithfully to be devoted to the instructor, (5) continual exercise by which he can recite the lesson exactly when the teacher demands it, (6) reverence toward the instructor.

The same things are asked of the student of sacred theology who desires to turn the sacred letters and God's Word to the good of his own soul.

For (1) let him have a firm resolve to put off the old man, that in Christ he may become a new man, indeed a man of God, for whom Sacred Scripture is uniquely destined (Second Timothy 3:16–17).

(2) From God our LORD let him humbly ask with earnest and frequent groans for spiritual understanding and spiritual judgment (James 1:5; Luke 11:9–13).

(3) To JESUS CHRIST, the Master whose chair is in the heavens, let him look with unturned eyes and rightly acknowledge him.

(4) In this divine school let him be assiduous, and not only read but reread what he has read, and with eyes and heart lifted together to heaven meditate and ruminate on what he reads.

(5) Let him weigh one reading against another, render it to the heavenly Master, seek the foundation of truth in him alone, practice by day and by night the doctrine received from him, often remember it, and anxiously ask that he himself may daily become better from himself.

(6) Let him endure under the discipline and correction of Christ and of his Spirit, the heavenly teacher; let him revere and love him, and in his studies seek nothing outside God's glory and his own soul's salvation.

Such a one in Sacred Scripture and theology, or the mysteries of God's kingdom, as θεοδίδακτος — taught by God — will advance most excellently and be blessed forever in heaven.

For this is properly necessary: that whoever desires to understand the sacred letters inwardly and savingly, still more to interpret them for others and apply them with fruit, must first repent, revere God, be willing to acknowledge Christ in his kingdom according to the Spirit and to press his footsteps in the crowd of this world, and ardently ask the spirit of faith and of divine wisdom from him who opened his disciples' mind that they might understand the Scriptures (Luke 24:45).

System of Sacred Theology — Book 2

BOOK TWO. On the end of man as citizen of God's kingdom — the absolutely highest and last end, or eternal beatitude. CHAPTER ONE. Whether there is some highest good of man, and that eternal, and what it is §2.1.1

2.1.1BOOK TWO. On the end of man, as a citizen of God's kingdom — the absolutely highest and last end, or eternal beatitude.

CHAPTER ONE. Whether there is some highest good of man, and that eternal, and what it is.

The common part of sacred theology pursues three things: the absolutely highest and last end of man, namely eternal beatitude; the subject, that is, man himself as a citizen of God; and the principles on which eternal salvation depends, together with the means by which he is directed to it.

II. Man's absolutely highest and last end and good is given, and that eternal; Augustine on eternal beatitude §2.1.2

2.1.2II. But for man — the noblest creature and a citizen of God's kingdom — an absolutely highest and last end and good is given, by which he is perfected in every way, and that eternal, which embraces all things to be wished for, as Augustine teaches in book 4 of the City of God, chapter 21.

And in the same sense eternal beatitude, or the possession of the highest and most perfect good, is so called.

Every thing has its end; whatever acts tends to some good; intelligent and non-intelligent agents §2.1.3

2.1.3For among all the saints — indeed among the sane — it is confessed that to each thing some end of its own belongs, its own good, and its own perfection: because neither God nor nature does or produces anything in vain, but all things are for an end (; ).

2. Whatever acts, whether it works with cognition or without cognition properly so called, acts toward an end, and therefore seeks some good, since that cannot be an end which has no account of good.

3. Although there is a difference — that those which understand move themselves to the end and act by knowing the end and the means, comparing them with one another and ordering these to that end, while those which do not understand are moved rather by natural inclination — yet both act for an end, or, to speak more clearly, tend into an end.

4–5. Perfection and beatitude when the end is attained; the highest good defined as last and most perfect §2.1.4

2.1.44. Each thing, if it attains its good and end, is perfect — or, if its nature is intelligent, blessed. For no animal that lacks knowledge can be blessed, and it does not fall to things without reason to be blessed, as Augustine teaches in the book of eighty-three questions, question 1; but on the contrary it is imperfect, wretched, and unhappy if it falls from and is deprived of its end and good.

5. The highest good is called also the last, because it is subjected to no other as a means, or is not at all ordered to the attaining of something higher and greater; and most perfect, because it excludes every defect and need, and gives itself to the one who has it so that it may be perfectly well with him.

III–IV. Perfection must be proportioned to the subject; mortal and eternal goods §2.1.5

2.1.5III. But this perfection of the thing that is perfected is necessarily proportioned, so that it cannot be lesser or worse than the thing to be perfected.

For it would not be perfection if it could not perfect its subject — or, what amounts to the same, actuate and exhaust that potency which it has toward perfection, and sufficiently fill its appetite.

IV. Hence it is that to mortal and fleeting things mortal and fleeting perfections also belong, which affect and perfect them as long as they last; but if any thing is eternal and immortal, its good too is eternal and immortal.

For it would be absurd if the perfection of an eternal and immortal thing were placed in something that is by its nature fragile, flowing, and liable to ruin, among those things that are below the first heaven.

Dionysius the Carthusian against Scotus; Richard on philosophers; Thomas on duplex contemplation of God §2.1.6

2.1.6Dionysius the Carthusian speaks aptly against Scotus: There is not, he says, the same mode of receiving a natural and acquired form and habit as a supernatural and infused form and habit; nor is the inclination of the created mind to a supernatural form and habit judged natural, but rather supernatural — that is, fitting to a power beyond and above the grade, measure, and limit of its natural condition, namely by respect to a supernatural end. Indeed if it consisted as natural, it could be completed and actuated by a natural cause.

And Richard, whom they call the solid Doctor, holds that philosophers, however excellent in talent, who have not been supernaturally illuminated, have never known nor been able to know true and full beatitude. These are signs of the evangelical light, which in the midst of the darkness of the papacy was not wholly obscured among all.

But also Thomas, whose authority even the scholastic crowd prefers to Scotus: All, he says, who have sensed rightly have placed the end of human life in the contemplation of God.

But the contemplation of God is twofold: one through creatures, which is imperfect, inasmuch as the creature is an effect not proportioned to the Creator but infinitely distant from him. Therefore it leads into an imperfect knowledge of God, in which the philosopher places contemplative happiness — which happiness is nevertheless a way, and to it the whole of philosophical cognition is ordered, proceeding from reasons and considerations of creatures.

The other is the contemplation of God by which he is seen immediately through his essence: this is perfect contemplation, and it is had in the homeland, and is possible for man according to the supposition of faith; whence those things that are toward the end must be proportioned to the end, so that man in the state of the way may be led by the hand to that beatitude not by cognition taken from creatures but by cognition inspired from divine light. And this is the doctrine of theology, whose office it is to command all other sciences and to use them in its service.

Why supernatural theology is necessary; five hypotheses before the highest good can be taught §2.1.7

2.1.7So Thomas. From which it is gathered at once what and why this supernatural doctrine and theology is necessary for man beside and beyond the natural sciences: namely because it raises and directs his true practice — which is according to piety — above nature to his highest end and to the good of eternal joy and glory.

That good cannot be taught clearly enough unless other hypotheses have already been settled in the reader's mind, namely: first, the immortality of the rational soul; second, the state of the same when separated from its body; third, the end of this world; fourth, the resurrection of the flesh; fifth, the last judgment.

When these are rightly established, the highest beatitude of God's kingdom, and of man as citizen of this kingdom, will be explained somewhat more solidly.

V. The good suited to the rational immortal soul; proof that man has a rational soul §2.1.8

2.1.8V. Since therefore man is endowed with a rational soul, which is immaterial, indissoluble, and immortal, such a good suits him as exceeds the measure and duration of the body and endures with the immortal soul itself after departure from the body: when he has obtained it he will be happy and blessed; but if he falls from it he will be extremely wretched.

Man has a rational soul: this is confessed among all, and we all experience it from the operations of the soul in us. For we understand that we arrive from known things at knowledge of unknowns, which is to reason.

From which we gather that there is in us some principle from which this operation flows. This is the soul, which from so excellent an effect we call rational; concerning its nature the following rules are to be observed here in passing.

1. The rational soul is the true informing form of man — not accidental motion, crasis, or Averroist assistance §2.1.9

2.1.91. The rational soul is the true form of man.

I mean a form that is not accidental — such as continuous and perennial motion, which Cicero in the first Tusculan Questions believed Aristotle meant by the word entelechy, and such as the mixture of the primary qualities, which both impious heretics (Carpocrates, Epiphanes, Prodicus, the Cainites and Antitactae, in Theodoret, book 5 On divine decrees, chapter on man) and Galen (in the book That the manners of the soul follow the temperament of the body, chapters 3 and 4, and Epidemic book 6, and book 3 On affected places) imagined as the form of man;

nor an assisting form, such as Averroes (On the soul book 3, chapter 5) thought to be one for all, in reality separated from all, and joined to individuals only through images of phantasy residing in them;

but an informing form, which informs the body and with it constitutes man in a certain species of things.

2–3. The soul is spiritual and separable from matter; VI hypotheses for teaching the highest good §2.1.10

2.1.102. It is of a spiritual nature. This is shown first by its operations, which are far nobler than those that can proceed from a corporeal thing; second by all the places of Holy Scripture that call the rational soul a spirit — as;;;;;; and;; and.

Against John, bishop of Thessalonica, who in the pseudo-synod of Nicaea, at the beginning of the fifth action, does not fear to say, for establishing the cult of images, that the Catholic Church believes every soul to be corporeal — with many philosophers of the Stoic and Italic sects, with Tertullian and a certain Apollinaris of Alexandria (of whom in the Tripartite History book 5, chapter 44), and according to some with the Luciferians (Augustine, On heresies, chapter 81).

Against all of whom the third Council of Constantinople, or sixth ecumenical, sensed more holy in its eleventh action: God is born, it says, with a human body and likewise with the habit of having a rational and incorporeal soul.

3. It is separable from matter. For experience teaches that all die. But death is nothing other than the separation of the soul from the body.

VI. But here especially is to be considered the immortality of the rational soul, the state of its separation from the body, the resurrection of the flesh, and what follows upon this. For until these are surveyed and set beyond the cast of doubt, the highest good of man and eternal beatitude cannot be taught fully enough and distinctly.

VII. Immortality of the soul defined; Bernard, Nyssenus, Augustine, Ambrose on death as change §2.1.11

2.1.11VII. The immortality of the soul is that perfection of it by which, without destruction of its substance, by the kindness of its Creator, it endures forever.

This is opposed to death strictly taken, inasmuch as it is extinction with respect to the destruction of substance. Otherwise certain of the fathers take death more loosely, for change with respect to its state, whatever that finally is. So Bernard: Every change, he says, is a death. And therefore Nyssenus proves that death is implicated in this life, because this life is subject to change.

Augustine agrees in book 3 against Maximinus the Arian bishop, chapter 12, column 730: Immortality, he says, God alone is said to have, because he alone is immutable. For in every changeable nature the change itself is some death, because it makes something in it not to be what it was. Accordingly the human soul itself, which is therefore called immortal because in whatever way, according to its own mode, it never ceases to live, nevertheless has according to that same mode a certain death of its own: because if it was living justly and sins, it dies to justice; if it was a sinner and is justified, it dies to sin — not to mention its other changes, about which it is long to dispute.

Ambrose agrees in book 3 On faith, chapter 2: And the soul, he says, dies. For the soul that has sinned, it itself shall die. Every rational creature receives accidents and is subject to judgment. But in accidents both the penalty of judgment is corruption and also progress.

Chapter 2: On the immortality of the soul, from the light of nature and the confession of barbarians, both ancient and recently discovered §2.2.1

2.2.1CHAPTER TWO. On the immortality of the soul, from the light of nature and the confession of barbarians, both the ancient and those discovered in our own memory.

That our rational soul, free from destruction, survives after its departure from the body is shown by the light of nature and of Scripture, as by two torches shining in the dark. See our Alsted's Encyclopaedia, book 6, pneumatic part 4, chapter 2.

II. By the light of nature: Gentiles both barbarians and philosophers acknowledge immortality and care about the soul's state after this life §2.2.2

2.2.2II. By the light of nature: because it has been received by common opinion that the Gentiles — both barbarians and philosophers — have acknowledged this, and on that account have been anxious about its state after this life.

III-IV. Barbarians ancient and recent; the ancient Getae and Egyptians (Herodotus, Diodorus) §2.2.3

2.2.3III. Barbarians — both the ancient and those recently and newly discovered — have acknowledged it.

IV. The ancient, such as the Getae and the Egyptians. The Getae do not think that they themselves cease, but that he who has died goes across to Zamolxis. The Egyptians judge that their parents and ancestors have been translated to an eternal dwelling. Concerning the former Herodotus bears witness in book 4; concerning the latter Diodorus Siculus in book 1 of the Library, number 93.

V. Recently discovered peoples listed; whether the West Indies were known to the ancients; Fathers denied antipodes §2.2.4

2.2.4V. The recent and newly discovered, such as the Guineans, Chinese, Peruvians, Mexicans, Guianans, Tupinamba, Brazilians, and Virginians.

I call these newly discovered. Yet it is not a curious question whether those regions which we now mark with the title of the West Indies were known to the ancient Greeks, Romans, and other nations. The holy Fathers once denied antipodes — Lactantius, Divine Institutes book 3, chapter 24; Augustine, City of God book 16, chapter 9. Indeed the constant opinion of those who asserted antipodes was that their region was wholly unknown to us — in Cicero, On the Republic book 6, and Pomponius Mela book 1, chapter 1 — and that it had still lain hidden in the secret of the divine mind, as Salmuth thought in his notes on Panciroli's New Discoveries, chapter 1; Jacob Martin, professor of Wittenberg, Miscellaneous Disputations, folio 599; Joseph Acosta, book 1, chapter 1.

Yet the New World may long have been partly known; Besoldus; Japheth origin; Fuller and others §2.2.5

2.2.5Yet it is more likely that the islands, and the adjacent continent of that New World, were also long ago, many ages before, not wholly unknown to our world, as the polyhistor Christopher Besoldus, professor of Tubingen, demonstrates at length in his Political Discourses on the growth of empire, chapter 4, year 10; and the inhabitants are believed to have been of Cymbric or ancient Teutonic and Scythian origin from Japheth the son of Noah (Genesis 9:19, 27). Compare Nicholas Fuller, Theological Miscellanies book 1, chapter 4; Vandermylius On the Belgian Language chapter 25; Acosta book 1, chapter 24; Claude Duret, History of Languages chapter 78; Peter Bertius in his contracted maps of America; Johannes Goropius Becanus in the Antwerp Origins, in the Niloscopium; Lipsius, Stoic Physiology book 2, dissertation 19.

VI. The Guineans on another life and the last judgment; burial goods and royal funerary sacrifice §2.2.6

2.2.6VI. THE GUINEANS, when asked about another life and the last judgment, answered that they indeed were wholly ignorant of the last day of judgment, yet affirmed that the account of men is one thing and that of cattle another; and although they were completely unaware of what becomes of people after death, nor did they know whether that place to which they would be transferred was above or below the earth, they nonetheless usually assign some part of their household goods to the dead, so that wherever they finally arrive they may have what is necessary for daily uses.

So narrates the Description of the African kingdom of Guinea, chapter 21. And from this it is clear, says the author, that they somehow believe another life after this one survives, yet are wholly ignorant of the resurrection of the dead, estimating that as soon as they die they are transferred into another world, where they need varied household goods just as in this world: whence if they happen to lose something, they at once form thoughts of this sort — that perhaps some friend of theirs has come from the other world and carried it off because he could no longer do without it. The same author reports in chapter 44 that nobles, when a king has died, bestow some slave, and even slaughter a dearest wife and sons, so that they may be buried with the king and serve him in the other world.

VII. The Chinese: pagan religion; immortality and retribution; magnificent tombs (Linschoten) §2.2.7

2.2.7VII. THE CHINESE, whose religion — without the contagion of Mohammedanism — is merely pagan, all believe the immortality of the soul, and after this life a retribution of goods or evils according as each has done good or evil things, and on that account they set up for the dead sepulchral monuments magnificently carved. They believe there is an immortal life in the other world, as Hugo Linschoten witnesses, part 1, chapter 25.

VIII. The Peruvians: immortality, eternal life and damnation (Acosta); ignorance of bodily resurrection; funerary slaves (Benzoni) §2.2.8

2.2.8VIII. THE PERUVIANS believe the immortality of the soul and eternal life and death. Joseph Acosta, book 5, chapter 7: The Indians who dwell in Peru, he says, hold that the souls of men are immortal, and that eternal life awaits the pious, but eternal damnation the impious. And therefore they can easily be led to take up the faith of this article. But that bodies would one day rise again together with the souls themselves they were wholly ignorant. And from this he writes that it came about that, anxious about the other life, they slaughtered slaves at the funerals of their own, to minister there. Compare Girolamo Benzoni, History of the New World book 3, chapter 20.

IX-X. Mexicans profess the same faith; Guianans agree with Peruvians (Raleigh); burial with wives and treasures §2.2.9

2.2.9IX. THE MEXICANS profess the same faith. For Acosta in chapter 8 reports nearly the same things, and that at the funerals of great men those who had been ready in serving the living were compelled by them to die, so that they might render the same services in the other age as well.

X. THE GUIANANS, Epicurean natives of the gold-bearing province, agree with the Peruvians in religion and opinions. For, as Walter Raleigh witnesses in his Description of Guiana, they believe the immortality of souls, adore the sun, and take care that the dearest wives they have had, as also their treasures, be buried with them: but the Orenoqueponi are not indeed buried with their wives, yet with all their treasures; they hope and believe that after these times they will again possess them.

XI. The Tupinamba of Brazil: fierce cannibals who believe soul-immortality; Lery on virtue, paradise, and Aygnan §2.2.10

2.2.10XI. THE TUPINAMBA, Brazilians, believe the immortality of souls, being fierce and cannibals. For concerning them Jean de Lery, who spent a year among them, that he does not believe there is any nation in the whole globe of lands more alien from all religion: if nevertheless, by his own witness, they not only believed the immortality of souls, but also held it for certain that after death the souls of those who had cultivated virtue (but they define virtue in their own way — namely to take vengeance on enemies and to devour as many as possible), flying past the highest mountains, are gathered to the souls of their fathers and grandfathers, and there in most pleasant gardens spend a joyful age in perpetual delights and dances: but on the contrary the shades of the cowardly, who have lived without any care of defending the fatherland and ingloriously, are snatched away to Aygnan (so they call the evil demon) and live with him amid everlasting torments.

XII. The Virginians also believe soul-immortality; transfer to gods' seats or Popogusso (Hariot) §2.2.11

2.2.11XII. THE VIRGINIANS also believe the immortality of the soul. For as soon as it is loosed from the body they hold that it is transferred according to the works it has done, either to the seats of the gods to enjoy perpetual happiness, or to a huge ditch or pit (which they judge to be situated at the furthest bounds of the world, far from themselves toward the west) unto perpetual fire. This place they themselves call Popogusso, as Thomas Hariot the Englishman related in his narrative of the commodities and rites of Virginia.

XIII. What barbarian confession shows: universal natural consensus; true light overlaid with false, vain, and impious additions §2.2.12

2.2.12XIII. This confession of the barbarians shows: 1. That concerning the immortality of the soul and its beatitude or misery after death there is a constant opinion among all nations, drawn from the principles of nature (as discussed in pneumatology), which may seem not so much learned as connate. For in every matter the consensus of all nations is to be counted the law of nature, as Cicero authorizes in Tusculan Disputations book 1; of which common consensus the vulgar opinions of the Gentiles, or the fables of shades, the Elysian fields, and Tartarus sung by the poets — Homer in Odyssey book 11, Virgil in Aeneid 6, and Ovid in Fasti book 2 — also give faith, which rest upon the immortality of the soul as a foundation from which they were born and without which they could not have been born.

2. That upon those things which are indeed true and legitimately deduced from the light of nature, the darknesses of the nations have built false, vain, and impious additions. It is true that souls are immortal, and that after their departure from the body it will go well or ill with them. It is false that happiness comes on account of victory won over external enemies. It is vain that household goods should be buried as if they would be of use in another world. And it is also impious and more than superstitious to slaughter human beings to that end, that provision may be made for the comforts of the dead in eternal life.

Chapter 3: On the immortality of the soul from the confession of the best philosophers and from reasons §2.3.1

2.3.1CHAPTER THREE. On the immortality of the soul from the confession of the best philosophers and from reasons.

Hitherto the immortality of the soul has been established from the confession of the Gentile barbarians: now the same will be demonstrated from the consensus and reasons of the best philosophers.

I. Not the best: Epicurus, Lucretius, Dicaearchus, Panaetius, and the Stoics deny or dilute immortality §2.3.2

2.3.2I. I say of the best philosophers, because there are not lacking philosophers of no best sense who have denied, attacked, or at least called into doubt the immortality of the soul. Epicurus, parting company with the better ones, embraced a sentence worthy of himself; Lucretius following him in the third book which he wrote On the Nature of Things attacks the immortality of the soul with good and elegant verses indeed, but with bad and weaker arguments, and tries to prove that minds and light souls are native to living things and mortal. Nay more, as Cicero witnesses in Tusculan Disputations book 1, troops of contradictors come — not only of Epicureans, but Dicaearchus also discoursed against this immortality and wrote three books in which he tries to make souls mortal. So also Panaetius wants them to perish. But the Stoics grant us a loan as to crows: they say minds will remain long, they deny forever.

Stoics on the soul's duration; Cleanthes and Chrysippus; Pliny impiously mocks immortality §2.3.3

2.3.3The same Stoics, according to Diogenes Laertius book 6 on Zeno, hold the soul to be generated twice.at all remain until the conflagration; but Chrysippus only those of the wise. Pliny, a philosopher not of better mark, in Natural History book 7, chapter 33, impiously mocks the sentence on the immortality of souls: Those, he says, are inventions of childish deliriums and of a greed never to cease from mortality.

Peripatetic interpreters Alexander and Averroes; Pomponazzi; Galen vs Plato; Isidore of Pelusium §2.3.4

2.3.4Next from the Peripatos there are two interpreters of Aristotle, one Greek — Alexander of Aphrodisias — the other Arab, namely Averroes: both place outside man the agent intellect, which alone they admit to be immortal; to which opinion of Averroes in the previous century Peter Pomponazzi alluded in disputing, and thereby provoked the censure of Pope Leo X in the Lateran Council, session 8. Galen also either denied the immortality of the soul or called it into doubt. For although somewhere he speaks so that he might seem less alien from admitting it, yet in the book That manners follow the temperament of the body he rebukes Plato for asserting the immortality of the mind.

Oppose to him what Isidore of Pelusium, the excellent disciple of the great Chrysostom, says against him in book 4, letter 125. Concerning the cure of bodies, he says, since that man is a most excellent craftsman in this art, let him speak by his own judgment: but concerning the soul let him not take up a contest with the wise nor descend into a struggle for which he is neither trained nor prepared. Galen was indeed a most excellent man in philosophy and medicine, and an impious mocker of the doctrine of Moses, who even in On the Use of Parts book 10 dared to deny that God, if he wished, could make a horse or an ox from ashes — much more, as it seems, about to deny that the first man was produced from a clod of earth, or that the body of each man already reduced to dust would be raised again the same in number.

II. Paradox: some who acknowledge Scripture deny immortality — Sadducees; Arabians; John XXIII §2.3.5

2.3.5II. But a wonder has occurred: that what by nature's instinct among barbarian nations, and by best reason among the learned (if you except a few), was received without Scripture, that very thing has been denied by some who have acknowledged Scripture. The Sadducees of old taught that there is no resurrection, nor angel, nor spirit (that is, immortal) (Acts 23:8). See also Josephus, Antiquities book 18, chapter 2, and Jewish War book 2, chapter 7. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History book 6, chapter 30, reports that certain persons arose in Arabia in the third century who so denied the immortality of souls that they did not meanwhile abolish the resurrection, but affirmed that the soul is also raised again together with the body. Augustine from Eusebius mentions the same in Heresies 83. Then John XXIII, Roman Pontiff, said and stubbornly believed that the soul is extinguished and dies together with the human body, otherwise of brutes, as the words of the Council of Constance, session 11, have it.

Photinians imply mortality; Tertullian assigns body yet vindicates immortality §2.3.6

2.3.6The Photinians of this age lay down those principles from which the mortality of the soul must necessarily be concluded, in the Racovian Catechism, in order to attack the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, in the chapter on the knowledge of Christ. So they say that two substances adverse in properties cannot come together into one person, as mortal and immortal are. Tertullian ascribes a corporeal nature, yet does not take away immortality, but rather vindicates it sharply. But he seems to call every created thing that truly subsists a body, as also Hilary in his Matthew canon 5; therefore he ought not to be numbered among those errors: yet what he ascribes in On the Soul chapter 9 — length, breadth, and height, by which philosophers measure bodies — cannot be excused or explained by any convenient reason. And chapter 36: The soul, he says, sown in the womb together with the flesh, together with it also obtains sex. These things are to be trembled at, not laughed at, as Augustine witnesses in On Genesis Literally book 20, the last chapters.

III. Best philosophers asserting immortality: Pherecydes, Pythagoras, metempsychosis; Druids, Brahmans, Pharisees §2.3.7

2.3.7III. The best philosophers asserting the immortality of the soul are Greeks or Latins. Pherecydes the Syrian, as Cicero witnesses in Tusculan Disputations book 1, was first or among the first, and his disciple was Pythagoras, who, though he knew the soul to be immortal, yet did not have it known what happens to it after departure from the body, and embraced metempsychosis, concerning which Ovid in Metamorphoses book 15 introduces him speaking thus: Souls lack death, and always, the former seat left behind, they live in new homes and dwell in those received. The Druids of the Gauls, embracing Pythagoras's opinion, according to Julius Caesar, Gallic War book 6, wish above all to persuade this — that souls do not perish, but after death pass from some to others. And the Brahmans who still survive among the Indians today profess themselves disciples of Pythagoras, as Linschoten witnesses, part 1, chapter 38, and believe that souls are immortal, yet so that they transmigrate from one body into another, and that there is no difference whether they fly into a brute or a human body, according as each has done well or ill. This reciprocal recurring discourse of souls, as Tertullian calls it in On the Soul chapter 28, the Pharisees also of old believed, as Josephus witnesses in Jewish War book 2, chapter 7, and Antiquities book 18, chapter 2; concerning Herod the tetrarch and the Jews the same seems to be gathered from Matthew 14:2 and 16:14 and Luke 9:7.

III continued. Among the Greeks Plato and Aristotle held soul-immortality certain and clear §2.3.8

2.3.8Among the Greeks, among the chiefs of philosophers, for Socratic Plato and for Aristotle the immortality of the soul was a certain and clear thing. For even Cicero, however devoted to the Stoics, thinks those who dissent from Plato and Socrates and from that family ought to be called plebeian philosophers (Tusculan Disputations book 1). Plato pursues this matter expressly in the Phaedo, which when read Cleombrotus of Ambracia, as the same Cicero reports from Callimachus's epigram, though nothing adverse had befallen him, threw himself from a wall into the sea — whom Jerome in letter 25 calls a martyr of foolish philosophy. See also, if you please, Plato in the Phaedrus, Timaeus, Philebus, and Republic; and among Platonists above the rest Marsilio Ficino in Platonic Theology, or On the Immortality of the Soul, a far most learned treatise.

Aristotle left contexts not to be despised for the immortality of the soul in the books On the Soul: book 1, contexts 65 and 66 — he says the intellect does not perish, is something divine and impassible; book 2, context 21 — that the intellect is a diverse genus of the soul, and this alone is separated, as eternal from corruptible; book 3, contexts 4, 6, 7, and 19 — he teaches that it, since it understands universals, is neither mixed nor corporeal; likewise separable from the body, though sense cannot be separated. And context 20 he expressly says immortal and eternal. And On the Generation of Animals book 2, chapter 3: It remains that the intellect alone enters from outside and alone is divine. For it has nothing in common by its act with bodily act.

IV. Among the Latins Cicero and Seneca vote for soul-immortality; Tertullian on what nature knows §2.3.9

2.3.9IV. Among the Latins Cicero and Seneca stand for all, who vote for the immortality of the soul. Cicero in On Friendship under the person of Laelius does not assent to those who have begun to argue that souls perish together with bodies, and that all things are destroyed by death. And in Tusculan Disputations book 1 he brings reasons into the middle, as also in On Old Age. But Seneca so often inculcates the immortality of the soul that he seems to have been wholly in it. See Consolation to Marcia chapter 24; to Helvia his mother chapter 11; letters 85 and 102. From which testimonies it is gathered how wisely and rightly Tertullian pronounced in On the Resurrection chapter 3: certain things are known from nature, as the immortality of the soul among many, as our God among all.

V. Heap of reasons after authorities; Ficino and Petrus Gregorius; RATIO I from operations of intellect §2.3.10

2.3.10V. Thus far have been the authorities of the best philosophers: to these can be added not a few reasons by which they were accustomed to establish the immortality of the soul. A heap of reasons after Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero for the immortality of the soul, and a refutation of contrary sophisms, are exhibited especially by Marsilio Ficino in his Platonic Theology, and by Petrus Gregorius of Toulouse in the volume of his Commentary on the Wonderful Art concerning the immortality of the soul. For us these suffice which are sought from its operations and rest, and from the chief inconveniences of the contrary opinion.

REASON I is from the operations of the intellect. For whoever conceives and knows the genera of all things, all grades of natures, even spiritual things such as God and intelligences, and is not, like bodily senses, hurt and weakened by perceiving such excellent objects, but rather is perfected, is reflected upon himself, and understands what and how he knows, abstracts universals from singulars, and those immaterial things have a reason of futures, compares these, and gathers what is of use: he is immortal. But the rational soul by its intellect produces operations of such a kind. Therefore it is immortal.

REASON II from operations of will; REASON III from the soul's ultimate rest §2.3.11

2.3.11II. From the operations of the will. That which by its will is so carried toward every good as the intellect toward every true thing, delights in the beauty of all things, and in admiring the artifice that shines in singulars, and also in just and honest actions and liberal disciplines; is free, and can itself specify its actions and determine to either part of opposites; often also resists its own body, rules its affections, and operates contrary to what they urge: that is immortal. But the rational soul by its will produces such operations. Therefore it is immortal.

III. From its ultimate rest. Whatever nothing non-eternal fills, and for which neither time nor place nor life nor pleasure nor honor nor empire nor finally any good, however great, when apprehended as mortal and something about to fail, neither all these together nor each singly so satisfy that it rests in them: that is eternal and immortal. But the rational soul is such. Therefore it is immortal and eternal.

REASON IV from inconveniences of the contrary; Wisdom 2; VI use of these reasons §2.3.12

2.3.12IV. From the chief inconveniences of the contrary opinion. For if the sentence on the immortality of souls is taken away from human minds, and the contrary persuasion of their destruction is put in its place, there is also taken away and overturned not only all worship of deity and religion, but whatever there is among men of integrity, virtue, justice, and honesty; and from the opposite side is introduced and confirmed the pursuit of the body's delights and pleasures, and a life wholly given to filling carnal desires, and placing the highest good in such enjoyments and delights. For if the soul is of the same nature and condition with flesh or body, why should it pursue anything other than what is pleasing to flesh and body? And if nothing of man remains after the destruction of the flesh, and he lasts only so long as his flesh, why should he not have care of his flesh alone, that by its benefit he may survive as long as possible? Why should he ever discomfort or oppose his flesh? Why look to anything but what is present, and by which the body may be well and kept stuffed and covered?

That these inconveniences necessarily follow the denied immortality of souls has been observed in Wisdom 2, where at verse 1 the wicked first deny and mock it; then, this hypothesis made, they plunge themselves wholly into pleasures (verses 6 and following); third the wise man adds how, that they may have whence to care for their skin and live genially, they spoil and afflict others, and serving their affections define by their power what is lawful and honest (verses 10, 11 and following); fourth the wise man concludes at verse 21 that these have erred in judgment.

VI. THE USE of these reasons is: 1. that we presuppose them in our theology; 2. that we have them ready, so that when need arises we may turn them against those who do not receive the Scriptures.

Chapter 4: On the immortality of the soul from clear testimonies of Scripture §2.4.1

2.4.1CHAPTER FOUR. On the immortality of the soul from clear testimonies of Scripture.

Hitherto there have been authorities and reasons concerning the immortality of the soul: there follow clear testimonies of the Scriptures, by which it is demonstrated to Christians and to all who receive the Scriptures.

II. And those testimonies are of the Old or of the New Testament.

III. In the Old Testament Ecclesiastes 12:7 is most clear; dust and spirit opposed (Augustine) §2.4.2

2.4.2III. In the Old Testament that of Ecclesiastes 12:7 is most clear: the dust (the body produced from dust) will return to the earth as it was (what was made from earth ought to return into earth), but the spirit will return to God who gave it. Here body and spirit or the rational soul are opposed: and as they are of diverse nature and origin, so also they obtain a diverse exit. The body indeed, made from soil and matter, returns or is resolved into that very thing from which it was made — that is, it perishes. But the soul, produced not from any matter but from nothing, when it returns has nowhere to return except to the author who gave it, as Augustine writes in On Genesis Literally book 10.

IV. In the New Testament Christ asserts soul-immortality apart from the body (Matthew 10:28); Lazarus; the penitent thief §2.4.3

2.4.3IV. In the New Testament Christ most clearly asserts the immortality of the soul and a nature diverse from the body (Matthew 10:28): do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul. If the rational soul were mortal and of the same condition with the body, why could it not be killed as the body is killed? So also the Savior's narrative of the rich man and Lazarus clearly shows that by the death of the body all things are not finished (Luke 16:22 and following). So on the cross, about to meet death for the human race, he solemnly affirms to the penitent thief who was about to act out his soul, Today you will be with me in paradise (Luke 23:43) — with the body indeed nowhere but on the cross and in the tomb, but with the soul with Christ in Paradise.

Paul desires to depart and be with Christ; Stephen; souls under the altar §2.4.4

2.4.4So Paul in Philippians 1:23 desires to depart and to be with Christ. So Stephen the first martyr, stoned and now about to die, says, Lord Jesus, receive my Spirit (Acts 7:59). So John in Revelation 6:9 sees under the altar the souls of those who were slain for the word of God.

Chapter 5: On the state of the soul separated from the body; death as judgment on Adam's posterity §2.5.1

2.5.1CHAPTER FIVE. On the state of the soul separated from the body.

Hitherto there has been discussion of the immortality of the soul: there follows its separation from the body, which by the just judgment of God awaits all Adam's posterity — rich as well as poor, those conspicuous for piety as well as the impious and wicked: whence a new state of the soul arises, which is commonly called the state of separation.

For from the time when the first parents, to whom it had been said by God, On whatever day you eat of this fruit, you shall die the death, violated God's commandment, they drew upon themselves not only the necessity of dying, but also upon all their posterity, as the Apostle witnesses (Romans 5:12 and 6:23 and 1 Corinthians 15:22 and 36). With which Wisdom of Solomon 1:13 and 2:24 agree. An example is Luke 16:22.

Hence the Council of Milevis pronounces anathema (canon 1) against the Pelagians who say that a human being goes out from the body not by the desert of sin but by necessity of nature. And the Second Council of Orange (canon 2) strikes with anathema those who deny that the death of the body is the punishment of sin.

The state of freed souls is adumbrated figuratively; II duplex common or proper; III common = departure from the visible world §2.5.2

2.5.2But the state of freed souls Scripture does not so much express to us as adumbrate by the word house taken figuratively. For concerning the state of the future life, as it regards the soul, almost nothing is properly enunciated in the sacred writings. Rightly indeed Irenaeus (book 2, chapter 35) says it is fitting that earthly things be types of those that are heavenly, yet made by the same God. For spiritual images could not otherwise be assimilated. What is this? Heavenly things cannot otherwise be taught except figuratively. Gregory of Nyssa seems to give the reason of this matter: Nor indeed, he says, let anyone describe to me the figure, habit, and form of that dwelling not made by hand, after the likeness of those figures which now appear in us. For since not only is the resurrection preached to us from the sacred letters, but also a change is promised: it is altogether necessary that it be hidden and utterly unknown into what we shall be changed — inasmuch as no example and no likeness of the things hoped for is seen in this life. See Sanford, On the Descent to Hell, book 2, folios 43 and 44.

II. The state of the separated soul is twofold, common or proper.

III. The common state is each soul's departure from this visible world by dissolution from its body.

Hermes on death as mutation; body's death when the soul leaves, soul's when God forsakes §2.5.3

2.5.3So Hermes in the Asclepius (p. 61): Death, he says, is a change, because the body indeed is dissolved, but life goes away into obscurity, so that some part of the world daily becomes invisible. The death of the body is when it is forsaken by the soul; of the soul, when it is forsaken by God. And just as when the soul departs the body does not indeed return into nothing, but loses the whole nature of humanity: so also when God departs the soul does not indeed cease to be, but ceases to be what it was, and is no longer a soul, if one may say truly, but — so to speak — a corpse of a soul.

Nor let anyone wonder that corruption is attributed also to the soul above in chapter 1, scholium on aphorism 7. For besides the privation of every good, which is the greatest corruption, which the souls of the damned suffer: even in the most blessed, until they are consummated with bodies resumed, there is privation, there is defect, and therefore there is corruption — though far distant from that which the souls of the impious experience. Nor indeed in the bodies themselves is the reason of corruption the same. The bodies of the pious are dissolved, but that they may put on a heavenly nature; of the impious, that they may lose what good they had: therefore they first melt away into this our earth, from that again to pass into a spiritual earth of eternal corruption. The same reason holds of souls: the force of privation reigns in all for a time, but the souls of the pious by failing advance, while the natural fall of the impious is terminated in eternal precipice.

IV. Four grades of the common status: divorce, loss of sense, privation of outward acts, defect of consummated glory §2.5.4

2.5.4IV. Of this common status there are four grades: (1) the soul's divorce from its body; (2) the loss of the sensitive part; (3) the privation of outward actions; (4) the defect of consummated glory pending the resumption of the body — which may be called so many of its mutations, plagues, and as it were wounds.

V. First plague: the body torn away; Hadrian's lament; Paul would rather be clothed; Tertullian on inferi §2.5.5

2.5.5V. The first plague is that which separates the body from her, with which she had been associated from birth by the dearest bond of covenant. This unhappy divorce the impious are accustomed not only to lament tearfully — as Hadrian the Roman emperor: Little soul, wandering, charming, guest and companion of the body, where now do you go? Pale, cold, naked, nor will you give jokes as you used to — but the pious also, although they certainly know they will migrate to the Lord, bear it ill, as Paul testifies (2 Corinthians 5:4): We would not be unclothed, but rather that mortality might be swallowed up by life, without any death namely, as will finally befall those who at the Lord's last coming shall be among the living.

Concerning this, and concerning these inferi, Tertullian in On the Flesh of Christ, chapter 4222: Who, he says, will not desire, while he is in the flesh, to put on immortality over it and to continue life, having gained by death through a vicarious change, lest he experience the underworld that will exact even to the last farthing? For the rest, he will attain the change also after the resurrection, having already experienced the inferi.

VI. Second plague: the sensitive part common with brutes is stripped away; Hebrews 4:12; mind, soul, body §2.5.6

2.5.6VI. The second plague of the soul in death is that which snatches from her that part which is common to us with the brutes. That we may understand this privation, some things from others' opinions seem here to be repeated. Paul in Hebrews 4:12 has a division of soul and spirit, from which one may conjecture that the ancients did not altogether foolishly philosophize who constituted three things in the human being — mind, soul, and body — of which they also affirmed the two latter to be mortal.

Nor did Gregory of Nyssa in On the Soul and Resurrection seem to derogate anything from the immortality of the human soul when the irascible and concupiscible parts were said to perish: inasmuch as they are not of the essence of the soul but adventitious from without and as it were placed on the soul's boundary, he shows by these reasons: (1) Whatever is alien from God is also alien from the definition of the soul, which admits nothing except what is proper. (2) Reason fights against these and segregates itself from them as far as it may; but nature does not wage civil war. (3) These have causes from the body, as anger from the heat of blood. Compare Ambrose, On Paradise, chapters 1 and 2. Origen places the same division on Matthew 24:51: He divides him, he says, when his spirit indeed returns to God who gave it, but the soul goes with its body into gehenna. But the just man is not divided, but his soul goes with the spirit to the heavenly kingdoms. To this looks what Jerome writes on Ephesians chapter 5, that he nowhere reads of the death of the spirit, frequently of the soul.

VI continued. Authorities for the division; sensitive part's abolition is the second plague (Prudentius, Plutarch, Antoninus) §2.5.7

2.5.7This division is supported by Irenaeus (book 5, chapter 6), Chrysostom (homily 13 on Romans), Tertullian at the beginning of On the Trinity, and Athenagoras On the Resurrection. If this opinion is true, the solution is easy of all things that are brought from the Scriptures against the immortality of the mind, and the ancients' soul-sleep, well understood, will contain not much absurdity — the sensitive soul, not the rational, passing as it were into the matter of the soul, as bodies are born from bodies. Concerning which matter Prudentius among the ancients thus: Dry soil receives the body; the breeze snatches the moisture of the soul. An oracle in Pausanias says the soul is carried into the ether. So Psellus: the Greeks carry the soul atermon to the sublunary elements; the Chaldeans even above the moon; but Christians even make it die. Plutarch, On the Face in the Moon's Orb (p. 174): The element of souls, he says, is the moon, for they are dissolved into it just as the bodies of the dead return into the earth. But the sun receives the mind, which gave it. Finally Antoninus in his book On His Life (p. 36) had drawn from the Stoics that the human being consists of three things — soul, body, and spirit: whence he says the mind is a part of God and therefore returns into heaven; but concerning body and soul he philosophizes much, which we here forbear to review. Therefore the abolition of the sensible part is the other plague and mutation of each soul departing from its body, nor indeed will this seem light to him who considers this complaint of the crowd in Gregory of Nyssa.

VII. Third plague: outward operations cease; Tatian, Tertullian, Nyssen, Bernard, Durandus §2.5.8

2.5.8VII. The third plague of the soul in death is that by which it extinguishes all its operations, especially those outward. For that the state of the soul severed from the body is imperfect, and that it has no act, has seemed so to many holy men. Tatian by that argument proves that souls do not become demons: how would souls be operative after death? The soul, by its own resources, barely suffices for action, says Tertullian in On the Resurrection chapter 46. For from its own it has only to think, to will, to desire; but for accomplishing, it awaits the service of the flesh. Deeds are administered through the flesh. The soul alone does nothing, says Nyssen in the first oration On the Resurrection. The spirit of a human being without the body can neither itself advance nor profit another, as Bernard authorizes in Song of Songs sermon 5. And again, where the body shall be wanting, there will be no delusion. So Durandus, whom Pico della Mirandola follows. Angels are said to be moved from place to place insofar as they operate successively in diverse places. But the separated soul is not said to have any operation around a place, or around a body existing in a place, because since by its nature it is determined to a certain body, it cannot move nor act upon another except by means of its own body, but it lacks that while it is separated. Therefore the soul cannot be moved from place to place by reason of operation.

VIII. Fourth plague: burning desire for consummated felicity with the resumed body; Bernard; souls under the altar §2.5.9

2.5.9VIII. The last plague of the soul in death is that which implants in her a certain burning — painless yet — desire of felicity to be consummated together with the resumed body. Hence Bernard in the treatise On Loving God: The freed souls, he says, even of the saints are bound to bodies — if not by life or sense, certainly by natural affection — so that without these they neither will nor are able to be consummated. And in sermon 4 on the feast of the saints: There will not be integral beatitude until the whole human being is cared for. Nor indeed is this privation to be lightly estimated. Tertullian seems to acknowledge a certain great punishment in it at the end of On the Soul: In sum, he says, when we understand by that prison which the Gospel demonstrates the inferi, and interpret the last farthing — a little also deferred by the delay of the resurrection — as to be paid there: no one will doubt that the soul pays something among the inferi, the fullness of the resurrection through the flesh also being safe.

And indeed their desire toward bodies is vehement. Therefore in the Apocalypse they are even introduced crying under the altar, concerning which Gregory in the Moral Exposition on Job chapter 1, book 2, chapter 4: What is it to say that souls petition for vengeance, except to desire the last day of judgment and the resurrection of extinguished bodies? For their great cry is a great desire. And Bernard in sermon 3 on Palm Sunday: Those who die in the Lord rest from labor, but they do not meanwhile rest from crying. Finally under the throne of God the souls of the slain cry, because although they have nothing that molests, they do not yet have what delights, until the resurrection follows rest, until Passover follows the sabbath.

IX–X. The separated soul is not extinguished; it does not sleep but remembers and knows its lot after judgment §2.5.10

2.5.10IX. Further, the separated soul is not extinguished, but remains. Irenaeus in Against Heresies book 2, chapter 62, draws this chiefly from Christ's narrative: Most fully, he says, the Lord taught that souls persevere in that narration which is written of the rich man and of Lazarus, who was refreshed in Abraham's bosom. The same Christ confirms (Matthew 22:32; Mark 12:26–27; Matthew 10:28; and Luke 12:4 and 23:43); and Stephen (Acts 7:59); and Paul (Romans 8:10 and 14:8; Philippians 1:23).

X. The separated soul does not sleep, but remembers the things it did in this life, and knows what lot awaits it after judgment, and either rejoices in the thought of its felicity or is tormented by the expectation of terrible punishment. Irenaeus gathers this in the same place: Most fully, he says, the Lord taught not only that souls persevere, but also that they remember the works which they did here and from which they ceased, in that narration which is inscribed of the rich man and Lazarus, in which he says the rich man recognizes Lazarus after death, and Abraham likewise. The same the martyrs confirm (Revelation 6:10) and those who follow the Lamb (Revelation 14:4). Whence also Cyprian in his most elegant sermon On Mortality: A great number of dear ones, he says, awaits us there; a frequent and abundant throng of parents, brothers, children desires us — already secure of their own immortality, and still anxious about our salvation.

XI. Proper status is duplex: joy of heaven for the pious, torment of gehenna for the impious; no third place §2.5.11

2.5.11XI. These things concerning the common status: the proper status of souls, when they have gone out from the age, is likewise twofold — the status of joy or of the kingdom of the heavens, by which the souls of the pious are received, and of torment, into which the souls of the impious are delivered, which in the same sense is called gehenna (Hypognostics book 5). So Christ teaches (Matthew 25:34, 41; Mark 16:16; Luke 16:23; John 3:18). Hence Irenaeus (book 5, chapter 27), making two orders of the dead, says the impious and blasphemers are sent into eternal fire, while to the just and equitable life is given and eternal brightness is put around them. Tertullian also gathers the same in On Idolatry chapter 13: If we rejoice with the age, it is to be feared lest we mourn with the age hereafter. But let us mourn while the age rejoices, and we shall rejoice when the age afterward mourns.

So Lazarus is about to obtain refreshment in Abraham's bosom; on the contrary the rich man, comforted in the torment of fire, compensates alternating turns of evils and goods by rival retribution. Nor besides these two is there a third place and status of the dead, nor otherwise Fulgentius to Venantius On Penitence chapter 7: That we may know, he says, that those who delight in temporal joys and contemn divine commands are to be burned with eternal fires, but those who patiently bear temporal evils with the fear of God will obtain eternal rest: let us attend to the purple-clad rich man and poor Lazarus. Nor is it to be said that these things have place after the resurrection indeed, but not before it. For as Olympiodorus truly says on Ecclesiastes 1:3: In whatever place a human being is found when he dies, in that grade and order he remains forever. And Augustine to Hesychius (letter 80): In what state each one's own last day finds him, in that the last day of the world will seize him. And sermon On Time 232: Let no one deceive himself, brothers. For there are two places, and there is no third. Whoever has not deserved to reign with Christ will perish with the devil without any doubt.

XII–XIII. Joys and torments persist until judgment; no benefit after death; no magical return to earth §2.5.12

2.5.12XII. Neither the joys of the pious nor the torments of the impious are finished: but the status of both remains the same from death until the day of judgment, nor after the soul's exit from the body can humans perceive any benefit by any prudence and study of humans. This from Christ's words in Luke 16:26 Epiphanius gathers (Heresy 59 against the Cathars) and Chrysostom (homily 2 on Lazarus) and the author of Questions and Responses to the Orthodox. So also Cyprian in tract 1 to Demetrianus (folio 32): When departure from here shall have occurred, there is already no place of penitence, no effect of satisfaction. For that reason what Damascene — or whoever else is the writer of the oration concerning those who have departed this life with faith — says, that the soul of Falconilla, although dead without washing and faith, was yet saved by Thecla's prayers: that conflicts with the judgment of the sacred letters and of purer antiquity.

XIII. Nor is return to the lands granted to a soul, from where it has once been carried, by any magical power. Tertullian concludes this from Christ's words already praised, in On the Soul chapter 57: Enough, he says, has the Lord sanctioned in that argument of the resting poor man and the groaning rich man from Abraham's person, that a messenger of the infernal disposition cannot be relegated: which might even then have been permitted, that Moses and the prophets might be believed. But although God's power recalled some into bodies for proofs of his right, it will not therefore be communicated to the faith and boldness of sorceresses, and the deceit of dreams, and the license of poets.

XIV. Received opinion: Old-Testament faithful not received into paradise until Christ opened it; limbus patrum §2.5.13

2.5.13XIV. The positive and received sentence of the ancients down to our Sardian age was that the souls of the faithful of the Old Testament were not received into paradise before Christ by his death had unlocked it and first entered it with the thief. But this is among those questions on account of which the Church ought least to be troubled or split, as Calvin authorizes (Institutes book 4, chapter 1, §12) — especially if there is consensus in this, that the souls of the ancient fathers immediately from their departure obtained beatitude and the beneficent presence of God. Theophilus of Antioch among the ancients (Allegories book 4): In these things also, he says, that he sees Abraham among the infernal, this reason is thought by some to underlie, that all the saints before the advent of the Lord Jesus Christ are said to have descended even to the inferi, though into a place of refreshment.

So John Chrysostom (homily 4 on Mark), Jerome to Heliodorus in the epitaph of Nepotianus, likewise to Paula on the death of Blesilla and on Ecclesiastes chapters 3 and 9, Augustine (City of God book 20, chapter 15, and letter 99 to Evodius), the Council of Toledo under Honorius celebrated in the year 633 (chapter 1): He descended, it says, to the inferi, that he might rescue the saints who were held there — which sentence clearly also assert Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, Gregory of Neocaesarea, Eusebius, Macarius of Jerusalem, Basil, Athanasius, Epiphanius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Ambrose, Rufinus, Synesius, and even among the juniors Zwingli on Hebrews 11:39–40, Calvin in the Psychopannychia, Bullinger on Luke 16:23 and Hebrews 9:8 and 1 Peter 3:19, and Martyr on 2 Kings 2:13.

XV–XIX. After Christ opened paradise souls are received at once; fathers differ in speech on heaven vs inferi; no controversy §2.5.14

2.5.14XV. The fathers who lived before the four-hundredth year of Christ judged that the souls of the faithful, after Christ had opened paradise, are received into paradise immediately from their departure.

XVI. But in the manner of speaking they seem to differ much, because some say they are received at once into heaven, others will have them detained among the inferi even to the last day.

XVII. Although nothing seems more diverse from heaven than the inferi: yet if we weigh those fathers' mind rather than their words, we shall not find among these so great a contradiction as it seems. For under the name of the inferi they do not understand a place of torments, but either the more common (so they call it) status of separated souls, or an invisible place defined by God, which some place below, some within the earth, some outside the world, some even think unknown to humans. See Sanford and Parker, On the Descent to Hell, book 2, sections 44, 45, 53, 54, 55.

XVIII. But in this all agree, that souls in this state they certainly await with joy the blessed resurrection and the consummation of glory

XIX. Nor do we seem about to do rightly if on that account we move controversy against those fathers, or others who thus far agree, as if they were badly catholic. See the most learned Gerhard Vossius On the State of the Separated Soul, question 2, thesis 5; Hugh Sanford and Robert Parker in four most erudite books On the Descent of Our Lord Jesus Christ to Hell, solidly discussing this great question of hell from the ancients.

XX–XXIII. Origen first imported purgatorial fire from Plato; differs from papal thrice §2.5.15

2.5.15XX. But Origen, laying the foundations of the papal purgatory from Plato's dogma, also expressed by Virgil in Aeneid book 6, first imported into the church a fire by which souls after this life would be purged from sins. XXI. Ambrose, Hilary, Jerome, and Rufinus followed Origen in this matter.

XXII. Yet Origen's purgatory differs from the papal in three ways. (1) By reason of persons: because according to the papalists only those are purged by fire whose souls are bound by the guilt of some temporal punishment, or who migrate from this life with some venial sins; but according to Origen and others who preceded Augustine, all mortals except Christ alone will undergo this fire. (2) By reason of time: because the papalists teach souls are to be purged by this fire immediately from departure, those ancients only on the last day of judgment. (3) By reason of mitigation: because the papalists judge that purgatorial punishments can be taken away or mitigated by the offerings and prayers of the living — which sort of thing Origen neither felt nor said, nor those we touch who followed him.

XXIII. Therefore purgatory such as the papalists hand down was unknown before Augustine's times: but to Augustine it seemed doubtful; yet from Gregory's age in the Roman church it has been held certain from lying revelations and visions; but the Greek church does not receive it even today. All these things Gerhard Vossius, a man of infinite reading and doctrine, has most rightly built up in On the State of the Separated Soul. If any things are brought from antiquity to the contrary, they are either from spurious and bastard writings, or they speak of the purgation of this age which is done by the fire of tribulation (as Augustine), or of the purgation of fire which may be done at Christ's second advent. Compare Doctor Johannes Crocius's treatise On Purgatory, and others of our people.

Chapter 6: On the end of this world; heavens pass by free omnipotence, not natural cause §2.6.1

2.6.1CHAPTER SIX. On the end of this world.

From the state of the separated soul there follows the end of this world, by which the heavens (Enchiridion chapter 91) will pass away with a great noise not from a natural cause but from the free determination and omnipotence of their Creator; the elements burning with heat will be dissolved, and the earth and the works that are in it will be burned up.

Names of the end; this world began and will end; against Didymus on three worlds §2.6.2

2.6.2It is called συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, the consummation of this age (Matthew 13:40 and 18:20); τέλος, end (Matthew 24:6, 14); harvest (Matthew 13:39 and Revelation 14:15–16 and Joel 3:13). This world, as it had a beginning, so also will have an end (Revelation 21:1; 2 Peter 3:5, 6, 7, 8, 12).

Nor is Didymus to be approved here, in his exposition on the canonical epistles, observing that mention is made here of a threefold world — of the ancient or past (verse 6), of the present (verse 7), and of the future after this one (verse 13) — which things he thinks were sprinkled into this epistle by heretics dreaming of several creations and periods of worlds. But this conjecture deceived him. For that Peter says the world perished by the flood sufficiently indicates that he is not speaking of three worlds diverse in essence, as the followers of Origen thought, but only pointing out that just as this world once began and was corrupted by water, so the same will sometime perish by fire.

Christians confess the end; Porphyry mocks; against Plato, Xenophanes, Aristotle, Averroes on eternity §2.6.3

2.6.3And indeed this dogma has always been among the things confessed among Christians, whom therefore Porphyry mocks, as Augustine witnesses (City of God book 20, chapter 24), following Plato, who in the Timaeus hands down that the world began but will not perish. Others also withdrew further, as Xenophanes, who thought the world neither began nor will cease, as Plutarch is author in On the Opinions of the Philosophers book 2, chapter 4, and that long before Plato. For Xenophanes lived around the sixtieth Olympiad, that is, in the times of Cyrus and Tarquinius Superbus. Aristotle with great effort defends this sentence of Xenophanes (Physics book 8 and On the Heavens). Averroes defends Aristotle tooth and nail in his first disputation On the Eternity of the World, where he answers Algazel's solutions.

Fire is proper, not mere metaphor for wrath vs Puccius; Augustine on conflagration; Magius; starry heaven disputed §2.6.4

2.6.4But fire is thought to be taken by metaphor for divine wrath and judgment by Franciscus Puccius of Filidino, as Nicolaus Serarius the Mainz Jesuit notes (book 1 against Puccius, chapter 2, and book 2, chapter 2): yet that it is taken properly is argued by this, that it is said that as it formerly perished by water, so on that day it will perish by fire. Hence Augustine (City of God book 20, chapter 16): Then, he says, the figure of this world will pass away by the conflagration of worldly fires, just as it was done by the inundation of worldly waters in the flood.

But what that fire will be and whence it will come, Hieronymus Magius disputes in On the Burning of the World book 3: yet we love Augustine's modesty, who in the place praised judges that no one, so far as he himself knows, has known these things. But here it is controverted whether the starry heaven also is to be purged by fire. The most ancient fathers affirm it. Augustine denies it, and with him the juniors. We hold the ancients' sentence, resting on the sayings of Scripture by which we have already proved that this world will perish, to be preferable to the other.

Augustine's doubt on the heavens; Greeks and Latins before him affirm corruption of the heavens §2.6.5

2.6.5Augustine dissents (City of God book 20, chapter 24), and speaking doubtfully on Psalm 101: There are, he says, three heavens of heavens superior in the firmament. But whether they themselves also will perish by fire, or only those heavens which also perished in the flood, is a somewhat more scrupulous debate among the learned; nor can it easily be explained, especially in the narrowness of time. But how many now follow Augustine's sentence, Sixtus of Siena shows (Sacred Library book 6, annotation 246) and Feuardentius on Irenaeus book 4, chapter 6.

Against whom you will set the fathers, both all the Greeks and the Latins who wrote before Augustine — namely Justin Martyr, or whoever else, in the Confutation of Aristotle's Dogmas book 2 On the Heavens denying that the heavens can be corrupted; Irenaeus book 4, chapter 6; Ambrose Hexaemeron book 1, chapter 6; and among juniors also Augustinus Eugubinus on 2 Peter 3; and Hieronymus Magius On the Burning of the World book 2, chapters 6 and 7.

II. Whether the world perishes as to substance or only qualities is uncertain; commoner opinion: renovation §2.6.6

2.6.6II. Whether this world will truly perish as to substance, or only as to its qualities, is uncertain. The more common sentence is that the world will not simply perish but is to be renewed, and Paul strongly urges this (Romans 8:19, 20, 21, 22), and because new heavens and a new earth are often mentioned in the Scriptures.

The ancients, whose sentences Gerhard Vossius, a man of diffuse learning — whose works we cite here gathers as it were in a medley (disputation On the End of the World, thesis 3, page 280), all thought that this world will not utterly perish but is to be renewed: as Irenaeus, Andrew of Caesarea, Probus in Epiphanius, Eusebius, Philastrius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria, Theodoret, Aeneas of Gaza, Elias of Crete on Gregory of Nazianzus's tenth oration, Basil the emperor Constantine, Oecumenius, Euthymius. From the Latins: Hilary, Jerome, Quintus Julius Hilarianus, Augustine, Julian of Toledo, Bede, Alcuin, Ambrosius Ansbertus, Olympiodorus, Haymo, Anselm or Hervaeus Brito, Peter Lombard, Otto of Freising, Hugh Etherianus, Hildegard, Vincent of Beauvais, Nicholas of Lyra, Ludolph the Saxon Carthusian, and others.

Juniors who hold substance-perishing; Chassanis; we prefer renovation yet dare not harshly reject §2.6.7

2.6.7Certain of the juniors dissent from all these, namely Johannes Chassanis, a French theologian (Common Places book 3, chapter 22). Revelation 20:11 and 21:1 seem to favor his sentence, where it is expressly said that the sea will be no more; also Psalm 102:26; Luke 21:33; Job 14:12; Psalm 72:7. For this reason we dare not reject harshly the sentence of those who judge that the world will perish according to substance — especially since nothing about it was defined of old by any synod, and certain truly outstanding men dissent about it. Meanwhile we more approve the former sentence.

III. The precise time of the conflagration is unknown; always prepare by watching, prayer, repentance §2.6.8

2.6.8III. Nor is it more certain to humans when this world's conflagration will definitely and precisely be future, so that, security shaken off, they may always prepare themselves for it by watching, praying, and performing the exercises of repentance.

For wisely Augustine (City of God book 18, chapter 53): It is altogether importune, he says, that that be asked. And he adds: If it were profitable for us to know this, by whom better than by God's own Master would it be said to the asking disciples? For they were not silent about it before him, but asked of him present, saying, Lord, will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel? But he: It is not yours, he says, to know the times which the Father has put in his own power (Acts 1:6–7). They had certainly not asked about day or hour or year, but about the time, when they received that answer. So also Anastasius of Sinai (Hexaemeron book 7): The true exit and end of the age, he says, only the creator of times and of all things knows. And Vincent of Beauvais (Natural Mirror book 32, chapter 102): How much time remains until the end of the age, it is certain that no mortal knows, unless perhaps the Lord has revealed it to someone by special grace. For he who says It is not yours to know commands the fingers of all who calculate about this matter to rest.

Against mathematicians' great year and the rabbinic six-thousand-year scheme ascribed to Elijah §2.6.9

2.6.9Therefore certain mathematicians and philosophers are in vain who say that it will be in the great year, within which the sun, moon, and all the stars return to the same place of heaven whence they set out; on which see Censorinus On the Birthday chapter 18. The opinion of the Jews and of certain fathers also seems propped on uncertain conjectures — that the world will last six thousand years: two before the law, two under the law, two after the law under the Messiah. That this was said by Elijah the Tishbite has been believed not only by Jews but by many of the Christians, as by Stratonicus bishop of Cumae, as Sixtus of Siena proves from his collectanea (Sacred Library book 2, under Elias), who himself also seems to have been of that sentence, and also Ludovicus Vives (City of God book 20, chapter 7).

We confess indeed that it is Elijah's — but not the Tishbite's, but a Cabbalist Rabbi's, whose comment, as Genebrard observes at the start of his Chronography, is read in the Talmud, in the treatise Sanhedrin and in the treatise On Idolatry and in the treatise On the Sabbath.

Rabbi Isaac's four reasons for six millennia; juniors' additions from Genesis 6, Moses, Jericho, Esdras, Apocalypse §2.6.10

2.6.10The reasons by which the Rabbis defend the truth of this saying, Rabbi Isaac on Genesis chapter 1 offers four. (1) Because the first verse of Genesis contains א six times, by which a thousand is denoted. (2) Because God made heaven and earth in six days and rested on the seventh; but a thousand years before God are as one day. (3) Because God, both in days and in years, indicates by the sixfold the time of labor and by the sevenfold the time of rest. For he commanded us to work six days and on the seventh to rest from all work: he also granted a six-year period to agriculture, but in the seventh year enjoined rest both on the field and on the cultivator. (4) Because the six first makers of the human race died — namely Adam, Seth, Enos, Cainan, Mahalalel, Jared — but Enoch, who is the seventh, happily translated into a place known to God, still lives.

To which reasons some of the juniors add: (5) Because when the human race was corrupted God said (Genesis 6:3), My spirit will not remain in man forever, for he is flesh: and his days will be one hundred twenty years — where first they understand the time of repentance granted before the flood, which was 120; if you take it fifty times, the number of six thousand results. (6) They also gather the same from Moses' age. For he lived 120 years (Deuteronomy 34:7): forty years in Pharaoh's court (Acts 7:23), forty in exile with Jethro (Exodus 2:15 and 3:1), by which two thousand years under the law are adumbrated; likewise he ruled the Israelite people forty years in the desert (Exodus 16:35), by which two thousand years under Messiah's empire are signified. (7) To these they add that Noah's ark rested in the seventh month (Genesis 8:4); that Moses was in the cloud six days and on the seventh was called by the Lord (Exodus 24:16); that when the Israelites had gone around Jericho six days, on the seventh day its walls fell (Joshua 6:16); likewise that the angel foretold to Esdras (4 Esdras 7:30) that the age would be of seven days; further that seven trumpets (Revelation 8:2) and seven bowls (Revelation 16:1) are commemorated, and certain other things of the same kind. Therefore what Christ said to the Apostles present, let us think said also to us: It is not yours to know the times which the Father has put in his own power (Acts 1:7).

IV. Scripture reveals the last day as not far; signs of Christ's approach — Jews' conversion, gospel preaching §2.6.11

2.6.11IV. But God has revealed in Scripture an indefinite time of the last day, and various things signify that it is not so very remote from this our age. Some declare simply that Christ's advent is approaching; others are immediately joined with Christ's advent. Of the former mark are: (1) the conversion of the Jews predicted (Romans 11:25; Revelation 3:9 and 7:4–8) — see Finus Hadrianus in The Scourge of the Jews book 7, chapter 20; (2) the preaching of the Gospel through the whole world, as Augustine wills (letters 78 and 80 to Hesychius), Jerome on Matthew chapter 24, Origen tractate 28 on Matthew, Prosper's reply to the fourth chapter of the Gauls, Ambrose on Luke book 10, the author of the Incomplete Work homily 48 on Matthew, Damascene On the Orthodox Faith book 4, chapter 27. From the more recent: Lyra, Cajetan, Maldonatus on Matthew 24, Bellarmine On the Roman Pontiff book 3, chapter 4, Suarez disputation 50, tome 2.

Signs in sun, earth, and sea; Jewish fifteen signs; disputed sign of the cross; sign of the Son of Man §2.6.12

2.6.12Of the latter mark are things in the world, in which both heaven is beheld and the globe of earth and sea (Luke 21:25–26). On the Scriptures and Ecclesiastical Dogmas book 3, tractate 3, folio 159. The Jews hand down fifteen signs which will precede the last day by fifteen days, which Thomas recounts from Jerome (Sentences book 4, distinction 48, question 1, article 4). But that they assign to each sign its own day is Rabbinic.

Hither they also refer that the sign of the cross will appear in heaven, and they gather that from Matthew 24:30. Remaclus de Vaulx in Divine Harpocrates or On the Consummation of the World part 2: By this sign, he says, both Greeks and Latins with consenting minds assert that Christ's cross is signified. And Lucas Pinellus On the Other Life book 2, chapter 20: By this sign of the Son of Man, he says, all interpreters, both Greek and Latin, affirm that the cross is signified. Whom Maldonatus refutes on Matthew chapter 24. It seems simpler if the sign of the Son of Man is understood as the Son of Man himself coming in a cloud (Luke 21:27), whose sight will be the most certain sign of the world's end. By a similar phrase the sign of circumcision is taken for circumcision itself (Romans 4:11). See the ocean of antiquity and learning, Gerhard Johann Vossius, disputation On the Advent of Christ, theses 5–9.

V. Since the world and its goods will soon perish, cling not; Christian wisdom dismisses the world §2.6.13

2.6.13V. Since this world with all its goods will soon perish and cannot grant perpetual quiet and tranquillity to our mind, it is extreme madness and misery so to cling to it that by love of it you lose the true good; but it belongs to Christian wisdom and felicity in this life to send a farewell to the world and its goods, so that after this life you may enjoy the eternal good. Hither looks Paul's warning (1 Corinthians 7:29, 30, 31) and David's (Psalm 49:4, 7, 12, 13, 15, 20, 21).

Chapter 7: On the resurrection of the flesh; new inseparable reunion of souls with bodies at the last day §2.7.1

2.7.1CHAPTER SEVEN. On the resurrection of the flesh.

The disputation concerning the end of this world having been settled: there follows the resurrection of the flesh, which is a new, inseparable, and definitive union of souls — as many as have departed from their bodies by death — with those same bodies, future on the last day of this age, by the power and command of God, so that each one may be presented before the tribunal of Christ the judge to God and may carry away, correspondingly to what he has done, either everlasting good or everlasting evil.

Scripture leads further than reason; the immortal soul reunited; article of faith in the Creed §2.7.2

2.7.2For Sacred Scripture leads us further than where the light of reason can. For it teaches that this immortal soul will sometime again be joined to its body, and that the body itself also will be partaker of immortality: which is nothing other than the resurrection of the flesh, or of that very body from which the soul formerly departed, which has been consumed by worms, or reduced to ashes, or corrupted by any other chance and mode — which we Christians profess to believe as an article of our faith in the Apostles' Creed and in the other catholic symbols.

II–III. New inseparable union; vestiges of resurrection among Gentiles — Ariovistus, Americans, Peruvians §2.7.3

2.7.3II. I call the union new, because the soul, which formerly when a human is generated had been united to the body and separated from it by death, is now again united.it inseparable, because it will never again be separated but will remain united forever — whereas concerning those who were raised by Christ, the prophets, and the Apostles, a new union indeed was made, but one which was again dissolved by death.

III. But it can be asked, since the article of Christian faith concerning the resurrection of the flesh is said purely and properly, whence it is that certain vestiges of it are also observed in the minds and opinions of the nations? For Ariovistus and the Germans in Appian On the Gallic Wars are said to be despisers of death because of hope of recovering life. Indeed some also report concerning the American barbarians that they had some sense of resurrection. For the Spaniards, who that they might possess the riches customarily buried with funerals — as we said above — disturbed bones with opened tombs, were asked by the Peruvians not to do what might perhaps hinder the resurrection.

Acosta contradicts; if barbarians knew resurrection it was by tradition; Seneca, Phocylides, Plato §2.7.4

2.7.4Yet these authors contradict Joseph Acosta, praised by us above. But if anything concerning resurrection was believed by the barbarians, it must be established that it was passed down to them through tradition, as though from their ancestors, just as the opinion concerning the flood, which was not itself utterly unknown. See the notes on Benzoni book 1, chapter 10. And indeed if we refer knowledge of such mysteries to nothing other than the traditions of the ancestors, it is certainly less wonderful that Seneca in letter 36 alludes to resurrection. And what would be said by a Christian concerning resurrection more expressly and rightly than what is transcribed under Phocylides' name? Which poem Joseph Scaliger in the Eusebian Animadversions number 1480 judged not to be of that most ancient Phocylides, but of some Alexandrian Hellenist, or — what he thinks nearer the truth — of some Christian. Eusebius also (Preparation for the Gospel book 11, chapter 11) tries to persuade that the resurrection of the dead was known to Plato: but it is more probable that he alluded not so much to the resurrection believed by us as to the παλιγγενεσία and ἀποκατάστασις such as the Platonists invent when the great year is completed.

IV. Democritus and like stammerings from corrupt tradition, not from natural principles §2.7.5

2.7.5IV. For the rest, whatever Democritus — whom Pliny mocks (Natural History book 7, chapter 55) — or others of the same flour stammered concerning resurrection, they could have received that whole only by hearsay, either from tradition, which yet for the most part they either received corrupt from their teachers or themselves corrupted: but from reason or from principles which all would admit as known apart from revelation they could not draw it. For there is none of those from which it is permitted to prove that the resurrection of bodies will sometime be future.

Chapter 8: Some who acknowledge Scripture wrongly deny the resurrection of the flesh; better assert it §2.8.1

2.8.1CHAPTER EIGHT. It is demonstrated that the resurrection of the flesh is denied by some to whom the authority of Scripture is established.

The resurrection of the flesh is wrongly denied by some who acknowledge the authority of Sacred Scripture, but is firmly asserted by others and better ones.

II. It is denied either by the ancients or by certain more recent ones.

III. By the ancients, as by the Sadducees, Hymenaeus, Philetus, and the like.

I. Sadducees; Hymenaeus and Philetus — spiritual-only or succession-by-procreation readings §2.8.2

2.8.2I. Concerning the Sadducees it is established from the Gospel history and the Acts of the Apostles. Hymenaeus and Philetus said that the resurrection had already happened (2 Timothy 2:18), because they judged that no other than a spiritual one — which is from sins through regeneration — is promised, as Haymo and Lyra explain, or because they placed the resurrection in succession through the procreation of children, as Theodoret hands down concerning them, and Augustine concerning the disciples of Severus and Hermias (Heresy 89 to Quodvultdeus).

II–IV. Other ancient deniers — Carpocrates, Valentinians, Gnostics; Tertullian on partiarii of the Sadducees §2.8.3

2.8.3II. Besides these Augustine also teaches that Carpocrates denied the resurrection (Heresy 7); a certain Marcus (Heresy 14); the Cainites (Heresy 21); the Severians (Heresy 24); the Hieracites (Heresy 47); the Seleucians and Proclianites (Heresies 59 and 60).

III. Irenaeus also, writing against the Valentinians or Gnostics (book 5, chapter 4 and following), says that they excluded the salvation of the flesh, denied it, despised its regeneration, saying that it is not capable of incorruptibility and of God's gift, which is eternal life.

IV. Tertullian likewise in On Prescriptions chapter 15 teaches that the resurrection was denied by that whole Gnostic bilge: Paul, he says, notes deniers and doubters of the resurrection. This opinion is proper to the Sadducees: Marcion and Apelles and Valentinus usurp part of it. But why he says part, he gives the reason in chapter 16 — namely that the Sadducees admit salvation neither of soul nor of flesh, namely immortality and restoration: but these who brandished the name of Christians conceded it indeed to the soul, but by no means to the flesh. Whence also Tertullian in chapter 20 called them partiarii of the Sadducees' sentence.

Early heretics from Simon Magus onward; Philoponus; V. nearly all prior-century heretics denied flesh-resurrection §2.8.4

2.8.4Toward the end of On Prescriptions he indicates that in the first ages heretics attacked this article of our faith — namely Saturninus, Basilides, the Ophites, Carpocrates, Cerinthus, Valentinus, Ptolemy, Secundus, Marcus, and Colarbasus, Cerdo and his disciple Marcion of Pontus, Lucian, Apelles. Concerning each see Epiphanius bishop of Cyprus, who teaches that from Simon Magus, parent and leader of the heretics in the New Testament Church, the resurrection was denied, and that the sects born from him persisted in this error. Add to him Theodoret (Heretical Fables book 1). Johannes Philoponus the Grammarian wrote a book On the Resurrection in which he takes away the resurrection of bodies and speaks many things inconsiderately, even mocking the holy fathers, as Photius notes.

V. In sum, if we unroll ecclesiastical history and the authors who wrote on heresies by design, it is plain that nearly all the heretics of the prior ages denied the resurrection of the flesh.

IV recent. Fewer openly deny; Amalric of Paris; Pope John XXIII; Libertines per Calvin §2.8.5

2.8.5IV. From the more recent who profess Christ's name, not indeed so many proceed to that temerity and profanity that they openly deny the resurrection of the flesh: yet there are not lacking those who are not ashamed to call back from hell the ancient heresies interpolated and crusted over even in this part of doctrine. Under the emperor, son of Ahenobarbus, Amalric the Paris doctor, having embraced this error among others, was burned at Paris with companions and followers. Pope John XXIII denied the resurrection of the flesh just as he denied the immortality of the soul.

Concerning the Libertines arisen in our fathers' memory, having many things in common with Cerdo, Valentinus, and Marcion, the great John Calvin (Instruction chapter 3): Whatever, he says, Christians hold concerning eternal life, concerning the resurrection, is a fable to them. For they imagine this — that the human soul, which is God, returns to itself when death has come, not so that it may live as a human soul but as God himself. And chapter 22: They laugh, he says, at every hope which we have concerning the resurrection, and say that what we still await has already happened to us.

Libertine spiritualizing; Photinians, Weigelians, Rosicrucians, Paracelsian chemists recook Valentinus §2.8.6

2.8.6If it be asked how they understand that, they say namely that a human may know that his soul is an immortal spirit perpetually living in the heavens; and that Christ by his death abolished the false opinion, and by that reason restored to us the life which is in him, so that we may know that we by no means die. But also the Photinians, Weigelians, and Rosicrucians of our time and like fanatics recook this error of Valentinus, and above the rest the more superstitious chemists, going on foot into Theophrastus Paracelsus's opinions and certain trifles, deceived by a certain analogy of their art, dare to evoke from three as it were worlds — namely elemental, angelic, and divine — threefold bodies, nay even souls and spirits: against whom the catholic faith is to be opposed courteously from the perfume-boxes of the sacred letters, as the midday sun by which the dusky and dark dawn of their wisdom is scattered with temples and open doors of hearts.

Feuardentius insults Farel; Farel meant humanly impossible, not simply impossible; Rivetus on the letter §2.8.7

2.8.7But Franciscus Feuardentius shamelessly insults Farel on Irenaeus book 5, chapter 2, and writes that he goes off into the camps of the Simonians and Marcionites, because the resurrection of the flesh seems to him among the ἀδύνατα, among those things which cannot happen. For Farel well knew that things impossible with humans are possible with God (Luke 18:27), for whom no word will be impossible (Luke 1:37): but he wished only to indicate that by human judgment it seems impossible — inasmuch as he proves by a letter written to Calvin with most dense and solid arguments that not simply the resurrection of a body, but of this flesh with which we are now clothed, ought to be believed by us, as the most learned Vossius teaches in his thesis On the Resurrection. But the most clear Rivetus (Synopsis of Purer Theology, disputation 51, thesis 27) observes that it is Calvin's letter to Laelius Socinus, which was falsely titled Farel to Calvin, on account of which Feuardentius insults Calvin.

Chapter 9: The resurrection of the dead is proved possible from natural principles; five heads follow §2.9.1

2.9.1CHAPTER NINE. The resurrection of the dead is proved to be possible from natural principles.

These things concerning those who wrongly denied the resurrection of the flesh: there follow the better ones, who rightly and firmly assert (1) that it is possible, (2) that it is certainly future, (3) its causes, (4) its mode, (5) its necessary consequence.

II. Future resurrection not demonstrable by nature's light; possibility and fittingness can be proved (Scotus) §2.9.2

2.9.2II. For although that the resurrection of the flesh will be future cannot be demonstrated by the light of nature: yet that it is possible and fitting can be proved. Theologians in the schools defend this aphorism. John Scotus not badly in Sentences book 4, distinction 43, question 2: Neither a priori, he says, by an intrinsic principle within the human, nor a posteriori by reason of some operation or perfection congruent to the human, can resurrection be proved as necessary by leaning on the light of nature. Therefore this is not held as altogether certain except by faith. And afterward: From these things it appears how great is the grace and liberality of the Creator's heart, who through faith has made us most certain in those things which pertain to our end and everlasting perpetuity.

He brings to this sense that of Augustine (On the Trinity book 13, chapter 9): Those attempting to find these things by human argumentations — scarcely a few endowed with great genius, abounding in leisure, and trained in the most subtle doctrines — have been able to arrive at investigating the immortality of the soul alone. But that faith promises that the whole human will be immortal, who certainly consists of soul and body, and on that account truly blessed, not by human argumentation but by divine authority.

Aphorism's two members; prior reason is God's free will; posterior reasons ad hominem or ad rem §2.9.3

2.9.3But of this aphorism there are two members: one by which it is denied that the resurrection can be demonstrated as necessarily future from the light of nature; the other by which it is affirmed that it can be proved from that light to be possible and truly fitting. The reason of the former is that both resuscitation and glorification hang on God's free will, which cannot otherwise be known or demonstrated except from revelation, which, made by him likewise freely and kindly, opens to us so great a mystery looking toward beatitude and our last end. But the reasons of the latter are brought either to the person or to the thing.

Ad hominem: fathers press pagans with their own revivification stories — Theophilus, Aeneas, Pliny §2.9.4

2.9.4The fathers argue for the resurrection of the flesh when they confront pagans, using examples—though some might call them fables—of revived figures. Of Antioch (To Autolycus book 1): You believe, he says, that Hercules, whom the flame consumed, lives; and that Aesculapius struck by lightning was restored to life: what madness is it to refuse to give faith to those things which God speaks?

So Aeneas of Gaza, a Platonic Christian philosopher flourishing in the fifth century after Christ under the emperors Zeno and Anastasius, in his Dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul and the Resurrection of Bodies, which he titled Theophrastus, under Theophrastus's person: Do you think, he says, that this earthly body is to be resuscitated? But that would be like a miracle, seeing that it has flowed apart and been dispersed. And one part indeed has been filed by fishes, another torn by birds; and those animals in turn have been caught and consumed by others, so that not even any vestige of the human body remains. And he answers under Axitheus's person. Pliny also recounts some who revived after being carried out (Natural History book 7, chapter 52). These are arguments to the person, which press no one other than him who believes such things.

RATIO I. From the soul's natural union with the body; immortality seems to demand reunion (Thomas) §2.9.5

2.9.5REASON I. It is from natural desire and inclination. For the soul is naturally united to the body. For according to its essence it is the form of the body. Therefore it is against the soul's nature to be without a body. But nothing that is against nature can be perpetual. Therefore the soul will not perpetually be without a body. Since therefore it remains perpetually, it must be joined again to the body, which is to rise. Therefore the immortality of souls seems to demand that the resurrection of bodies will be future.

II. From natural desire for felicity; incomplete happiness without the body (Thomas) §2.9.6

2.9.6II. From the human's natural desire by which he tends toward felicity. Next, Thomas says, it has been shown that the human's natural desire tends toward felicity. But last felicity is the perfection of the happy one. Therefore to whomsoever something is lacking toward perfection, he does not yet have perfect felicity, because his desire is not yet totally quieted. For every imperfect thing naturally appetites to obtain perfection. But the soul separated from the body retains a natural desire toward union with the body; therefore it is not yet perfectly blessed without the body.

Gentile reply on desire; III. From divine justice — reward and punishment for soul and body (Thomas, Tertullian) §2.9.7

2.9.7Therefore the Gentiles can reply that if any desire toward union is in the soul, it is sufficiently filled by that union which it once obtained, and that the soul does not receive some perfection from the body but rather communicates to the body: but by separation it has already drawn closer to the highest order of beings, and so is more like the intelligences and God.

III. From divine justice. Third, Thomas says, from divine providence punishment is owed to those sinning, and reward to those acting well. But in this life humans composed of soul and body sin. Therefore reward or punishment is owed to the human both according to soul and according to body. And truly this reason is the strongest of all in this kind, which the ancient doctors everywhere and vehemently urge, especially Tertullian.

IV–V. Actions and passions are of the whole person; reason persuades but does not compel §2.9.8

2.9.8IV. From a principle conceded by all — namely, as actions are of the subjects, so also passions, and so also rewards and punishments: but now it is certain that the soul alone is not the human. Yet if what is the case must be confessed, this reason persuades, yet does not compel and prove. For since the soul is the principal cause of action, but the body the instrument, it cannot be proved that justice does not stand consistent with itself if the principal cause is affected with reward or punishment, the instrument meanwhile left aside — especially if the matter has come to that.

Nature and art types of reunion: Nyssen's quicksilver; potter, glass, chemistry §2.9.9

2.9.9But to the thing: concerning which Gregory of Nyssa, who wrote three most learned orations on Christ's resurrection, in the book which the ancients called On Structure, On the Making of Man chapters 25, 26, and 27, teaches that the soul by affection and love from a singular nature pursues the body in whose quasi-companionship it was, and by an ineffable pull of nature is carried to its conjunction; and he declares that by the example of quicksilver.

But the types of art are various. The first is of the potter's art, which Gregory of Nyssa uses in his third oration On the Resurrection. For just as the potter forms a vessel from clay and dries it in the sun, but if by chance it is broken and reduced to clay he reshapes and restores it: so also God our bodies. The second is the golden Achilles who formerly had been bronze. The third is of the glassmaker's art: for from sand and nitre transparent glass is made, and there are also glasses from ashes. The fourth finally is of chemical art: if a lye prepared from the ashes of nettles is exposed to cold, in that ice the nettles offer themselves to be seen. Hitherto we have seen that the resurrection of the flesh is possible.

Chapter 10: The resurrection of the flesh is demonstrated certainly future from the Old Testament §2.10.1

2.10.1CHAPTER TEN. The resurrection of the flesh is demonstrated to be certainly future from the Old Testament.

So far we have seen that the resurrection of the flesh is possible: now we shall demonstrate from the Scriptures and from orthodox antiquity that it is certainly future.

Answer to Sadducees with Matt. 22:29; demonstration from both Testaments §2.10.2

2.10.2Those who are nearer to the Sadducees, and the Christian Sadducees — as Tertullian calls the deniers of the resurrection, both On the Flesh of Christ ch. 1 and On the Resurrection ch. 36 — we answer not undeservedly with Christ, Matt. 22:29: You err, not knowing the Scriptures, by which God has foretold and promised the resurrection; nor the power of God, by which things are done that otherwise could be done by no power of nature, and on which the resurrection of the flesh depends.

II. And this is to be demonstrated both from the Old and from the New Testament.

III–IV. OT obscurely by just interpretation: Sadducees' marriage reductio; Abraham–Isaac–Jacob §2.10.3

2.10.3III. From the Old Testament it is demonstrated either more obscurely, by just interpretation, or more clearly, by evident diction.

IV. More obscurely by just interpretation it is demonstrated when a firm consequence is drawn from a saying of the Old Testament. Luke 20:27: the Sadducees tried to defend their opinion against Christ and to overthrow the resurrection he asserted with an argument to absurdity: If there is a resurrection of the dead, a great confusion of marriages will arise, so that seven will be husbands of one woman. But the consequent is absurd and against the law of nature. Therefore so is the antecedent. They prove the consequence from Moses' law, Deut. 25:5. But Christ answers (1) by denying that consequence, because in the resurrection marriages cease (Luke 20:34 more fully); (2) by opposing a new argument: Concerning the resurrection, Have you not read what was said to you by God: I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob?

How Abraham–Isaac–Jacob proves resurrection; why Christ argued from Moses §2.10.4

2.10.4It is asked whether and how these words prove the resurrection. Those whose God is God, they live. But God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Therefore Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob live. The major: there is a true and real relationship between God and them; if a true relation, there must be a true foundation on both sides. Therefore they cannot be utterly nothing, but truly exist in some way — certainly according to the soul if not according to the body. It would be the same if, proving the resurrection against the Sadducees, he proves the soul's immortality, because by proving this he proves that indirectly.

Secondly the sense is: they are not wholly withdrawn from the divine power, but so subject to it that they can be recalled to life at his good pleasure; Luke 20:38 hints this.

Why did Christ wish to prove by consequence when clear OT testimonies occur? Origen and Jerome note that the Sadducees received Moses alone. More rightly: since the Sadducees attacked the resurrection from Moses, Christ wished to confirm it from the same and to beat back their arrogance.

V–VI. Evident OT diction: clear documents — Daniel 12 and Job 19 §2.10.5

2.10.5V. The evident diction of the Old Testament concerning the resurrection of the flesh exhibits partly clear documents, partly splendid and living specimens.

VI. Clear documents are testimonies which no sane person can deny. Here belongs (1) Dan. 12:2, Many of those who sleep, &c. For this reason Chrysostom in Homily 1 on Lazarus was too much hallucinating when he thought the secret dogma of the resurrection unknown to OT men. (2) Job 19:25: For I know that my Redeemer lives, and that he shall at last stand upon the dust, and from my flesh I shall see God. Rightly Jerome, Epistle 61: What is clearer than this prophecy? No one speaks so openly after Christ as this one before Christ concerning the resurrection.

VI continued: Isaiah 26, Ezekiel 37, Hosea — Hebrew context and fathers §2.10.6

2.10.6(3) Isa. 26:19, Your dead shall live, &c. Cyril of Alexandria and Jerome understand this of the resurrection of the flesh, and older than these Irenaeus 5.14 and Tertullian ch. 31. The Hebrew context shows the prophet speaking of restoration for the Jewish people after calamities; yet this promise is foreshadowed by the raising of the dead.

(4) Ezek. 37, the dry bones: Tertullian On the Resurrection ch. 30 — A figure could not be composed of bones if that very thing were not going to happen to bones. Theodoret: a figure not only of recalling the Jews but of the resurrection of all men. We omit Hosea 6:2 (alluding to Christ's resurrection) and Hosea 13:14 (which the Apostle refers to the resurrection at 1 Corinthians 15:55).

VII. Living OT specimens; Sadducee origin from Antigonus §2.10.7

2.10.7VII. The splendid and living specimens by which in the OT the resurrection of the dead is established are God's wondrous works recalling some from death to life: the widow of Sarepta's son by Elijah, the Shunammite's son by Elisha, and the man who revived at Elisha's bones — 1 Kings 17:22; 2 Kings 4:35 and 13:21.

One wonders that the Sadducees so obstinately denied it. The occasion of erring was taken by Sadoc from Antigonus of Socho's words: Be not like servants who serve the Lord to receive a portion; he commanded not so much by hope of reward as from love. Twisting that sentence worse, they inferred no reward of good deeds, no hope of another life — to which Paul alluded in Acts 23:6.

Chapter 11: The same is demonstrated certainly future from the New Testament §2.11.1

2.11.1CHAPTER ELEVEN. That the same is certainly future is demonstrated from the New Testament.

We have seen that in the Old Testament the resurrection of the flesh as certainly future is clearly enough foreshadowed, preached, and promised: now we shall see it taught in the New Testament so clearly as if written by a sunbeam.

II–III. Partly asserted, partly proved; asserted by divine authority §2.11.2

2.11.2II. And there it is partly asserted, partly proved.

III. It is asserted by testimonies of divine authority. The bare assertion of it in the NT suffices for all Christians, because its authority is divine and deservedly received by Christians. It is plainly brought forward at John 5:28; 6:39–40; 11:24; Luke 14:14; Acts 17:18 and 23:6 and 24:15; Phil. 3:21; 1 Thess. 4:14; 1 Tim. 4.

IV. Proved by solid reasons — Ratio I from Christ's resurrection and our union with him §2.11.3

2.11.3IV. It is proved by most solid reasons. Although the bare Apostolic assertion of this dogma suffices, yet lest anything be lacking against deniers and sophists, it is also proved through the whole of 1 Cor. 15.

Ratio I. From Christ's resurrection and our conformity and conjunction with Christ as members with the head, v.13: If there is no resurrection of the dead, Christ also has not been raised. The consequence is proved: (1) if there is utterly no resurrection, neither did Christ rise, since he was one of the dead; (2) he called himself the vine and us the branches (John 15:5) and is head of the body, the Church (Col. 1) — so if the joined members remain dead, the head itself also remains in death. From the same principle Paul argues at 1 Thess. 4:14. Then, the consequent granted, many absurdities follow: vain preaching; vain faith; we still in our sins; the Apostles false witnesses of God; those who fell asleep in Christ have perished.

Ratio II from providence; Ratio III baptism for the dead — early interpretations §2.11.4

2.11.4II. From God's providence, by which it must finally go wellof whom in this life it goes ill, v.19. And v.20 he returns to the first reason.

III. From baptism for the dead, v.29. This reason is difficult and has strangely exercised the most learned interpreters. First Epiphanius (Haer. 28 on the Cerinthians) reports some who, when someone died without baptism, substituted another to be baptized for the dead. Second, others of those baptized when near death — preferred by Calvin, Vermigli, Gualther, Hemmingsen. Third Chrysostom on Marcionite abuse; he expounds of confession of the resurrection before baptism. Fourth Sedulius and the schoolmen of the death of sin. Fifth Bellarmine of the baptism of tears for purgatory. Sixth Guilandus and the Leiden theologians of martyrdom. Seventh Major of baptism over graves — of which custom there is no trace. Eighth of sepulchral washing. Ninth Camerarius. Tenth Scaliger of annual refrigerium.

Baptism for the dead: preferred ad hominem reading; Corinthian abuses §2.11.5

2.11.5Of all opinions that seems truest which is most ancient — and what some have gathered from Tertullian by presumption should be admitted — and thence the Apostle after his manner argues ad hominem: which is also Musculus's judgment. For the simple and customary acceptation of the words is preserved. Further it is certain the Corinthian church was not very pure then, and as Scaliger notes, deadly rites and errors had then begun. So it is no wonder men so stained with errors erred about baptism's administration.

If it be objected that the Apostle nowhere rebukes this abuse: Answer with Chrysostom — one need not answer to farces. The article shows not all but some were baptized for some; he notes only those who did this, and of them shortly after said v.34: Awake to righteousness and sin not.

Ratio IV from hope of sufferers §2.11.6

2.11.6IV. From the hope which the Apostle connects with the foregoing; opposing to the opinion of those who act wrongly the sure hope of those who suffer gloriously, and confirming the resurrection from this also as from that, vv.30–32: unless there is a resurrection of the dead and hope of recompense, he and all who undergo extremities for truth and Christ will have been in vain. Why, he says, are we in danger every hour? If after the manner of men — for praise or gain or some other cause for which secular men face dangers — I fought with beasts at Ephesus (against wicked men such as Demetrius, Acts 19), what does it profit me? Finally, if the dead are not raised, we shall not only in vain expose our heads to so many dangers, but rather will join those who say: Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die.

Chapter 12: On the causes of the resurrection §2.12.1

2.12.1CHAPTER TWELVE. On the causes of the resurrection.

So far we have seen that the resurrection of the flesh is certainly future: now we shall examine its causes — namely efficient, material, formal, and final.

II. The efficient cause is God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

Efficient cause: Trinity immediately; Christ specially; angels as ministers §2.12.2

2.12.2The raising of the dead is a merely divine work, far surpassing every power of creatures (Dionysius On the Divine Names ch. 6), and therefore proceeds immediately from God, as prefigured in Ezek. 37:12. The Father raises (Rom. 8:11; 1 Cor. 6:14; 2 Cor. 4:14); the Son (John 5:28; ch. 6; 11:25); the Holy Spirit with the same power (Rom. 8:11). Although the Holy Trinity is commonly the cause of the resurrection, yet Christ is specially so (John 6:54) — both as exemplar cause and because his most powerful voice is instrumental cause. If resurrection is taken strictly, it is God's immediate work; if more loosely for the whole complex before and after, angels may be called ministers and instruments (Matt. 24:31). We reject Richard and Scotus who thought nature could be a cause of the resurrection.

III–IV. Material cause: man alone; subject-quo is the whole human body §2.12.3

2.12.3III. The matter of the resurrection is considered either as the subject-quo or as the subject-quod. The matter is man alone: for his body alone, being mortal, is rendered immortal, as Nemesius On the Nature of Man ch. 1. Therefore Muhammad is to be refuted, who in the Qur'an makes the resurrection of beasts an article of faith.

IV. The subject-quo is properly the flesh, or the body of man, and that whole and complete. For resurrection properly is not according to the soul but according to the body, because the human soul is immortal. Hence they err who say souls perish with bodies, or that to die is to be utterly extinguished.

Same body numerically: seven proofs against Origenists §2.12.4

2.12.4The body that will rise is the same in number and substance: (1) Matt. 10:28; 1 Cor. 15:53; Phil. 3:21; 2 Cor. 5:10; (2) from God's justice (Ambrose); (3) from the very name — otherwise a new creation, not resurrection; (4) because death is called sleep and resurrection awakening; (5) from Christ's example and nine particular examples; (6) from the promise of immortality to this flesh; (7) from the double rite of baptism and burial. Nor does 1 Cor. 15:50 hinder — flesh and blood are barred under the name of guilt, not substance. Against the Origenist delirium Gregory the Great disputed. The subject-quod are all who are to rise.

Living at the last day; whether the impious rise §2.12.5

2.12.5Of those found alive it may be asked whether they will rise, since they have not fallen. Christ is judge of living and dead; the Apostle at 1 Cor. 15:51 and 1 Thess. 4 — by a shortcut of death through change, the living will not die but be stripped of mortality. Augustine Retractations 2.33: Either they will not die, or they will not feel death. Both expositions stand. Next, will the impious also rise? Besides recent Jews and Socinians, Scripture on the judge of living and dead, eternal fire, and the worm that dies not must be opposed. Resurrection is sometimes taken strictly for that unto blessed life.

VI–VII. Formal cause internal and external; VIII. Final cause; millenarian error rejected §2.12.6

2.12.6VI. The form of the resurrection is twofold, internal or external. The internal, for those who properly rise, consists in gathering ashes, reforming bodies, uniting souls; for those to be changed, in sudden change of qualities (1 Cor. 15:51).

VII. The external consists in the order in which Christ will appear in the clouds and by his voice set all before the tribunal.

VIII. The end with respect to God is the glory of Christ the Mediator; with respect to men, the judgment, glory for believers, ignominy for unbelievers. We reject Lactantius's error of the millennium and double resurrection. Rightly Gennadius: There will be a resurrection of all the dead, but one together and at once. A double purpose: comfort and a deterrent from sin.

Chapter 13: On the mode and necessary consequence and end of the resurrection — namely the last judgment §2.13.1

2.13.1CHAPTER THIRTEEN. On the mode and necessary consequence and end of the resurrection — namely the last judgment.

So far have been the causes of the resurrection; now follow its mode and necessary consequence and end.

II. The mode of the resurrection is not perfectly known — he who willed that not even of all natural things the modes and reasons be open to us. The mode can be reduced to the form explained in Cap. 12 aph. 6–7: gathering of dust, formation of the body, animation — but it is a mystery (1 Cor. 15:51; 1 Thess. 4:15).

III–IV. Necessary consequence is the last judgment; definition; Gentile inklings §2.13.2

2.13.2III. The necessary consequence and end is the last judgment, and the condition of those judged.

IV. The last judgment is that most august act by which Christ, returning from heaven with highest glory and majesty at the end of this world, judges the whole orb of the earth. In the foundations of the Christian faith (Heb. 6:2) these two are joined. A general notion is implanted in all by nature, and a confused sense among the Gentiles — whether because they gathered that divine justice requires such a judgment, or from conscience, or because something of the Church's teaching reached their ears. That the dogma was revealed to the patriarchs the prophecy of Enoch shows (Jude 14–15).

V. Certainty of the day hidden; VI. Efficient cause — Trinity; Son visibly §2.13.3

2.13.3V. Its existence as certainly future is on the last day of this world, hidden in the treasures of divine wisdom. Scriptures: Acts 17:31; Rom. 2:5; 2 Thess. 1; Matt. 24:36; 25:31. Detestable are the Borborians, Floriani, Manichees and Proclinianites who denied it. In vain we try to compute the years; Christ forbade it (Acts 1:7).

VI. The principal efficient cause is the Holy Trinity as to authority and power; the visible form and exercise is the Son of God in assumed human nature. To him is given all judgment (John 5:22, 27), all power (Matt. 28:18); he is appointed (Acts 17:31) — not as a delegated judge but as prince by appropriation. The saints enter partnership not as to authority in themselves, but inasmuch as in Christ the head they pronounce, approve, and testify by their life.

VII–IX. Matter: persons (angels and all humans) and all acts §2.13.4

2.13.4VII. The matter or object of the last judgment is partly persons, partly their acts.

VIII. The persons are the evil angels and all humans both good and evil. The evil angels, already subject to punishments, will receive the complement on the last day. All humans living and dead will be judged — the good by a judgment of discernment and absolution, the evil of condemnation.

IX. The acts are all thoughts, inclinations, gestures, words, and deeds of all humans, with their principles, circumstances, and accidents. Their revelation is signified by the opening of the books (Rev. 20:12).

X–XI. Form of judgment in four parts; end — God's glory §2.13.5

2.13.5X. The form of this judgment is contained in (1) knowledge of the cause; (2) separation of those to be judged; (3) decision of the known cause and promulgation of the sentence; (4) execution of the sentence passed. In knowledge the judge needs no examination of witnesses. Separation of sheep from goats is Matt. 25:32–33. The sentence is most joyful for the pious, most sad for the impious. Execution is in public and solemn pronouncement, so that the just begin to enjoy beatitude consummately in heaven, and the impious to be punished without end in hell.

XI. The ultimate end of this judgment is that God be glorified in his saints and become wonderful in all who believed; subordinate ends are the salvation of the pious, the casting off of the impious, and the liberation of Christ's Church (2 Thess. 1:6–7).

Chapter 14: On the condition of those judged — namely eternal life, man's absolute highest end §2.14.1

2.14.1CHAPTER FOURTEEN. On the condition of those judged — and namely on ETERNAL LIFE, which embraces man's absolutely highest and last end.

The state of those judged, which they enter after this judgment, is for some eternal life and beatitude, for others death, misery, and eternal damnation.

II. Eternal life defined; why called life and eternal §2.14.2

2.14.2II. Eternal life is the citizens of God's kingdom's absolute immunity from sin, Satan and the tyranny of the impious, and every misery, and joined with this the eternal and fullest fruition of every good in the blessed vision and communion of God, perfect glorification of soul and body, restoration of the divine image, most joyful fellowship of holy angels and all the pious, and unexhausted joy for perfectly celebrating God's glory.

We call it life by metonymy of the subject for the elect's beatitude in a protected and youthful state — here to live is to be blessed. We call it eternal to differ both from temporal bodily life and from the faithful's spiritual life in this world, which is a degree and beginning of that eternal life now hidden with Christ in God (Col. 3:3).

Citizens of God's kingdom; consists in removal of evils and positive goods §2.14.3

2.14.3(3) It belongs to the citizens of God's kingdom (Heb. 11, &c.). (4) It consists both in the removal of contrary evils and in the access of positive goods — the vision of God, glorification, fellowship of the saints, joy. The vision of God is essential to beatitude. God's essence is infinite; this vision if considered statically; what is natural in God; the reason of the persons; another reason of the decrees. Fellowship of the holy angels. The end of eternal life is God's glory. Therefore man's highest beatitude is in God alone.

Porismata I: highest beatitude is not fleshly pleasure or fortune's secondaries §2.14.4

2.14.4II. From this the following porismata are inferred. (1) Man's highest beatitude is not the pleasure of the flesh.

(2) Nor is it in secondary things under divine providence it blinds mortals; entangles the most prudently planned with the worst outcomes; afflicts with great sadness; makes men insolent; and keeps a strange constancy in its very mutability.

Porismata: not wealth, magnificent buildings, or nobility §2.14.5

2.14.5(3) Nor is it wealth — the immoderate zeal of heaping up riches; acquiring wealth is full of toil; he who has ample riches exposes them to so many dangers.

(6) Nor is it in magnificent and proud buildings. (7) Nor in nobility — full of toil; whatever good is in nobility is fragile; it is not a perennial and stable good.

Porismata: not favor of princes, wife and children, or goods of body and mind taken together §2.14.6

2.14.6(8) Nor is it the favor of kings, princes, and others — more by flattery than by desert.

(10) Nor is it in wife and children — they are outside us; they are lost; they often turn to evil; they do not eternalize.

(11) Just as the highest good is contained neither in goods of the body nor in external goods, so neither in goods of the mind alone. (12) Nor in these goods of body and mind taken together.

IV. Positive conclusions: eternal beatitude's earnest; life in Christ; image restoration §2.14.7

2.14.7IV. So far the porismata: there follow positive statements. (1–2) True beatitude is in God alone. (3) The earnest of eternal beatitude in this life is not separated from it as a pledge. (4) Eternal life is not in us and the world, but in Christ. (5) Restoration of the divine image in man begins in this life. (6) The principal good of eternal life is union with God. (7) Diligent and religious meditation on eternal life leads to piety and loathing of sin — Cap. 14 close before CHAPTER FIFTEEN on eternal death.

Chapter 15: On eternal death §2.15.1

2.15.1CHAPTER FIFTEEN. On eternal death.

These things concerning eternal life: there follows eternal death, which is the separation of the impious from God and all the saints because of impenitence and unbelief, and so their own malice, in which with the Devil they will endure without end the wrath of God, the bite of conscience, and thence ignominy of every kind and anxiety with unspeakable torment.

I–II. Names of eternal death; receiving subject the impious §2.15.2

2.15.2I. The nomenclature of eternal death is taken from 2 Thess. 1:8–9, where it is called eternal destruction; also Wis. 4:19; and Heb. 6:2 eternal damnation; from place and reception hell, prison, furnace of fire, place of torments, lake and winepress of wrath, lake of fire, pit, chains of darkness, Gehenna, eternal fire, outer darkness.

II. The receiving subject are the impious who do not have true and heavenly wisdom, nor the wedding garment of Christ's righteousness through faith, not obeying the Gospel, but worshiping the beast — the fearful, unbelieving, fornicators, idolaters, and the like.

III. Reason of eternal death: absence of the highest good and presence of evil §2.15.3

2.15.3III. The reason of eternal death is both the absence of the highest good and the presence of evil. Absence of good is separation from God, the principal evil of the damned — they are deprived of God's face and fruition entirely. From separation from God arises separation from the saints; denial of all compassion. Present external evils: a horrible place, society of the Devil. Internal: (1) God's wrath; (2) the bite of conscience (the gnawing worm); (3) ignominy, anguish, envy, fear, horror, and perpetual despair.

IV–V. Efficient/deficient cause; end; canons 1–2 on place and God's concurrence §2.15.4

2.15.4IV. The efficient — or rather deficient — proximate and adequate cause is the impenitent unbelief of the impious with malice.

V. The end intended by God is the glory of his patience and justice; the terminus of that death is none — it will be continued forever.

Canons: (1) That the damned have a certain place and will be tormented with eternal fire is plain from Scripture; the constitution of hell and what sort the fire is is not revealed — be not curious. (2) Although God is not the procreating cause of damnation but the damned themselves, he yet concurs as just judge by preparing, threatening, inflicting, and continuing punishments.

Canons 3–5: degrees of punishment; against extinction and finite torment §2.15.5

2.15.5(3) Just as in eternal life there will be degrees of glory in the elect, so in the damned there will be degrees of punishments from deserts. Equality in the defect of God's vision and in eternity; distinction of degrees from deserts.

(4) That eternal death is nothing other than eternal extinction of soul and body is a harmful and most absurd Socinian opinion.

(5) That the hour of torments will at last have some end — Origenists and some Anabaptists dream, but in vain: eternal death and life are opposed in the same sense; the worm does not die; the smoke ascends forever and ever.

Canons 6–8: pious taste hell's pains tempered; impious carry hell daily; broad way §2.15.6

2.15.6(6) The pious in this life sometimes also feel some of hell's torments, which yet God's grace so tempers that they make them seek him more ardently. Christ felt the pains of hell in our place.

(7) The impious, although they carry their hell about with them daily in this life, yet most rarely feel it because of incredible stupor, and under it at last they sink.

(8) The way which most pursue is the way of hell, which the more it is loved the more it ought to be suspect to the pious.

Canon 9: meditation on hell; close of Book 2 — consensus of confessions §2.15.7

2.15.7(9) Perpetual meditation on hell ought to rouse us from the flesh's security and license to sin; in persecutions to comfort by confidence of eternal immunity. Let us descend into hell while living lest we descend while dying (Bernard). It serves repentance and consolation.

For the rest: as concerning Sacred Scripture in Book I, so concerning man's highest good and its opposite evil in Book II — among theologians against papist tyranny who embrace the Augsburg, Helvetic, French, English, and Belgian confessions, by God's benefit there is consensus. For which the God of peace is to be prayed that he further confirm it. Closing distich of Bernard of Morlaix: No one can speak or write or meditate the joys of the just nor the torments of the wicked.

System of Sacred Theology — Book 3

BOOK THREE / CHAPTER ONE. On man, as he can be subjected to God and beatified, in common §3.1.1

3.1.1BOOK THREE. On the subject, namely man, insofar as he is a citizen of the kingdom of God, capable of the right and life of God and of eternal salvation.

CHAPTER ONE. On man, as he can be subjected to God and beatified, in common.

Thus far there has been the first thing treated by the common part of sacred Theology, namely the absolutely highest and last end of man: there follows the second, namely the subject, which is man, insofar as he can, as a citizen, be subjected to God his eternal King, by whom he was created and redeemed, be united to Him, be beatified forever, and attain his highest end.

Ratio of order; theology directs fallen man; know thyself and know God §3.1.2

3.1.2The reason of order requires that, after we have explained how great and of what kind that highest good is which is both man's most absolute happiness and his perfection, we treat here of man, the citizen of God's kingdom, because he himself is the one to whom by this discipline, built and founded upon the divinely revealed Word, we show the way by which he may decline the extreme misery into which he fell when the bond of conjunction with God was broken, and may return to the highest beatitude, righteousness, and life of God.

For since sacred Theology, dealing with the divine kingdom, does not inform both God the King and man the subject at once — as politics, dealing with a human commonwealth, informs both the prince and the subject citizen — but directs only man fallen into misery toward recovering beatitude; therefore we call its subject especially man, insofar as he is to be subjected to God his King, united to Him, and forever kept, as was declared in Book I, chapters 1 and 4-7. For in this the kingdom of God chiefly consists (Luke 17:21; Matthew 13:23; Luke 8:11; Romans 14:17-18).

We will therefore not teach everything about man that can be known of him, but only those things which declare his character in any way in order toward the kingdom of God and eternal life. And so this part of Theology will hand on that divine saying Know thyself, and thence the other no less necessary: Know GOD, your Creator and Redeemer.

II. Man's origin and states; summary of the kingdom's mysteries §3.1.3

3.1.3II. But here his origin and states are to be considered, through which he is led to the state of highest perfection.

For neither can the theologian attain his end unless he knows these things, and has so far explored the nature and condition of man — whose return with God his King into grace and eternal salvation he seeks — that he may know how man depends on his Creator and King; to what end and into what state he was placed and created by Him on the sixth day; how, eating the fruit of the forbidden tree which is called the knowledge of good and evil, he soon fell with his whole race; and that Christ obediently handed Himself over to death to God the Father for lost man, and on the tree of the cross became for the whole human race dead in Adam the bread of life, which by faith one may break, eat, and therewith be satisfied and beatified.

For this is the sum of all the mysteries of the kingdom of God and of Christian doctrine, which if each person, according to the measure of his faith, understood more deeply, weighed more loftily, and recalled to his mind with simple study, truly Christ with the riches of His heavenly blessings would be sought by us hungering with unsatisfiable desire, and He Himself would satisfy our hunger and thirst with His banquet.

Chapter 2: On man's origin specially, and namely on God's existence §3.2.1

3.2.1CHAPTER TWO. On the origin of man specially, where namely of the existence of GOD.

The origin of man has a principle and a mode. We are not treating here of the principle of time in which man began to be, which is the sixth day of the world's creation, but of the principle of production, from which he is and by which he is ruled.

I. Man's principle is God; Gen 1:26-27; Acts 17; theology must know God §3.2.2

3.2.2I. The principle of man is God. For man was created by God (Genesis 1:26-27).

But since man is from God and depends on Him above all else in theological reflection place to treat of God. For the theologian cannot lead man back to God his King and principle, and onward to eternal life, unless he has God known.

Hence the Apostle too (Acts 17:24-31) proclaims God the creator; and now commands all everywhere to repent, because He has appointed a day of judgment through Christ raised from the dead.

II-V. What can be known of God: sufficiency and efficiency; sufficiency defined §3.2.3

3.2.3II. But God, as He is in Himself, can be known by no one except by Himself (1 Timothy 6:16); yet as He has revealed Himself to us, He is seen as it were from behind (Exodus 33:23), not clearly but enigmatically (1 Corinthians 13:12). But what has been revealed about God suffices for us to live well (Deuteronomy 29:29).

III. Now this which can be known of God is His sufficiency and efficiency. These two are the pillars of faith.

IV. God's sufficiency is that by which He in Himself has enough for Himself and for us: almighty, needing no one and without defect. V. God's sufficiency is considered in His existence, essence, and subsistence.

VI. God is, that is, He actually exists; foundation of religion; known in itself vs to us §3.2.4

3.2.4VI. God is, that is, He actually exists. The first and highest foundation and axiom of all true religion is that God is, according to Hebrews 11:6: whoever comes to God must believe that God is.

That God is is indeed known in itself according to nature; yet not according to us, whose knowledge begins from the senses, and therefore we assent only by some prior discourse (Romans 1:20; Acts 17:28; Wisdom 13).

When we speak of God, by the common conception of minds we understand the most perfect being, the first, most powerful, most wise, and best, the producing cause of all things and the governor of all.

Against atheists; proof a posteriori by axioms, nature's voice, consensus, conscience §3.2.5

3.2.5Yet it can be demonstrated from the senses against those who deny that God is, such as Diagoras and Epicurus.

Although it is known to every rational creature that God is, and all the pious are persuaded by Scripture and the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit: yet because of the impudence of this age's atheists it must briefly be demonstrated not a priori but a posteriori from effects — by theoretical axioms, by nature's public voice, by the perpetual consensus of all nations, and by the practical axiom which conscience dictates.

Reasons 1-4: coordination; first wisdom; first love §3.2.6

3.2.6The first reason is based on the axiom of things' singular existence and coordination. We perceive by sense is from itself. Therefore some one being necessarily pre-exists from which as first cause all draw origin. But this first being is God.

THE SECOND REASON is founded on the axiom from first wisdom. Every primary efficient cause is more excellent than its effect. Therefore there is one supreme and most wise mind. But this is God.

THE FOURTH REASON is founded on the axiom from first love. All things love to be. This love is not through itself but participated. Therefore there is a first love through itself. But this is God.

Reasons 5-8: universe; nature's voice; order; contraries §3.2.7

3.2.7THE FIFTH REASON is founded on the axiom from the universe's existence. The world was not always, because it consists of parts. Therefore it was produced from nothing. But this is God.

THE SIXTH REASON is founded on nature's public voice. Magnitude, multitude, variety, beauty, and perfection cry out that all are from some one. But this is God.

THE SEVENTH REASON is founded on the order of things and their disposition to an end, even of those that lack reason. Every order is from one. But this is God.

THE EIGHTH REASON is founded on the temper and enmity of contraries; a moderator is needed. But this is God.

Reasons 9-12: body fabric; stars; harmony; human arts §3.2.8

3.2.8THE NINTH REASON is founded on the body's fabric so skillfully ordered. Only by a most wise craftsman. But this is God.

THE TENTH REASON is founded on contemplation of the stars revolving with marvelous art. But this is God.

THE ELEVENTH REASON is founded on the fatal and necessary harmony of things. But this is God.

THE TWELFTH REASON is founded on the human arts. If man is ruled by art and wisdom, the whole world must be ruled by art and wisdom. And therefore let us believe God.

Reasons 13-16: miracles; societies; prophecy; best men's authority §3.2.9

3.2.9THE THIRTEENTH REASON is founded on miracles that exceed the whole force of the created universe. Therefore there is a cause that surpasses the universe. But that is God.

THE FOURTEENTH REASON is founded on the preservation of social, academic, political, and religious institutions, which could not be maintained except by one all-powerful. But that one is God.

THE FIFTEENTH REASON is founded on predictions of future things and their fulfillment (Isaiah 41:22-23).

THE SIXTEENTH REASON is founded on the authority of the best men: Moses, the Prophets, the Apostles, and the better philosophers proved it by miracles, holiness, martyrdom, and prophecy.

Reasons 17-18: universal consensus; conscience; against Aristotelian motion §3.2.10

3.2.10THE SEVENTEENTH REASON is founded on the perpetual and universal consensus of all nations and lawgivers. All assert that God is. Whoever denies this consensus will also deny that Rome is and that Caesar was.

THE EIGHTEENTH REASON is founded on the practical axiom which conscience dictates. In all there is a conscience which in good deeds cheers, in evil torments (Romans 2:15; Wisdom of Solomon 17:11). From which it is gathered that there is a supreme judge. But this is God.

For the rest, whether from motion it can be concluded that God is: those who with Aristotle prove from this labor under a double paralogism. But the reasons by which we have demonstrated that God is can suffice for the present.

Chapter 3: On the knowledge of God; way, mode, and reason of knowing Him §3.3.1

3.3.1CHAPTER THREE. On the knowledge of God; where the way, mode, and reason of knowing GOD are shown.

We have seen that GOD is: now we will show the way, mode, and reason by which God's nature can rightly be known by a Christian. For in vain we seek what is unknown unless we first know by what way and power it is to be investigated.

His nature cannot be known a priori, because it is first of all (Isaiah 44:6; Revelation 1:8). It is adequately known by God alone. By us it is known to some extent, but infinitely lower (1 Corinthians 13:12). Tertullian: nothing at all can be comprehended of God except that He is incomprehensible. Augustine: God is that which no opinion attains.

I-VI. Immediate and mediate knowledge; vision; analogy; affirmation, negation, eminence §3.3.2

3.3.2I. Now God is known by us either immediately or mediately.

II. Immediately, by clear vision of Him as He is (1 John 3:2; 1 Corinthians 13:12), proper to the blessed in heaven.

III. Mediately, through analogical images and signs — God's outward actions, works, and word (Psalm 19:1; Romans 1:20). This knowledge is called seeing through a mirror in mystery, proper to pilgrims.

IV. Mediately God is known from His works or word in three modes: affirmation, negation, and eminence. V. The first mode is affirmation. VI. Negation removes imperfections; eminence raises perfections above the manner of creatures.

ASSERTION 1: God imperceptible by outward sense in Himself §3.3.3

3.3.3FIRST ASSERTION. God, by our outward sense, is imperceptible in Himself and in His nature.

Often in the Scriptures we read that God was seen; whence someone might doubt whether God can be known by bodily eyes. But that cannot be done: first, by reason of the object — God is incorporeal and immense; second, by reason of the subject and organ — sense knows only through bodily organs. Therefore Isaiah saw an appearance of God sitting, not God in Himself. If the eyes do not see God in Himself, much less do the other senses.

ASSERTION 2: God known by natural mental discourse, but most imperfectly §3.3.4

3.3.4SECOND ASSERTION. God is indeed known by the natural discourse of our mind, but in a most imperfect way.

Since God cannot be perceived by sense, we inquire whether we can perceive Him by reason. But we know God much more faintly from His effects, which are infinitely surpassed by God. Hence Nazianzen, correcting Plato: God's nature can be explained by no words, and by mind and intellect can be comprehended still less.

ASSERTION 3: God known in this life by grace-strengthened intuition §3.3.5

3.3.5THIRD ASSERTION. God can be known in this life not through an image by which His essence would be represented, but by intuition and the swiftest discourse of a mind strengthened by the light of grace.

For this reason Paul says: we speak God's wisdom, which none of the rulers of this age knew, but God has revealed it to us (1 Corinthians 2:7-10). For God can reveal things thoroughly unknown through sensible words, and form notions in our spirit.

IX-XII. Distinctions: mediate/immediate; philosophical/theological; theoretical/practical §3.3.6

3.3.6IX. From what has been said a closer distinction of the knowledge of God is to be observed.

X. First, one is mediate, another immediate. That is in the present; this in the life to come.

XI. Second, that is philosophical or natural, or truly theological. That is drawn from nature's principles by discourse, and is crude, unclear, and limited... This is perceived from God's word, and is more learned, plainer, and fuller.

XII. Third, this is theoretical or practical. That is merely historical and bare; this includes the obedience prescribed by God's word, joined with piety's affection and saving.

XIII. Use of the knowledge of God: seven rules §3.3.7

3.3.7XIII. The use of the knowledge of God is contained in these rules.

1. Although God cannot be known a priori, yet He is known a posteriori (Exodus 33:23). 2. Implicit knowledge of God alone is of no moment for salvation; one must distinctly know God as one and three, eternal, almighty, creator, redeemer, sanctifier. 3. Some knowledge of God is naturally implanted as the seed of religion. 4. Natural knowledge of God suffices that you are without excuse (Romans 1-2). 5. Perfect knowledge of God for salvation is completed by knowledge of His nature, will, and works. 6. Knowledge of GOD is saving only when practical and filial. 7. Natural knowledge of God is not killed but perfected by knowledge above nature. For the book of nature is explained by the book of Scripture.

Chapter 4: On the unity of God; ASSERTION: God is one §3.4.1

3.4.1CHAPTER FOUR. On the unity of God, where it is shown that God is one.

Thus far we have proved that God is, and by what way and power we may know Him: now we will demonstrate that the same is one, against the fictitious number of gods.

There is therefore another axiom of our faith, the ASSERTION: GOD IS ONE. Tertullian (Against Marcion): Christian truth directly pronounces, God, if He is not one, is not. But He is one in the sense the Apostle declares (1 Corinthians 8:4). And Isaiah 44:6; John 17:3 — the only true God.

Unity of universality not mere number; Rufinus; Scripture; reasons against plurality §3.4.2

3.4.2Rufinus in his exposition of the Creed: God is one not by number but by universality — as one sun, so that another cannot be added. Much more is God named one by a word of universality, because there is no other.

This unity of God is manifest in the Scriptures (Deuteronomy 4:35, 39; 6:4; Psalm 18:31; Isaiah 44-48; John 17:3; Romans 3:29; 1 Corinthians 8:4; Galatians 3:20; Ephesians 4:6; 1 Timothy 2:5). Yet to stubborn minds it must be persuaded by reasons known by nature's light. We will not only prove that God is one, but also demonstrate that there cannot be many.

Reasons 1-3: order of the universe; supreme unity/truth/goodness; if many, absurdities §3.4.3

3.4.3The first is taken from the order of the universe's parts. Where there is order, there must be something one to which the rest are reduced. Aristotle: a plurality of rulerships is not good; let there be one ruler. Athanasius: a multitude of gods is a nullity of gods.

THE SECOND: God is highest unity, highest truth, highest goodness, which cannot be except unique and pure.

THE THIRD: if there were many gods, they either differ altogether, or are altogether one, or partly both: the first is absurd; if the second, they were already not many but one.

Reasons 4-6: infinity; consensus of the wise; pagan deities as names of one §3.4.4

3.4.4THE FOURTH: either God is one, or if there are many there must be infinitely many; but there cannot be infinitely many.

THE FIFTH is from the unanimous consensus of all the wise.

THE SIXTH: most names of the Gentiles' gods designate one God under diverse attributes. Jupiter and Pluto, Phoebus, Dionysus are one. God stands as one in all. The philosopher On the World to Alexander: though God is one, He is called by many names.

Reasons 7-8: confession of the pagan crowd; nothing favors a multitude of gods §3.4.5

3.4.5THE SEVENTH is from the sense and confession of the pagan crowd. Orosius: pagans confess that they do not follow many gods, but under one great God venerate many ministers. Tertullian (Apology 17): the soul, when it comes to its senses, names God alone — O testimony of a soul naturally Christian! Lactantius: when they swear or give thanks, they name not Jupiter or many gods but God.

THE EIGHTH: nothing can champion a multitude of gods. Hermes Trismegistus: one performs all these. Therefore God does all things. For this reason God is customarily compared to unity.

Against Manichaean dualism: evil's deficient cause §3.4.6

3.4.6If with the Gnostics, Manichaeans, and Encratites you object that evil mixed with good cannot be from the good God, and gather that another God from whom evils arise must be posited: we answer,

1. that no efficient cause of evil is to be sought, but a deficient one, which is not God — from whom nothing but good can be — but the creature itself falling from its goodness, because evil's nature consists in privation.

2. If God were the cause of evils, He would be the highest evil; but there cannot be a highest evil, because it destroys itself. 3. If this God is the highest evil, He will neither act nor know nor live nor be at all, because action, knowledge, and life are goods

Chapter 5: On the nature of God in general; what God is §3.5.1

3.5.1CHAPTER FIVE. On the nature of God in general.

And so we have shown that God is one: now we will see what His nature is, and of what sort He has revealed Himself to us both by works and by the Word. For knowledge of this is exceedingly necessary for us, both because it discriminates the true God from all fictitious divinities, and because it stirs us to fear, love, and honor Him, and to place our trust in Him.

What then is God? I. God is being simply, the highest, living integrally and independently. From what we taught in chapter 3 it is plain that God's essence cannot be explained by a definition, which is also clearly concluded from this principle: whatever things are properly defined consist of genus and difference. But God has no genus above Himself, because He transcends all genera, nor does He admit a true difference, because that is nowhere found without a genus which contracts and determines it — which will be more fully demonstrated in the attribute of infinity, and was rightly asserted among the Gentiles by Plato. Yet He can be described in some measure by certain attributes which declare the excellence of the divine nature and are as it were marks by which God is distinguished from all other things.

Common and proper ratio of divine perfection; description by negation and degrees §3.5.2

3.5.2But the common ratio which we conceive in God is that absolute which we are accustomed to think of as a certain common grade in every being. The proper ratio, however, is a certain proper perfection, which we can declare partly by comparison to our concept — that according to His nature it is conceived only positively — partly by comparison to the opposite, which excludes every imperfection of the creature, by which the creature is in a manner non-being: and that we intimate when we call God infinite (chapter 9).

And so we explain God's perfection by negation of a ratio. For to deny imperfection or non-being is in the truth of the thing an affirmation, but one conceived in the manner of a negation because of a preceding fiction by which non-being is conceived after the likeness of being. And that God's own grade of being may somehow be understood, all the partial or graded forms of perfection which we see distributed in any way in created things are to be considered: these gathered into one, we will think that all which are divided in creatures are in God most simply and infinitely even more — much more than we say all the grades of light that appear more sparsely in other bodies are at once eminently and in a more perfect manner in the sun.

Such descriptions are frequent both in the divine letters and among ecclesiastical and pagan authors. We choose this one for the present, both because it sufficiently distinguishes God from all other things, and because it grants us a certain principle that is as it were a foundation on which all the remaining attributes of God may be built.

PRINCIPIO: ens said of God; Exodus 3:14; analogical not univocal predication §3.5.3

3.5.3IN THE FIRST PLACE, Being is here put in the place of a genus, and is rightly said of God. For God is in the most perfect manner, because He exists from Himself, as we showed in chapter 2. And hence He imposed on Himself a name from that which is to be (Exodus 3:14), by which He declares that He is BEING SIMPLY, from whom, through whom, and in whom are all things. For so He discerns Himself from others that He says Himself to be simply, but signifies that the rest in a manner are not (Isaiah 40:15, 17; Psalm 62:9).

Yet Being is not said of God altogether in the same way as of creatures. For the ratio of being in God infinitely exceeds that which is in creatures: from which Being is predicated of God and creatures not univocally but analogically — since these are not called beings except by attribution to Him from whom they have it that they are and are called beings. God therefore most properly and substantially is being. Nor do we destroy unity when we say God is being. For the copula here does not couple diverse things, nor several according to the thing, but according to formal rationes conceived by us, and in divine propositions is always taken essentially.

God Himself revealed to Moses that this is His name: I am who I am. Afterwards He said, the LORD your God, God is one. Therefore it is to be established that nothing is said of God more essentially.

Why ens is most essential: four reasons; Bernard and Augustine on divine identity §3.5.4

3.5.4Which is variously established. 1. God is not in a genus, but exceeds all things. But Being prescinds every generic mode of existing and leaves the significate in its infinite amplitude. For Being cannot be limited, but this and that being can. Being surpasses times, places, and modes of existing in them.

2. This vocabulary makes our mind wander to the infinite sea of the divine essence, so that we do not find where to stay the intuition. But he who thinks he finds something beyond Being has not yet had the ratio of being. 3. Being says the present of eternity, taking away future and past. For those are not in God, but in things that suffer succession. But succession is from mutability. Therefore it also indicates eternity and immutability. But no creature can be exquisitely named by this name insofar as it is a noun, but insofar as it is a participle. For they participate some entity, yet are not beings, but some beings. So man is not being, but some being. And although Being is predicated of all without addition, yet it is always understood with addition and contraction, but of God absolutely. And this is the difference between predicable being and first being, as in Thomas Aquinas in the little book On Being and Essence. For God is all things eminently. Therefore His name is every name, as Trismegistus said.

4. In every thing accident is found except in God. But accident differs from the substance of a thing. Therefore no thing can say of itself, I am what I am, since it also is otherwise than it is. For a man, besides being a man, is also white. But to be white is other than to be a man. But for God to be just is not other than to be God, to be good, to be wise — according to the judgment of Bernard to Eugenius and of Augustine, namely according to the nature of God.

Formal rationes one in God; analogical ens; concrete names without composition §3.5.5

3.5.5Moreover these vocabularies have been taken and invented by us not for signifying one and the same thing, but many formal rationes. For being is said of what has essence; wise, of him to whom things taste as they are; good, of him who is lovable from this, that he helps others. Yet all these rationes are one in God. For He is not good by one thing, being by another, just by another, but by Himself is all those: indeed He is who is, not what is, as Bernard says. For these are not divided in Him, even if they are such in us. Nor yet, when we enunciate these distinctly of God, do we trifle, but as we have said above, we say many formal rationes which yet all, though they were infinite, express that one which is God, founding in His infinity all these rationes distinct by reason and, so to speak, ideally — not in the foundation, but in the term of the reasoning and in the exemplar of our things. things. Things.

We said Being is said of God and creatures analogically. God therefore is being through Himself; the other beings are not except with respect to Him, just as urine is not healthy except with respect to the health of the animal, of which it is an effect and sign. It is therefore most proper to God to be that which is. Nor is the word God a more essential name for Him than Being, except as regards us, who not grasping the infinity of Being name God from some particular effect.

For here this rule holds: Concrete names, when they are said of God, do not argue any composition or concretion, but show that He Himself is a thing subsisting through Himself, or a suppositum.

Summum; vivens; integrity; independens; nature as Deity §3.5.6

3.5.6But since being is divided into substance and accident: God is so being that He is substance as much as possible, because He most of all subsists through Himself and depends on nothing at all, but from Himself, in Himself, and through nothing other than through Himself is whatever He is. But every accident presupposes another being by which it is sustained: yet God, since He exists from Himself, is necessarily the first being, and therefore cannot be sustained by another prior being.

NEXT, God is here called the highest being, that is, leaving all the rest behind Himself in perfection, as being their cause. For every principal cause of which we treat here, if it produce an effect of a diverse ratio from itself (which here must necessarily happen), is nobler than that effect; which is demonstrated in the Metaphysics. And hence it is that Dionysius said things are like God, but not God like things, since He exceeds above, and they have from God that they imitate Him, not the reverse (Isaiah 40:17-18; Romans 1:23).

THIRD, since two things chiefly contain the essential perfection of substances, namely essence and life — that of all, this of some, beyond which the human mind can comprehend nothing in them — therefore, as essence, so also life is most deservedly attributed to God, by which namely He is active in Himself and outside Himself; and without which He cannot be the cause of the other things, as will be demonstrated below. For this reason God in the Scriptures is everywhere called being and living (Revelation 1:8 and 4:8; Deuteronomy; Psalm 18:46; 84:3; Jeremiah 10:10; Ezekiel 33:11; Daniel 4:34; Matthew 16:16; John 5:26 and 6:57; Acts 14:15; Romans 9:26). FOURTH, since life belongs to God as first and highest being in the most perfect manner, and therefore spiritual, we deservedly consider integrity in it, which is contained in virtue and beatitude (Psalm 25; 1 Timothy 6:15). LASTLY, the word independent is added in the description, which here stands in place of a difference, and discriminates God from created things, and signifies that both essence and life are so in God that He has each not from elsewhere but from Himself (Exodus 3:14; Psalm 36:9). From all which it is firmly gathered that nature is rightly attributed to God, that word taken in a looser significate, so that it notes the same as Deity itself (Colossians 2:9) — namely that through which God is God and differs from all other things. Hence Paul (Galatians 4:8): Not knowing God, he says, you served those who by nature are not gods — indicating that He alone is the true God who is God by nature, that is, who has a truly divine essence and persons.

II. God's nature viewed in essence and persons §3.5.7

3.5.7II. The nature of God is viewed in essence and persons. Knowledge of the one essence is sought from the book of nature and of Scripture jointly: knowledge of the three distinct persons from the book of Scripture alone.

That the name of essence truly belongs to God we understand from this, that He is the first and highest being, on whom all other beings depend. But if He is being, He certainly has essence: since by it being is necessarily defined. And because God has essence from Himself and not from elsewhere, and therefore possesses it perpetually, He is also said to be essence in the abstract: from which Jerome (tome 2, letter to Damasus): One, he says, and only nature of God, which truly is. For that which subsists does not have from elsewhere, but is its own. The rest which are created, even if they seem to be, are not, because once they were not, and can again not be what they were. God alone, who is eternal — that is, who has no beginning — truly holds the name of essence.

Concerning the name of the persons from Scripture (1 John 5:7; Hebrews 1:3) it will be seen more inwardly.

Chapter 6: On the essence and names of God in particular; singular essence common to three persons §3.6.1

3.6.1CHAPTER SIX. On the essence and names of God in particular.

The essence of God is a singular nature, common to the three persons. It is also called the form of God (Philippians 2:6). For although essence, nature, and form differ in the philosophers' judgment, yet according to the holy fathers in the doctrine of God these three are the same, as Damascene testifies in the Isagoge, chapter 1. Likewise also divinity (Romans 1:20). It is singular, because numerically it is so one that it is at once unique (Deuteronomy 4:35). It is common, because it equally belongs to the three persons (1 John 5:7).

REGULA 1–3: one essence; common to three persons; attributes one in essence §3.6.2

3.6.2RULE. 1. God is so one that He is unique, and does not have many essences. The reason of the former is that it cannot happen that there be several first or highest and infinite principles. The reason of the latter is that God through one and the same essence is immutable, eternal, wise, good, omnipotent. Therefore God does not have many essences diverse or opposed, extreme or moderate, real or accidental, general and specific partial: but an essence so one in number or individual that it does not admit a principle of individuation.

2. The essence of God is common to the three persons: yet it is not one in genus or species. For it is not multiplied in the persons as a universal thing: but equally is in each as an infinite singular thing. 3. The multitude of God's attributes does not fight with the unity of God's essence; because all those attributes are one in essence. For they are nothing other than one and the same essence of God related to various objects and effects. So God's eternity is God's very essence insofar as it has no beginning, succession, and end of duration. God's omnipotence is God's very essence insofar as it can effect every good.

II–III. Names and attributes distinguished; what divine names are §3.6.3

3.6.3II. In the essence of GOD the divine names and attributes are to be considered. Many ancients and moderns take the names and attributes of God for the same, so that they also call the essential attributes or properties of God names. But since we ought to study the propriety of words, we preferred here to distinguish the names of God from the essential attributes or properties.

III. Divine names are those by which God is called in the sacred letters, that by them, as far as concerns us, His nature may be explained. The name of God in the Scriptures signifies various things. First, a mark by which God is designated and discerned from creatures (Genesis 32:29; Exodus 3:15 and 14:5). Second, God Himself (Deuteronomy 28; Psalm 5:11 and 7:18 and 20:2 and 116:4; Proverbs 18:10). Third, the power and grace of God (Psalm 118:10-12). Fourth, the will and commandment of God (Deuteronomy 18:19; 1 Samuel 17:45; John 5:43; Luke 24:47). Fifth, the worship, invocation, celebration, profession of God and faith (Micah 4:5; Matthew 28:19; Acts 21:13). We take it here in the first signification.

IV–IX. Distinctions of divine names (OT/NT; essence/properties; proper/common; absolute/relative; affirmative/negative) §3.6.4

3.6.4IV. But of the divine names a distinction is to be noted, a review of the chief ones, and the use of all. V. Their distinction is multiplex. First, some divine names are in the Old Testament, some in the New. Those are for the most part Jah, Eheje, El, Elohim, Schaddai, Adonai, Heljon, etc.; these Theos, Kyrios, Father, Son, Abba, Spirit, Sabaoth.

VI. Second, some note God's essence, others properties of the essence. Those are Jah, Eheje and the like: but these El, Elohim, Schaddai, etc. VII. Third, some properly belong to God alone, as Jehovah: some are common to God and creatures, but by a diverse ratio, as Elohim. Those discern God from all created things insofar as they note God's altogether incommunicable perfections: but these declare Him the author of every good nature, since they are predicated of God and creatures analogically.

VIII. Fourth, some of them are absolute, as God omnipotent: some respective, and that either toward the divine persons, as Father, Son, Holy Spirit, or toward created things, as creator, savior, King of kings, Lord of lords. IX. Fifth, some are affirmative, as omnipotent, some negative, as infinite.

X–XII. Concrete/abstract; first name Jehovah / Tetragrammaton §3.6.5

3.6.5XI. Seventh, some are concrete, as God, Lord, Father: some abstract, as life, charity, deity. Those teach that God truly subsists: but these that He is a most simple being. XII. And this is the distinction of the divine names.

FIRST is YHWH (Exodus 15:3; Psalm 83:18; Isaiah everywhere). This name is also called the Tetragrammaton and Schemhamphoras. Letters, as quantities, whether painted or pronounced, of themselves have no efficacy. The name YHWH or Tetragrammaton or Schemhamphoras has neither miraculous nor magical force.

Second–fourth names: Jah, Eheje, El §3.6.6

3.6.6The SECOND name is JAH (Exodus 15:2; Psalms everywhere), by which they exhorted one another to praise GOD. The THIRD is EHEJE (Exodus 3:13-14), denoting God's absolute existence and necessity. The FOURTH name is EL (Isaiah 9:6), signifying God's fortitude and power.

Fifth–eighth names: Elohim, Adonai, Schaddai, Heljon §3.6.7

3.6.7FIFTH is ELOHIM (Genesis 1:1 and in countless places). Sometimes it denotes all three persons of the Deity. The SIXTH name is Adonai (Daniel 9:17; Psalms everywhere). SEVENTH is Schaddai (Genesis 17:1), the Almighty. EIGHTH is HELJON (Psalm 9:2 etc.).

Ninth–tenth NT names; use of the chief names §3.6.8

3.6.8NINTH from the New Testament is ho Theos, God. TENTH is Kyrios, LORD (Matthew everywhere).

XIII. This is the review and use of the chief names of God. Although no name of God perfectly expresses the infinite essence: yet many are His names which impress His properties. For God by His Word has revealed many things about Himself. Names imposed by God in the Scriptures usefully increase the knowledge of God; names invented by men are not easily to be admitted.

Chapter 7: On the attributes of God; essential properties not accidents §3.7.1

3.7.1CHAPTER SEVEN. On the attributes of God.

Thus far have been the divine names: there follow the attributes, which are after the manner of properties naturally connected to the nature of God as it was somehow sketched for our capacity, by which every perfection of God's essence is more fully declared to us.

That attributes first found use in divine matters, Daniel Heinsius, a man of wide learning, teaches learnedly (Aristarchus sacer, chapter 2, p. 42). They are commonly called essential or natural properties and perfections of God, which indeed are not qualities that happen upon God's essence, but God's very essence itself. For which reason they are not distinguished a priori or in the thing itself from the essence or among themselves, but formally and by our mode of conceiving, nor do they admit more and less.

II. Proper or figurative attributes; three genera of proper attributes §3.7.2

3.7.2II. The attributes of God are proper or figurative. The proper attributes of God are of three genera. Some are as of being; others as of living virtually; others as of living integrally.

Those belong to God simply, with respect to essence, insofar as He is in the supreme mode; these evidently, with respect to intelligent life, insofar as He understands, wills, acts, and works; these excellently, with respect to virtue and beatitude, insofar as He acts well and blessedly. This is proved jointly and separately. Jointly, by the words TRUE and LIVING (Jeremiah 10:10; 1 Thessalonians 1:9; Revelation 1:17-18). Separately, with respect to essence (Exodus 3:14; Isaiah 44:6; Revelation 1:8 and 21:6 and 22:13); with respect to spiritual life (Deuteronomy 32:40; Judges 8:19; 1 Samuel 25:34; Psalm 18:46; 84:3; John 4:24; 1 Timothy 1:17; Colossians 1:15); with respect to integrity (Deuteronomy 32:4; Matthew 5:48).

III–IV. First-genus attributes by removal of creaturely imperfections; the six §3.7.3

3.7.3III. Attributes of the first genus are those which designate the absolute perfection of the divine essence, by which it stands above all, by the removal of those imperfections which commonly inhere in creatures. For this reason, if we speak accurately, they can in no way be attributed to creatures.

IV. But they are six, namely: 1. absolute necessity of existing; 2. infinity; 3. simplicity; 4. immutability; 5. immensity; 6. eternity. To these the rest which others have been accustomed to add can without difficulty be reduced. But to these the properties of creatures are opposed, which, because they signify imperfection by which those fall short of God's highest perfection, ought to be removed from God — as are 1. contingency; 2. finitude; 3. multiplex composition; 4. mutability; 5. local presence defined to a certain and determined space; 6. finite duration.

But these which we have called attributes of the first genus are all negative, because they are conceived and explained by us through negations: yet to them in God there answers a positive perfection which is the foundation of that negation.

V. General canons 1–6 on the divine attributes §3.7.4

3.7.4V. But here general CANONS are to be observed. 1. The attributes of God, or His essential properties, are many in one manner, because we cannot comprehend the whole infinite perfection of the divine essence in one concept, but only apprehend it to some extent.

2. In the attributes of God there is not prior and posterior except as regards us. For since all are one with the essence, in themselves they do not admit prior and posterior. 3. The attributes of God do not admit more and less in themselves. But their effects can admit intensification and remission. 4. The attributes of God are not contrary to one another. But their effects can be contrary, as the sun by one and the same virtue hardens mud and melts wax.

5. The attributes of GOD viewed in themselves are altogether incommunicable. For they are God's very essence itself. Yet they are not wrongly distinguished into communicable and incommunicable, because some impress their image on creatures, as wisdom and goodness, some scarcely a vestige or thinnest shadow. 6. The attributes of God are not multiplied in the persons of the Holy Trinity. For just as there is one essence of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so also there is one eternity, omnipotence, etc. Therefore although the Father is omnipotent, and the Son omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit omnipotent: yet there are not three omnipotent ones, but those three are one omnipotent GOD.

Canon 7: attributes govern all theology §3.7.5

3.7.57. The attributes of GOD divide universal theology. For in all theological comments, disputations, and sermons regard is to be had to the attributes of God, lest anything contrary to them be established. And in the whole Christian life these attributes are as a cynosure, that we may revere and imitate God, and perceive solid consolation.

Chapter 8: On God's absolute necessity of existing; definition §3.8.1

3.8.1CHAPTER EIGHT. On God's absolute necessity of existing.

Thus far concerning the attributes of God which stand in place of properties consequent upon His essence in general: now, about to speak of the several ones separately and distinctly, there occurs before the rest I. Absolute necessity of existing, which is that perfection of God by which He so is or exists that He cannot not be.

The sacred letters point out this attribute by the names of immortality and incorruptibility (1 Timothy 6:16-17; Romans 1:23). It is called a perfection of God for the foundation of that negation by which we declare this necessity, which is a positive perfection that truly exists in God, which materially, as they commonly speak, is signified by this attribute. But its formal ratio is placed in the negation of some imperfection which commonly inheres in all creatures and is called contingency.

Necessity distinguished from immutability and eternity §3.8.2

3.8.2But he errs who thinks this attribute ought to be reduced either to immutability or to eternity. For just as for things to be changed properly is not for them either to be produced so that they are, or to be destroyed so that they are not, but with existence remaining safe to acquire or lose something formally — so conversely to be immutable is not the same as not to be able not to be; but properly signifies not to be able to acquire a new perfection, or to be deprived of any, with existence remaining safe.

From which it is gathered that necessity of existing and immutability differ not a little; since this is opposed to mutability, that to contingency. But eternity is nearer to this necessity, although they differ in this, that this denies the beginning and end of duration, but that denies contingency or the power of not existing: and therefore, as immutability is a certain cause of eternity, of which it is the prior cause and reason, so this necessity is a cause of eternity. And so we conclude that God is eternal — that is, lacks beginning and end of His duration — from this, that He Himself is a necessary being, to whom not to be is altogether adverse.

Proper to God alone; created 'necessaries' only secundum quid §3.8.3

3.8.3But we assert that this absolute necessity of existing is so proper to God that it can be attributed to no creature. For created 'necessaries' only in a certain respect

Demonstration: Scripture, the Name, reason from independence §3.8.4

3.8.4But we demonstrate that God is an absolutely necessary being, FIRST, by the testimonies of sacred Scripture (1 Timothy 6:16-17; Romans 1:23; Psalm 102:27-28), where God is called immortal and incorruptible and is opposed to corruptible things, and is established always to remain, to declare absolute necessity of existing. From which also Augustine (On the Trinity 1.1): Although, he says, the soul is said to be immortal in a manner, the Apostle would not say, Who alone has immortality, unless because true immortality is incommutability, which no creature can have, since it belongs to the Creator alone.

SECOND, by the Name of God, Eheje (Exodus 3:14), by which absolute necessity of existing is indicated, as Nazianzen (Oration 24 / 2 on theology) and Augustine (On True Religion, chapter 49) testify. For this reason God also attributes Being to Himself alone, as He who alone is necessarily (Isaiah 42:8; Amos 5:8).

THIRD, by reason. For every independent being, and what exists from itself, is absolutely necessary. God is an independent being, existing namely from Himself, as was demonstrated in chapter 2 on God's existence. Therefore God is an absolutely necessary being.

Major proved; pagan confession §3.8.5

3.8.5The major is proved in two ways. First, because an independent being or one existing from itself exists by the force of its essence or nature, and therefore existence belongs to it as necessarily as essence. Second, because an independent being neither could once not have been, nor hereafter not be. Therefore it is absolutely necessary.

FOURTH, also by the confession of Gentile philosophers. For Orpheus spoke of the necessity of all things — that is, a substance which is necessarily through itself, and on which all the rest depend, but itself on none. Aristotle calls God a necessary, perpetual being. Apuleius: I would judge necessity itself to be called nothing other than God. Avicenna: That holy thing is the necessary being which is from itself, but not the remaining beings, even if they have necessity of existing from another.

Chapter 9: On the infinity of God; extensive and intensive §3.9.1

3.9.1CHAPTER NINE. On the infinity of God.

And these things concerning the first attribute of God, namely absolute necessity of existing: there follows the second, namely I. Infinity, which here is the highest perfection of the divine essence, without any limit or boundary. The vocabulary of INFINITY we here borrow from those things which otherwise are properly attributed to quantity.

But God is said in two ways to lack a term of His perfection, namely extensively and intensively. Extensively, because His nature is not precisely limited to one genus of perfections, but in itself encloses all genera of perfections whatever can be thought or be in any way, and that infinitely. And so God is called simply and absolutely perfect, because every perfection so necessarily inheres in Him that none at all can be lacking to Him.

Formal ratio of infinity; proper to God alone §3.9.2

3.9.2The formal consists in the negation of a term, which is both any perfection of a being with the precision of the other perfections, and any grade of perfection with the precision of the remaining grades. But this property so belongs to God that it is found in none of the creatures, because every creature necessarily takes from God the fountain of every perfection a certain and definite number of perfections, and of all of them a definite and limited grade.

Proofs 1–2: Scripture; infinite goodness §3.9.3

3.9.3FIRST, by the testimonies of sacred Scripture, which attribute to God greatness and excellence above all created things (Job 36:26 and 37:23; Psalm 48:1 and 95:3 and 96:4 and 97:9 and 99:2 and 145:3; Titus 2:13 and elsewhere everywhere).

SECOND, from God's highest goodness. Such goodness is necessarily undefective for eternities, and therefore infinite: since every finite goodness necessarily falls short of the highest goodness. From which Gregory of Nyssa (On the Making of Man, chapter 1) teaches that God is good, surpassing every good which is comprehended by understanding and thinking — that is, infinite.

Proofs 3–4: nothing greater than God; first being contains all perfection §3.9.4

3.9.4THIRD, I prove that God is extensively and intensively infinite thus. For every finite being something else can be more perfect and greater. For God nothing can be more perfect and greater. Therefore God is not a finite being.

FOURTH, God has every perfection of being, because the absolute first, on which all the rest depend, necessarily exceeds all remaining beings by His perfection. Therefore He contains every perfection of theirs in Himself in a more eminent manner, and powers which can never be so exhausted that they cannot bring forth new species and perfections of things.

Proof 5: intensive infinity from aseity; joined with affirmative attributes §3.9.5

3.9.5FIFTH, that every perfection of essence which is in God is also intensively infinite — that is, inheres in Him without measure and term — I show thus. A being existing from itself by the necessity of its nature cannot be limited to a certain grade of perfection. But God is a being existing from itself by the necessity of its nature, as was demonstrated in chapter 8. Therefore God cannot be limited to a certain grade of perfection.

And from this we attribute infinity to God not only absolutely, but also join it with other attributes, especially affirmative ones, as when we say infinite wisdom, power, and goodness are in God.

Proof 7: orthodox antiquity and pagan witnesses §3.9.6

3.9.6SEVENTH, by the consensus and authority of orthodox antiquity. Dionysius (On the Divine Names, chapter 5): Unity, he says, God contains according to His supersubstantial simple infinity. Damascene (Orthodox Faith 1.12): The universe, he says, that which is, as a certain immense and infinite sea of essence He contains in His embrace. Bernard: For God this is to be, which is to be all these things. Mercury Trismegistus calls God the interminable and infinite Good. Orpheus calls God the infinite end. So Xenophanes, Parmenides, Melissus say that that which is — namely God — is infinite.

Chapter 10: On the simplicity of God; definition §3.10.1

3.10.1CHAPTER TEN. On the simplicity of God.

And these things concerning the second attribute of God: there follows His third attribute. First, simplicity, which is God's highest perfection, by which He is free from every composition. The word SIMPLICITY we borrow from corporeal things. But it is called simplicity because it notes not something positive, but chiefly the negation of composition.

Simplicity proper to God; not univocal with creaturely simplicity §3.10.2

3.10.2This property so belongs to God that to creatures we attribute only a thin shadow. Nor do we think a composition of reason — not real — fights against the divine simplicity. Therefore God's simplicity is not the same as that in creatures, but more eminent, removed from every substantial and accidental composition.

Demonstration from Scripture: spirit, first being §3.10.3

3.10.3We demonstrate that God is simple. First, by the testimonies of sacred Scripture, which declare God spirit, light, and not constituted from parts. THIRD, because our Savior (John 4:24) attributes to God that He is spirit: yet it is not true that when God is called spirit something corporeal is indicated. Fourth, because He is the first being. For the first being exists from itself and is composed from none. For whatever is later from its components is therefore not simply the first being, nor altogether independent.

From infinity and freedom from every composition §3.10.4

3.10.4Sixth, and this is the most evident of all, from God's infinite perfection. SEVENTH, that God is free from every composition whatsoever. For whatever is composite is more imperfect than that which is simple; and an infinite being does not suffer composition.

First genus of substantial composition: genus and difference — rejected §3.10.5

3.10.5The FIRST genus of substantial composition is that distinguished from genus and difference. Every true genus is univocal. But there is no common genus for God with the other things, nor a difference properly so called. God cannot be restricted to some predicament or genus, but is above all genera and outside them. To this first genus of composition we have also reduced composition from essence and existence.

Further substantial composition genera (matter/form; integral parts) rejected §3.10.6

3.10.6The THIRD genus of substantial composition is that from matter and form. But that composition does not fall upon God. The Fourth genus of composition is that by which a substance is from integral parts. The FIFTH genus of substantial composition is from the actual and the potential. But these do not fall upon God, because they are refuted by open Scripture and reason.

No accidental composition in God §3.10.7

3.10.7THUS FAR we have seen that no substantial composition falls upon God. There follows concerning the accidental. God is not mutable, as will be proved below. He is not integral, because God is not measured or spread out.tal in creatures is in God the substance itself.

Against world-soul and corporeal composition of God §3.10.8

3.10.8God is not the soul of the world, nor a term of matter produced by an agent, because He is the first being. The idea in God is not other than God. God is the governor of the world, but not as a soul, nor as a sailor needing a ship, but far more eminently governing and vivifying all things by His goodness alone, with no necessity.

Pastoral close §3.10.9

3.10.9It belongs to pious and theological prudence so to instruct the Church concerning this attribute of God that nothing of those things remote from the people's capacity be brought to the pulpit; but especially these two are to be inculcated. 1. That is always to be attributed to God which is both most perfect and can be perceived by an intellect divinely illuminated. 2. That the mind is not to be tormented by those things which fall out to the contrary, but rather to acquiesce in a sane confession of our ignorance, that meanwhile the unimpaired glory of every perfection may remain for God.

Chapter 11: On the immutability of God; definition §3.11.1

3.11.1CHAPTER ELEVEN. On the immutability of God.

Thus far there has been the third attribute of God, namely simplicity: there follows the fourth, namely immutability, which is God's highest perfection, by which He always remains the same as He isIMMUTABILITY, which certain Greeks render as unchangeableness, is expressed from the sacred letters not by a distinct word, but by like and opposite words of power.

Scriptural vocabulary of immutability; formal ratio §3.11.2

3.11.2It is of like power that of God it is affirmed in Psalm 102:27, But You remain. And in verse 28, But You are the same. And Malachi 3:6, I do not change. So Romans 1:23 says the incorruptible God. 1 Timothy 6:16, who alone has immortality. Opposite words of power are denied of Him in James 1:17: with whom there is no change or shadow of turning.

The material in this attribute also is the same as in the rest, namely God's most eminent perfection. But its formal ratio consists in the negation of every change by which God in His essence would become other and other. For He never acquires a new perfection, nor loses that which He possesses.

Proofs 1-4: unity, necessity, infinity, simplicity §3.11.3

3.11.3That God is in Himself plainly immutable I show in this way. FIRST, from His most eminent unity. Whatever is most eminently one is in itself plainly immutable. But God is most eminently one, as was demonstrated in chapter IV of this book. Therefore God is in Himself plainly immutable.

SECOND, from the absolute necessity of existing. Whatever exists by absolute necessity is in itself plainly immutable. But God exists by absolute necessity, as was demonstrated in chapter VIII. THIRD, from the infinite perfection of essence. Whatever is endowed with infinite perfection is in itself plainly immutable. FOURTH, from simplicity. Whatever is absolutely simple is in itself plainly immutable, because it is capable of no accident. But God is absolutely simple, as was demonstrated in chapter X.

Proofs 5-8: modes of change; independence; potency; first mover §3.11.4

3.11.4FIFTH, from an induction of the modes by which an intelligent nature can be changed: as to existence; as to accidents; as to knowledge; as to decree or purpose of will. But by none of these modes is God changed. SIXTH, from independence. Whoever is independent is plainly immutable in Himself. But God is independent, as was proved in chapter V.

SEVENTH, from the state of a being in potency. Whatever is mutable is somehow in potency. But God is in no way in potency. Pure act, indeed the purest, is God alone. EIGHTH, from the nature of motion. That from which every motion and change is, is simply immobile and immutable, as Augustine and Boethius assert from Aristotle. But from God is every motion and change.

Against Vorstius; five scholastic objections deferred §3.11.5

3.11.5Conrad Vorstius in his Notes on Disputation III On God seems somehow to deny this attribute of God, writing that the fifth species of change can have a place in God insofar as He exercises certain immanent actions according to free will.

But of old certain doubts were objected to the orthodox consensus by the scholastics: first, that God began to act; second, that yesterday He knew the sun would rise today; third, that His liberty would be taken away if He could not change His will; fourth, that He was made man; fifth, that God was changed because He suffered and died. Each of these arguments has its proper seat below. Meanwhile, since it is certain that God is entirely immutable and immobile, a few rules are here to be observed, useful for solving contrary arguments.

Rules 1-8 on change, motion, and relations §3.11.6

3.11.6RULES. 1. Change properly is according to substance, but motion according to accident. Hence, since God is in potency neither in substance nor in accidental forms, He is altogether immutable. 2. God is said to move Himself by an effect of nature, or of grace, or of glory; such motion is not referred to God, but to His effect. 3. God governs the world by a motion which is from Him, not which is in Him; the preposition in, when He is called unchangeable, does not deprive Him of active power of moving, but denies passive power of being moved.

4. Motions of approach and withdrawal are not referred to God except according to effect. 5. God does not now hold Himself otherwise than from eternity; He is called creator and conserver by a relation that denominates Him only extrinsically. 6. From habit to act only those are changed which so act that they can suffer. 7. When God is said now to will what He did not will before, that says a change in the thing willed, not in the one willing. 8. The ratio of personal relation in the divine is other than that of other relations in creatures.

Rules 9-16; pastoral uses §3.11.7

3.11.79. God is always the same because of His essence, intellect, will, and power, as stated in Psalm 102:27-28. 10. God repents, not because He changes counsels, but benefits and judgments, as He decreed to change them. 11. What God under condition decrees, commands, promises, threatens, or does, argues His liberty, goodness, or severity, not mutability. 12. God does not depend on creatures, but decrees that He will do something through creatures and about them.

13. God, by creating, redeeming, and doing other things outside Himself, is not changed, but freely applies His omnipotence, clemency, and justice to various objects. 14. God from angry becomes placated and vice versa, not by change of essence, but by exchange of judgment with benefit. 15. Prayers, holiness, and evil life do not change God, but the works of God according to His decree. 16. The immutability of God serves faith, lest we take for God what changes; consolation, that we may be persuaded God will never change His goodwill toward us; and piety, that we too may be constant and immutable in the love of God and neighbor.

Chapter 12: On the immensity of God; definition §3.12.1

3.12.1CHAPTER TWELVE. On the immensity of God.

These things concerning the fourth attribute of God, namely immutability: there follows the fifth. Immensity, which is GOD's highest perfection, by which He is free from circumscription and from local presence defined to a certain and determined space.

The material in this attribute also is the same as in the others, namely GOD's most eminent perfection. But the formal consists in the negation of circumscription and of defined local presence. From which, creatures and places now being posited, there follows omnipresence or ubiquity, which can be considered in a threefold ratio: of knowledge; of voluntary operation; of essence — which third we chiefly allege when we call God immense and hence omnipresent.

God everywhere; things in God; Parmenides answered §3.12.2

3.12.2But God is said to be everywhere to the measure of our grasp, when rather things are in GOD, from whom, through whom, and in whom are all things in Romans 11:36 and Acts 17:25, 27-28.

Parmenides argues: If the One is, it is not in itself, nor in another. But that does not strike us, because we say God is in Himself according to our mode of understanding, and we explain it negatively: God is in Himself, that is, not in another. Yet Jeremiah 23:24 also attributes to God that He fills heaven and earth. Scripture teaches both, because each sense is true: that one worthier of God, this one more fitted to our intelligence.

I. God fills all places of this world — five reasons §3.12.3

3.12.3We will demonstrate three things. I. That God fills all places and spaces of this world through the boundlessness of His beings being, or is present everywhere. FIRST reason: Whoever is at heavens, in the grave, at the extremity of the sea, in the lowest parts of the earth, fills all places and spaces of this world through the boundlessness of His beings being. But God is at once in all these places, as Psalm 139, Isaiah 66:1, Jeremiah 23:24, 1 Kings 8:27, Acts 7:49 and 17:27, and Ephesians 4:6 testify.

SECOND, from God's infinite perfection. THIRD, from inconvenience or absurdity: if God according to substance is nowhere but in heaven, it follows that Christ sojourning on earth was not true God. FOURTH, from God's immediate operation. FIFTH, from the catholic consent of pious antiquity — Cyprian, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Athanasius, Tertullian, Justin.

II. God not bounded by this world's spaces; III. No creature ubiquitous by essence §3.12.4

3.12.4II. God according to His substance is not defined or circumscribed by this world's spaces, but is also outside this world. FIRST reason from the testimony of sacred Scripture: 1 Kings 8:27, The heaven of heavens cannot contain You. Job 11:8, Higher than heaven and deeper than hell. SECOND from infinity. THIRD from catholic consent — Chrysostom, Augustine; Hermes Trismegistus: God is a circle whose center is everywhere, circumference nowhere.

Outside this orb God is in Himself, as before this orb was founded. Outside the world He is in only one mode, by substance. III. No creature can be present everywhere by immensity of essence, because God's absolute perfection cannot be formally communicated to any creature.

Against Vorstius: God only in heaven by substance — rejected §3.12.5

3.12.5Therefore Conrad Vorstius errs, deceived by Scotus, Bodin, and Taurellus, in Notes on Disputation III On God p. 232, because against the catholic consensus and the most learned Zanchi he teaches that God according to His substance is nowhere but in heaven. He alleges seven reasons.

But that error is from a double confusion: it does not distinguish Scripture's proper from improper speech about throne and dwelling; and from the aspect of special presence it overturns the very immensity of essence. For God is in a special ratio in Christ's humanity by hypostatic union, in the saints by knowledge and love, in the Church by help, in heaven by majesty and glory — the immensity of essence nonetheless remaining everywhere.

Rules 1-11 on immensity §3.12.6

3.12.6RULES. 1. God's immensity is regarded absolutely or relatively — absolutely from eternity; relatively partly as omnipresence, partly as incomprehensibility. 2. The mode of divine immensity is to be conceived without any multiplication, extension, or division of parts. 3. God is in every place not as located, but as cause and lord of each place. 4. God is everywhere not by extension of His essence, but by comprehension. 5. God is outside the world not by physical size, but by infinity of essence.

6. God is so in the heavens and saints by His majesty, grace, and glory that He is nonetheless everywhere by essence and power. 7. When God is in the saints by grace, presence sometimes is hidden, sometimes open. 8. God's presence is general, special, and most special. 9. To be everywhere is not unseemly for God. 10. Scripture places that attribute greatness, throne, house to God are to be understood as far as they suit the immensity of His essence. 11. We ought to imitate God's immensity by immense desire of eternity.

Chapter 13: On the eternity of God; definition §3.13.1

3.13.1CHAPTER THIRTEEN. On the eternity of God.

There follows GOD's sixth attribute, namely eternity, which is His highest perfection, by which He is free from finite duration. The word eternity properly notes a standing duration without beginning, middle, end, without flux of past, present, future.

Among the ancients Boethius defines thus: Eternity is the whole, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life — or it is interminable, indivisible, and independent duration.

Eternity vs time; essential vs participated; Albertus Magnus §3.13.2

3.13.2It differs from time, as Clement of Alexandria is authority. Improperly it is attributed both to things which, though they have a beginning of time, will yet have no end — as angels, demons, rational souls — and to those which are long-lasting.

Hence Albert the Great: Eternal is said in two ways, namely by essence and by participation. By essence God alone is eternal. But by participation that is said to be eternal which participates some property of eternity — immutability and lack of end — analogically, not univocally.

Proofs 1-7 that God is properly eternal §3.13.3

3.13.3I demonstrate that God is properly eternal — that is, without beginning or end, never about to cease. FIRST, from the testimony of sacred Scripture: Psalm 90:2; Isaiah 57:15; Genesis 21:33; Daniel 7:13; Romans 16:26; 1 Timothy 1:17. SECOND, from the immutability of essence. THIRD, from the absolute necessity of existing. FOURTH, from independence.

FIFTH, from simplicity of nature. SIXTH, from catholic consent — Athenagoras, Cyprian, Augustine, Gregory, Anselm, Bernard, Albert the Great. SEVENTH, from the reckoning of the philosophers — Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.7.

Against Vorstius on eternity; rules 1-3 §3.13.4

3.13.4Conrad Vorstius contradicts this doctrine in Notes on Disputation III On God p. 226, contending that the common opinion of eternity existing all at once is false. For that reason we hand down certain foundations and rules here.

1. God's eternity is not an accident, but God's substance — for it is in reality nothing other than God's duration, and duration nothing other than persevering existence. 2. God's eternity is indivisible and entirely simultaneous, and has no parts succeeding one another. 3. God's eternity, being indivisible, necessarily exists with all differences of times — not that all parts of time exist together among themselves, but that each part of time, while it is in act, exists with eternity.

Rules 4-8; pastoral close §3.13.5

3.13.54. God acts in time not by being subject to time, but by subjecting a finite thing to time. 5. In God there is prior and posterior not by reason of essence or time, but by reason of order among the persons of the Holy Trinity and among His attributes, by reason of our intellect. God's inward works are an act always lasting; but outward works are finished according to God's free will.

6. All things are present to God not by reason of existence, but of knowledge. 7. Eternal years and days of eternity are not said of God because of a division of eternity in itself, but because of the division of perpetuity and time, which He contains under Himself excellently. 8. We ought to imitate God's eternity by constant activity of the good, by unceasing desire of blessed eternity. For that reason I seal the chapter on God's eternity with this monition: THINK ON ETERNITY.

Chapter 14: On the life of God; second-genus attributes; definition §3.14.1

3.14.1CHAPTER FOURTEEN. On the life of God.

The former attributes agree and declare God's absolute perfection as a being negatively: now there follow attributes of the second genus, which affirmatively note God's highest perfection as spiritually living — that is, evidently with respect to intelligent life. And these exist in God as principles of actions; for which cause they are also attributed to creatures, not indeed as they are in God with the degree of supereminence, but in their own limited mode, namely by participation and according to some likeness, which still infinitely falls short of God's perfection.

Hence it is that men are said to be made in God's image (Genesis 1:27) and to become partakers of the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4). But these second-genus attributes are affirmative, because first and formally they indicate a positive perfection, and therefore are also rather conceived and expounded by us through affirmation or position. Yet the mode of supereminence added to them always includes a negation. The life of God is His highest perfection, by which His essence is excellently active.

Life of God ambiguous: in Himself and in us; natural and spiritual §3.14.2

3.14.2The life of God is said ambiguously: either that by which He Himself lives in Himself, or that by which He lives in us. Of the latter Paul speaks in Ephesians 4:18, saying the Gentiles are alienated from the life of God. Of which also Irenaeus, Against Heresies book V chapter 13: The life of man, he says, is twofold, natural and spiritual.

Natural is that life which we have through the first generation in Adam, and is nothing other than the function of the rational soul in moving, sensing, and reasoning; of this it is said in Acts 17:28, In Him we live and move and are. Spiritual is that life which we have through the second generation in Christ, and is nothing other than perfect motion from the action of the Holy Spirit, who is as it were the soul of the regenerate man: and this is that life which to the Ephesians is called the life of God, and in 2 Corinthians 4:11 the life of Jesus.

Not of this, but of that we chiefly treat here — namely that by which God lives in Himself, which is God Himself, and is conceived by us as the second moment of the divine nature. The material in this attribute also is the same as in the others, namely God's highest perfection; but the formal consists in the position of the most supereminent mode of spiritual life by which God is active in Himself and outside Himself.

Proofs 1-5 that God lives §3.14.3

3.14.3But that God lives we prove thus. FIRST, from the clear testimonies of sacred Scripture. For this distinctly attributes life to Him: Genesis 16:14; Numbers 14:21; Deuteronomy 32:40; 1 Samuel 17:26; Psalm 36:9; Psalm 42:2; Jeremiah 4:2; Ezekiel 33:11; Matthew 16:16; Acts 14:15; Romans 9:26; Hebrews 3:12; Hebrews 10:31.

SECOND, from God's infinite perfection. Whoever is of infinite perfection lives. God is of infinite perfection. Therefore God lives. THIRD, from God's inward actions. Whoever understands, wills, and can, lives. God understands, wills, can. Therefore God lives.

FOURTH, from God's inward actions commonly called ad intra. Whoever is begetting and begotten, breathing and proceeding, lives. But God is begetting and begotten, breathing and proceeding. Therefore God lives — John 5:26. FIFTH, from God's outward actions. Whoever vivifies all things lives. But God vivifies all things — Genesis 2:7; Numbers 16:22; 1 Samuel 2:6; Psalm 36:9; Acts 17:25; 1 Timothy 6:13. Therefore God lives.

Proofs 6-7; against Vorstius on diversity in life §3.14.4

3.14.4SIXTH, to these is added the consent of orthodox antiquity. To Dionysius named from the Areopagus God is self-life and living through Himself, eternally living; and with him Gregory, the archetypal author of life. Irenaeus: God is life and incorruption and truth. Cyril of Alexandria: There must be in the true God incorruption and freedom from destruction, and indeed that He live and can grant life to those in whom He wills life to be. Basil the Great; Augustine: There is no life that is not from God, because God is indeed the highest life and Himself the fountain of life.

SEVENTH, the Gentile philosophers subscribe. Aristotle, Metaphysics XII: We say therefore that God is a living being everlasting and best. Therefore life and continuous eternal age are in God. Orpheus; Hermes; Zeno of Citium called God an animal, that is an immortal living being.

Here also Conrad Vorstius departs in Notes on Disputation III p. 247, saying it seems some diversity is in God, so that one thing is God's living substance itself, another the life or force by which He lives. But they wisely know who know divine things well, and attribute to God those things whose likeness exists in creatures only with the mode of supereminence and negation of every imperfection.

Rules 1-5 on life of God; vital faculties §3.14.5

3.14.5II. But concerning these second-genus attributes, and so concerning the life of God, RULES are to be held. 1. When second-genus attributes are painted in God, they are to be measured to the norm and form of first-genus attributes, so that they are attributed to Him infinitely, most perfectly, most simply, immutably. So God is called living infinitely and most perfectly, because nothing of His life is wanting and He lacks every bound extensively and intensively; simply, because His life is entirely without composition and is His very active essence; immutably, because as God never began to live, so neither will He cease.

2. Whatever like and analogous to these attributes is found in created things is finite, imperfect, mixed, subject to turns of motion and change, and finally accidental and adventitious. 3. From attributes of this genus it is understood especially that God is the first true cause of all — whence He can be called the first living. 4. By His life the true God is distinguished from idols — Joshua 3:10; Jeremiah 2:13; 10:9-10; Daniel 6:26; 1 Thessalonians 1:9. 5. Because of His life God is to be worshiped — fear, Deuteronomy 6:13; honor and adoration, Hebrews 9:14; Revelation 4:9; oath, Jeremiah 4:2; hope, 1 Timothy 6:17.

III. The life of God consists in an intellect penetrating all things, a will wholly free, and a ready power of acting which none can resist. These are as it were God's vital faculties, to which we refer all attributes.

Chapter 15: On the intellect of God; definition §3.15.1

3.15.1CHAPTER FIFTEEN. On the intellect of God.

The intellect of God is His highest perfection, by which He distinctly, most inwardly, and most perfectly knows all and each things which in any way are, were, will be, or can be, and the order, connection, and various respects of all and each among themselves which they have and can have, and their opposites.

Intellect, so called by the Latins from inter and lego, by force of etymology notes the power, act, and habit by which we know so as to have choice between this and that — which is to know so as to discern. The material in this attribute also is the same as in the others, namely God's highest perfection. But the formal consists in the position of the most supereminent mode of spiritual life by which God most perfectly understands all things.

Proofs 1-5 that God has intellect §3.15.2

3.15.2That this truly belongs to God we prove in this way. FIRST, from the clear testimonies of sacred Scripture: Genesis 6:5; Job 28:23; Psalm 94; Acts 1:24; 15:8, 18; 1 John 3:20; 1 Samuel 2:3 — Jehovah is the strong God endowed with all knowledge. SECOND, from the infinity of the divine nature. To whose essence is infinitely perfect, intellect belongs, and indeed infinite intellect.

THIRD, from spiritual life. Whoever lives spiritually also has intellect. But God lives spiritually — demonstrated in chapter XIV. FOURTH, from God's outward operations: whoever by the Word produces, preserves, bears, governs, and orders all things has intellect; and whoever grants intellect to others and illuminates it has intellect — Exodus 36; Psalm 16:7; 32:8; 119. FIFTH, from the consent of Gentile philosophers — Hermes Trismegistus, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Proclus, Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Zeno.

II-V: act, object, primary and secondary objects §3.15.3

3.15.3II. But in the divine intellect there are to be distinctly considered act, object, order, mode, and use. III. The act is the comprehension of all knowables insofar as they are knowable — or, what amounts to the same, one perfect cognition. We say the act of the divine intellect according to itself and its substance with respect to all intelligibles is one and simple, seeing it is in reality God's very essence and intellect; yet from the varied termination of God's knowledge to diverse objects it is commonly conceived by us as manifold and receives diverse names — of wisdom, science, foreknowledge — which yet do not multiply the substance.

IV. The object of the intellect's act is every intelligible, or everything that can be known. Therefore God is called omniscient — Hebrews 4:13; 1 John 3:20. V. And it is primary, namely God Himself, or secondary, anything besides God. The divine essence is the primary object of the divine intellect by primacy of dignity, order, power, and adequation.

VI-VIII: threefold order of knowable objects §3.15.4

3.15.4VI. The order of knowable objects is threefold. First, of those which are simply necessary, and which from eternity always were, and all possibles insofar as they are only possible — such is God Himself and whatever naturally is in God. VII. Second is of those which are not eternal and simply necessary, yet truly are existing each in its own mode, either by proper act or at least in their causes — heaven, earth, angels, humans; accidents; past, present, future.

VIII. Third is of those which are necessary neither simply nor from hypothesis, but either only possible, or even altogether impossible and contradictory — as David betrayed by the men of Keilah if he had remained (1 Samuel 23:11); the Tyrians and Sidonians if the Gospel had been preached (Matthew 11:21); that it is impossible for God to perish or lie. From which it is gathered that nothing at all escapes Him.

IX-X: mode of divine knowing; thirteen theorems §3.15.5

3.15.5IX. The mode of knowing is to be estimated both from the condition of the knowable object and from the nature of God's intellect. For God understands no thing otherwise than as it itself stands, because He is the God of truth. But God knows in a divine mode — most perfectly, not through intelligible species, not by discursive reasoning, but by thoroughly penetrating all things with His intellect through His own essence alone, except evils which He knows through opposite goods.

X. That mode of knowing in the divine intellect is considered in genus or in species. In genus, these theorems explain it: (1) As is the nature of knowables, so also is their science in God. (2) God first knows Himself. (3) He knows Himself wholly and adequately. (4) Other things besides Himself He knows wholly — excellently as in Himself, adequately as in their proper natures. (5) God's understanding is His being and essence. (6) God does not understand successively or by discourse, but by a simple and infinite intuition. (7) From eternity He knows all things, nothing newly. (8) He knows all things immensely. (9) He knows all things immutably. (10) By one individual act He knows all things. (11) God understands all things holily. (12) God's intellect depends on no external cause. (13) God's intellect is always certain and can never be deceived, not even in future contingents.

XI-XXI: distinctions of divine science §3.15.6

3.15.6XI. But in species the schools distinguish God's science, which in itself is unique and most simple, according to various objects and respects to objects. XII. It is science of simple intelligence or of vision. In the first instant of reason they place science of simple intelligence; in the second, decrees of free will; in the third, science of vision. Some set a fourth instant after the first, in which they consider a middle science before free will's decrees.

XIII. Science of simple intelligence is the cognition of all possibles, preceding in God the free act of will. XIV. Science of vision is that by which God, after the decree of will, knows besides Himself all other things which are, will be, or have been. XV–XVII. It is natural or free — natural nearly the same as simple intelligence; free that by which God after the free act of His will distinctly understands all future things. XVIII–XX. It is theoretical or practical. XXI. These and like distinctions are taken from our mode of knowing. I do not deny the thing itself of middle science, but make it a part of simple intelligence; a science distinct from simple intelligence and vision does not seem needed.

XXII-XXIV: theoretical and practical uses §3.15.7

3.15.7XXII. Still concerning mode: there follows a manifold use. The first is theoretical, both for confirmation of orthodox faith and for elenchus and refutation of various error. XXIII. For this doctrine confirms the catholic faith concerning God's omniscience; and it refutes those who confuse the distinct modes of divine science, who set absolute foreknowledge of things certainly future before the divine decree, make it the cause of things, and from the certainty of divine foreknowledge take away the contingency of things.

Things are not future because God knows them, but because they are future they are known by God — Origen, Chrysostom, Ambrose; Augustine speaks of active science joined with will and power. XXIV. The other use is practical: pedagogical, corrective, consolatory — that we may live holily in God's eyes (Psalm 139); that we may beware evils of fault; that the conscience of things well done may be consoled against unjust judgments, by the argument of Psalm 7; 1 Corinthians 4:5; 2 Corinthians 10:18.

Chapter 16: On the will of God; definition §3.16.1

3.16.1CHAPTER SIXTEEN. On the will of God.

This is God's image: will is that life of His by which God is borne toward a known good. That will is rightly attributed to God, both the perfection of God's essence and intellect, and Scripture, and the consent of men abundantly confirm — Jonah 1:14; Daniel 4:17; Romans 9:18; James 1:18; Psalm 115:3; Matthew 20:15; Ephesians 1:11.

But when it is defined as rational appetite, the learned Molina rightly notes that it is not properly attributed to God in this sense, because reason does not properly belong to God.

Object of will; proofs God wills §3.16.2

3.16.2III. The object is the good known by the intellect. For will is borne toward a known good. That God truly wills we prove from the testimonies of Scripture, from perfection of essence, from intellect, from spiritual life, from inward and outward operations, from the consent of the church and of the philosophers.

The will of God is His highest perfection, by which His essence is excellently borne toward the good known by Himself.

VII-XI: natural and free will; will of sign and of good pleasure §3.16.3

3.16.3VII. FIRST, God's will is natural or free. VIII. Natural is that by which God wills according to the necessity of His nature. X. SECOND, God's will is free. XI. The will of sign is that by which God signifies to creatures what He wills to be done by them. XII. The will of good pleasure is that by which God establishes with Himself a decree concerning things to be done or permitted.

XVI-XXI: absolute and conditioned; antecedent and consequent §3.16.4

3.16.4XVI. THIRD, God's will is absolute or conditioned. XVII. Absolute is that by which God wills something without condition. XVIII. Conditioned is that by which God wills something under a condition. XIX. FOURTH, God's will is antecedent or consequent.

Antecedent will is that by which God wills something before particular circumstances are considered; consequent that by which, circumstances being posited, He wills. This can be called judicial will — as a magistrate by antecedent will desires all citizens to live, by consequent will some to die for crimes; so God by antecedent will wants all men to be saved (1 Timothy 2:4), by consequent will confers righteousness on believers and inflicts eternal death on the impenitent.

XXII-XXV: approving, efficient, and permitting will §3.16.5

3.16.5XXII. FIFTH, God's will is approving, or efficient, or permitting. Others distinguish in the same sense into the will of approbation and of decree. XXIII. Approving is that by which God loves something as a possible good not dissonant from His nature, which yet He does not effect. XXIV. Efficient is that by which God wills to produce something, and to work something in or through something. XXV. Permitting is that by which He wills something to happen which, though He hates it, He does not impede because of a joined good — so God willed to permit the fall of the first parents, Romans 9:17; Acts 4:28.

XXVI-XXXVIII: arcane and revealed; precise, modified, ample, limited §3.16.6

3.16.6XXVI. SIXTH, God's will is arcane or revealed. XXVII. Arcane is that which is hidden from the intelligent creature as long as it seems good to God — the good pleasure of Ephesians 1; it is not to be searched out, Deuteronomy 29:29. XXVIII. Revealed is that which is made plain by God's sign or by the event of the thing — the will of sign.

XXIX–XXXI. And it is precise or modified. XXXII–XXXIV. And it is ample or limited. XXXV–XXXVIII. And it is exploratory, promissory, or minatory — as Abraham's sacrifice in Genesis 22; promises and threats under a tacit condition.

XXXIX-XLIV: ordinary and extraordinary; per se and for another §3.16.7

3.16.7XXXIX. God's will is either ordinary or extraordinary. XL. Ordinary is that by which God constantly keeps the order once established by Himself in the works of nature and the gifts of grace. XLI. Extraordinary is that by which God acts beside and above this order according to His wisdom and choice — hence miracles.

XLII. EIGHTH, God's will is through itself or for another and by accident. XLIII. God's will through itself is that by which God wills things simply good. XLIV. God's will for another is that by which He wills things which in a certain respect are evil, yet ordainable unto good — it is lawful for God to will that sin should have happened with Him permitting, because of a joined good.

From these things rightly established concerning God's will it can be obscure to none that nothing is better than God, nothing kinder, nothing holier, nothing more just — the foundation of all our religion and consolation. CHAPTER SEVENTEEN, On God's executive power, follows.

Chapter 17: On God's executive power; definition §3.17.1

3.17.1CHAPTER SEVENTEEN. On Gods executive power.

And these things also concerning the will of God: there follows the power of acting, which is Gods life by which, according to the liberty of His will, He can work outwardly — whatever He can freely will, He works, whatever He freely wills.

That power is rightly attributed to God, the sacred writings sufficiently declare — Genesis 17:1; 28:3; 35:11; Jeremiah 32:18-19; Psalm 91; Luke 1:37; Revelation 4:8; 11:17; 19:6.

Active executive power, not passive or ad intra §3.17.2

3.17.2But by the name of power here we do not understand passive power, which cannot fall upon God as pure act, nor the act by which God inwardly in Himself always acts from the necessary perfection of His nature, and therefore neither the power of generating and spirating, by which He acts naturally and inwardly: but active or executive power, by which He can work outwardly and, whenever it pleases Him, does work.

Under this operation we also will to comprise impeding, permitting, and ordering, which, with the intellect directing, the will commands. Nor do we attribute this to God in the notion by which Aristotle in Metaphysics V defines a principle of change into another according as it is other: for such active power belongs to created and finite being, in which act and power differ. But to God active power is attributed according to perfection, not according to participation, and in Him power and act are the same. Hence Richard of Saint Victor: It is certain that God is powerful by fullness of power, not by participation of power.

II-III: object of power; possibility and impossibility §3.17.3

3.17.3II. But in it there is to be considered the object, the condition, and the distinction. III. The object is everything which God, as true and possible being comprehended by His infinite intellect, can freely will. For whatever God can freely will, that same He can also do; and whatever He can do, that same He can freely will.

But God can freely will only those things which are not contrary to His essence and natural will and which can be comprehended by His infinite intellect as true beings, at least as possible. Possibility of a thing is principally from Gods intellect, but formally from the formal reason of things. Hence not because of Gods power, but because of inherent contradiction in the thing, there is no power with respect to contradictories.

And hence God is said to be able to do all possibles which agree with His nature, intellect, and will: all the rest are impossible, because they involve contradiction, impotence, perversity, and falsehood — as to make another God, to be changed, to lie, to sin, to make something simultaneously be and not be. When we deny that these can be done by God, we do not injure His infinite power, but we take care that things incongruous to Gods essence, intellect, and will not be attributed. Compare Luke 1:37; 18:27; Mark 14:36; James 1:17; Psalm 5:4; Numbers 23:19; 2 Timothy 2:13.

IV-VII: conditions of power — universality, immensity, perfection in work §3.17.4

3.17.4IV. Its condition is threefold: universality, immensity, perfection in the work. V. Universality is that by which God can do all things which He can will. VI. Immensity is that by which God's power reaches and surrounds all things. VII. Perfection in the work is that by which God does most excellently whatever He does. Hence Moses in Genesis 1:31: Then God looked upon all things which He had made, and behold, they were very good.

Finally, to this power of God what is already done is not subject under the reason of the done, but under the reason of being done. And therefore by the same power by which He could create the world, it is not as already made, but as to-be-made, which is in the power of the maker and not already made in act.

VIII-X: absolute and ordained power; nature threefold; miracles §3.17.5

3.17.5VIII. The distinction is that by which Gods power is absolute or ordained. Absolute is so called because it is not limited by the universal law of nature, as if beside and above that God could not do something; and so it is said in comparison with the ordained, by which He acts precisely according to the common law and order of His decrees.

IX. Absolute power is that by which God can do whatever He wills and can will, beside the order of nature placed by Himself through providence, and the universal laws, and the particular judgment drawn from them. It is also called extraordinary, by which God works miracles beside, above, and, if you speak with the Greeks, against the universal and common laws of nature placed by Himself. Nature is said in three ways according to Augustine: 1. the accustomed course of nature; 2. active and passive force; 3. nature naturing, namely God. Therefore some things are above nature, some against nature, some beside nature. God therefore does against nature in the first sense in all miracles; but against nature in the second and third senses He never does anything. Thus God does nothing against nature, but above and beside it.

X. Ordained is that by which God works precisely according to the order constituted by His providence, conformably to universal laws and particular judgments drawn from them. It is also called ordinary; by this God still either conserves or governs or destroys all things created by Himself; by this He commonly works all things in all, according to the good pleasure of His will.

XI: observations 1-2 on omnipotence §3.17.6

3.17.6XI. But there are certain useful observations concerning Gods omnipotence. 1. Omnipotence belongs to God alone, and cannot be communicated to any creature as such. For of the power by which the world and the things in the world are created without compulsion, without hindrance, without subject matter, without instrument, without external exemplar, the creature is not capable. For every creature works in subject matter; and every created essence is finite and limited by its own bounds, and therefore it is impossible that it be referred to all things.

2. God's power, considered in itself, is not bound by time, and is only related to time through a temporal act or effect that is subject to omnipotence. Believable articles abstracts from time: yet according as it is compared to believers according to diversity of times it is signified diversely. Hence the ancient fathers believed Christ was to be incarnate, to suffer, and to rise; we believe Christ has been incarnate, has suffered, has died, has risen. But Augustine says: Times have varied, faith has remained unchanged. So also concerning power: it is the same power which is toward one and the same according to every difference of times; but it is determined to diverse times when it is said He could create the world, and the world could have been created by Him.

XI observations 3-5 §3.17.7

3.17.73. Because a thing in itself varies according to difference of time, therefore when we speak of power as referred to the thing, it is necessary that we use diverse forms of speaking. Thus God at one time was about to make from power, and at another time from the same power He makes, and at another He has made. To be about to make is not to make, and to make is not to have made. And therefore it does not follow: whatever God could do, He can always do, because before the thing He could do something when the thing was only in potency, which He cannot do when the thing is perfected. But it rightly follows: whatever He could at some time do, He can always do, provided the makers power is always toward that.

4. It is indeed true that whatever is in God is act and nothing in potency: yet it does not follow from this that whatever He could do He can always do. For power is with respect to that which can be done, and not with respect to that which has been done. Therefore this proposition — whatever God could at some time do, He can always do — is simply to be denied. But this is true: whatever God could at some time do and is of the subject of divine power, this He can always do.

5. From Gods omnipotence it cannot be concluded that something is or will be, unless it is established concerning Gods will. The reason is this: because Gods free will determines power to doing this or that, and God therefore does something because He wills to do it — Daniel 3:17-18; Romans 4:20-21; Matthew 8:2; Luke 1. Therefore here that saying has place, that reason is to be taken captive under the obedience of faith, namely when Gods will is established, even if our mind does not grasp the possibility of the thing. Compare Calvin, Institutes 4.16.24. CHAPTER EIGHTEEN, On Gods attributes of the third genus, follows.

Chapter 18: On God's attributes of the third genus §3.18.1

3.18.1CHAPTER EIGHTEEN. On Gods attributes of the third genus.

These things also concerning the attributes of the second genus, which belong to God as living with respect to intelligent life: there follow the attributes of the third genus, which are attributed to Him with respect to His integrity, and affirmatively note His highest perfection by which He lives integrally.

These attributes of the third genus contain the eminence of divine ethics, just as the attributes of the first genus declare the eminence of divine metaphysics, and those of the second genus the eminence of divine physics: and they commonly stand under the name of moral integrity or perfection, rectitude, justice, and holiness — Deuteronomy 32:3-4; Matthew 5:48; Leviticus 11:44; 1 Peter 1:15.

II-VI: God's virtue; wisdom and prudence §3.18.2

3.18.2II. But God is virtue and blessedness.. Gods virtue is the integrity of His intellect or will. Virtue in God is not an accident, and therefore not a quality or habit of intellect or will, but God's very essence considered in order to the true and the good, and a certain eminence of that which in our virtues and affections is most perfect. For He Himself is to Himself the right reason of all things knowable and to be done.

IV. Integrity of intellect is wisdom and prudence. V. Wisdom is integrity of intellect by which God knows what agrees with each thing and what is alien from it. By this God most inwardly knows Himself and all things — possible, future, existing in act, past — Job 11; 1 Samuel 2:3; Psalm 139; Romans 11:33; 1 Timothy 1:17; Hebrews 4:13; 1 John 3:20.

VI. Prudence is integrity of intellect by which God knows how to accommodate to all things in order to practice what is fitting. By this God decrees and does all things from the most wise counsel of His will — Isaiah 40:28; Jeremiah 10:12.

VII-XII: integrity of will; primary affections — love and hatred §3.18.3

3.18.3VII. Integrity of will is that which in God is conceived after the manner of affections or of virtues or moral habits. VIII. What is conceived after the manner of affections can be referred to two genera: those we can call primary, and those which arise from the primary. IX. Primary affections are of union, as love; of separation, as hatred opposite to this; or of communication, as goodness with its progressions — benignity, grace, mercy.

Love is the affection of union by which God is borne toward Himself as the highest good, and toward things like Himself, toward order and the good of justice, toward the creature and its happiness. Gods love is active or passive; the active has a double object — God as highest good, and creatures as a lesser good. With respect to God the act is merely natural and necessary; with respect to creatures partly approval, partly favor or benevolence — John 3:16; Romans 5:8; 1 John 4:8-10.

XI. From what has been said of Gods love we gather three rules: 1. Gods love as benevolence toward creatures is wholly gratuitous and the fountain of all goods. 2. Gods love is wisely ordered in certain degrees according to the series of lovable things. 3. Of Gods special love by which He embraces us in Christ we can be made more certain from the very effects of divine love. XII. Hatred is the affection of separation by which God turns from the injustice and misery of creatures, and loves creatures less than Himself and others. Its primary object is sin; He also hates sinners inasmuch as they are alien from the study of piety — Psalm 5:5; 139:21-22; Zechariah 8:17.

XIII-XVI: goodness, benignity, grace, mercy §3.18.4

3.18.4XIII. Goodness is that by which God inclines toward communicating good outside Himself. That God is good is testified by Scripture and by all His works — Psalm 34:8; Matthew 19:17; Luke 18:19; Genesis 1:31; against the heresies of Cerdo, Marcion, and the Manicheeseses.

XIV. Benignity is that by which God, by giving some good, shows Himself beneficent to His creatures. The first progression of divine goodness is benignity; one general toward all creatures — Psalm 145:9; Matthew 5:45; another special toward the elect. XV. Grace is that by which God imparts some good to intelligent creatures, regarding none of their merits. Grace excludes the creatures merit; distinctions of grace into operating and cooperating, prevenient, concomitant and subsequent, sufficient and efficacious, we treat elsewhere.

XVI. Gods mercy is the affection of coming to the aid of the miserable, nothing obstructing by reason of sin. Gods mercy is taken actively or passively; here in the former way — Exodus 34:6; Romans 9:18; Ephesians 2:4; Titus 3:5. Just as grace is the second progression of divine goodness excluding merit, so mercy is its third progression, finding a remedy for the miserable.

XVII-XXIX: secondary affections — desire, abomination, joy, grief, hope, fear, wrath §3.18.5

3.18.5XVII. And these things concerning Gods attributes which have analogy with affections as it were primary: there follow attributes that resemble affections, as if arising from the primary, which are occupied not about good and evil commonly, but in species about that as present or absent, and are distinguished from the mode of our consideration inasmuch as they are conceived either in the concupiscible or in the irascible.

XVIII. In the concupiscible first is desire and abomination, then joy and grief. XIX. Desire is as it were Gods affection of obtaining things agreeing with His nature — faith and works of piety and justice prescribed by Himself to intelligent creatures and performable through His grace. XX. Abomination is that by which God execrates things abhorrent from His nature — unbelief, works of impiety and iniquity, and omission of remuneration.

XXI. Joy is that by which God delights in a good thing as present and agreeing with Himself and His will. XXII. Grief is that by which God holds Himself toward the sense of present evil. XXV. Hope is that by which God pursues the best good. XXVII. Confidence is that by which God with great spirit pursues the desired good. XXVIII. Fear is that by which God declines evil as a possible future. XXIX. Wrath is the affection of driving away by which God wills to punish the sinning creature.

XXX-XXXVIII: moral virtues; justice universal and particular §3.18.6

3.18.6XXX. These are Gods attributes which have analogy with affections: there follow those which are analogous to moral virtues, as moderators of those affections; they look either to all affections generally, as justice, or to some only, as patience which moderates wrath and punishments from wrath.

XXXI. Justice is that by which Gods will is constant toward rendering to Himself and to each other what is his. Gods justice is indeed through itself and in the thing itself one, just as His essence is one. XXXII. Universal is that by which God directs His actions conveniently to the rectitude of His infinite nature. XXXIII. Particular is that by which God, according to the status of the person which He regards in some certain action of His, renders to each his own.

XXXIV. And it is first toward Himself or toward creatures. XXXV. Toward Himself is that by which God renders to Himself and wills to be rendered by others that glory which is owed to Him as highest good. XXXVI. Toward creatures is that by which God does injury to no creature, whatever He decrees or does concerning it. XXXVIII. Disposing is that by which God most wisely orders all things.

Justice of wrath and vindication; patience, longsuffering, meekness, clemency §3.18.7

3.18.7Justice of wrath is that by which God most equitably exercises His judgments which He has threatened. Vindicating justice is that by which God destroys the reprobate; this God exercises both in the reprobate of this life and in eternal damnation. Justice of deed is that by which God, whatever He does in decreeing or executing, does conveniently to His infinite rectitude.

Patience is that by which God moderates wrath and punishments. LI. Longsuffering is that by which God suspends wrath, lest He hasten to drive away evil as soon as the creature merits it — Psalm 103:8-9; Nahum 1:3. LII. Meekness is that by which God tempers His wrath, lest it be too great, and lest its severity answer to the magnitude of crimes — Psalm 30:5; 103:10-11; Jeremiah 3:12.

LIV. Clemency is that by which God so moderates due punishments that they by no means surpass the creatures strength, and are much inferior to the merits of sins in gravity and duration — 2 Samuel 7:14-15; Psalm 89:33-34; Joel 2:13; Exodus 22:27. From these things rightly established concerning Gods attributes of the third genus, there follows CHAPTER NINETEEN, On Gods blessedness.

Chapter 19: On God's blessedness; definition §3.19.1

3.19.1CHAPTER NINETEEN. On Gods blessedness.

Thus far was the integrity of Gods life, which stands as virtue: there follows that which stands as blessedness, and it is the act of Gods life by which He so enjoys His infinite perfection fully known through the intellect and supremely loved through His will that He wholly rests in it.

All who confess that God is, throughout the whole world, call God most blessed. Thing His blessedness consists, many doubt, reasoning about His blessedness from our satiated appetites.

Against placing blessedness in power, external wisdom, or pleasure alone §3.19.2

3.19.2The Machiavellians of our time place blessedness in dominion alone. But they err (1) who constitute it in power and dominion alone, or in conservation of oneself by resisting power long in that. For horse and lion are more powerful than man, who yet rules them by wisdom; and a strong man without wisdom is not conserved, and tyrants themselves are of all the most unhappy. Thus a stone would be more blessed than an eagle or a man.

(2) Nor does it consist in wisdom of external things, because that comes about in us not without prior passion; and the wise man, if powerless, is exposed to many miseries, nor is he preserved by his wisdom if he is not good; and though he be best to himself, yet if he considers something better in another, he does not think himself blessed but becomes wretched by envy.

(3) Nor in the sole full enjoyment of pleasures of love. For who enjoys while ignorant and does not taste the enjoyment, nor can conserve himself in it — who will be blessed? Better is he who knows how to abound and to suffer want than he who abounds without sense. (4) Love of self also falls short of blessedness when something better is seen elsewhere, or what is loved cannot be made eternal. Therefore all who think blessedness consists in power alone or wisdom alone or love alone or any other private good err.

Boethius; blessedness as essential identity with God; power, wisdom, love §3.19.3

3.19.3More rightly Boethius defines the state as perfect by aggregation of all goods, which yet in God are not aggregated but are essentially one, since He can, knows, and loves all things, and so is Himself sufficient to Himself.

If you ask in which of these three perfections blessedness chiefly consists: you will not easily say in any one, but equally in the three. Yet if one ought to be judged more potent, love will be more potent, whose object is the good which formally blesses; but as known it is not the good. Love presupposes power and wisdom, and so as it were completes essence and blessedness.

Power does not suppose wisdom and love: but wisdom precedes love and is as it were ordered to it, although not formally but radically all blessedness is in power and likewise in wisdom and love. It begins as it were in power, proceeds through wisdom, is consummated in love.

Objection: hatred of sins and things God cannot undo; reply — essential beatitude §3.19.4

3.19.4But you will say: if God is blessed because He can, knows, and loves all things, He seems not perfectly blessed, because He holds many things in hatred, as sins, and many escape His power, because He cannot make what is done undone.

Reply: Gods blessedness is God Himself, the adequate object of His love, and of wisdom and power. For blessedness is not from outside and accidental to Him, as Bernard puts it, but for God to be and to be blessed are the same. Hence the being all things, and the knowledge of Himself which is at once of all things, make Gods blessedness.

But to be able outwardly, as regards active or passive power, and likewise to know and love exterior things, is not essential blessedness but a flight from and remedy of need, as in us who love food, wife, honor, by which we are conserved because we cannot be conserved in ourselves and through ourselves. Therefore in us to be and to be blessed are not the same. But God is not so, since the infinity of His perfections is without beginning of deficiency and need, and their object is the same as they themselves. It can be said that God outwardly can all things, knows all things, and loves all things, while in Himself He can be what He is, and knows Himself and loves Himself. For all things participate His likeness. But God is said not to be able and not to know and not to will certain things which are not truly beings — sins, contradictions, privations — concerning which it is certain that to be able, know, and love those does not hang on power, wisdom, and love, but on impotence, folly, and, so to speak, dislike, or a share of these.

Essential property; creatures beatific good; glory §3.19.5

3.19.5But Gods blessedness is an essential property, indeed the essence itself, which can be communicated to no creature — Isaiah 42:8; Jeremiah; 1 Corinthians 15:28; 1 Timothy 1:11; 6:15; Psalm 16:2,11. And yet it is the beatific good of intelligent creatures by reason of the object completing the act tending into the object and resting in the same, in which two the creatures blessedness consists and shines. For the object is the good which we enjoy. But the act is that by which we enjoy the good.

And it is glory or joy. III. Glory is that by which, on account of His infinite perfection, He excels all things. And so this attribute is indeed from Gods perfection, but with a certain respect outwardly, because He variously manifests His excellence above all things and His infinite perfection by external acts — Romans 1:23; 9:5; Psalm 8; Deuteronomy 32; 1 Timothy 1:11; 6:15.

And that either through unusual flashing and shining of light and splendor, or through opposed and split darkness, or through production of works which agree with His perfection and excellence — Matthew 17:2,5; Luke 2:9; Exodus; Psalm 19:1.

God objectively and effectively the blessedness of all; joy §3.19.6

3.19.6It is manifest that God is not only His own blessedness objectively and formally, but also of all things objectively and effectively. For all things are blessed in some measure by some good, and especially intelligent creatures; but God is the efficient and exemplar cause of every good, and every good is a certain participation of Him. There are indeed those who think God is also formally the creatures blessedness, because He is more intrinsic to things than their own act: but they err. For God is indeed in us, yet not some part of essence or our whole essence formally, but only causally and eminently.

And if indeed the highest good for each is its own being and conservation: yet because they neither are nor are conserved from themselves but from God: therefore they are also blessed by Him, and love Him more than themselves while they love themselves. For they love not only what they are, but would wish to be that always and everywhere and seek extensive and intensive infinity, which is in God alone, in whom there is never or anywhere any defect of goodness — which blessedness is called eternal life, which God does not acquire from elsewhere by His virtues, but by them gives it to others.

IV. Joy is that by which He pleasantly enjoys Himself. This is not a variable affection. For God is affected with perfect joy and perpetually delights in Himself, to use Lactantius word — Zephaniah 3:17. If you ask a philosopher concerning Gods blessedness, Aristotle of Stagira in On the Heavens book 1 chapter 9 attributes to God a life most sufficient to Himself. Nothing truer than this saying was brought forth by this pagan. CHAPTER TWENTY, On Gods figurative attributes, follows.

Chapter 20: On God's figurative attributes; rule of reduction §3.20.1

3.20.1CHAPTER TWENTY. On Gods figurative attributes.

Thus far were Gods proper attributes: there follow figurative ones, which are predicated of God by trope. But these are to be resolved and reduced to the proper, according to the rule: An improper locution ought to be resolved into a proper one, which is its standard and basis.

II. And some are metonymic, some ironic, some metaphoric, and finally some synecdochic.

III-IV: metonymic and ironic attributes §3.20.2

3.20.2III. Metonymic attributes are those which are said of God by metonymy. Thus God is called firmness — Psalm 18:2; strength — Psalm 22:19; our salvation and help — Psalm 27:1,9 — because He is the author and giver of our firmness, strength, salvation, and help. Thus He is called our song — Exodus 15:2 — because He is the subject of which we sing. And in the same sense our glory — Psalm 3:3; trust — Psalm 65; Jeremiah 17:17; our hope — 1 Timothy 1:1; Jeremiah 14:8.

IV. Ironic attributes are those which are enunciated of God by irony. To this are referred Genesis 3:22; 1 Kings 22:15; Job 38:3 and 40:2; Psalms; Jeremiah 4:10; 1 Corinthians 1:21,25.

V-VII: metaphoric attributes from man — anthropomorphism §3.20.3

3.20.3V. Metaphoric attributes are those attributed to God by metaphor. The fathers say these are predicated of God not theologically but economically, as may be seen in Theodoret, second dialogue, titled Unconfused. VI. And of these some are drawn from man, some from other creatures.

VII. From man are drawn those which are said of God by likeness from human nature alone. And here that celebrated manner of speaking has place, which they commonly call anthropomorphism and anthropopathy — as when to God are ascribed mans parts: soul — Isaiah; Jeremiah 5:9,29; Amos 6:8; members of the body, head — Daniel 7:9; face — Psalm 31; Exodus 33; eyes — Psalm 34:15; 2 Chronicles 16:9; pupil — Zechariah; mouth — Job 9; Jeremiah; ears — Psalms; nose — Jeremiah; neck — Jeremiah 18:17; hands — Numbers 11:23; Job 19:21; Acts 4:28; arm — Genesis; right hand — Psalm 118:15; finger — Exodus 31:18; heart — Genesis 6:6; Jeremiah 19:5; bowels — Isaiah; feet — Psalms; hinder parts — Exodus 33; internal senses such as memory and forgetfulness — Psalms; external, sight — Genesis 1:4; hearing — Psalms; smell — Genesis 8:21; affections such as gladness — Judges 9:13; grief — Genesis 6:6; wrath — Romans 1:18; zeal — 2 Kings 19; Isaiah 9:7 — concerning which we also saw above when we treated Gods life as integral.

VIII-IX: metaphors from other creatures; synecdoche; Maimonides §3.20.4

3.20.4VIII. But those drawn from other creatures are either common to man and other creatures, or peculiar to these. Common are place, time — Psalm 68; 17. Peculiar, as fire — Deuteronomy 4:24 and 9:3; Hebrews 12:29; shield — Psalms; light — Isaiah; way — Psalm 77; shadow — Psalm 91:1; wing — Deuteronomy 32; sun — Psalm 84:11.

IX. Synecdochic attributes are those attributed to God as it were by synecdoche. Thus the Father is called God, not with exclusion of the Son and Holy Spirit — John; 1 Corinthians 8:6.

And these things concerning Gods attributes, whose perfection is based on the negation of imperfections concerning Him, said both properly and figuratively — concerning which things worthy of observation are those which the Guide of the Perplexed, Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, Moreh Nevukhim, reports: The Law speaks according to the language of the sons of men. Whose sense is: whatever men from the beginning of their thought can attain by their understanding and imagination, that in Scripture is attributed to the Creator. Attributes attributed to God by negation are true attributes; affirmative attributes are greatly imperfect. CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE, On the most holy Trinity, follows.

Chapter 21: On the most holy Trinity; from essence to subsistence §3.21.1

3.21.1CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE. On the most holy Trinity.

Thus far we have treated of GOD as to existence and essence: next is that we consider Him according to His subsistence, according to which the one and highest God is the eternal Father, the Son begotten from eternity from the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from both — undivided TRINITY and unmixed UNITY.

This mystery was handed down somewhat obscurely by the ancient Church of the Jews in the Old Testament, but more clearly and illustriously explained by the LOGOS Himself, the second person of the Trinity, after He assumed flesh, in the New Testament, in which the interpretation of the Old is contained, and this secret is more expressly set forth and more frequently inculcated.

One God vs many gods; Trinity beyond demonstration from cause or effects §3.21.2

3.21.2It is indeed of the same madness to acknowledge no God and to assert many gods with the ancient Sabaeans, in Averroes and Maimonides, to whom Moses law was chiefly opposed — Deuteronomy 6:4. We understand God to be one when we understand that He is, as our weakness bears. For that must be unique which is best, greatest, and most perfect. Nor is he highest who has a superior or equal. And if two are set as equals, neither will be highest.

Therefore we no less execrate the delirium of Cerdo, Marcion, and the Manichees bringing in two gods unequal in nature and office, than either the Valentinians multiple offspring of Aeons, or the Sabaeans and other pagans innumerable swarms of deities. But that the same is threefold in persons is a secret unsearchable to human reason, to be adored with humble faith and piety, not searched with curious or scrupulous rashness.

For this Trinity can neither be demonstrated from its cause, which it has none, nor from effects, which do not declare this distinction of persons precisely and evidently, but only what belongs to each person. But whatever may be learned of this secret is to be learned from Gods word, and one must piously rest in the measure of this divine revelation.

Platonists and scholastics cannot prove the Trinity; Davenant on fundamentals §3.21.3

3.21.3For what is read in Trismegistus, Plato, Plotinus and other Platonic philosophers concerning three principles — mind, word, and spirit — is altogether alien from this secret, because those men invent three hypostases and therefore three separate gods; though this opinion of theirs seems to have flowed from the ancient doctrine of the Hebrews and Chaldeans and remnants of pure religion.

Among the Scholastics Scotus, Gandavensis, Bonaventure and others try to demonstrate this mystery by natural reasons: whom our Keckermann in his theological system somewhat emulates. But experience teaches that no one would have thought of it unless some tradition from the patriarchal family had spread to the Gentiles. Yet once revelation is given, it is not hard to dissolve the adversaries gathered reasons.

Around the most fundamental things certain least-fundamental problems can arise, which the ancient fathers, if they had been raised in their age, would never have tried to define with the danger of stirring or continuing schism among the churches — as the most reverend father Dr. John Davenant, bishop of Salisbury, warns. That God is one in essence, threefold in persons distinct among themselves, that the Son is begotten from the Father, that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Father and Son, that these three persons are coeternal and coequal — all these have rightly been defined and placed among fundamental articles.

Name Trinity; persons; one essence three subsistences §3.21.4

3.21.4Moreover, by the word Trinity here we do not signify a ternary numbering number simply, but persons distinct in one essence. A person in God is a hypostasis or individual subsistence, incommunicable, living, rational, willing, powerful, and active John 5; 14.

But there are three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, not three Gods, because the essence or deity is one — Colossians 2:9; 1 John 5:7. Thus the orthodox fathers established the distinction from the words ousia and hypostasis. There are not three Gods, three Lords, and so on.

Person with the relations by which they are constituted are subsistences — John 14. Yet they are distinct not by reason alone but in the thing itself, by reason of a certain property and relation.

Relations and notional acts; five notions of the persons §3.21.5

3.21.5If the Father alone begets, it is proper to Him to beget; if the Holy Spirit alone proceeds and is spirated, it is proper to Him to proceed and be spirated. And there is a similar relation in mode between Father and Son.

But a notion is nothing other than a property or notional act, which by synecdoche of the genus denotes relation. Hence in the schools there are in all five notions of the divine persons, concerning which besides the ancient scholastics and most learned men Jerome Zanchi and Franciscus Junius, see the Leiden theologians Synopsis of purer theology, disputation 7 theses 21-24.

The Trinity of persons can in some way be illustrated by likenesses from the book of nature: but it ought to be demonstrated from the book of Scripture alone. For from finite things to Gods infinite essence the consequence is too weak, and this secret is higher than natures light.

Order of persons; generation; transition §3.21.6

3.21.6In the order of persons we set the begetter before the begotten in thought — Matthew 28:19; John 5:26-27. Active generation is attributed to the Father; generation properly so called comes about by communication of the whole essence.

We rightly assert that the Father has begotten the Son from Himself: the principle which begets is the Father; the principle by which generation comes about is nature. Hence the begetting and begotten person constitute opposite relations.

The Trinity of persons can in some way be illustrated by likenesses from the book of nature; but it ought to be demonstrated from Scripture alone. CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO, On GOD THE FATHER, follows.

Chapter 22: On God the Father; definition §3.22.1

3.22.1CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO. On God the Father.

The Father is the first person in the most holy Trinity, who brings forth His eternal Word, and together with the Son spirates the Holy Spirit. He is called Father not tropically but properly. For just as He properly is, lives, understands, wills, acts: so also He properly begets, though He does not beget as bodily things do.

Hence wisely Basil the Great in book 1 against Eunomius: I judge that no dogma is more important and greater than that faith in the Father and in the Son is in the gospel of our salvation.

Useful observations: Father absolutely, toward Son, toward Spirit §3.22.2

3.22.2II. But here there are certain useful observations and rules. 1. The first person is called Father properly, not tropically.

2. The person of the Father is to be considered in three ways. Absolutely in Himself, because He is devoid of every origin, whether we regard according to essence or according to mode of subsisting. In order to the Son, whom in the common essence shining from His perfection in the Son He begets by an internal and eternal act. In order to the Holy Spirit, whom together with the Son in the common essence He spirates from the perfection both of His own and of the Sons shining in the Holy Spirit.

3. The begetting by which God the Father begot the Son from eternity differs more than in whole genus from every physical begetting. For in physical things it is transient; in divine things it is pure immanent act. Nor has place here section, or extension, or propagation and multiplication, or derivation and transfusion or effusion.

True speech: person begets person in unity of essence §3.22.3

3.22.3Yet this secret is not placed in speculation alone, as genera and species are conceived in our intellects operation, but even when our intellects operation ceases, there is a true multiplication of hypostases, and a true distinction of them, without any confusion or separation among themselves.

Therefore to reduce the mode of this generation to the laws of human nativity or of any created thing is inept, impious, even sacrilegious. Therefore those who love to speak cautiously and circumspectly avoid certain of the ancients kyriologies, such as: the divine essence begets or is begotten; essence begets a person; God from His essence begets God.

But truly and properly it is said that the Father has begotten the Son, person a person, hypostasis a hypostasis, not from essence but in the unity of essence, which the Father gave wholly to the Son, not by alienation but by communication. CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE, On the SON, follows.

Chapter 23: On the Son; begotten not created or adopted §3.23.1

3.23.1CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE. On the Son.

The Son is the second person in the most holy Trinity, the Logos of the Father by communication of the same deity which the Father has without origin, begotten from eternity from the Father.

We call Him Son neither by creation properly so called, because all things that were created were created through Him — John 1:3 — nor by adoption, because all who are adopted sons are adopted in Him — John 1:12; Ephesians 1:5-6 — but by generation, as Son by nature, having the whole divinity communicated from the Father — Micah 5:2. He is called Person in the same signification as the Father, because He is a subsistence, individual, incommunicable — John 1 — of living nature — John 5 — understanding — John 1:18 — willing — Matthew 11:27; John 5:21 — powerful — Philippians 3 — acting — John 5:17,19. And indeed a person in the most holy Trinity, that is divine, or, what is the same, that one and highest God, coessential with the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Five classes of proofs of the Sons deity §3.23.2

3.23.2We demonstrate this chiefly by four distinct classes of arguments. II. The first class is from the names attributed to the Son by Scripture. For (1) He is called God not only attributively — John 1:1; Romans 9:5 — but also subjectively — 1 Timothy 3:16; Hebrews 1:8-9; Titus 2:13. (2) He is called Son of God properly and univocally — Romans 8:32; John 1:18. (3) He is called King of kings and Lord of lords, Lord of glory — Revelation 19:16; 1 Corinthians 2:8.

IV. The third class is from divine works. V. The fourth class is from proper worship of God. VI. The fifth class is from testimonies.

From these things well established is gathered agreement and distinction between Father and Son. Agreement is in one and the same nature and essence — Philippians 2:6; according to the Nicene synod homoousios with the Father. Distinction is in the mode of subsisting by which each has divinity. For the Father has it from none, the Son has it communicated to Himself from the Father.

Against Socinus and Photinians on eternal generation §3.23.3

3.23.3Against these things Johannes Crellius the Frenchman, with his Socinus, in vain argues, denying the eternal generation of the Son of God from the Fathers essence — (1) because the son would be son of himself, (2) because there would be infinite sons, (3) because the Son of God from eternity both would have been and would not have been, (4) because the Son of God would still be being generated and would have to be generated into all eternity — which absurdities arise from a sinister confusion of finite and infinite nature.

To these with his Socinus also contradict Smalcius, Ostorodius, and before them Servetus, Valentinus Gentilis, Alciati, Blandrata, Franciscus Davidis, and the patriarchs of all these, Photinus bishop of Sirmium condemned in the year 351 by the Sirmian council, and Paul of Samosata. Compare Sozomen, Epiphanius, Augustine on heresies; among juniors Ursinus, Calvin, Zanchi, Junius, Polanus, Tarnovius, Gerhard; among pontificals Bellarmine book 1 on Christ chapter 18.

On the Holy Spirit; name; four things to be proved §3.23.4

3.23.4CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE continued. On the Holy Spirit.

The Holy Spirit is the third person in the most holy Trinity, who emanates from the Father, is sent by the Son, and proceeds from both as distinct according to hypostasis. Spirit signifies (1) properly and adequately a being most simple and subtle in first act and essence, but in second act and efficacy most active. By singular property it is attributed to the hypostatic virtue, or third person which is in God, and that not rarely with the addition Spirit of Elohim, Spirit of the Lord, Holy Spirit — Genesis 1:2; Isaiah 11:2; 63:10; Matthew 12:28.

II. But concerning the Holy Spirit four things chiefly are to be proved: (1) that He truly is a person; (2) that He is an infinite person, or true God; (3) that He is a person proceeding from Father and Son; (4) that according to hypostasis He is distinguished from Father and Son.

Spirit is true God; proceeds from Father and Son §3.23.5

3.23.5VI. Secondly, that the Holy Spirit is true God the divine names, divine attributes, divine works, and divine worship show. XIV. Thirdly, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father — John 15:26. XV. And that the same proceeds from the Son — John 16:7; 20:22. For just as the Son is generated from eternity from the Father, so the Spirit is spirated from eternity from both.

XVI. But the difference between generation and procession consists in the mode of production. XVIII. Fourthly, the Holy Spirit is distinguished from Father and Son not only according to name but also according to hypostasis — Isaiah 48:16; 61:1; John 14:16,26; 15:26; 1 John 5:7.

Let the reader set a limit to curiosity, and not fetch upon himself troublesome and perplexed disputations more greedily than is fitting, as Calvin Institutes 1.13.19 piously and prudently warns, and Twisse: whenever it occurs that one must treat of the Trinity, I desire the matter to be dispatched in as few words as possible. CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR, On creation in general, follows.

Chapter 24: On creation in general; from God to His efficiencies §3.24.1

3.24.1CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR. On creation in general.

Thus far we have seen concerning GOD, prince and king of man and of all things, as to His essence and subsistence, by which His sufficiency is contained, as the primary object of Christian religion — both what His nature is or what sort God is, and who He is, or why this nature is to be attributed, lest something unsuitable be attributed to the highest true God, or another or alien GOD be held for that true and highest: there follow His efficiencies, as causes on account of which religion is owed to God, namely creation and the restoration of man.

The necessity of Christ and of Christian religion hangs and shines chiefly from these two causes, on account of which God rightly demands it from men — both as creator and as savior in the Son of His love, under which is also contained that He wills to be glorifier.

Against curious decree-disputes; creation as alphabet of revelation §3.24.2

3.24.2At length indeed and learnedly there are commonly inserted here dogmas concerning divine decrees and counsels, whose consideration, as it is hard and abstruse, so will be undertaken most well and safely of all a posteriori in their own places: lest we further divide the German churches already long enough divided by dangerous altercations concerning predestination, reprobation, providence, as some years past happened, alas, in neighboring Belgium.

But soberly and with great religion, without scrupulosity, we must think and speak concerning the Lords counsels and ways — Isaiah 55; Romans 11:33-34. Nothing here can flesh and blood, but all things are to be sought from the heavenly Fathers Apocalypse, which Genesis 1:1 God in the beginning and before all things made known through the act of CREATION of these heavens and this earth, which certainly is the revelation of revelations, and by its power embraces all the rest. This is the alphabet of every notion and action.

II-III: creation considered in itself; definition §3.24.3

3.24.3II. But creation is to be considered both in itself and in order to creatures. III. Creation considered in itself is Gods action by which God the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit produced from nothing heaven and earth and all things that are in them — Genesis 1:1; Psalm 33:9; Hebrews 11:3; Revelation 4:11.

Creation is production of a thing from nothing of itself and of subject, or, as they say, from negative and privative non-being. And therefore, when we speak of permission, there is something middle between doing and hindering lest someone do; but creation properly is the effective fulfilling of the decree through Gods will and power.

IV-VII: immediate and mediate creation §3.24.4

3.24.4IV. And it is immediate or mediate. Immediate is that by which God without a creatures medium, by His single will things — as heaven and earth in the beginning, angels, the rational soul.

VI. Mediate is that by which things are produced from principles already created, God yet primarily acting — as plants, animals from earth and waters on the following days.

VII. But the existence of things mediately created hangs no less from God than of those immediately created; for God works in all things.

XIII-XVI: efficient, impulsive, material causes §3.24.5

3.24.5XIII. Nor is creation of all things efficiently from God alone only, but also no creature can create. XIV. But the impulsive cause of creation is Gods communicative goodness, or the love by which God willed to communicate His good outwardly.

Matter properly so called did not lie beforehand for created things; for creation is from nothing. Those who invent eternal matter with Aristotle, or two principles with the Manichees, wander from the truth.

XVII-XX: form and final cause; inequality of things §3.24.6

3.24.6XXVII. The form of creation is the divine command itself or fiat — Psalm 33:9. From which God is called FOUNTAIN. XVIII. The final cause of creation is Gods glory, and the good of creatures subordinated to Gods glory — Proverbs 16:4; Romans 11:36; Revelation 4:11.

XX. Inequality of things is not from matter but from Gods most wise ordination, that there may be order and harmony in the universe.

XXII. And these things concerning creation commonly: there will follow creatures, which are regarded either jointly or discretely. Regarded jointly they come under the name WORLD: discretely they are called the works of the beginning, of the first night, and of the six days. CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE, On the world, follows.

Chapter 25: On the world; definition and names §3.25.1

3.25.1CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE. On the world.

The world is the fabric of heaven and this earth and of all things in these most beautifully and intensely ordered, produced by GOD the Father through His Word and Spirit from things not apparent — Hebrews 11:3.

Mundus among the Latins, Pliny being author, is so called from perfect and absolute elegance. Among the Hebrews olam hazzeh, on account of a beginning remote from mens memory; and among the Greeks aion — Hebrews 11:3 — not as if it were eternal and had always been, but from the stable order of things which God established in it. Also to pan, the universe, because it embraces all existing things besides God. Also kosmos on account of the adornment and beauty of singular things.

Worlds unity, finitude, beginning; against eternity of the world §3.25.2

3.25.2The world is one, not many; finite, not infinite; it has a beginning of time, it is not eternal. Those who invent an eternal world with Aristotle oppose Scripture — Genesis 1:1; Psalm 90:2; John 17:5.

The world was created in time, or with time, not in a pre-existing time. For time is the measure of the motion of creatures.

Goodness of the world; use of non-being for multitude §3.25.3

3.25.3The world in itself is good — Genesis 1:31. Non-being formally is nothing, but effectively God: not because He effects nothing, but because He uses it, and orders it to the number and distinction of things.

For since in the production of things God shows the riches of His goodness participable in innumerable ways, and cannot be wholly or totally exhausted by one thing, He makes many things, but ordered to one, by using non-being, that multitude may stand. Hence in God there is one idea of Himself, which, as participable, is multiplex without end. Therefore non-being always distinguishes.

More, if you wish, see in Jerome Zanchi, Zacharias Ursinus, Amandus Polanus. For here I am forced to break off the web. CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX, On those things which were created in the beginning, follows.

Chapter 26: On things created in the beginning; heaven and earth §3.26.1

3.26.1CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX. On those things which were created in the beginning, and namely on the highest heaven, Angels, and earth.

In the beginning God created heaven and earth — Genesis 1:1. Heaven here is taken both properly for the expanse and heavenly things, and figuratively. Figuratively either by metonymy or by synecdoche.

By metonymy: (1) For God its possessor and author — Daniel 4:26; Matthew 21; Luke 15:18,21; John 3:27. (2) For other heaven-dwellers — Job 15:15; Psalm 89:6. (3) For the church militant on earth — Daniel 8:10; Revelation 9:1; 12:7. (4) For meteors — Leviticus 26:19. By synecdoche: (1) For the highest heaven only — Mark 16:19. (2) For the starry heaven — Psalm 19:6. (3) For the air — Genesis 1:26. But in the present heaven is taken by Moses both for the angelic heaven and for the heaven-dwellers produced by God in the beginning: but Earth for the other principle, from which these interior things which the highest heaven encloses — except the rational soul or our immortal spirit — were produced later.

III: heaven produced in the beginning of time; angels §3.26.2

3.26.2III. The heavens were produced in the beginning of time, and with them the Angels, intelligent spirits, created by God immediately.

Angels are spiritual substances, complete, incorporeal, understanding, willing, powerful. They are not eternal but created; they are not everywhere by essence as God is, but where God has willed them to be.

Orders and hierarchies are distinguished, concerning which one must judge soberly from Scripture, not from Pseudo-Dionysius.

Earth as incomplete principle; chaos §3.26.3

3.26.3Earth in the beginning was produced incompletely, as is clear from chapter 24. It was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep — Genesis 1:2.

That chaos was not eternal matter, but a created subject from which God on the following days brought forth distinct species. The Spirit of God was brooding upon the waters — Genesis 1:2 — preparing the matter for the Hexaemeron.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN, On the Hexaemeron or the works of the six days, follows.

Chapter 27: On the six days of creation §3.27.1

3.27.1CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN. On the Hexaemeron, or the works of the six days.

The Hexaemeron is the third act of creation, by which through the Word (And God said) God completed, in a threefold ordering across twice three days, every part of that earth which the Father had produced as a threefold unity in the beginning and which the Holy Spirit had brooded over in the first night: (1) on the first day light from darkness; (2) our visible heavens and the air from the waters; (3) dry land and seas, herbs and trees from the dry land; (4) for the distinction and government of darkness and light, or of day and night, and for the illumination of this our earth, other luminaries — namely the stars, the sun, and the moon — placed in the watery heaven; (5) from the marine waters under the expanse, fishes and birds that would multiply in those waters, in the air, and on the earth; (6) finally from our germinating earth animals, and us human beings, and besides our multiplication together with fishes and birds, food of herbs for every living soul and of trees especially for us.

In this third act of creation it is especially worth noting that the works of the fourth day answer the work of the first, those of the fifth the work of the second, and those of the sixth the work of the third, as autopsy and comparison of the Mosaic text clearly show from Genesis 1:3 to the end of the chapter.

Three Augustinian notes; Day 1 light distinguished from darkness §3.27.2

3.27.2Three things are not unfittingly noted in this Hexaemeron from Augustine. (1) That in the work of creation, though it is most miraculous, God instituted nature, and what was made is not to be sought as miracles but as natures and natural laws. (2) That the historical truth Moses narrates concerning creation must be firmly held and not twisted to human imaginations. (3) That no opinion of any philosopher or holy man is to be opposed to sacred Scripture when it narrates the beginnings of things. Here that saying truly holds: whatever is most ancient is most true.

II. The work of the first day is light, the most subtle part of that mass which God by the Word called upward from darkness and so distinguished that light received the name of day and darkness the name of night. It is worth noting that God did not say Let heaven be made from earth — because heaven and earth were produced from nothing, not made from something — and to declare simple emanation He first said In the beginning God created heaven and earth; but light was made. When God said Let there be light, He commanded that heat dispersed through so great a mass be united and manifest itself. That self-manifestation is light, as the Apostle testifies in Ephesians 5:13.

On the first day light was distinguished from darkness — both with respect to place, since light was made in one hemisphere and darkness in the other, and with respect to time, since light is called day and darkness night. This agrees with true philosophy and disagrees with Aristotelian physiology, which invents heat and light as arising accidentally from the attrition of air rather than as a most noble being made by God, as Moses testifies. That same physiology takes darkness, which is the face of real matter, for a mere privation; yet Moses testifies that God divided light from darkness, and darknesses, though less noble than light, are not mere nothing — Genesis 1:4; Isaiah 45:7; Job 26:10; 28:3.

III: Day 2 heaven and air by expanding the waters §3.27.3

3.27.3III. The works of the second day are heaven and air, produced by GOD through the Word by expanding and distinguishing between some waters and others.

Someone may ask how heaven, created in the beginning, is now said to have been made on the second day. Reply: in the beginning the angelic heaven was created from nothing; here, however, the expanse from the watery part of the earth produced in the beginning and dissolved in the first night, the earthly thickness removed, received the character of heaven and air, and seems properly called shamayim by the Hebrews, as if where the waters are. Bede and Strabus say the empyrean heaven was created on the first day — which we with Moses said was produced in the beginning — and on the second the starry heaven, and that this is the firmament of which Basil the Great, Ambrose, Bonaventure, Telesio, and the Pythagoreans speak. The watery heaven or expanse distinguishing upper from lower waters is therefore the work of the second day.

V: Day 3 sea, dry land, herbs, and trees §3.27.4

3.27.4V. The work of the third day is the distribution of the waters into seas, the appearance of dry land, and the production of herbs and trees.

When the sea has been formed, dry land appears, which is called earth. Augustine thinks this happens formally on the third day and only materially on the first; other fathers think the name — or rather the nature — is then revealed, as Basil teaches against those who assign things an unknown nature in the Peripatetic school beyond what always lies open. Finally the uncovered earth, immediately fertilized by heat and moisture, brings forth herbs and trees by God's command before the creation of the sun, so that it germinated, Ambrose testifies, not from the sun but from God's precept; the sun afterward executes God's commands — and so do the other elements. He omitted stones and minerals because they are nearest to earth. On this third day the adornment of the elements begins after their distinction. Summarily, then, there are four works of the third day: (1) Sea, (2) Dry land, (3) Herb, (4) Trees — of which more fully in geographic and botanical writings.

Day 4 luminaries in heaven for light upon the earth §3.27.5

3.27.5The work of the fourth day is the production of luminaries in heaven — sun, moon, and other stars — to carry light upon the earth. Moses narrates that the earth germinated before the sun and stars were made, because he first teaches which substances God made. The sun was therefore made the executor, not the institutor, of nature, and fittingly on the fourth day, as Moses teaches in Genesis 1:14 and following.

Moses speaks of the stars with respect to us to whom he was giving the law. For they can be considered, Aquinas testifies, either according to their own act, or with respect to God whom they serve, or with respect to us for whom they are useful — whence Deuteronomy warns us not to adore the sun, moon, and stars which were made for our ministry. When Moses says God made the greater and lesser luminary — the SUN and the MOON — he speaks to humans of our system, for whom to sense the moon is the second luminary presiding over the night. And he explains the use of the luminaries: that they make all things manifest by illuminating; that they distinguish day and night; that they are for seasons, days, and years.

We also condemn here the Muhammadan delirium that the moon was made by God equally bright as the sun, but that the angel Gabriel, flying by chance, extinguished it by the wind of his wings. What is more foolish than that so great a work of God could be extinguished by an angel by chance, and was not so made from God's intention for the utility of the earth and other causes?

Days 5–6: fishes, birds, land animals, and humankind §3.27.6

3.27.6XVIII. The work of the fifth day is the production of fishes and birds for the adornment of the waters and the air. For just as on the fourth day stars are made for the adornment of heaven, so on the fifth fishes and birds for the adornment of the waters, and on the sixth walking things and reptiles for the adornment of the earth. Therefore, as if by critical correspondence, the first answers the fourth, the second the fifth, and the third the sixth. God said: Let the waters bring forth the creeping thing of living soul and the flying thing upon the earth. This precept is the institution of nature, completed by power, wisdom, and love, and is called the art of God implanted in things, leading them to their ends.

XIX. The work of the sixth day is the production of all the living things of the earth of three kinds. XX. And it is of brutes or of those endowed with reason. Concerning the creation of brutes Moses in Genesis 1:24–25, teaching, constitutes three genera of them — namely some cattle and tame, reptiles, others wild and sylvan — of whose nature and use philosophers treat more fully and more subtly in Physics. These were fittingly produced on the sixth day from the earth, which answers the third; and after the less perfect species the more perfect are made, and finally humankind, the most perfect of all.

Chapter 28: On the mode of production, parts, marriage, possession, and chief dignity of humankind §3.28.1

3.28.1CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT. On the mode of production, parts, marriage, possession, and chief dignity of humankind.

Thus far concerning the origin of humankind as far as concerns his principle, namely God, whose being, existence, self-sufficiency, and power variously weighed: there follows the MODE by which humankind arose, which is his production from red earth with the breath of the spirit of life according to the image and likeness of the Creator.

Humankind, as he was the last of creatures, was also the compendium of all creatures both immediately and mediately perfect, participating their nature as to spirit and these as to body: the epitome of the world, the horizon of time and eternity. He was moreover also the end of those mediately perfect, and therefore viewed in them and above them with respect to the Creator's intention. Therefore he is said to have been created in another mode than the other creatures. For those were produced by the Word alone: Let there be light, let there be an expanse, and so on; but humankind as if by greater counsel and deliberation: Let us make humankind — Genesis 1:26 — whose image's reason is declared to us by (1) Christ's human nature, pure and whole as in Adam before the fall; (2) human nature glorified in heaven; (3) universal sin, which succeeded into the place of this lost image; (4) begun renovation, by which it begins to be restored in us — Colossians 3:10; Ephesians 4:24.

II–VII: definition; essential parts — body and rational immortal spirit §3.28.2

3.28.2II. Humankind is the last of creatures, made by GOD through the Word from the dust of the earth, and by breath into his nostrils made a living soul, endowed with immortal rational spirit according to the image of God after His likeness. Briefly and in the philosophical manner humankind is defined a rational animal; we here, considering him in order to his creation, have described him from the biblical text — Genesis 1:26–27; 9:6; Ecclesiastes 7:29; Acts 17:28; 1 Corinthians 11:7.

III. In humankind there are to be considered essential parts, sex, and finally proper affections. IV. His essential parts are the animated body and the rational spirit. V. The human BODY is his visible part, a fleshy structure supported by bones and covered by skin, animated by breath — Genesis 2:7; Job 10:11; Matthew 6:25; 1 Corinthians 12:12. VI. The rational and immortal SPIRIT is the invisible part of humankind, powerful with intellect and will, so united to the human body that nevertheless it can be separated from it — Genesis 2:7; Zechariah 12:1; Matthew 10:28; Acts 7:59; 2 Corinthians 5; 12:2; 1 Thessalonians 5:23; Revelation 6:9. VII. This spirit, though it dwells in the body, is through itself an essence without body.

Mind above elements; intellect, will, executive power §3.28.3

3.28.3We believe that to the well-formed body and living soul — which humankind has in common with all fishes and birds of the fifth day and terrestrial animals of the sixth, Genesis 1:20 and 30 — adorned, the mind sent in by God is coupled, which we confirm by these REASONS to be more divine than the vegetative and sensing soul. (1) Because no effect is elevated above its principal and adequate cause. Therefore the human soul is in reality more divine than the sensing spirit. The human mind, both by understanding and by seeking, thinks above the sun and the heaven of heavens and worlds however many, and always understands something beyond what it knows, into infinity. From which we conclude that it is not an effect of sun and elements, as the sensitive spirit is, but the offspring of the Infinite whom we call God.

VIII. The faculties of the rational soul are these. IX. Intellect is the faculty of the soul by which we apprehend, discern, and either approve or disapprove objects under the reason of truth — theoretical and practical; here observation and conscience. See Ames, Book 1 on conscience. X. Will is the faculty of the rational soul which seeks objects under the reason of good and turns from evil. The nature of this faculty is not to be compelled, and according to its first institution to be restricted by no necessity to extremes. XI. Executive power is the faculty of the soul by which we effect or impede or at least permit practical objects.

XII–XVI: sex; male and female; first parents Adam and Eve §3.28.4

3.28.4XII. So much concerning the essential parts of humankind: there follows sex, by which, distinguished by the organs of generation, he furnishes origin to his descendants. XIII. And humankind according to sex is male and female. This difference of sex is necessary for generation, and so for the perfection of the human race. For each being is then called perfect in physics when it can generate its like. Therefore, since the male alone cannot generate, he is not altogether judged perfect for the consummation of his genus unless he also have the other portion of himself. On that account Christ in Matthew 19:4, praising Moses' text, says: Have you not read that the Maker from the beginning made male and female? And Moses in Genesis 2:18: It is not good that the human be alone; I will make him a help that is before him. And in verses 21–22 the Lord God caused Adam to sleep with deepest sleep, drew out one of the ribs, and constructed the woman from that rib.

XIV. Sex shines forth both in the first parents and in their descendants. XV. The first parents are the first humans. XVI. Adam was the first man, divinely formed; Eve the first woman, constructed from Adam's rib.

XIX: marriage; paradise prepared for the first pair §3.28.5

3.28.5XIX. MARRIAGE is the covenant by which male and female are joined into one society of life for mutual help, the generation and education of offspring, and the conservation of chastity. Concerning the marriage of Adam and Eve see Zanchi on the works of God and others.

That garden of paradise was so prepared that it was most conveniently inhabited by the first parents: a pleasant place, distinguished by the trees of life and of the knowledge of good and evil, irrigated by rivers. Yet it is to be held that paradise did not lie open so widely as the whole world, nor is it to be sought everywhere by the allegorical deliriums of the Origenists. All those views are to be rejected which either invent paradise as merely allegorical or place it outside this earth against Moses' historical narration in Genesis 2:8–15.

Image and likeness of God in the whole human; natural and supernatural §3.28.6

3.28.6There follows the affection of humankind, which is that the whole human, both by soul and by body, was created according to the image of God and after His likeness, in which his highest perfection is beheld. Image differs from likeness as species from genus; among some, likeness is the exegesis of image, as if it were said the most similar image of God — Genesis 1:27; 5:1.

The word image signifies either the archetype itself to whose exemplar another is made, or that which is made toward another. In the former acceptance only Christ can be called the image of God; in the latter, the image of God is beheld in no visible thing except in humankind. We assert that its subject first and through itself is the rational soul, most beautifully adorned with the gifts of justice, holiness, and truth. Yet we do not altogether exclude the human body from the reason of this image. Rightly, therefore, the whole human is said to have been created according to the image of God — which is clear even from the restoration of this image, in which not only the soul but the whole human, and even the body itself, is so restored as to be the temple of the Holy Spirit. And the image of God exists not in the man only but also in the woman, though in the man it is more illustrious.

Natural and supernatural parts of the image §3.28.7

3.28.7The parts of this image can be distinguished thus: some are natural to the human, some supernatural; some essential, some accidental; some belong to him wholly, others according to some part — namely soul or body. What is natural and essential to the soul is to be a spirit and endowed with the faculty of understanding and willing both according to nature and according to the mode of freedom. What is supernatural and accidental: the knowledge of God and of things required for eternal salvation, which comes under the name of wisdom, and the rectitude and holiness of the will according to that knowledge. Immortality is thus far essential to the soul that it cannot die unless it cease to be; but supernatural and accidental insofar as it is from grace and the assistance of conservation. To the body, immortality is wholly supernatural and accidental. To the whole human externally belongs dominion over creatures.

Moreover that image of God which humankind is said to have lost in the fall was not wholly natural but supernatural, granted by God's peculiar gift — justice, innocence, integrity: in the intellect, supernatural knowledge of God's essence and will; in the will, the highest inclination to known good, or the highest obedience and subjection toward God; in the appetite, the highest concord with reason. Finally the end for which humankind was thus created is that he would acknowledge, love, and worship his Creator God and live blessed with Him forever — by which act of creation God most clearly exhibited the glory of His wisdom, goodness, and power.

Chapter 29: On the governance of God in general §3.29.1

3.29.1CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE. On the governance of God in general.

Creation finished, God rested — that is, He did not go on founding new species of things, but rested in what He had founded: there follows governance, which is God's actual providence, by which He conserves, rules, and orders the whole world and cares for each creature and its actions and passions, decently and as befits them, so that nothing in this universe of things subsists, acts, or is moved without Him, nor falls out otherwise than as seems good to Him, unto the good of the creatures themselves — especially of the godly — and unto the declaration of divine perfection.

For order requires that, after we have treated the doctrine of creation as the first foundation of God's kingdom in time according to His eternal counsel — which God's sabbath followed (Genesis 2:2; Exodus 20:11; Hebrews 4:4) — we now come to governance, as is clear from chapter 24, aphorism 2. Governance, otherwise commonly called actual providence, does not signify some property of God, nor a quality or power or habit, but an act — not inward and within Himself, but outward and external, about an object other than God, and that not as united to God from eternity in His intellection, but as separate and existing apart: an act, I say, of practical intellect or of will using the intellect, not finished in a single moment but continuous through the moments of duration; which, viewed as powerful and continuous, you may not badly so name.

Object of providence; necessary, contingent, rational, and irrational; God not author of sin §3.29.2

3.29.2And He rules all things universally (Nehemiah 9:6; Ephesians 4:6; Amos 3:6; Lamentations 3:37–38; Acts 17:25; Hebrews 1:3) — specially the necessary (Exodus 12:46; Job 5:10; 37:5; 38:26–27; Psalm 104:13–14), the contingent (Exodus 21:12–13; Job 1:21; Proverbs 16:1, 33; Matthew 10:29–30), the rational (Genesis 45:8; 50:20; Exodus 4:11; 2 Samuel 16:10; Psalm 34:16, 21; Proverbs 21:1; Isaiah 10:5; Lamentations 3:37; Daniel 4:32; Acts 4:27–28), and things without reason (Job 37 throughout; Psalm 104:9; Psalm 135:6–9) — so that nothing falls out otherwise than as seems good to Him (1 Samuel 2:25; Isaiah 8:10; Romans 8; 11:36; 1 Corinthians 9:9–10).

Yet God does not thereby become the author of any sin (Genesis 18:25; Deuteronomy 32:4; Psalm 5:4–6; Jeremiah 19:5; Habakkuk 1:13; John 8:44; James 1:13, 17; 1 John 1:5). He also rules those things in which chance is present of itself (Exodus 21:13; Ecclesiastes 9:11; 1 Samuel 6:9). By these and like testimonies it is proved that the object of providence is not only heavenly and incorruptible things, as some wished (Job 22:12–14), but that no thing of higher or lower nature is to be excepted. Nor is it beneath God's majesty if He also rules the least things, since He is creator and Lord of all, and He is not made low who looks to low things (Psalm 113:5–6); and the greater care with which He pursues humankind, the more its actions are subject to His providence than the actions of things without intellect (Psalm 33:14–15). Whence hearts, wills, and human actions are said to be in God's hand, power, and disposition, and all the events and outcomes of our actions (Proverbs 21:1; Genesis 45:8; Exodus 4:11; Philippians 2:13; Jeremiah 10:23; Proverbs 20:24). For neither in the actions of free choice is humankind exempt from the order of providence. See Chrysostom, Theodoret, Salvian, and others.

II–VI: parts of governance; conservation immediate and mediate; notable observations §3.29.3

3.29.3II. In governance there are to be distinguished: (1) parts; (2) grades; (3) the great influxes into created things. III. First, its parts are conservation and ordination.

IV. CONSERVATION is the first part of governance, by which God makes things founded in the world so that they continue to be. See Psalm 104 throughout, a most clear mirror of such providence. Opposed to conservation is destruction, by which God abolishes some substance or accident. Conservation is the formal continuation of a thing's own being. For from the same principles from which being originates, it ought also to be continued and kept — not from contraries, which destroy, nor from diverse things, which contribute nothing: but like is kept by like, especially by the more powerful, and what is being by participation is kept by that which is being by essence. So fire is fostered by fire, cold by cold of itself, being by being — most of all by the greatest Being from whom it has that it is. Therefore it is written, from Him and through Him and in Him are all things (Romans 11:36) — that is, they emanate, are ruled, are kept. And Gregory: All things, he says, would be reduced to nothing unless conserved by the operation of divine power.

V. Conservation of things is immediate or mediate, and that direct or indirect. For God conserves things not only through Himself but also through other causes. VI. Here there are certain notables: (1) God conserves all things principally; second causes secondarily; and those nearer to God conserve more. (2) What can be made by God alone through creation, and not otherwise, can be conserved only by God. (3) Because the multitude of things is so great and diverse, God inserted necessity, fate, and harmony, by which second beings are kept as long as needed and transmuted when needed. (4) God distinguished many systems mutually keeping and moving one another, as wheels in a clock. (5) Inferior things have a certain sympathy with first and superior seeds.

VII–XVI: ordination — effectio, permissio, motio, cohibitio; ordinary and extraordinary; mediate and immediate §3.29.4

3.29.4VII. ORDINATION is the other part of governance, by which God directs all things to the last end most wisely appointed by Himself. VIII. And it is (1) effecting or permission; (2) motion or restraint.

IX. DIVINE EFFECTING is the ordination by which God produces goods of every kind and evils of punishment: in the same sense providence is called efficient. X. DIVINE PERMISSION is the ordination by which God, knowing and willing, lets something come to be. This looks chiefly to evils of fault, which God so permits or does not impede that He directs them to the best end: and therefore providence is also called permitting. XI. DIVINE MOTION is the ordination by which God so moves all things with respect to principle, means, and end that He either effects and directs the motion, or only directs it. XII. DIVINE RESTRAINT is the ordination by which God impedes a creature's action.

XIII. SECOND, as to grades and modes, governance is (1) ordinary or extraordinary, that is, customary or unusual. XIV. ORDINARY GOVERNANCE is that by which God governs things in the order He instituted in the first creation. Hence things are said to happen according to nature, from God's common good pleasure (Hosea 2:21–22; Acts 14:17; 17:25–28). XV. EXTRAORDINARY is that by which God governs things otherwise than He instituted in the first creation. Hence something is said to happen above or beside nature, from a singular dispensation. And here miracle excels: an extraordinary and evident operation of God exceeding the force of all created nature. XVI. Governance is mediate or immediate. God is said to govern immediately what He rules without second causes; mediately, what He procures by their ministry. Yet sometimes both an immediate and a mediate action concur about the same work.

XVII–XXI: general and special governance; merely corporeal creatures §3.29.5

3.29.5XVII. Third, governance is general or special. XVIII. GENERAL governance is that by which God governs all things in common. It is also called universal, and likewise common providence; and this does not admit of more and less.

XIX. SPECIAL governance is that by which God governs singular things as befits their natures. This is also called singular providence, and it has certain grades of its own. XX. And it is of merely corporeal creatures, or of corporeal and incorporeal together, or of the incorporeal simply — that is, of angels and of humans.

XXI. Merely corporeal creatures God governs with less labor, yet so that what was given them He either conserves in them, or raises, or brings low; some again He rules as things without sense, others as things that sense. Compare Deuteronomy 28; Psalm 104; 146:6–9; Psalm 147 throughout; Isaiah 42:5; Acts 14:15–17; Job 36–41; Proverbs 6:6–8; Jeremiah 5:22; 8:7; Jonah 4:7; Matthew 5:45; 10:29.

XXII–XXXVII: governance of intelligent creatures by teaching — narration, law, promise, threat, covenant §3.29.6

3.29.6XXII. The governance of intelligent creatures is that by which God governs them through teaching and through action. And He governs them as befits their nature (Genesis 28:15; Psalm 103:6–7, 11–12).

XXIII. God teaches first either without condition, or with a condition sometimes expressed, sometimes tacit. XXIV. Then He teaches either simply, outside the reason of a covenant, or compositely, in a covenant. XXV–XXVI. Simply He teaches either by narrating or by defining something about creatures. Narration is that by which God only sets forth the truth in things to be known — simple doctrine, prophecy, history — to which faith ought to answer. XXVII. Narration is here specially called admonition when God sets forth truth in things to be known for caution.

XXVIII–XXXII. Further, about intelligent creatures God defines something when by law He designates something to them — by commanding, forbidding, or conceding — or pronounces something concerning them. Precept teaches holiness in doing; interdiction, holiness in omitting; concession, middle things to be done or omitted prudently for our liberty. XXXIII–XXXVI. The mode by which He pronounces something concerning creatures is by promising, by threatening, or by indulgence. Promise teaches His mind concerning kindness to be exercised; threat, concerning severity; indulgence, concerning neither notable kindness nor severity. XXXVII. There follows the composite mode of teaching, by which God strikes a covenant with intelligent creatures, solemnly joining modes of teaching and constituting mutual obligation.

XXXVIII–XLII: effecting, impeding, permitting, tolerating §3.29.7

3.29.7XXXVIII. Thus far we have seen how God is accustomed to teach intelligent creatures even compositely: now there follows how He fulfills something concerning the same — namely by effecting, or impeding, or permitting, or tolerating. When God has taught intelligent creatures, if they then do or omit what they ought and as they ought, their obedience is approved by God as good or lawful; if not, it is disapproved as unlawful.

XXXIX. EFFECTING is that by which God brings about those things of which He is the true cause, whether by doing good or by afflicting (Leviticus 26; Deuteronomy 28; Psalm 18:27; 57:3–4; 116:7; Exodus 23:22; Deuteronomy 8:2–3; Haggai 1:6; Psalm 80; 90). XL. IMPEDING is that by which God withdraws from the creature in conservation or concurrence what He wills, and sometimes opposes a stronger force to a weaker, or beyond order strengthens the weaker so that it can stop or drive back the stronger (Genesis 20:6; Isaiah 37:29; Acts 16:6–7).

XLI. PERMISSION is that by which God leaves certain creatures to their own choice. For sometimes He does not impede creatures from acting of themselves, left a little to themselves (Job 1:12; 1 Kings 22:21–22; Acts 14:16). And when God permits them to their own choice, it comes about that if they do not use their wisdom and prudence considerately enough, they fall into sin by their own fault. XLII. TOLERATION is that by which God neither afflicts His creature with punishment nor even with notable benefit. See Matthias Martini's Method published at Herborn and the epitome of methodical theology, book 3, chapters 2–3, printed here.

Chapter 30: On the three great influxes of God's governance into created things §3.30.1

3.30.1CHAPTER THIRTY. On the three great influxes of God's governance into created things.

Thus far concerning God's governance as to its parts and modes: now, THIRDLY, we treat of its three great influxes, which are as it were the instruments of a most exalted unity, by which He communicates His power, wisdom, and love, and modifies them in things.

II. They are necessity, fate, and harmony. We have seen the principle and governor of all things, whom the nations call God: it remains to speak of His great influences — namely necessity, fate, and harmony — which depend upon His power, wisdom, and love, and through which we see the generations, mutations, essences, operations, and relations of all things brought to completion.

Nature examples: rain and digestion show necessity, fate, and harmony together §3.30.2

3.30.2Examples are ready to hand in nature and in the arts. In nature: rain comes about by necessity, because the sun necessarily lifts vapors upward, and when condensation is added they are turned into rain, which, grown heavy, falls downward of necessity. And this happens by a certain fate, when vaporable earth, the sun's action, and condensation from the dispensation of heaven and of time concur; and at last it results in harmony, because the earth is renewed by rain, sprouts herbs, and nourishes animals.

The same appears in the excretions. For of necessity, while the blood is cooked, burned feces remain; and this happens by fate from the concurrence of many causes — namely bread eaten, heat acting in the narrow liver, and the spirit that separates — which causes met by fate; and this too results in harmony, and for the better, because when the blood is cleansed the feces (as melancholy) serve to excite hunger in the stomach lest the animal perish if it does not eat, and to stimulate the spirit toward fear of evils and toward contemplation.

Arts example; power as necessity, wisdom as fate, love as harmony §3.30.3

3.30.3We find the same in the arts. For the architect necessarily sets the heavier and larger stones in the foundation, lest if placed in the roof they fall downward by their weight into the ruin of the house; the light ones and the timber he sets in the roof, because by necessity light things tend upward and heavy downward.

And this too happens by fate from the series of causes, that some things are light and small, others large and heavy, and that at the fitting time the architect needs them. And this at once results in harmony, because it is better for heavy things to be below and for light above — for their own sake, for the house more aptly formed and strengthened, and for the inhabitants' sake. And because what is better looks to love, what is ordered looks to wisdom, and what must be looks to the power of causes, therefore we call the influx of power necessity, of wisdom fate, of love harmony.

Chapter 31: On the necessity and contingency of things §3.31.1

3.31.1CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE. On the necessity and contingency of things.

NECESSITY is the influx of divine power giving things a mode by which they so are that they cannot be otherwise. For all call necessary that which cannot hold itself otherwise. And what cannot hold itself otherwise must so hold itself as it does. And what is so and cannot be otherwise is either from nowhere else — as God, the first and independent being, of whom we treated above — or is from the causes of things.

II. And it is either from the end, or from the agent, or from the idea, or from matter, or from form.

III–V: necessity of end, of agent, and of idea §3.31.2

3.31.2III. Necessity of the end is twofold: either simply, or unto the better. So unto salvation, according to the preaching of the Gospel, faith is necessary simply; but knowledge of the holy languages and reading of the sacred letters are unto the better — because without faith no one is saved; without these one is saved, though not so well.

IV. Necessity from the agent is likewise twofold: violent and natural. Violent, as when that rich man of the Gospel is dragged into Gehenna against the inclination of his will. Natural, when the rich man's spirit is moved by musical sound, because spirit is by nature movable and is invited by sound to its proper operation. And necessity is partly violent and partly natural when dry wood is kindled — inasmuch as dry it is disposed by heat to receive more heat, but inasmuch as burning wood is against its nature

V. Necessity from idea is that by which, according to the idea of God or of humankind, things so hold themselves that they cannot hold otherwise. Hence two and three make five, and number progresses to ten among us, yet not among all nations — for among some Africans it does not pass six. Hence also letters and syllables are so formed among this or that people and not otherwise. And this necessity concurs somehow with the formal; but because it can hold itself otherwise at the artisan's pleasure — whence other nations have other letters and other words — therefore it is not intrinsic necessity as the formal is.

VI–VII: material and formal necessity; necessity of supposition; only God simply necessary §3.31.3

3.31.3VI. Material necessity is that which depends on a thing's matter as divinely determined. VII. Formal necessity is that which depends on the thing's form. Both are called by some absolute, and likewise essential, according to which a composite cannot hold itself otherwise at all. So it is necessary that humankind be a rational animal. But things that lack determined matter — as number, triangle, circle, which can be made in wood, stone, and everywhere — have necessity not from matter but from idea alone.

So humankind is necessarily endowed with flesh and bones by necessity of matter; necessarily rational by formal necessity, because form is the principle of actions and operations. And from this essential necessity arises necessity in syllogisms. Whence it follows that every necessity is from the first Necessary, as number looks to unity, and every passive power to the active.

All voluntary things are necessary by natural necessity, not violent. When we will, we necessarily will — the necessity of supposition, which arises from the thing's state, not from a condition. Do all things except God share the necessity of supposition? No necessity seems to be that is not of supposition, except the divine. For that God is most powerful, most wise, and best is necessary by absolute necessity. But that humankind is a rational animal is necessary with God's will supposed deciding to make humankind of this essence. Whence certain ancient theologians not unfitly place necessity simply in God alone, and in the rest only in a qualified sense.

VIII: contingency as withdrawal from the necessary; plurality, motion, disformity §3.31.4

3.31.4VIII. So much concerning necessity: Contingency is a withdrawal from the necessary, by which things so are that they can be otherwise. The contingent is a certain withdrawal from the necessary; and the necessary consists in one, but the contingent in many, and it is spoken of in as many modes as the necessary.

Whence Cajetan (Summa I, question 13, article 13) says that the contingent has the character of plurality, motion, and disformity, because it can hold itself otherwise; but the necessary has the character of one and of the uniform, because it is impossible to hold itself otherwise. And the contingent proceeds from the necessary naturally, as plurality from unity, and not the reverse.

Future contingents; how God knows them §3.31.5

3.31.5I. Do future contingents fall under God's knowledge in any way? It is to be affirmed. For God knows contingent things as they are, because as they are they necessarily are, however they may be. God's knowledge does not impose absolute necessity on things, but regards them as in their causes and in the eternal decree.

II. God knows future contingents in two modes: in themselves, inasmuch as they are present to His eternity; and in their causes, inasmuch as He decreed to produce or to permit them. Whoever wants more, let him read after the scholastics in Philip Melanchthon's Loci the place on the cause of sin and on contingency. So necessity of power, fate of wisdom, and harmony of love prepare the passage to the chapter on fate.

Chapter 32: On Fate §3.32.1

3.32.1CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO. On Fate.

FATE is the great influx of divine wisdom granting things a mode by which in causing they are ordered toward one another. Therefore the SECOND great influx put into things is Fate, differing from necessity — which seems chiefly to consist in simple things considered alone — inasmuch as fate itself seems to be in the concurrence of many things and to pertain to ordering wisdom, as necessity pertains to power giving each thing to be according to its mode.

Whence fate is said from speaking (fari), as Blessed Augustine witnesses, as if the things that happen by fate were ordered and decreed by someone speaking and commanding. Yet he thinks the name of fate ought to be exploded, because he says this was given to the stars by the Astrologers — in which Doctor Gregory agrees with him. Moreover even the more ancient philosophers who gave God the world's generation and the distinction and regimen of things say the name of fate is vain and false, as Anaxagoras, Alexander witnessing in the book On Fate and the second On the Soul; and in sacred Scripture you will not find the name Fate, even if lot, chance, and fortune are sometimes found there.

Scripture attributes to God what some call fate; atheist and Machiavellian abuse of fate §3.32.2

3.32.2For what some theologians and philosophers attribute to fate, Moses attributes to God when he says (Exodus 21:12–13): If anyone kills a man not willing it of his own accord, but because the axe slipped, he killed him because the Lord delivered him into his hand. Yet Alexander says that whoever denies the name of Fate cries out against common credulity and usage of speech, and therefore is not worthy of faith. But the fathers cry out not against true but against false credulity, and they do not take away the name of Fate except where there is danger of fallacy in the intellect.

And philosophers anxiously inquire what fate is, and the common opinion is that it is an order of causes. Homer and Ovid indeed introduce Jupiter weighing the fates and unable to do anything beside fate. These same things today's Machiavellists and atheists of our time often press — that if God truly gives laws, yet we do not keep them, acting otherwise by a certain fate; and when He wills to punish us He cannot. So atheists under the pretext of Fate corrupt the secrets of the Christian religion.

Chaldeans, Peripatetics, Astrologers, Aquinas, and Boethius on fate's mutability §3.32.3

3.32.3The Chaldean and Egyptian wise men thought fate can be changed by sacrifices and prayers, because God, the orderer of things, did not bind His own hands so that He cannot do other than He decreed from eternity. The Peripatetics do not admit this mutation in God, but rather that some things happen by chance beside His intellect and will from the concurrence of inferior causes, and that the series of fate can be cut by our choice and by fortune.

Astrologers deny this, because every accidental cause is reduced to a superior cause of itself: whence the series of fate seems infallible to the Arabs in Averroes, and namely to Avicenna with the Stoics against Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas (lecture 3 on Metaphysics VI) thinks Aristotle's reason neither takes away fate nor providence, and is fallacious because it regards particular causes, not universal — which Boethius also teaches by the example of two servants. And a triple cause is to be posited: (1) the most universal and immutable, as God; (2) universal but mutable, as heaven; (3) particular, ordered to its proper effects.

Not all effects reduce to heaven; soul, angels, demons; contingent modification §3.32.4

3.32.4But because not all effects can be reduced to heaven, other contingencies still remain with respect to heaven. First, because human souls, angels, and demons within the order of concausing things — as Augustine and Boethius witness — are not subjected to heaven except accidentally, inasmuch as the soul bound to bodies is affected through organs according to sense — and they themselves can master sense by repressing anger, shaking off sloth, perceiving remedies against plague and other deadly influxes of heaven, and helping themselves by hidden modes through prayers poured out to God. Therefore not every effect of heaven is necessary.

Next, because the matter on which heaven acts is variously disposed, and otherwise receives heaven's action as strong and necessary, otherwise as weak and contingent, as is plain from meteorology. Therefore although the aspects of the stars in heaven are necessary, yet from the defectibility of inferior things they are modified unto contingency.

Boethius: fate as disposition inhering in mobile things §3.32.5

3.32.5Therefore fate, as Boethius teaches in book 4 of the Consolation of Philosophy, is an immobile disposition inhering in mobile things, through which providence binds each thing to its orders. It does not follow that all things happen necessarily, but that it is necessary that some effects happen necessarily, others freely, others contingently, according as God prepared causes for them — whose proper work is to give being, while others use being once given unto necessity or contingency.

With respect to heaven inevitable fate is not given, but with respect to the most universal cause, whose order he calls providence and not fate, to which it pertains to make every being as it is. So fate of ordering wisdom prepares the passage to harmony, which is the great influx of divine love — of which the thirty-third chapter.

Chapter 33: On the harmony of things §3.33.1

3.33.1CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE. On the harmony of things.

Thus far concerning fate: next comes harmony, which is the great influx of divine love, granting things a mode by which their order sounds together toward a good and delightful end. Because no order exists for its own sake but for an end, and the end is the best among things, therefore the respect of order to the end is for us harmony — the sounding-together of many things toward one delightful good. We have taken the word from music, where on one instrument many strings, varied, thick and thin, stretched in various ways, with art going before and cooperating, when struck by the musician produce a sweet melody for the delight of the soul.

Therefore harmony seems the object of love, and indeed of love as active influx, just as fate is of active wisdom; and as love is the offspring of wisdom, so harmony is the offspring of order. The harmony of the whole world may be hunted out from its parts. We see every agent act for an end, and when the end is gained the action ceases, and the agent rests in the good of the end — as a stone tends downward because it is preserved among like body and, once among its like, rests as if the cause of motion were confessed; but fire goes upward and, joined to heaven, is carried round with heaven as if it had attained the end that consists in the conservation of the thing.

Arts analogy: nested ends toward the commonwealth; necessity, order, harmony referred to power, wisdom, love §3.33.2

3.33.2Yet because all things are bound together by place, coexistence, and compact, we see some to be ends of others — as the end of navigation is merchandise, of shipbuilding navigation, of hewing timber shipbuilding, of cutting hewing — and yet these arts do not communicate among themselves. For the cutter of timber does not cut so that it may be hewn, but that by such labor he may seek his living. He who hews does not understand the building; that is understood by the one who hired him, while he himself looks to his wage. He who builds a ship for navigation, insofar as he is hired by another, does not look to that further end but has his own; the sailor does not ask whether the wares are good or useless, but that he may finish his voyage; of the merchandise the merchant cares, but of trade and of all the other arts together the commonwealth cares, because its happiness consists in their communication.

Hence Aristotle too thinks the good of the universe is order; but we mean that for the sake of which order is, speaking of the intrinsic good. Of the extrinsic it is plain that it is God Himself. And because whatever happens necessarily is so ordered that it happens for the better — as necessity is referred to power, order to wisdom, and the harmony of the better to love — all things happen necessarily from a certain coercion, either pure or mixed with love, or else altogether free. Freedom altogether is in the one God alone.

Pleasure and pain as wisdoms goads; forced love of ones own being; seeming evils that serve the world §3.33.3

3.33.3For other things are driven to their proper work by two goads of His wisdom — namely pleasure and pain — from which arise desire and fear, grief and indignation. All things somehow sense their own being and love it; but they sense and love exterior things insofar as they sense themselves changed and affected by them. Hence if they are affected well toward their own conservation, they delight; if badly toward destruction, they hate and grieve.

Next, all things seem affected partly by force, partly spontaneously — that is, by pain and love — with necessity always going before. For to love ones own being belongs to each because it does not know a better: as a dog loves being a dog, and wood loves being wood, since they know their own being as best and are ignorant that other things are better. They are forced to that ignorance by the limitation of their being, and therefore forced also to love this one thing, not to love simply. Hence human beings who from religion or reason are persuaded that another life and being suit them after this one despise the present life, afflict themselves, and long to be dissolved and to be with God. Love of life therefore seems somehow forced, since whatever we do while ignorant of the better we do in part by force. Hence also Seneca in the Tragedy: O how sweet an evil added to mortals — the dread love of life.

We are forced also to love exterior things — food, clothing, labors, and all by which we are somehow preserved in ourselves or in others. We are forced also to regard things good in themselves as evil to us — fire because it burns us, the serpent because it bites, hemlock because it poisons — although in themselves and toward the world and toward like things they are all most excellent and most beautiful.

Ignorance preserves order; the comedy of masks; why corruption hurts; harmony as the ordering causes great good §3.33.4

3.33.4But eternal wisdom uses our ignorance for our life. For if each thing knew that all other things are beautiful, they would do nothing against one another, nor preserve their own life, and all would turn into chaos. Therefore, since all things are good and safe, it is best for the worlds order that some things appear to others evil and foul, lest they fall back into chaos. And truly, whoever lifts himself to the Author of things and with Him looks upon this as a comedy in which all things are masked by certain disguises — some appearing good and beautiful, others evil and deformed — sees that when the masks are laid aside they agree beautifully.

Affections and actions are brought forth from coercion and love together; and coercion is truly such when things are driven against their propensity and against the love added to them. But that things may be kept in the life they are allotted, God gave them pain and pleasure. For a human being rejoices to be among things that conserve his nature, and grieves among things that destroy it. And this is fate: that they exist for so long as has been decreed by the divine power, as for playing Its play and comedy.

But you say: why do things grieve when they are corrupted, and as it were resist death? It is answered, first, lest other living things also wish to die before their time; second, that while dying they may resist the causes bringing death and modify them for fates uses. Since therefore all corruptions and generations of things and actions are not for the sake of the things alone — because they themselves are driven by pain and pleasure toward others ends — it follows that the ordering cause draws from such order a great and divine good, which we call HARMONY, founded in the being and order of things, that is in necessity and fate. For all things come by necessity for the sake of fate and harmony. From these results the harmonic goodness that is the end of things.

II. Triple end of each thing; plant example; harmony for self, others, whole, and God; against Epicureans and chance §3.33.5

3.33.5II. Now of each thing produced by GOD there is a threefold end: first, conservation of itself, to which it is driven by pleasure and pain; second, the use of others, to which it is driven by fear and desire; third, the order and integrity of the universe, which is for God in the harmony and concurrence of causes and in the first necessity. So a plant makes fruit for its own conservation, to which fear of death and love of life drive it; from this results the second end, the nourishing of animals from its fruits, since imperfect beings exist for perfect ones; and the life of animals is for the integrity of the world. Therefore the end of the plant is the worlds integrity. But those that more immediately attain the last end are nobler than the rest.

Besides their proper end, things have many other ends that beget harmony for the world; and whatever is evil and excrementitious has most excellent ends. So choleric humor is gathered in the gall lest it infect the blood; and because it goes to its like, it is vital to the gall, and then serves great uses. From which it is plain there is a Craftsman of things who so disposed and tempered them that while each acts for itself it is at once useful to others, and all to the whole, and the whole is dedicated and set under sail for Gods glory. Harmony therefore does not consist only in each things acting for itself, but in this: that while it acts for itself it acts at once for others, for the whole, and for God.

And this reason of order is from the first wisdom. But the beauty rising from order is from the first love; and beauty itself, not as a sign by which we are carried to the notion of the good, but as an influx from active love, is the seat of harmony. Therefore, since the Craftsman of things is most wise and can and knows all things and wills according to His nature, He must dispose and order all things. Nothing therefore is by chance with respect to Him. Otherwise many things would happen beside necessity, beside fate, and beside harmony, and He Himself would be subject to fate and not fate to Him — which is as foolish and absurd as subjecting the inventor of an art to the art rather than the art to the inventor.

From all of which it becomes plain that the Epicureans, Muhammadans, and others gravely err who against harmony think all things happen by chance, breaking Gods power, wisdom, and love, by which ends are appointed even to harmful animals, serpents, flies and the like, and even to infirmities. Nor are wars, plague, famine, and death itself excluded from this harmony. For these too are useful to the world, as the discord of heat and cold — for inventing doctrines, for changing kingdoms, for punishing sins, and for the exercise and varied demonstration of virtue.

Chapter 34: On the governance of angels §3.34.1

3.34.1CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR. On the governance of angels.

Next, the special governance of GOD is of ANGELS or of HUMAN BEINGS. II. The governance of angels is that by which they are governed by GOD only spiritually. Their governance must be considered here because God variously uses their ministry concerning human beings (Psalm 91:11 and 34:8; Isaiah 37:36; Hebrews 1:14) and other creatures that serve humankind.

III. It is the conservation of their essence and the direction of their actions. IV. Conservation of their essence is that by which each is eternalized without propagation. For they are spirits, and so incorporeal, created immediately by God from nothing, as shown above in chapter 26, and not made for generating (Matthew 22:30). Actions is the prescription of law and the ordination of the event that follows from it.

VI. Angelic law and five offices: singers, orators, ambassadors, protectors, war-leaders §3.34.2

3.34.2VI. That law is that by which obedience is required of them — the same in substance as the Decalogue prescribed to human beings. Yet here must be excepted all that regards either the nature of the human body or the condition of this mortal life: many duties of the second and fourth commandments; many of inferiors toward superiors, as of children toward parents in the fifth; many concerning the propagation of the race in the seventh; and some concerning the way of gaining livelihood in the eighth — which do not suit them.

The offices of angels are roughly fivefold. They are first singers, second orators, third ambassadors, fourth protectors, fifth war-leaders. Their first and chief task is always to love God and never cease praising Him; they so love that they burn for God, and so love that with a sleepless harmony of praise they praise Him together. Who will make the concert of heaven sleep? Job asks (38:37). Otherwise in heaven the angels sing and make the pleasure of their music more lasting: they begin and never leave off; they satisfy and create no weariness. Isaiah heard and wrote the words of that heavenly oratory (chapter 6), where the Seraphim cried one to another: Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God of hosts; the whole earth is full of His glory.

Their second office: they are orators (Revelation 8:3). Third: ambassadors in affairs of highest moment. Fourth: they are protectors (Psalm 91). Fifth: they are war-leaders, and such that whenever they will they have victory standing on their side (Exodus 23:20; Joshua 5).

VII–X. Ordination of events: preservation, confirmation, permission of fall, hardening; good angels works §3.34.3

3.34.3VII. Ordination of the event is preservation, confirmation, or permission of a fall and hardening. VIII. Preservation is that by which certain angels are kept from falling. IX. Confirmation is that by which they are made firm in the good.

X. There are many modes by which good angels work concerning human beings: they open tongues and hand on divine speech (Isaiah 6:6); they heal the sick (John 5:4); they refresh the weary (1 Kings 19:7); they allow themselves to be overcome by the dear (Genesis 32:28); they console the afflicted (Genesis 21:17); they exhort to doing good (Acts 8:26); they pass from heaven to earth (Genesis 28:12; John 1:51); they animate those who pray (Judges 13); they love and defend the chaste everywhere most ardently (Judith 13:20).

It may be asked why no holy angel (so far as I know) has ever seated himself in a dear human body, though fugitive angels have so often dared it. I answer: first, the human being is a temple sacred to the Deity; angels, led by reverence and love, refuse to invade their Princes chamber by their own entry. Second, since God so ennobled human origin by the wondrous conjunction of divine and human nature, angels will claim so little license over a human being that they endure to be called not only servants of the Deity but servants of the human as well.

XI. Canons concerning good angels and their governance §3.34.4

3.34.4XI. Canons are to be observed concerning good angels and their governance. First, the confirmation of angels in the good was not a wages owed to some merit, but the free reward of most liberal God (Romans 11:35). Second, angels serve each person and each order (Psalm 34:7). Third, a human being has not only one guardian angel but many at once (Psalm 91:11; Matthew 18:10; Acts 12:15; Zanchi). Fourth, angels are not to be adored (Revelation 19:10). Fifth, angels turn away from whatever smells of vice; yet among vices they most hate heat, smoke, and stench — the heat of anger and envy, the smoke of pride, the stench of luxury.

XII–XIII. Permission and hardening of fallen angels; names of unclean spirits §3.34.5

3.34.5XII. Permission is that by which, with divine power temporarily set aside, certain angels are allowed to fall. XIII. Hardening at by which the fallen, grace denied, are made firm in evil.

They are also called unclean spirits (Luke 11:24), worthless spirits (1 Samuel 16:14), spirits of error (1 Timothy 4:1), Satan, the Devil, the ancient serpent, the dragon, angels of Satan (Revelation 12:9), father of the lie (John 8:44), spiritual wickedness (Ephesians 6:12), roaring lion (1 Peter 5:8), demons (Luke 11), satyrs (Leviticus 17:7), hairy ones (Isaiah 13:21; 34:14). The reason for the naming is that they are spirits created by God indeed, but who by free will fell away at the beginning from the truth in which they were made, and became horrible adversaries of both God and human beings, and are kept in eternal chains for judgment (John 8:44; 2 Peter 2:4; Jude 6).

XIV. Canons concerning fallen angels §3.34.6

3.34.6XIV. Canons are to be noted concerning them. First, the Devil was evil from the beginning not of creation but of defection (Augustine; Thomas; Zanchi). Second, the impious are children of the Devil not with respect to their substance but in view of the accident of malice. Third, the Devil is the first author and fountain of sin — of malice both in his own nature and in the human race (John 8:44; 1 John 3:8). Fourth, fallen angels retained their substance with intellect and will, and great power besides, but by all these they are borne only to evil. Fifth, the Devil abuses intellect, will, power, and all his forces not only to propagate his malice but also to root out Gods kingdom.

Sixth, the Devil does not know human thoughts except through outward signs and probably, or impure ones that he himself suggests. Seventh, Satans power is great, but under Gods omnipotence. Eighth, the Devil can do wonders, but not true and properly so-called miracles. Ninth, the Devil does what he can when God permits; what he can, he does not do when God forbids. Tenth, no human being by his own powers can drive back the Devil and resist him; it is Gods grace and power alone to overcome him and to free the repentant and believing human being from his snares.

Chapter 35: On the governance of human beings §3.35.1

3.35.1CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE. On the governance of human beings.

Thus far concerning the governance of angels: next follows the governance of human beings, by which God governs them both spiritually and in body. This part of the governance of Gods kingdom we chiefly consider in Theology, because it brings us nearer to a more distinct knowledge of the theological subject. Yet the governance of angels was not to be wholly set aside, because it also illustrates that of humans. God governs human beings both spiritually and bodily, because they are mixed of both natures. Hence Chrysostom (Homily 83 on Matthew): If you were incorporeal, God would have handed you naked incorporeal gifts. But since your soul is joined to a body, things to be understood are handed to you in sensible things.

II. Governance before and after the fall; paradise charge and the fall by serpent and free choice §3.35.2

3.35.2II. And first it is one thing before the fall, another after the fall. For the human being, so adorned by God the creator as shown above, was placed in the garden of Eden, which we call paradise, that there he might enjoy most sweet contemplation, propagate his race, and lead a blessed life without all trouble, diseases, and death — both by Gods singular providence and by the benefit of the life-giving tree — from which he would be transferred to the most blessed life. Truly God, the highest good, that inexhaustible fountain of love, had adorned the first human with most excellent gifts, and so delighted in him that He lived, walked, dwelt, and worked in his intellect, will, and other powers, and uniquely willed to be loved again by him from the whole heart, mind, and strength.

Therefore, when the supreme Lawgiver had impressed the universal law on the human, He also enjoined a lighter command, by His right as creator and to test obedience, concerning a thing in itself indifferent — neither good nor evil (Genesis 2:16). But Satan, driven by burning envy and hatred against God and all creatures obedient to God, tried to overthrow this noblest work of the creator. Therefore, covered in a serpents form, he approaches the woman as the weaker and more open to deceit, corrupts Gods words and command, and interprets them slanderously. Humans ought indeed to have clung to Gods word and declined the serpents snares; and they could have, had they been willing to use the gifts they possessed; indeed, as Paul witnesses (1 Timothy 2:14), Adam was not deceived. Therefore knowingly and willingly they set Gods command aside, obeyed the Devil, and cast themselves into ruin.

III–V. Modes of governing humans: instinct, institution, and teaching §3.35.3

3.35.3III. Second, governance is one thing by way of instinct, another by way of institution, another by way of fulfillment. IV. By way of institution God governs human beings by teaching. V. Thus in a more notable respect God teaches humans both immediately and mediately. Immediately, when by Himself, by the Son and Holy Spirit, by angels, by revealed word, by the law of nature impressed, by conscience, by dreams and visions, by miracles and wonders, by special inspiration. Mediately, when through parents, teachers, ministers of the word, magistrates, and other humans to whom He commits His word. Those mediately called are to be obeyed with this proviso: if they add nothing to the principles, take nothing away, or teach nothing contrary (1 Thessalonians 5:21; 1 John 4:1).

VIII–XI. Bodily means; covenants of marriage and natural religion §3.35.4

3.35.4VIII. Through bodily or natural things God also governs human beings — for conserving life, for discipline and punishment, and for benefits and warnings. XI. Further, in a more notable respect God governs humans by teaching when He constitutes covenants among them, and between Himself and them, and acts according to those covenants.

God constituted among humans the covenant of marriage, of which we saw above when teaching the creation of humankind (Genesis 1:28-29; 2:24; Malachi 2:14), which spouses ought to keep between themselves by the faith of chastity and to strengthen by a concordant partnership of useful works. And between Himself and humans God at the beginning constituted the solemn covenant of natural religion (Genesis 1:28-30; 2:16-17; 3:1-4, 22). Here circumspect faith and special obedience toward that law became humans, with the understanding that they were justly punished for their sins, as they also understood themselves obliged to every obedience (Genesis 3:3).

And according to this covenant God so acted that He permitted humans their liberty, as the event makes clear. But they by their own fault, the Devil deceiving, fell into sin, and therefore are justly afflicted by God (Genesis 3; 2 Corinthians 11:3). Hence also they begot offspring after their own likeness (Genesis 5:3; Job 15:14-16; Psalm 51:5; Romans 5:12).

XII. Governance by fulfillment: permitting, impeding, effecting, tolerating §3.35.5

3.35.5XII. By way of fulfillment God governs human beings when He permits or impedes something spiritual or bodily, or effects it while benefiting or afflicting them, or tolerates it in them. You will see these modes of fulfillment in 2 Peter 2:4 and following. But in truth, by the fall of the first parents the salutary modes of teaching were weakened, and the modes of fulfillment impeded, as will appear from the following chapter 37.

Chapter 36: On the first state of the human being §3.36.1

3.36.1CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX. On the first state of the human being.

There stand the states through which the human being is led to the highest perfection for which he was made. II. And it is either the first or that which followed the first. Theologians commonly distinguish four states of the human: of creation, of falling, of regeneration, and of blessedness — or of constitution, defection, restoration, and perfection — or of innocence, sin, grace, and glory.

III. The first is that in which the human was made by God the creator and circumscribed by a peculiar law. The formula of the law prescribed to the human in this state stands in Genesis 2:16-17 and is repeated in Sirach 15:14-18. Adam could easily keep it and violated it compelled by no necessity. For if he had necessarily violated it, that necessity would have been from nature, or from the Devil, or from God. It was not from nature, because the human was made of free choice; nor, if it were otherwise, would Adam have concealed it when laboring under accusation of himself (Genesis 3:12). Nor was it from the devil, because he could persuade, not compel. For the devil would not have deceived the human unless he had already begun to please himself, as Augustine says (City of God XIV.13). Nor from God, because He made him good and after His own image (Genesis 1:27; 5:1).

IV–V. First state partly animal, partly spiritual; the animal part and pure naturals §3.36.2

3.36.2IV. And this state was both animal and spiritual.we may more rightly understand what has been said of the image of God, and so have a fuller and more distinct knowledge of our subject, we must consider in detail both what is natural and what is supernatural in the newly created human — or what and how much he could do in the state of pure naturals; whence afterward it is easily drawn out what, the supernatural gifts now lost, he can do in the state of sin.

V. It is animal insofar as, from the natural union of body and soul, the soul procures goods for its body, and by the body in turn the soul is ready for the offices of nature and for desires fitting to it. This part of the first state in which the human was made is founded on the natural union of soul and body and on the life the soul naturally lives in the body. From that union and life it is that the soul procures its goods for the body, and the body is ready for the soul unto offices congruent with its nature. And according to this state there is a mutual respect between the human and the goods of this world, which makes it that the human can desire them and put forth the effort he judges necessary and fitting for acquiring them. Which part of the first state, if considered alone and without order to spiritual or supernatural things, is called by the schools the state of pure naturals.

VI. Spiritual part of the first state: image of God, original righteousness, and powers §3.36.3

3.36.3VI. It is spiritual insofar as the human, from Gods special grace and favor, was endowed in the intellect with divine light, in the will with uprightness and holiness, and in the affections with harmony and order, so that he knew God, loved Him, and obeyed Him from the whole heart, and neighbors as himself. In this state the first image of God consisted, not in the mere immortality of the soul or use of reason, but in true righteousness and holiness (Ephesians 4:24; Colossians 3:10), by which the human pleased God and served Him. He had a lucid intellect without culpable ignorance, an upright will without a crooked inclination to evil, and ordered affections without disturbance. He was able not to sin, yet he was not unable to sin — that is, liberty toward both, not necessity toward the good alone. The tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in paradise were signs of this state and of its probation.

VII. Observations on the first human state: integrity, dominion, and original happiness §3.36.4

3.36.4VII. Observations are to be noted concerning this first state of the human. First, the human in the first state was created whole and would have remained whole had he not sinned by free will. Second, dominion over inferior creatures was given him (Genesis 1:28), not tyrannical but paternal and household-like. Third, labor in paradise was not a punishment but a delight and exercise. Fourth, death was not subject to natural necessity in this state, but was the punishment of sin as denounced. Fifth, conjugal society was instituted before the fall in holiness and mutual love.

Sixth, the first parent had received from God the happy integrity of the image of God of the first state, as author of the human race, so that through it he might wholly please God and serve Him. This observation is plain from what has been said. Here there was no stain, but highest purity; no culpable ignorance, but outstanding knowledge; no aversion from God, but whole love.

Political order before the fall §3.36.5

3.36.5In the first state also there would have been one political order without the division of empires introduced by sin. The first and sole lord of the circle of the earth was Adam, the second Seth, the third whoever was best among the descendants — and therefore empire was divided, because humans sinned, and divided fields and dominions, and usurped kingship. And the law of nations was introduced through iniquity, as holy Clement teaches, which is retained by permission, not by Gods command, who willed all to live in common, as the same witnesses, and Ambrose, and Chrysostom, and the better fathers. Hence also Solomon says: because of the sins of the land, many are its princes.

For in the beginning the same one would have been king and father and highest priest of the commonwealth and supreme in the whole world, depending on God, as Melchizedek. And therefore Christ recalled all princes under the empire of Himself as one shepherd, when He came to restore that age (Ezekiel 34:23; John 10:16). Nor will wars, famine, heresies, schisms, and plagues cease until all the princes of the earth, brought under one power, have one senate and live in concord. Which will plainly happen when from this warfare and pilgrimage we pass into the homeland of eternal rest and triumph. For the Chiliasts are vain who hope this on the earth of this warfare, and the papal party who violently grasp at it.

Chapter 37: On the state following the first, and human free will and its powers in that state §3.37.1

3.37.1CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN. On the state following the first, and the freedom of the human will, and its powers in this state.

The state into which the human, made after Gods image, falling from the first — God permitting — by his own free will transgressing the law, lost his innocence for himself and for his posterity, and rendered himself and his whole race liable to death. In the preceding chapter we treated the first state of the human, which is followed by this one now to be treated — by far the most miserable and most fertile of evils.

II–III. What is to be considered here: will, free choice, and the loss after the fall §3.37.2

3.37.2II. Here are to be considered the will, free choice, and its powers in this state. The will is the rational appetitive power of the soul by which the human tends toward the good apprehended by the intellect. Free choice is the faculty of the will of choosing among objects proposed to it without coercion.

III. Before the fall free choice was flexible toward good and evil, but inclined to the good from original gifts. After the fall free choice indeed remains as to natural and civil acts, but as to spiritual saving good it has lost its powers unless restored by new grace. The fallen human cannot raise himself to true conversion, nor fulfill Gods law spiritually, nor merit eternal life from works (Romans 8:7-8; 1 Corinthians 2:14; John 15:5).

IV. Object of free choice; natural, civil, and spiritual goods distinguished §3.37.3

3.37.3IV. Its object is the good proposed by the intellect. Natural, civil, and spiritual good must be distinguished. Toward natural and civil goods the fallen human even now retains some liberty and powers, though weakened and often bent toward evil. But toward spiritual good — which is true conversion toward God, saving faith, and new obedience — natural powers do not suffice. Hence Augustine and the Reformed theologians teach that free choice in spiritual things after the fall is a slave — not so that the human does not act, but so that he cannot will the spiritual good unless prevented and helped by the Holy Spirit.

V–VII. Darkness of intellect, stubbornness of will, disorder of affections after the fall §3.37.4

3.37.4V. In the intellect after the fall there arose darkness and culpable ignorance concerning God and divine things (Ephesians 4:18; 1 Corinthians 2:14). VI. In the will there arose aversion from God, inclination to evil, and impotence toward spiritual good (Romans 8:7).

VII. Second, the darkness of the intellect is followed by the perversity of the will and the disturbance of the affections. The human loves himself and creatures inordinately, hates Gods spiritual law, and is drawn by concupiscences (Galatians 5:17; James 1:14-15). This corruption does not take away the substance of the soul nor liberty as to acts, but deprives of original uprightness and brings guilt and punishment.

VIII. Inability toward saving good without grace §3.37.5

3.37.5VIII. Third, to the blindness of the intellect and the crookedness of the will is added impotence toward beginning, advancing, and perfecting the work of salvation without the grace of the Holy Spirit. With respect to the beginning toward the good, or the first motion of conversion, the human can do nothing from himself (John 6:44; 15:5). With respect to progress, even the regenerate needs the continual help of grace. With respect to the end, perseverance and glory are gifts of God, not our merits. Therefore in this state free choice, unless elevated by grace, is not a principle of salvation but of sin and misery. Of sin itself the following chapter must treat; of the permission of sin, chapter 39; of the obligation to death, chapter 40.

Chapter 38: On the sin of the human being §3.38.1

3.38.1CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT. On the sin of the human being.

Thus far concerning the state after the fall and liberty: next follows sin. Sin is the transgression of the divine law, or a falling short from Gods law as the norm of uprightness (1 John 3:4; Romans 4:15). II. And it is either the first or arising from the first. III. The FIRST is the transgression of the law concerning not eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, committed by the first parents in paradise (Genesis 3). This sin is called originating sin, because from it original sin in posterity and all actual sins took their rise.

IV–V. Original sin: imputed guilt and inherent corruption; habitual deformity §3.38.2

3.38.2IV. Original sin is the fault of our nature derived from Adam, consisting of guilt and corruption. Guilt is the obligation to eternal death because of Adams sin imputed to us (Romans 5:12-19). Corruption is the privation of original righteousness and a crooked habit in intellect, will, affections, and the whole human. V. HABITUAL sin is the deformity of the object from the uprightness of the law, remaining in the nature even when the act is not put forth. Hence infants even before actual sin are held by guilt and corruption (Psalm 51:5; Job 14:4; Ephesians 2:3).

VI. Notable points on original sin: imputation, propagation, and extent §3.38.3

3.38.3VI. Certain points are here to be NOTED. First, Adams sin is imputed to posterity not by imitation alone, but by a real communication of guilt, because all were in Adam as in a head and root (Romans 5:12). Second, propagation happens through natural generation, not through creation of the soul as sinful by God. Third, original sin is not a substance, but a privative accident and a positive habit of evil. Fourth, it does not take away free choice as to natural acts, but deprives of powers toward spiritual good. Fifth, baptism and regeneration do not remove all corruption in this life, but the guilt and dominion of sin (Romans 6-7).

VII–XII. Actual sin: definition, kinds against the law of works, and omissions §3.38.4

3.38.4VII. ACTUAL sin is called by the Scholastics and theologians every act, whether inward or outward, contrary to God's law is distinguished into sins of commission and of omission; into sins of heart, mouth, and work; into sins against God, neighbor, and oneself.

XII. Sin against the law of works is the transgression of the moral precepts of the Decalogue and of the law of nature. Sin of omission is the neglect of a due office. Communication with others sins is also sin, which the ancients expressed in these verses: I counsel, I command, I consent, I provoke, I praise; I do not uncover the fault, I do not punish, I do not rebuke, I do not withstand, but I command and defend anothers sins.

XVI–XXI. Sins in necessities and adiaphora; sins of infirmity, ignorance, and malice §3.38.5

3.38.5XVI. Sin in necessities is either against affirmative or negative precepts that oblige absolutely. XVII. Sin in adiaphora is when things in themselves indifferent become evil from the circumstance of scandal, contempt, or bad intention (Romans 14; 1 Corinthians 8-10).

XXI. Sin of infirmity is when one sins from weakness of nature or sudden passion, not from destined malice. It is distinguished from sin of ignorance, which arises from defect of due knowledge, and from sin of malice or presumption, which is committed from deliberate will against a known law. Sin against the Holy Spirit is obstinate and malicious repudiation of known truth, to which remission is denied in this age (Matthew 12:31-32; Hebrews 6:4-6; 10:26-29).

XXIV–XXV. Sin against conscience and not against conscience §3.38.6

3.38.6XXIV. Sin against conscience is when someone acts against the dictate of conscience, whether right or erroneous — for even an erroneous conscience, until corrected, obliges one not to act against it (Romans 14:23). XXV. Sin not against conscience is when an objectively evil act is committed without actual contradiction of conscience, whether from ignorance or from a hardening habit.

Actual sins are not only those that happen from stubbornness, destined malice, and an hardened custom of sinning, but also those committed from infirmity and ignorance — and not only by committing, but also by omitting or by communicating with others sins. Of the permission of sin the following chapter must treat.

Chapter 39: On the permission of sin, its foundation, opposite, connections, and consequences §3.39.1

3.39.1CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE. On the permission of sin, and its foundation, opposite, connections, and consequences.

Thus far concerning sin: next follows its PERMISSION, which is an act of divine providence concerning it, by which all impediments that God knows would stop the sin if applied to human power or will, and also compelling forces that efficaciously drive toward doing what one abhors, are suspended. This locus on permission the most learned Twisse inquired into; Arminius also attempted it more than once. Ignorance of this doctrine makes it that when some could not understand whence sin is — inasmuch as it is the highest evil that is given, which cannot be from God who is most highly good — they denied Gods providence itself.

VI–III. What to weigh in permission; foundation in free choice and God's wisdom and power §3.39.2

3.39.2VI. In the permission of sin there is to be weighed its foundation, opposite, connections, and the consequences around the progress and consummation of sin. III. The foundation is partly the liberty of choice that God the creator planted in the rational creature, and whose use the Creator's constancy does not allow to be taken from that creature; partly Gods infinite wisdom and power, by which He knows and can produce good from evil.

Hence God permits whatever He permits: not unknowingly of creatures powers and affection, because He knows all things; not unwillingly, for He could have not produced a creature that would be of free choice, and could reduce one produced to nothing or change it in various ways.

IV–VIII. Opposite of permission: impediment and coercion; kinds of impediment §3.39.3

3.39.3IV. The opposite of permission is impediment and coercion. Impediment is that by which an obstacle is set to the creatures power and will lest it sin. Coercion is that by which someone is efficaciously driven toward doing what he abhors. VI. By reason of efficiency it is either efficacious or inefficacious. VII. By reason of the object an impediment is set either to power or to will. VIII. An impediment set to power takes away the faculty; one set to will, without taking away the faculty, bends or holds it back. Permission is not a positive law of sin, nor is God the author of sin; but the suspension of impediments and the non-impeding of the act of a creature freely sinning.

XII–XVI. Connections of permission; direction of sin by providence §3.39.4

3.39.4XII. Connected to permission in beginning, progress, and end are: foreknowledge, decree, ordination, direction, and determination. XVI. Direction is the divine providence by which the act of sin, though evil in itself, is directed by God toward good ends, whether toward an object or toward an end. Examples: Joseph sold by his brothers (Genesis 45:8); Job afflicted by Satan (Job 1-2); David and Absalom (2 Samuel 12; 15-16). God is said to do evils wrought by wicked humans and by Satan himself, because the chief parts in those actions by directing and determining were Gods, and because the power of harming effected no more than God determined.

XVIII–XX. Direction into object and end; determination of sin §3.39.5

3.39.5XVIII. Direction into an object is when God so moderates the sinners action that it falls on this object, not that — as He permitted David to resolve concerning Nabal, but did not permit him to pour out innocent blood (1 Samuel 25); He permitted him to flee to Achish and feign folly, but not to fight against Israel (1 Samuel 21; 27; 29). XIX. Direction into an end is when God draws from sin a good end, whether of justice or of mercy.

XX. Determination of sin is the act of providence by which God circumscribes the measure, time, mode, and limit of sin, lest it be able to rage beyond what He Himself wills (1 Corinthians 10:13; 2 Corinthians 4:8-9). Thus God by permitting does not cease to reign, nor does sin escape outside the limits of providence.

Chapter 40: On the human's obligation to death §3.40.1

3.40.1CHAPTER FORTY. On the humans obligation to death.

Thus far concerning the permission of sin: the human's obligation to death is his penal condition, into which by the just judgment of God offended by that fall he has been reduced, so that he is liable to eternal curse. From chapter 37, aphorism 2, it is plain that after the dogma of the permission of sin there is place for the doctrine of the fallen humans obligation to death or the undergoing of punishment, of which Genesis 2:17 speaks.

This obligation presupposes partly Gods offense from sin, which has before it Gods prohibition and the denunciation of punishment if the human should not obey Gods law. From offense there is born in God the affection of avenging, by which God seeks to assign to the sinner for the evil of fault the evil of punishment. And from the affection of vengeance and from guilt or obligation to punishment follows the punishment itself, whose equity is from guilt, but whose infliction is from the affection of vengeance or the wrath and rigor of justice, which is joined with Gods truth in keeping the threat — unless it is tempered by new grace, by which eternal curse is turned into eternal blessing joined with temporary chastisement.

II–III. Penal condition: eternal curse or paternal chastisement; curse remains on unbelievers §3.40.2

3.40.2II. The penal condition therefore is of eternal curse or of paternal chastisement. III. Eternal curse is that which, the guilt of the human race having been transferred onto Christ, remains for those who do not receive Him. The matter is clear in Mark 16:16: But whoever does not believe will be condemned. John 3:36: But whoever does not assent to the Son will not see life, but the wrath of God remains upon him. Revelation 21:8: But for the fearful and unbelieving and abominable and murderers and fornicators and sorcerers and idolaters and all liars (that is, those not receiving Christ, the truth) their portion is in the lake where fire and sulphur burn, which is the second death. A type of this was the ejection from paradise, insofar as paradise was a figure of the heavenly dwelling. Of eternal curse and death we treated above in Book II chapter 15; it remains only for those who do not receive the testimony of Christ.

IV–V. Paternal chastisement for those looking to the womans seed; of the first parents and of posterity §3.40.3

3.40.3IV. Paternal chastisement is that by which, for sinners looking to the blessed seed of the woman, their old nature is reformed through a temporary cross after the manner of an adult. Hence the Apostle in Romans 8:1: There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit. And verses 28-29. V. And this is either of the first parents or of posterity. On the first parents were laid: expulsion from paradise, labor, pain of childbirth, subjection, temporal death (Genesis 3:16-19). To posterity the same were transmitted with original sin.

VIII–XI. Eves fourfold penalty; natural and spiritual state after the fall §3.40.4

3.40.4VIII. EVES penalty has four parts: multiplication of pain in childbirth, desire toward the husband, the husbands rule, and death. Adams penalty: the curse of the ground, labor in sweat, return to dust.

XI. As to the natural state, the force of nature was loosed and left to itself, and is no longer ruled and repressed by that peculiar providence of God by which under the state of innocence it was held back lest it bring any trouble on humans, as we taught above. As to the spiritual state, it is partly the loss of Gods first grace and favor, partly — what followed this — the grieving of Gods good Spirit and His departure from the human, which continuously the darkness of mind and ignorance or crookedness of will followed, and the disturbance, perversity, and sinister turn of all the affections.

XIII. From this fountain original sin and its unhappy brood §3.40.5

3.40.5XIII. From this fountain and Lerna of evils there flowed to Adams posterity, who descend from him according to the mode of nature, the universal fault of our nature, which is circumscribed by the name of original sin, with its whole and unhappy brood of sins and punishments, which — like the hydras heads — the new grace of the blessed seed at last cuts off savingly in those who receive this by living faith.

Of originating sin we saw in chapter 38; and of its brood in what follows. In its compass theologians chiefly understand three things: first, the guilt of both deaths, which passes to posterity by a triple way — namely (i) by participation of fault, because all posterity were in Adam by seminal reason, as in a head or root, fountain and common principle of the whole nature; (ii) by imputation, because Adam so stood in grace that if he sinned the whole posterity with him would fall from it; (iii) by natural propagation, because through the parents generation we share the condition of the guilty; second, the privation of divine grace and the defect or lack of wisdom, righteousness, and holiness; third, a horrible darkness in the mind, and in the will, affections, and so the whole human a proneness and crookedness toward sinning.

Book III COMPLETE. Book IV begins at physical page 1005 On the principles and means of human salvation; Chapter 1 On the grace of paternal compassion.

System of Sacred Theology — Book 4

BOOK FOUR / CHAPTER ONE. On the principles of human salvation, namely the grace of paternal mercy §4.1.1

4.1.1BOOK FOUR. On the principles and means of human salvation.

CHAPTER ONE. On the principles of human salvation, and namely on the grace of paternal mercy.

Up to this point, in three books we have treated the nature and constitution of sacred theology; then the last and absolutely highest end of the human being — namely the supernatural blessedness of soul and body; and finally (1) the humans creation, by which God made him fit to attain this highest end, endowed with righteousness and innocence, so that after living a pleasant and quiet life in sincere and constant love and worship of the Creator without hardships he might be transferred, immortal and without sense of death, into heavenly, eternal, and absolutely blessed life; and (2) his defection, when by Satans persuasion and impulse and by his own imprudence he lost the blessedness to which he had been divinely ordered, and offended his Creator by wicked disobedience, so that he became heir not of eternal life but of eternal death, and as one guilty of divine majesty lese-majeste, stripped of those gifts received above his natures condition, cannot by himself see, find, and keep that way which leads to the blessedness destined for him at the beginning.

I. There follow now the principles on which eternal salvation depends; and they are nothing other than acts of divine grace, by which Gods mercy and justice are so tempered that the sinful human can escape Gods wrath and damnation and regain Gods friendship and eternal life.

II. Three principles of salvation; grace as free favor, not infused habit §4.1.2

4.1.2II. The principles of human salvation are the grace of paternal mercy, of fraternal redemption, and of Gods heavenly calling.

Since our salvation and Gods friendship are wholly desperate whether we turn to ourselves or to all or any other creatures — because Gods justice, whose precept we violated, cannot otherwise be satisfied — the first principle of this friendship and of our salvation is truly Gods grace. By this we do not mean that general beneficence of God by which all created things are conserved and governed; for that would stand even if the human had never been received into grace. We mean rather the acts of divine benevolence and philanthropy by which God pitied the fallen human race when He saw it wholly sunk in eternal ruin and unable to be freed from it unless He Himself came to its aid (Ephesians 1:5; 2:4; Titus 3:4).

First, therefore, when the divine writings say we have been saved by grace, by grace is to be understood nothing but Gods mercy and free favor toward us. And so the Papists sense must be rejected, who here interpret grace as an infused quality or habit — whether the habit of charity or another distinct from charity. This grace itself was given us in Christ before the ages of the world (2 Timothy 1:9). Nor is it to be doubted that God foresaw the humans fall before all times, even though it happened in time, and so foresaw the miseries and punishments in which the human race was to be entangled; and second, that just as God pitied humans in time, so by the very foresight of those miseries He pitied from eternity and decreed when He would help.

Yet since God is not only good but also just and constant in His words, it cannot be that He fail to exact the severest punishment for sins, and what He Himself pronounced must most certainly be fulfilled: in whatever day you eat the forbidden fruit, you shall die the death. Therefore it is most necessary to hold that Gods decree to free humans was made according to His mercy in such a way that His truth and justice were in no way violated. From this we gather that the principle of our salvation is truly an admirable tempering of divine mercy and justice, unsearchable to human reason — so that justice is satisfied, and yet mercy also has its place to help the wretched.

III–V. Paternal mercy as first principle; object is the whole human race as miserable and stained by sin §4.1.3

4.1.3III. The grace of paternal MERCY is the first principle of human salvation, by which God so embraces the whole human race that He wills all humans to be saved, and according to His wisdom and justice orders and determines for them the amplest means of salvation. The proper seats of this first principle are Genesis 3:8,15; John 3:16; 1 Timothy 2:4; Titus 2:11; 2 Peter 3:9.

IV. Here its object and mode are to be considered. V. The object of the grace of mercy is the whole human race, as miserable and stained by sin. Our Savior teaches this by the word world in John 3:16. For it is certain that world here does not mean the whole system of heaven and earth with all its inhabitants produced from nothing by God, but only the human race. In the sacred writings this word sometimes signifies the human race universally, sometimes a certain part of it — either only believers gathered from the whole world into Gods kingdom, or only the impious condemned from the whole world.

It is also plain that world here is not taken in that last sense of John 17:9 and 14:17. Nor does Christ here mean by world only the elect as already separated from the world, but the whole human race taken universally, as by nature it lies in sin, and as it is commonly called through the gospel to repentance and faith in Christ (Mark 16:15; 1 John 2:2). Yet although God so loved the whole world universally, this love peculiarly and chiefly regards believers.

We distinguish three post-fall states of the human: first, of nature or common corruption; second, of grace or regeneration; third, of impenitence or final hardening, where at last Gods love stops and sheer wrath and judgment overflow upon the obstinate.

VI. From the object: love of all and of some; no clash with election §4.1.4

4.1.4VI. From what we have said about the object of the divine grace of mercy, two things especially become plain.

First is the great controversy whether God so loved all humans, or only some. Who will deny that God singularly loved believers, whom He also elected and acknowledged from eternity, above all other humans? Who will affirm that God so loves unbelievers who remain without repentance in their unbelief, once He has already judged and condemned them? Who on the other side will assert that God in no way loved those to whom He so often, variously, seriously, and from the heart offers His love and grace — and against whom He is so vehemently angry, judging and condemning them precisely because they do not believe in the Son and spurn and reject love and grace?

Second: this love of God that embraces the whole world does not clash with the election of Gods children, and it by no means follows that if God so loved the whole world He therefore also elected the whole to salvation. Here the Saviors sayings in John 15:19; 13:18; Matthew 22:14 have place. For election first distinguishes the children of God, whom He gifts with salvation by His grace, from the remaining world that by its own fault remains in unbelief.

VII–IX. Mode of mercy: amplitude in gift, demand, and promise §4.1.5

4.1.5VII. The mode of the grace of mercy consists in its amplitude and determination. VIII. Its amplitude is set in the gift, in what is demanded, and in the promise.

IX. First, Gods overflowing love toward us is made plain by the gift. For He did not love us because of any merit of ours, as if we had first given Him something He should repay (Romans 11:35), or because we loved Him first (1 John 4:19), but much more because when we had deserved sheer wrath and indignation, and had as far as in us lay destroyed the image we had received from Him at the beginning — yes, and overturned what we owed Him, fear, honor, love, obedience, even our soul and body — when from servants we had become enemies, and when He could have given us the wages of sins, death and hell: He gave us the image of His substance, His only-begotten Son. It was grace to Israel to be given the servant Moses and David: how much greater the grace that we are given not a servant but the Son of God, and Him only-begotten — and not merely as prophet and teacher of salvation, as the Socinians invent, or as an earthly savior, as the Jews, but as eternal Savior, High Priest, and King, who offered Himself as a true propitiatory sacrifice unto death for us, not to lead us from Egypt into Canaan but from death and hell into heaven.

Second, the grace of divine mercy is plain from what He demands of us. For God does not exact Levitical sacrifices and gifts, nor servile and forced obedience to the Mosaic law, but the filial obedience of faith — and He demands this in such a way that He also wills to work it in us by His Spirit.

Third, and most of all, it shines from the promise made to us in the Son of God: that all who believe in Him should not perish but have eternal life.

Determination of mercy: only in the Son; by repentance and faith; by the light of Word and Spirit §4.1.6

4.1.6The determination of the grace of mercy is that by which God, through His wisdom and justice, so limits, measures, and orders it that He receives the sinful human into His friendship, absolves from sin, and gifts with eternal life — not without Christ His Son or outside Him, nor without repentance and faith, but by requiring this in accordance with His justice and promising life through Christ, and by grace bestowing both.

Three things therefore restrain and limit the universal philanthropy by divine wisdom and justice. First: God loved the world stained by sin, yet not so as to love it without the Son or outside the Son, or to remit sins and bless it without satisfaction and expiation, but only in the Son and through the Son, whom He gave as mediator and propitiator.

Second: after God gave His Son for reconciliation, He so loved the world in Him and reconciled it to Himself through Him that remission of sins is not obtained without repentance and faith.

Third: by the force of that new covenant of grace in Christ God so loved the world that He not only, according to His justice, exacted obedience and promised life as in the old covenant of the law, but also by His grace wills to work and bestow both what the gospel demands — the obedience of faith — and what it promises — the most certain consolation of remission of all sins and of eternal life; yet not by bare omnipotence and mere miracles, or by forcing humans as it were violently to faith, but by the light of Word and Spirit in the gospel.

Corollaries: unequal light of grace; election mystery; decree ordered to Christs merit and means §4.1.7

4.1.7From what has been said the following corollaries flow.

1. It does not clash with the universal grace and philanthropy by which God loved the world, nor with Christs merit, that God grants one people or region greater light — and so also greater grace and love — than others, and more or less according to the diversity of ages and times.

2. Nor does it clash with Gods love and Christs merit that even at the same time and place He grants one human greater light and grace than another, each according to the measure of Christs gifts.

3. In this disposition of God — when, where, and how He lets the light and efficacy of His Word and Spirit shine and work in the world — consists properly the highest mystery of the election of Gods children. For according to His counsel and purpose God from eternity mercifully appointed to dispense to fallen humans in Christ this free light of Word and Spirit.

4. Even though God was moved not by foresight of works or of faith or of any other animal condition in sinful humans, but by His alone unmerited mercy, to elect some of them to life: still this decree of election cannot simply be called absolute; for although on the animals side in the human there is no determination or condition of it, yet there is some on Gods side, who Himself bound it to Christs merit and to the means — namely the preaching of the gospel and the faith that applies it.

Cause of damnation in humans themselves §4.1.8

4.1.8Reprobation is the just sentence of Gods judgment upon all impenitent unbelievers. First, the fault is not the Fathers. For He sent His Son into this world not to judge it but to save it. By right, according to the rigor of His justice, He could have sent His Son to judge and condemn the world for sins against the law, because the whole lies in evil: yet from sheer grace He first sent Him not for judgment.

The proximate and chief cause of damnation is in humans themselves. The Lord does not speak simply of habitual and innate unbelief, but of actual, affected, obstinate unbelief joined with perpetual impenitence. This is the head of all sins, which God by His justice and truth cannot but condemn. The reason is that they do not believe in the name of the only-begotten Son of God: outside which name there is no salvation.

From all this it is plain that love of darkness and hatred of light — the proper cause of humans judgment and damnation — is to be sought only in themselves. See the excellent theologian Dr. Johann Bergius in his explanation of the saying So God loved the world, on the causes of human salvation and damnation, published at Berlin in 1629.

CHAPTER TWO follows, on the grace of redemption.

Chapter 2: On the grace of redemption; incarnation and the person of Christ §4.2.1

4.2.1CHAPTER TWO. On the grace of redemption: where of the incarnation and person of Christ.

Thus far concerning the grace of paternal mercy: there follows the grace of fraternal redemption, which is the second principle of our salvation, by which the Son of God, as philanthropic mediator, reconciled the fallen human race to His Father, justice being kept safe, according to the order and promise of the new grace.

For the grace of mercy explained in the preceding chapter is so arranged that the parts of divine justice, by which He hates and punishes sin, nevertheless remain whole, and nothing is derogated from it by Gods mercy. That this might be satisfied, it was necessary that the Son of God Himself put on human nature, so that a human might satisfy for humans and God might thus put a certain infinite force into this satisfaction. For infinite justice injured by us could be satisfied only by an obedience and passion in some way infinite. This grace is immense, as David testifies in Psalm 49:8-9.

II. Here are to be considered the incarnation, office, state, and satisfaction of the person of Christ.

III. Incarnation defined; personal subsistence communicated to the assumed nature §4.2.2

4.2.2III. Incarnation is that by which the eternal Son of God, human nature having been assumed into the unity of person, at a definite time was made human from a woman, that He might act as mediator between God and humans. Its foundations are shown in Psalm 45:7; Isaiah 7:14; 1 Peter 1:20; John 1:14; Matthew 1:21 and 16:16; Galatians 4:4; 1 John 4:2; 1 Timothy 2:5; Hebrews 2:14. Of this grace the Apostle asserts in 1 Timothy 3:16 that it is the great mystery of godliness.

This incarnation, as we learn from the Scriptures, took place thus: the Holy Spirit coming upon the blessed virgin Mary and the power of the Most High overshadowing her, she conceived and bore the Son of God — that is, an individual and singular human nature, which without male seed, by the omnipotent power common to the Son with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the virgin had conceived, and which the Son assumed into the unity of person, or, what amounts to the same, personally united to Himself and communicated to that human nature the ultimate substantial term and degree by which an intelligent nature is completed in the category of being

For since a person is a rational nature as incommunicable substance, we call personality that very thing by which a person is constituted in the ultimate and complete personal being, and by which it is made incommunicable. Such personality the nature conceived from the virgin could have had of itself; but lest there be two persons rather than one, the Son of God therefore communicated His own to it and terminated the assumed nature by His first and intimate personal perfection, completed it substantially, and constituted it in the ultimate hypostatic and incommunicable being.

IV–VI. Truth of the two natures in the incarnate person; divine and human §4.2.3

4.2.3IV. In the incarnate person of Christ are contemplated the truth of the two natures, divine and human, and their personal union.

V. The divine nature in Christ is that by which He Himself, the eternal Son of God, personally united human nature to Himself. The divine nature, as the Leiden theologians rightly teach (Synopsis, disputation XXV, thesis 9), is not here properly understood as incarnate insofar as it is common to the three persons, but insofar as it is the Sons, distinct by a singular mode of subsistence — not as if the Deity of the Father and of the Holy Spirit were other and other, but because the Word of the essence is distinctly considered in the Son as communicated to Him from the Father by eternal generation (1 Timothy 3:16; Colossians 2:9; Proverbs 8:22-23; John 1:1,14; 8:58; Philippians 2:6). Orthodox theologians demonstrate this most solidly against Photinians, Arians, Servetists, and Socinians.

VI. The human nature in Christ is that which, absolute in all its essential parts and properties, was assumed by Him from the flesh of the virgin Mary into the unity of person. From this nature the Son of God is called made flesh (John 1:14) by synecdoche, as a whole human consisting of a true body and a rational soul — and indeed not excluding the humble and miserable condition and origin of humans (Philippians 2:7; John 1:14; 2 Corinthians 8:9; Hebrews 2:14; 4:15). Hence His genealogy is also led to Adam (Luke 3:38), against Marcion and the Manichees who invent Christs body as only apparent and simulated, and against the Valentinians who deny that Christ assumed His flesh from the substance of the virgin mother. Because He is a true human, He will have what constitutes a humans essence and without which to be human would involve a contradiction: namely an animated body and a rational soul endowed with intellect and will.

VII–X. Conception, assumption, and nativity of the human nature §4.2.4

4.2.4VII. Further, of the human nature are considered conception, assumption, and nativity.

VIII. Conception is that by which, by a singular operation of the Holy Spirit, it began to exist in the womb of the virgin Mary from her own seed. This is taught in Genesis 3:15; Isaiah 7:14; Matthew 1:18,20; Luke 1:30-31 — and indeed supernaturally and by the immediate power of the Holy Spirit, in respect of which He is singularly called not begotten but made (Romans 1:3; Galatians 4:4), and holy (Luke 1:34-35; Hebrews 7:26), and is compared with the first Adam not as to the matter of the body but as to the mode of conception (Romans 5:14; 1 Corinthians 15:45,47).

IX. The assumption of human nature by the Word is that by which the Son of God, at the very first moment of conception, bestowed His own personality on that human substance in Marys womb that was properly without subsistence or personality. For Leo the Great rightly says (epistle XI): Our nature was not so assumed that it was first created and afterward assumed, but that it was created by the very assumption — lest anyone suppose the humanity existed before it was united to the Word. Compare Hebrews 2:16; Colossians 2:9; Philippians 2:7.

X. Nativity is that by which the Son of God was brought forth into the light as a true human from the virgin Mary at the mature and lawful time of birth. From the prediction of Moses (Genesis 49:10) and of Isaiah 7:14; Micah 5:2; Luke 2:6-7,22-23 teaches Christs birth, as also Paul in Galatians 4:4.

XI–XIII. Personal union; ineffable mode neither essential nor accidental §4.2.5

4.2.5XI. Personal union is that by which the Son of God joined the assumed nature to Himself into the unity of His person. XII. In it are contemplated mode and effect.

XIII. Although the mode is ineffable, it is denied to be a conjunction or union that is either essential — by which things having a mutual and natural respect to one another are united, as act and potency, matter and form, genus and specific difference — or accidental, by which either accidents are joined to subjects or substances themselves are accidentally joined among themselves: but personal, by which in the personality of the Word as a common bond distinct natures, not inclining by any natural tendency to union, are gathered into one — a union whose like is not found in the whole nature of things — against Eutyches confusing the natures and Nestorius tearing them apart and wrongly dissolving the unity of Christs person.

Since therefore there is one personality of both natures, there is also one person and one personal union (1 Corinthians 8:6; John 20:31; 1 John 4:15; John 9:37).

XIV. Effect of the union: communion of natures and communication of idioms §4.2.6

4.2.6XIV. The effect of the personal union is the communion both of the natures and of the properties, which is called the communication of idioms. On account of it they are predicated of one another — not absolutely and abstractly, but through concrete words that involve the supposit and connote the personality in which the natures agree. For the reason why one nature is predicated of the other is none other than the hypostatic union in the same supposit.

Therefore it is unlawful to say absolutely that God suffered, or that a human created heaven; but through concretes one is rightly declared of the other, and the property and operation of the one of the other — as God is human, the human is God, God suffered and died, the human is eternal and made heaven and earth. Damascene calls this an exchange of names, and Melanchthon defines the predication in which a property belonging to one nature is attributed to the person in the concrete. For just as the unity of person and the personal union, so also the distinction of the two natures in Christ is necessarily retained. And because the idioms of both natures are attributed indifferently to the person signified by concrete words, therefore on account of the difference of natures it is sometimes usual to add according to which nature the predicate belongs to the subject.

CHAPTER THREE follows, On the offices of Jesus Christ.

Chapter 3: On the offices of Jesus Christ; prophetic, priestly, and kingly §4.3.1

4.3.1CHAPTER THREE. On the offices of Jesus Christ.

The office of Jesus Christ is threefold: prophetic, priestly, and kingly. Since all offices are instituted for a certain end, and therefore have the character of means to obtaining that end, we will not badly measure Christs offices by the notion of His name. He is called JESUS CHRIST by words that belong to this person by excellence, of which the former indicates the ratio of the offices that serve this end.

The word Jesus signifies savior and physician. To save is to keep safe from evils — either by preventing them from coming on, or by removing them if they have prevailed — and consequently by conferring contrary goods. The worst of evils are sin and its wages, eternal death. The best of goods are righteousness and eternal life. He is therefore Savior in the most excellent mode, because He frees from sin and eternal death and confers righteousness and life (Matthew 1:21).

The word Christ denotes the anointed, from the anointing that under the Old Testament was done with oil, which because by natural efficacy it made bodies both fragrant and agile was fit to signify two supernatural things: the consecration of a person to some divine munus, and the collation of the gifts necessary for it.

II–VIII. Prophetic office: imposition, sanctification, instruction, promise of help §4.3.2

4.3.2II. The PROPHECY of Christ is considered both in its imposition and in its execution. III. This prophecy of Christ is not only that He confirmed the old law and the evangelical promise made to the fathers of the Old Testament, but that He more fully disclosed the new gospel.

IV. In the imposition are contemplated sanctification, instruction, and the promise of help. V. SANCTIFICATION is that by which Christ was separately destined and consecrated by the Father to the prophetic munus. VI. INSTRUCTION is that by which the gifts necessary for prophecy were conferred on Him. VIII. The PROMISE of help is that by which the Father promises His aid to the Son for discharging this munus.

Christs prophecy is necessary to eternal salvation, because without the knowledge of God and of Christ salvation does not come about.

XIV–XVI. Priestly office: preparation and function of the high priest §4.3.3

4.3.3XIV. In the priesthood of Christ are considered preparation and function. XV. Preparation is that of the priests vocation and consecration, by which the Son of God is destined and anointed to the priestly office.

XVI. The function of the munus consists both in the oblation of the sacrifice for sins and in intercession with the Father. Our Christ is high priest (Hebrews 2:17; 4:14; 5:6; 10:21), the Lamb of God (John 1:36), our Passover (1 Corinthians 5:7), and advocate (1 John 2:1). Through sufferings He was consecrated to the priestly and kingly office.

XIX. Kingly munus: titles and pertaining acts §4.3.4

4.3.4It is called kingly because it properly belongs to a king to govern, judge, and defend his people. Christ is king (Zechariah 9:9; Revelation 17:14), prince of the kings of the earth (Revelation 1:5), prince of peace (Isaiah 9:6), leader (Matthew 2:6), ruler (Micah 5:2), and judge (Acts 10:42; 2 Timothy 4:8).

XIX. To the kingly office pertain (1) the calling and gathering of the church; (2) its governance by Word and Spirit; (3) defense against enemies; (4) the final judgment. The means by which the kingly office is administered in the church are chiefly the Word and the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, which ought by no means to be separated from each other.

Word and Spirit inseparable §4.3.5

4.3.5For the Holy Spirit Himself ordinarily uses the Word or the senses of the Word in its external preaching (2 Corinthians 3:6). And the Word alone, apart from the Holy Spirits illumination and inspiration, does not suffice for the humans edification, as was shown above in Book I chapter 8. And Christ does not separate these two except by the fault of those who despise the Word and resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7:51; Luke 7:30).

Events opposite to the predicted outcome are the casting off of Christs right, the imputation of sin, the denial or removal of the Holy Spirit, and handing over into Satans power, into a reprobate mind, hardness of heart, and besides temporary evils eternal death.

CHAPTER FOUR follows, On the states of Christ.

Chapter 4: On the states of Christ: humiliation and exaltation §4.4.1

4.4.1CHAPTER FOUR. On the states of Christ.

The states of Christ that were required around the imposition and execution of these offices, so that He might bear the name Savior according to the will of His Father, are two: namely of humiliation and of exaltation.

II. To the state of humiliation belong the passion, crucifixion, death, burial, and descent to the lower regions.

III–IV. Passion and crucifixion under the state of humiliation §4.4.2

4.4.2III. The passion of Christ is completed by insults and torments of every kind, both of soul and of body, which partly the fury of enemies inflicted on Him, and partly the immediate chastisement of the Father.

We take the beginning of those sufferings from His captivity. What happened to Him before that we judge to have been foresufferings rather than the sufferings proper, by which He would be tested whether, already foreknowing the evils to be borne, and indeed by experimental knowledge, He would nevertheless be ready by voluntary obedience to bear others still. Hence Augustine: Christ did not die from necessity, because He is omnipotent, nor from debt, because He is holy and immaculate, but from free will, because He is a merciful and compassionate Lord.

IV. Crucifixion is a mode of killing that teaches that Christ was made a curse for us, so that we might be freed by His cross from the curse of the law. On the mode of crucifixion see, among others, Justus Lipsius. The cross was not for the sake of execration, but a trophy and sign, as Sanford teaches from Eusebius Pamphilus and Chrysostom (On the Descent to Hell, book 3, section 125).

V–VII. Death, burial, and descent to the lower regions §4.4.3

4.4.3V. The death of Christ is the true separation of His soul from the body. Hence the Jews are rightly said to have killed Him (Acts 3:15).

VI. The burial of Christ is a sure confirmation of that death.

VII. His descent to the lower regions is His state from the time of burial until the resurrection, in which He is judged to have been under the dominion of death. This state was especially necessary, both that He might render obedience to His Father, and that, tempted in all things yet without sin, He might be able to sympathize with those who are tempted, and finally that through sufferings He might be consecrated as priest and king, and so enter into the glory of His kingdom. See Sanford and Parker in their most learned books on the descent to hell.

VIII–X. Exaltation: resurrection and ascension into heaven §4.4.4

4.4.4VIII. The state of exaltation embraces three principal degrees: resurrection, ascension into the heavens, and session at the right hand of God the Father.

IX. Resurrection is the beginning of glory and liberation from the bonds of hell and death, by which the dead body of Christ, placed in the tomb, with the effects of death in it removed, was reunited to His soul and recalled into life — not this animal life, but a spiritual one. Yet by an overflowing power He could also discharge the offices of animal life for as long as after the resurrection He remained in this life with the disciples to win faith for the resurrection. We attribute this resurrection not only to the Father through the Holy Spirit, but also to Christ Himself as efficient cause, since He had power both to lay down and to take up again His soul (John 10:17-18).

X. The ascension of Christ into heaven is the progress of His exaltation, by which, after He had administered on earth the office enjoined on Him, He was taken up in His glorious body to discharge in heaven and from heaven other offices necessary for procuring the salvation of men, and there He remains until He returns for judgment. From this fountain are drawn certain solutions of the sophisms by which some papal writers seem to defend the dogma of transubstantiation, and some the dogma of consubstantiation, or of the presence of Christ's body IN, with, and UNDER the bread by substantial non-distance — an error that wiser men today do not acknowledge, as absurd.

XI. Session at the Father's right hand; necessity of exaltation §4.4.5

4.4.5XI. The session of Christ at the right hand of the Father is the supreme degree of that exaltation, which contains the highest glory and kingly power with full empire in heaven and on earth over all and in all created things, and the dignity of further discharging the priestly office in that action which was to be carried out in the heavens by the priest made higher than the heavens — all communicated to Christ Himself by the Father.

This state of exaltation is necessary especially for two reasons: 1. Because of the priestly office, since He had to appear in heaven before the Father's face, sprinkled with His own blood, and intercede for the faithful. 2. Because of the kingly munus, since He had to send from the heavens the Word (where the administration of prophecy is understood as subordinated to the kingly munus) and the Spirit, conferring all things sealed in the New Testament on those who obey Him, but inflicting evils on the disobedient after they have abused the patience of God, which His justice could tolerate. And the act of this administration will be the universal judgment that we await, and that we explained in Book II, chapter 13.

CHAPTER FIVE follows, On the satisfaction of Christ.

Chapter 5: On the satisfaction of Christ: definition §4.5.1

4.5.1CHAPTER FIVE. On the satisfaction of Christ.

Here, after the states of Christ, follows SATISFACTION, by which the Son of God, incarnate by the grace of mercy from the Father through the power of the Holy Spirit, granted to us as Sponsor of the better covenant, and paying Himself as the price of redemption for us, by His perfect obedience found in humiliation, truly and fully compensated the disobedience of the human race, and so merited and effected that, the justice of GOD being preserved, all sinners who believe in Him actually obtain remission of sins and eternal life, while the rest, if they repent and believe, can certainly obtain it.

The seat of this principle is Romans 3:24-25; 5:6,9,16-19; 8:1; 1 Corinthians 1:30; 15:22; 2 Corinthians 5:21; Isaiah 53:4; John 1:29; Ephesians 1:7; 5:2; Colossians 1:14; 1 Thessalonians 1:10; 1 Timothy 2:6; Hebrews 7:22; 9:12; 10:12; 1 Peter 1:18-19; 2:24; 2 Peter 2:1; Revelation 5:9; Matthew 20:28; Mark 10:45.

Against Socinus; the Son truly suffered according to the flesh, not the Deity §4.5.2

4.5.2This part of Christian doctrine Faustus Socinus, most unhappy of men, attacked most vehemently of all in his books on our mediator and Savior the Lord Jesus Christ. Against him we set Hugo Grotius's most learned writing On Satisfaction, and the learned and orthodox notes of others on that writing, together with what the most learned Constantijn L'Empereur discusses on this argument against the Jews on Isaiah and elsewhere. And what the papal writers undermine here, see asserted after Luther everywhere and Calvin, Institutes 3.4.25-26, by the most noble theologian Antoine de Chandieu (Sadeel) and other orthodox writers who write well and solidly against human merits and satisfactions.

Moreover among the orthodox it ought least of all to be controversial: 1. Not a bare man, but the Son of God Himself suffered and died for us, not according to a bare and external denomination only, but in very deed and in the work itself. For just as the Son of God truly became man for our sake, so also the Son of God truly and in reality died for us.

II. From this it by no means follows that the Deity, or Christ according to the Deity, properly suffered and died. For it is one thing to ask who suffered and died for us, and another in which nature, or according to which nature, He properly died. If you ask about the person who suffered for us, I answer with Peter (Acts 3:15) that they killed the Author of life; and with Paul (1 Cor. 2:8) that they crucified the Lord of glory; and Acts 20:28 that God Himself acquired the church with His own blood; and Galatians 2:20: the Son of God loved me and gave Himself for me. But if you ask about the nature in which or according to which He suffered, I answer with Peter that He was killed according to the flesh (1 Pet. 3:18), suffered for us in the flesh (1 Pet. 4:1), and bore our sins in His body (1 Pet. 2:24). For the Deity is and remains of itself immortal and subject to no passion; and yet the passion is and is called the Son of God's own, because He suffered in His own body and poured out His own blood.

III. Christ died for all as to sufficiency; Dort answer; universal serious offer §4.5.3

4.5.3III. Least of all may it be called into doubt that Christ, according to the eternal counsel of God, properly died for this end, and that by the fullest propitiatory sacrifice and the satisfaction of His passion and death He properly merited and obtained this: that each and every human who believes in Him actually obtains, because of Him, remission of sins and eternal life, while each and every other person, if only they repent and believe, can certainly obtain it — as I once answered to the second article, or second chapter of doctrine on the death of Christ, in the Synod of Dort. See the Judgments of the Foreign Theologians, p. 127, published at Dordrecht.

When it is asked whether Christ died for all humans or not for all, both can be said with a sound and distinct sense without contradiction. For He died for all, in the phrasing of Scripture, as to the perfection and sufficiency of His merit and satisfaction, because by His death He most fully, sufficiently, and efficaciously obtained this grace announced in the Gospel — that they ought to obtain remission of sins through faith — for all humans in this world, indeed even if there were another world of them, so that: 1. it is offered in common to all seriously and in good faith; 2. true repentance and unfeigned faith are demanded of all; and 3. remission of sins and eternal life are seriously promised to all together for Christ's sake under the condition of faith. Hence also 4. all are obligated and bound to repent and believe in Christ as their Messiah and Savior, that they may obtain the promise.

Died for believers as to application; Heidelberg confession; no absolute exclusion §4.5.4

4.5.4And in this way it is not badly asserted that God through the death of Christ has been so far reconciled to the whole human race that He wills His grace and reconciliation in Christ to be offered faithfully and seriously in common to all, even though by nature they are children of wrath (2 Cor. 5:20). And so there is absolutely no one among all humans for whom Christ did not make satisfaction, as Prosper truly answered the Pelagians on the articles falsely imposed on Augustine. Therefore the death of Christ in itself, without consideration of faith, pertains to all humans whatsoever, even sinners, enemies of Christ, and the ungodly; but the saving application of its fruit can be attributed to none except the believer, since faith is its instrumental cause.

He died not for all, but for believers alone, as to the actual communication and application of the merit of His death, because it does not benefit all with full act, nor do all humans thus become real partakers of it, but only those who embrace it with true faith. The chief foundations of this assertion are that Christ laid down His life for His sheep (John 10:15), for friends (John 15:13), that He might gather the scattered children of God (John 11:52), purify for Himself a people as His possession (Titus 2:14), redeemed the church with His blood (Acts 20:28), and gave Himself for the church (Eph. 5:25).

They assert only this: that Christ did not die, nor obtain and merit any reconciliation, for unbelievers insofar as they harden themselves in their unbelief and impenitence and persevere to the end. Those who do not believe, therefore, are excluded from it not because of any defect of the new grace of paternal mercy or of Christ's satisfaction and merit, but because of their own unbelief.

Notabilia I–II: satisfaction and merit; justice with grace §4.5.5

4.5.5II. Here there are certain NOTABLE points.

1. The satisfaction and merit of Christ do not differ in the thing itself so that they must be sought in diverse operations; but they must be recognized under a varied ratio in one and the same obedience and humiliation of His. For this was also merit, insofar as it is ordered to our benefit or to acquiring something good for us under the ratio of a wage (Rom. 5:10,19; 3:25).

2. This satisfaction, as to the substance of the thing, was perfect from the rigor of justice; yet it presupposes grace, by which Christ was called to perform this work, and by which what was performed was accepted in our name and for our good; and finally by which, from the remunerating covenant, that which was sought in this satisfaction is perfected (John 3:16; Rom. 3:24; 5:15). And so in the redemption of the human race the highest justice of God and the highest grace shine together (Rom. 5:17), so that all the fruits and effects of this satisfaction are rightly attributed at once to the grace and mercy of God. See John Calvin.

Notabilia III–IV: infinite value; against Socinians and Abelard §4.5.6

4.5.63. The value of this satisfaction is sufficient and in some respect infinite. That is proved: 1. from the person of the offerer, who was God; 2. from the dignity and excellence of the thing offered — for He offered Himself, God and man; 3. from the mode of offering, to which a certain divine perfection belongs from the hypostatic union. For just as the dignity of the offended person increases the gravity of the injury, so the value of satisfaction is intensified by the dignity of the one who satisfies, because here is seen the exhibition of honor that depends on the dignity of the exhibiting person.

4. The substantial dignity that was in Christ contributes more properly to the dignity of the work than accidental dignity, such as is in certain humans above others — namely princes, the wise, parents. Finally, whoever desires a fuller explanation of the description of satisfaction should see the Synopsis of Purer Theology of the Leiden theologians, disputation 29; Wolfgang Musculus's Common Places; and what we discussed for the Augsburg Confession to D. Mentzer on this argument.

Today especially the Photinians and Socinus On Christ the Savior dissent, with Smalcius, György Enyedi, Sommer, and Ostovod, following Peter Abelard, who around A.D. 1140 attacked satisfaction — to whom Arnold of Brescia and Albert bishop of the Poitevins and the Spaniard Servetus agreed, Judaizing in this.

CHAPTER SIX follows, On the grace of heavenly and holy calling.

Chapter 6: On the grace of heavenly and holy calling: third principle defined §4.6.1

4.6.1CHAPTER SIX. On the grace of heavenly and holy calling.

There follows the grace of heavenly and holy calling, which is the third principle of human salvation, by which the Holy Spirit, given by the Father through the sacrifice of the Son who has propitiated the whole world, and given to the Son, calls all sinners without exception to the faith of Christ and seriously invites them to participation in life.

We call this principle of human salvation heavenly and holy calling, with the Apostle at Philippians 3:14 and 2 Timothy 1:9 — and so heavenly (Heb. 3:1) — which differs from the lower and external call by which someone is lawfully called to the function of an ecclesiastical or political office, as Aaron (Exod. 28:1) and Saul (1 Sam. 10:1), the Apostles and among them Judas also (John 6:70), and which can be called personal. But that former calling is common and spiritual, by which all humans are called to the communion of spiritual goods.

III–V. Parts of calling: offering of redemption-grace and precept to embrace it §4.6.2

4.6.2III. The parts are the offering of the grace of redemption and the precept concerning embracing it.

IV. The offering of the grace of redemption is that by which the Holy Spirit offers grace to all sinners through His word. So Christ teaches (Matt. 22:4,8 and following; Luke 14:17).

V. The precept concerning embracing the grace of redemption is that by which the Holy Spirit seriously commands all the called to accept the offered grace of redemption in Christ and to enjoy it for their salvation. So Christ teaches (Luke 14:23) and Paul (2 Cor. 5:20; 1 Tim. 2:4).

VI–XIII. Degrees and modes: public preaching, singular revelation, direct and indirect §4.6.3

4.6.3VI. The degrees of heavenly calling are those according to which it is either of public preaching or of singular revelation.

VII. That of public preaching is that by which the grace of redemption is announced to the whole world and seriously offered (Matt. 28:19; Acts 17:30; Col. 1:28). VIII. Singular revelation is ordinary or extraordinary. IX. The ordinary is that which the Holy Spirit used under the Old Testament in responses from the mercy-seat and through Urim and Thummim.

XI. It is direct or indirect. XIII. Indirect is that by which the Holy Spirit leads humans to Christ through secondary means. Sufficient calling is that which is seriously proposed to all humans; abundant calling is that which is efficaciously applied to the elect.

XVII–XX. Abundant, operating, preventing, and assisting grace §4.6.4

4.6.4XVII. The calling of abundant grace is also called efficacious calling. It is called operating either because God works it in the human without the human, or because God through it also works alone and without the human or his consent, as He wills. It is also called preventing grace, because it altogether precedes human consent and is the help that God grants to a human still dead in sins, by illuminating his intellect or moving the will to saving acts.

XX. The calling of assisting grace is that by which the Holy Spirit aids a human already excited so that he wills, toward the good that he wills — so to speak — to be willed and perfected. This grace works willing in the human, but not without him consenting and cooperating in a human manner; yet so that the willing itself also is referred wholly to divine grace as its first principle. It is also called accompanying, consequent, and cooperating.

XXI–XXIII. External and internal calling §4.6.5

4.6.5XXI. It is external or internal. External is that which is done through the externally preached word and the administration of the sacraments.

XXIII. Internal is that by which the Holy Spirit illuminates the mind and bends the will, so that the human seriously and efficaciously obeys the external calling. This can also sometimes and in a certain extraordinary mode happen without the external word, but God's ordinary institution is to join the word with the internal operation of the Spirit.

XXIV–XXV. Effects of calling-grace; three notabilia §4.6.6

4.6.6XXIV. The effects of the grace of calling are illumination, regeneration, faith, conversion, and begun sanctification.

XXV. Here there are certain notable points. 1. Although God does not call all nations and persons in the same mode, nevertheless no one lacks what would suffice for salvation if his own fault did not obstruct. 2. That God withdraws the external preaching of the Gospel from some nations for a longer time does not remove His just judgment, nor that He seriously wills all to be saved. 3. That not all obey the calling is not the fault of the One who calls, but of the called and of the devil.

Why some refuse; against Pelagians §4.6.7

4.6.7Christ teaches this (Luke 8:12-14; Luke 14:18). For some altogether refuse to hear; some hear sleepily; others from hope of external advantage, or zeal for novelty, or a spirit of slander; others harden themselves by perpetual habit of sinning; others seek secular wisdom and eloquence in preachers; others of their own accord withdraw from acknowledged truth.

Whoever wants more on the grace of God and its necessity in the business of salvation against old and new Pelagians should read especially the Pelagian history described by the great men Johannes Latium and Gerhard Johann Vossius.

CHAPTER SEVEN follows, On the means of human salvation, and namely on the law.

Chapter 7: On the means of salvation; Word as law or Gospel §4.7.1

4.7.1CHAPTER SEVEN. On the means of human salvation, and namely on the law.

Thus far we have seen the principles of salvation on which it depends; now we will treat the means by which one arrives at it. These are partly external, by which God opens and offers us eternal salvation by which it is conferred on us by the same God and apprehended by us.

II. The external means are: the word, the sacraments, and the ministry. III. The WORD of God is the external means of salvation by which God indicates His will to humans, so that they may know what He wills to be done by them and how He is affected toward them. IV. And it is law or Gospel. The whole word of God is now contained in the books of the Old and New Testaments.

VI–X. Law defined; law of nature and human law §4.7.2

4.7.2VI. Distinctions are to be observed here. The divine law in itself is nothing other than the idea of the divine will concerning things to be done and omitted. The law of God requires perfect obedience with all powers; it not only orders the human's actions but also forbids actions by which occasion of sinning is given to others.

VII. Law is either of nature, or human, or divine. VIII. The law of NATURE is the light and dictate of right reason by which a human naturally discerns the honorable from the base. The law of nature as it now is in humans after the fall still retains certain sparks by which sin is rebuked.

X. Human law is a definite sentence of right issued by the magistrate for governing civil society.

XI–XVI. Divine moral law and the Decalogue's two tables §4.7.3

4.7.3XI. Divine law is a definite sentence of God proposed in the Scriptures. XIII. Moral law is that which commands perpetual duties toward God and neighbor, summarily comprehended in the Decalogue.

XIV. The TEN WORDS of this law are the sum of all morality. XV. The moral law is therefore distinguished into two tables. XVI. The former table contains duties toward God in four precepts; the latter table contains duties toward the neighbor in six precepts.

XVII–XXIV. First table: duties toward God §4.7.4

4.7.4XVII–XXIV. The precepts of the former table require knowledge, love, fear, trust, and worship of God, internal and external; they forbid idolatry, abuse of God's name, and violation of the sabbath.

Images of God for worship are prohibited; historical images, provided they are not used for worship or cause scandal, are not altogether forbidden. Words related to religion are sanctified by the third precept. Solemn duties of public and private worship are contained in the fourth precept.

XXV–XXXIV. Second table: duties toward neighbor §4.7.5

4.7.5XXV. The latter table with six precepts prescribes duties toward the neighbor, which Christ comprehended in the sum of charity: You shall love your neighbor as yourself.

XXVIII. Duties that regard actions around the order of human society are prescribed by the fifth precept, so that some preside and others are subject. There follow the precepts concerning life, marriage, goods, and speech: you shall not kill, commit adultery, steal, bear false witness, or covet.

XXXIV. Thus far were the duties that the moral law prescribes.

XXXV–XXXVII. Uses of the moral law before and after the fall §4.7.6

4.7.6XXXV. In the moral law the use and abrogation are to be noted. XXXVI. The use of the moral law varies according to the human's state. In the state of integrity its use was the norm of perfect obedience.

After the fall its use toward humans is: 1. that it may convict them of their sins (Rom. 3:19-20; 4:15; 7:7); 2. that it may be a pedagogue to Christ (Gal. 3:24); 3. that it may be a herald of the just judgment of God finally to be exercised against them; 4. that for the regenerate it may be a norm of life.

XXXVIII–XXXIX. How far the moral law is abrogated for believers §4.7.7

4.7.7XXXVIII. How far the abrogation of the moral law extends, and how far it obtains among the faithful constituted under the grace of Christ, is easily gathered from the uses already set out. For 1. it is abrogated as to the first use of justifying; 2. as to curse and condemnation; 3. as to increasing sin into all desiress to the rigor and mode of leading a human into obedience.

XXXIX. But the substance of the obedience that the law demands remains, even if the mode and rigor of legal justification has ceased under the Gospel.

Canons of interpreting the Decalogue §4.7.8

4.7.8In an affirmation the opposite negation is comprehended, and in a negation the opposite affirmation, because God demands not only abstinence from evil but also the doing of good. Homogeneous and related actions are commanded or forbidden by the same precept. An effect is commanded and forbidden in its cause, and a cause in its effect. When one relative is commanded or forbidden by a precept, the other also is commanded or forbidden. If it happens that two precepts cannot be observed at once, regard is had to that which is of greater moment.

CHAPTER EIGHT follows, On the ceremonial law.

Chapter 8: On the ceremonial law: definition §4.8.1

4.8.1CHAPTER EIGHT. On the ceremonial law.

After the moral law follows the CEREMONIAL, which is an ordinance of God containing precepts concerning the external worship of God to be observed in the Old Testament Church, for signifying, prefiguring, and sealing the promised good, and for preserving the sworn order in ecclesiastical assemblies and actions.

By this law God's Church in the Old Testament was governed as an infant and a girl under elemental mysteries (Gal. 4:1-3; Heb. 8:5; 10:1; Col. 2:14, 11).

II. Four classes of ceremonial precepts; sacrifices divided §4.8.2

4.8.2II. Its precepts, however varied, may chiefly be referred to four classes: sacraments, sacrifices, sacred things, and legal observances. Of the sacraments we will speak below in their place.

A sacrifice is an external sacred action by which some sensible, permanent thing is offered immediately to God by a properly authorized minister, to testify His supreme dominion and the human's subjection. four ways: by matter, by form, by bloody or unbloody offering, and by particular end (latreutic, eucharistic, petitionary, or propitiatory).

By sacred things are meant sacred persons and all else required for external worship. Legal observances were ceremonies of pacification and sanctification by which they were distinguished from unbelievers.

III–IV. Use of the ceremonial law §4.8.3

4.8.3III. The use and abrogation of the ceremonial law are to be observed. IV. Its use was: 1. to hold the ancient people under hope of the promised goods; 2. to distinguish Israel from the nations by a middle wall until Christ tore it down and they coalesced into one body; 3. that occupied with this laborious worship they might neither invent other cults nor take up those invented by others.

The first use it performs through types, figures, and shadows. In this respect that law is rightly called a pedagogue to Christ (Heb. 10:1-3; Col. 2:14, 17; Gal. 3:24; Eph. 2:14-15).

V. Abrogation through Christ's cross §4.8.4

4.8.4V. The ceremonial law was abrogated through Christ's cross, death, resurrection, ascension, and the sending of the Spirit—by the sun driving away the shadows and the body succeeding into their place.

It is abrogated as to the necessity of observing it, every right of obligation being taken away at once; and by this it ceases to be living and is dead. It was abolished in fact partly by the Apostles' teaching and partly by God's destruction of Jerusalem and the temple. From then those ceremonies became deadly which had been tolerable only among Jews in the intervening space (Col. 2:11-17; Gal. 4:9-10; Acts 16:3; 21:22-24).

CHAPTER NINE follows, On the forensic law.

Chapter 9: On the forensic law: definition §4.9.1

4.9.1CHAPTER NINE. On the forensic law.

The FORENSIC law is an ordinance God prescribed through Moses to Israel and repeated through his successors, containing precepts on the form of political government in civil society, for procuring animal and spiritual benefits by conserving the external worship and discipline of the moral and ceremonial law.

It chiefly treats magistrates, contracts, divisions of goods, judgments, and penalties (Exod. 21–23; Deut. 17). It has two genera: common right as to substance, and singular right belonging exclusively to the Jewish people.

II–III. Threefold use of the forensic law §4.9.2

4.9.2II–III. Its use is threefold: first, that the Jewish people's whole state might be ordered by a norm of public equity and justice; second, that this people might be distinguished by this law from other peoples; third, that it looked to future things and was a type.

The first use is gathered from Psalm 122:3-8. The second flows from God's will that His people share nothing needless with others (Ps. 2; Ezek. 34:23-24). As to the third, that whole Jewish state and kingdom shadowed Christ and His spiritual kingdom. In this respect the forensic law also deserves to be called a pedagogue to Christ.

IV. Abrogation §4.9.3

4.9.3IV. Abrogation does not remove the common equity founded in nature's light; yet insofar as the law looked to Christ, it is abrogated universally.

Simple observation is neither forbidden nor absolutely prescribed to any people, except what rests on common right and natural equity. What as to substance and chief end looks to Christ, no people may usurp. Refer Josephus, Philo, Maimonides, Sigonius, Bertram, and Cunaeus On the Jewish Commonwealth.

CHAPTER TEN follows, On the Gospel: where also on the Apostles' Creed.

Chapter 10: On the Gospel: definition §4.10.1

4.10.1CHAPTER TEN. On the Gospel: where also on the Apostles' Creed.

The Gospel is the word of God announcing and proposing to all humans Christ the Redeemer with His merits to be apprehended, and freely promising to those who apprehend Him by living faith remission of sins, righteousness, and eternal salvation for His sake.

Gospel properly means a good or glad message. In theology it notes the good news of the Savior born for us (Luke 2:10-11) and His merits; specially the doctrine of Christ the Redeemer and free remission of sins for Him (Matt. 11:5; Rom. 1:16). Sometimes it sometimes refers to the whole New Testament teaching, which also embraces the law (Mark 1:14-15).

Matter of the Gospel: Christ and application of His merit §4.10.2

4.10.2The Gospel chiefly contains as subject-matter two things: 1. the doctrine of Christ the Savior of humans and His merit (Rom. 1:3)—incarnation, fulfillment of the law, payment of penalties, liberation from the curse, reconciliation with God, overthrow of the Devil;

2. the doctrine of applying Christ's merit—remission of sins (Acts 10:36, 43), perfect righteousness of Christ promised to us (1 Cor. 1:30), and eternal salvation (Rom. 1:16; 1 Tim. 1:15).

Differences between Law and Gospel §4.10.3

4.10.3Law and Gospel differ: 1. in matter—the law commands works; the Gospel announces Christ to be apprehended by faith (Rom. 3:27; Gal. 3:2);

2. in form—law-promises under condition of one's own merit (Lev. 18:5); Gospel-promises free (Rom. 4:16; Eph. 2:8);

3. in effects—the law terrifies and condemns (Rom. 3:20); the Gospel consoles and absolves (Isa. 61:1-2; Luke 4:18);

4. in object—the law toward the ungodly; the Gospel toward crushed hearts (Matt. 11:28);

5. in mode of revelation—the law somehow known by nature (Rom. 2:15); the Gospel a mystery revealed through the Son (John 1:18; Rom. 16:26).

Gospel is not a doctrine of works; summa is the Apostles' Creed §4.10.4

4.10.4Therefore the Gospel is not a doctrine of works, and so adds neither new commands nor counsels upon the divine law. That it is not a doctrine of works is clear from Romans 10.

III. The compendium or little sum of the Gospel is the Apostles' Creed, whose letter, origin, and authority are to be considered. IV. Its letter, harmoniously arranged, the following SCHEMA of the sum exhibits.

V–VII. Origin of the Creed: baptismal Trinity; later expansions against heresies §4.10.5

4.10.5V–VII. From the beginning the baptismal Creed consisted in the Trinity alone, as gathered from the earliest fathers and the Nicene Creed. Ancient expositions do not go beyond the Trinity.

VII. What the Creed is today, as to the remaining clauses, contains nothing but as if in splendid garments and fair structures built upon that foundation, which in their times were necessarily added to extinguish heresies and are now necessarily retained lest they break out again. Heretics gave occasion for a more popular explanation of that Creed which before had been folded as in majesty of silence.

VIII–IX. Authority of the Creed §4.10.6

4.10.6VIII. The authority of the Apostles' Creed is considered either as it was from the beginning, or as it was later explained on the occasion of diverse heresies.

IX. The authority of the Creed as it was from the beginning is altogether divine and equal to the other canonical Scriptures, for it is immediately from Jesus Christ our Savior (Matt. 28:19). Among juniors Luther, Melanchthon, Erasmus, Bullinger, Calvin, Chytraeus, Hemmingius, Ursinus, Olevianus, Piscator, Perkins, Alsted, and others have piously and learnedly expounded the sense of the articles.

CHAPTER ELEVEN follows, On the sacraments in general.

Chapter 11: On the sacraments in general: definition §4.11.1

4.11.1CHAPTER ELEVEN. On the sacraments in general.

Thus far concerning the WORD, the first external means of salvation; there follows the second, namely the SACRAMENT, which is a sacred solemn action instituted by a peculiar word of God, by which a heavenly and invisible thing mystically united with a visible external element is dispensed, for offering, applying, and sealing the Gospel promise to humans. The same speech the Greeks call mystery.

Casaubon holds the name's origin may be Hebrew. They called sacraments and mysteries visible signs of invisible things that God Himself instituted in His church.

II. Rules for understanding the sacrament definition (1–3) §4.11.2

4.11.2II. These rules help understand the definition. 1. Divine institution alone makes a Sacrament; remove it and the sacrament is removed, change it and it is changed. In the essentials of a sacrament, nothing is to be changed

2. Though sacraments are signs, they are not empty signs, but exhibitive of the thing signified—namely spiritual grace—as veiled under them.

3. Sacramental union is not essential-natural but mystical, not feigned but true and real: the closest conjunction of earthly and heavenly thing, so that in lawful use, when one is named and exhibited, the other is truly exhibited to the believer according to the promise's formula.

Rules 4–6: instruments of grace; faith; necessity §4.11.3

4.11.34. Sacraments are also means or instruments through which Gospel grace is not only sealed and confirmed but truly conferred and applied to believers—baptism to regeneration (Rom. 6:4); the Supper to refresh spiritual life.

5. God Himself through the sacraments as instruments of grace exerts His power to apply and seal grace, not to any whatsoever, but only to those who apprehend what is offered by true faith. Sacraments neither have grace physically inhering nor exhibit it ex opere operato. Those who use them without faith acquire no grace and impose on themselves the heaviest burden of divine wrath (1 Cor. 11:27-29).

6. Their use is neither arbitrary nor superfluous but necessary from God's ordinance—not as simply as the preaching of the word, yet so that in a case of necessity they may be interrupted for a time. The rule: Not privation, but contempt of the sacraments damns.

III. Sacraments of Old and New Testament §4.11.4

4.11.4III. There are sacraments of the Old Testament and of the New. Before Abraham the Church was without sacraments strictly so called, fed by the word alone—though in integrity the tree of life showed Christ with a kind of sacramental signification, and after the fall there were extraordinary sacramental signs (Noah's ark, 1 Pet. 3:20-21; 1 Cor. 10:1-4).

On the sacraments of the Old Testament.

Chapter 12: Old Testament sacraments: circumcision and Passover §4.12.1

4.12.1CHAPTER TWELVE. On the sacraments of the Old Testament.

Old Testament sacraments are those handed down and instituted by God for the Jewish people which through an earthly thing designated the coming Messiah for conferring and sealing Gospel grace.

II. There are chiefly two: CIRCUMCISION and the PASSOVER. Other signs we do not here count under the stricter notion of sacraments.

III. Circumcision §4.12.2

4.12.2III. CIRCUMCISION was an Old Testament sacrament by which, with the foreskin of the little boy cut off on the eighth day from birth, God's covenant with Abraham and his seed was sealed (Gen. 17).

It designated circumcision of the heart by the Spirit (Deut. 10:16; Rom. 2:28-29; Col. 2:11) and Christ coming in the flesh. The eighth day shadowed Christ's resurrection and the beginning of the new age.

IV. Passover §4.12.3

4.12.3IV. The PASSOVER was the slaughter and eating of an unblemished little lamb for memory of liberation from Egypt and as a shadow of Christ.

The paschal lamb is not a sacrifice properly so called, but a true sacrament shadowing Christ and His merit and benefits—because the institution mentions no sacrificing; slaughter was by the people not a priest; it was eaten not burned; and it was slain in Egypt where no sacrifice was to be offered (Exod. 8:26). Yet it was a type of Christ's sacrifice: unblemished yearling (1 Pet. 1:19); set apart; slain (Isa. 53:7); bones unbroken (John 19:36); blood on the doorposts; memorial of liberation; flesh eaten without leaven (1 Cor. 5:7-8).

Chapter thirteen continues with a discussion of baptism.

Chapter 13: On baptism: NT sacraments; definition §4.13.1

4.13.1CHAPTER THIRTEEN. On baptism.

Thus far Old Testament sacraments; there follow those of the New, divinely instituted for the Christian people, which through an earthly thing exhibit at once a heavenly thing, that they may seal and confer Gospel grace on believers.

II. New Testament sacraments are two: BAPTISM and the LORD'S SUPPER. Baptism is the sacrament by which a human washed with water in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is received into the covenant of grace, sealed with remission of sins, regeneration, and adoption (Matt. 28:19; Acts 2:38; Tit. 3:5).

Object; not iterated; John's baptism; ministers §4.13.2

4.13.2VII. The object of baptism is every human who can be enrolled in the covenant of grace. VIII. Baptism is not to be iterated often.

John's baptism does not differ from ours as to substance: same matter (Matt. 3:11), same form (John 1:33; Matt. 28:19). Baptism is to be administered only by a lawfully called minister of Christ. Only humans who can and ought to be saved are to be baptized.

Infant baptism rightly practiced §4.13.3

4.13.34. Infants of both believing and unbelieving parents are to be baptized—not because of fleshly generation or parents' merits, but because of the promise of grace adhering to the covenant (Gen. 17; Acts 2:39; 1 Cor. 7:14).

5. Infants are rightly baptized in the New Testament as boys were circumcised in the Old—because the same promise and covenant, the same Christ, and the same faith of covenanted parents.

Rites; water regenerates sacramentally; lifelong fruit §4.13.4

4.13.46. Rites of baptism instituted by God belong to its integrity: washing with water and invocation of the Trinity; accessories include catechizing of adults, naming, and sponsors.

7. Baptismal water regenerates and renews not by its natural power but by supernatural operation and the adjoining word of the holy Trinity (1 Pet. 3:20-21; Eph. 5:26; Tit. 3:5; John 3:5).

8. Baptism's fruit is applied to adults through actual faith, and to infants dying before years of discretion by the Holy Spirit as principal cause of faith. 9. Though received only once, baptism serves us through all life for strength of faith, confirmation against temptations, and diligence in God's worship.

Doubtful baptism §4.13.5

4.13.510. If anyone cannot be sure from the testimony of church, parents, or others that he received baptism in infancy, he is to be baptized without scruple. The fifth Council of Carthage rightly decided that such infants are to be baptized without scruple. As Leo rightly adds, what is not known to have been done cannot be called iterated.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN follows, On the Lord's Supper.

Chapter 14: On the Lord's Supper: definition §4.14.1

4.14.1CHAPTER FOURTEEN. On the Lord's Supper.

The LORD'S SUPPER is a New Testament sacrament instituted by Christ Himself immediately for the Church's use until the world's end, in which by lawful external administration, taking, eating, and drinking of bread and wine the Lord's death is announced; inwardly the taking and fruition of Christ's body and blood are exhibited; and that closest union or koinonia by which we are joined to Christ our Head is sealed and confirmed; while the faithful profess their gratitude and obligation toward God, communion among themselves, and separation from others.

True exhibition of body and blood; against mere-bread charge §4.14.2

4.14.2Those who charge our churches' doctrine with setting mere bread and wine as merely heavenly in the Supper do us injury. For Calvin (Inst. 4.17) says we affirm that Christ descends to us by the external symbol as well as by His Spirit, so that He truly vivifies our souls by the substance of His flesh and blood.

Transubstantiation and consubstantiation or impanation excluded, we readily admit with the ancients in a sound sense those particles 'with', 'under', or 'in'or 'in'or 'in', to declare a presence of the things signified that is true yet mystical, and their exhibition in lawful use of the sacrament.

Sacramental presence not local or physical; no conversion of elements §4.14.3

4.14.34. Christ's body and blood are present in the Supper neither locally nor in any physical mode, but truly and really without any fiction, united with bread and wine by sacramental union through analogy and mystical relation—not by local inexistence or coexistence.

5. Blessed bread is not converted or transmuted into Christ's body, nor wine into blood; essences remain distinct on both sides even in sacramental union—because Scripture still names bread after consecration (Matt. 26:26; 1 Cor. 11:26-28); because bread is the communion of Christ's body; because Christ said not let this become but this is my body.

Worthy and unworthy eating; pastoral severity (Chrysostom) §4.14.4

4.14.4Sacramental eating is to be distinguished according to its objects. Those who approach unworthily eat and drink judgment to themselves (1 Cor. 11:27-29).

Chrysostom terribly warns ministers not to provoke the Lord by failing to purge the body: I would sooner give up my life than give the Lord's body to anyone unworthily; I would rather have my blood poured out than grant that most sacred blood except to one who is worthy. Far worse than a demoniac is the one who approaches conscious of sin.

Frequency; infants §4.14.5

4.14.513. True Christians do not use the sacred Supper by custom alone, but eagerly and religiously from ardent desire for Christ, that they may satisfy His precept, enjoy His love and treasure, and frequently also for their own need, to strengthen weak faith. In the primitive church the faithful communicated daily; later, as faith's ardor cooled, that custom faded.

As for little ones: since this mystery requires self-examination and announcing the Lord's death (1 Cor. 11), the institution does not of itself pertain to infants who cannot perform these.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN follows, On the ministry of the word.

Chapter 15: On the ministry of the word: definition §4.15.1

4.15.1CHAPTER FIFTEEN. On the ministry of the word.

The MINISTRY OF THE WORD is a sacred office enjoined by God through lawful calling on fit persons, that by teaching His word, administering the sacraments, and absolving and binding, they may call and direct people to God's kingdom and salvation.

In Greek it is called diakonia, leitourgia, episkope, oikonomia; in the Old Testament the Levites' ministry is custody and warfare. The Fathers call it hierurgia; Paul names ministers presbyteroi. It is a sacred office distinct from profane and civil offices.

Efficient cause God; vocation immediate and mediate §4.15.2

4.15.2Its chief efficient cause is God, and the Holy Spirit Himself speaks through the prophets. The proximate cause is divine calling—also named mission or election—either immediate or mediate.

Immediate or extraordinary calling is when God sends some by His peculiar mandate without human election (patriarchs, prophets, Apostles). Mediate and ordinary calling runs through means God constituted, directed by Him as the principal cause.

Ordinary call: church election by pastors, magistrate, people; requisites §4.15.3

4.15.3The means of ordinary calling is the Church's lawful election. God gave His church the keys of the kingdom and entrusted word and sacraments; therefore the church elects ministers through three orders: the eldership or pastors; magistrates as nursing fathers; and the Christian people.

Paul teaches the requisites (1 Tim. 3; Tit. 1): common—faithful, blameless, sober, hospitable, just; proper to the office—apt to teach, holding sound doctrine, able to exhort and refute opponents, not neophytes.

Form of the ministry: word, sacraments, keys §4.15.4

4.15.4The form of the ministry consists chiefly in three parts. First comes teaching and preaching the word; hence ministers are teachers, ambassadors of God, and laborers in the word.

Second comes administering the sacraments according to Christ's institution; ministers are stewards of the mysteries of God.

Third comes remitting sins to the repentant and binding the unrepentant, which is called excommunication, whether generally in sermons or specially toward persons, so that people may be saved unto the glory of God.

Rules on efficacy, public call, necessity-case, discipline §4.15.5

4.15.5II. Rules: God works salvation not by private suggestions against Scripture but by the ministry of word and sacraments. All Christians must handle and spread the word, yet none may publicly teach and administer sacraments unless specially and lawfully called—except in a case of necessity.

Immediate calling is neither to be sought nor expected today. The ministry is not idle dignity but an arduous office. Call is not of the eldership alone; diverse orders stand; errors must be refuted without chasing obsolete husks; visitations and discipline proceed from private admonition to public rebuke, excommunication only as last resort.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN follows, On faith.

Chapter 16: On faith: definition §4.16.1

4.16.1CHAPTER SIXTEEN. On faith.

Thus far the external means of our salvation; there follows the internal, namely FAITH: a fiduciary assent and acknowledgment of the truth which is according to godliness, unto hope of eternal life which God who does not lie promised before the ages and manifested in His times (Tit. 1:1-3).

Paul calls it the faith of the elect; Hebrews 11:1 describes it as the hypostasis of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen.

Heb. 11 terms; object of hope; things unseen §4.16.2

4.16.2Hypostasis properly means substance or subsistence, sometimes boldness of soul. Elenchus is demonstration and conviction.

Hope's object is both what is hoped for (eternal life) and that in which one hopes (God, Christ). Present and past goods believed done and trusted to remain also belong here, with things unseen that faith must apprehend.

Kinds and grades of faith §4.16.3

4.16.3Faith is distinguished as historical, dogmatic, temporary, miraculous, and justifying or saving faith.

Historical faith knows and assents to Gospel history without trust; temporary faith sprouts on rocky ground and withers under persecution; miraculous faith credits divine power for wonders. Justifying faith alone saves: knowledge, assent, and trust in Christ the mediator, apprehending the Gospel promise unto justification and eternal life.

Justifying faith: knowledge, assent, trust; instrument §4.16.4

4.16.4In justifying faith concur knowledge of Gospel truth, firm assent, and the trust by which the sinner rests on Christ alone for remission of sins and acceptance with God.

Faith is the organ or instrument of justification, not a meritorious cause; Christ and His righteousness are the object and foundation. Faith apprehends; it does not earn.

Faith's effects; against idle faith §4.16.5

4.16.5Living faith is not idle but effective through love (Gal. 5:6); yet it justifies alone—not insofar as it works, but insofar as it apprehends Christ.

Faith's effects—union with God, evangelical justification, sanctification, peace of conscience—are treated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN follows, On the consequences and effects of Christian faith.

Chapter 17: Faith's consequences: overview §4.17.1

4.17.1CHAPTER SEVENTEEN. On the consequences and effects of Christian faith: where on the union of believers with God, and their evangelical justification.

From faith in Christ follow justification, sanctification, and peace of conscience. Here union and justification; sanctification and peace in the chapters that follow.

II. Union of believers with God §4.17.2

4.17.2II. The union of believers with God is that by which a human is joined to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit through faith—mystically yet truly and most closely—so as to abide in Him and be blessed forever.

Notabilia: the union is real not imaginary; outside it one can neither act well, enjoy true peace, nor be blessed; it does not wholly remove infirmities in this life yet covers and increasingly purges them; believers united to God also share communion with one another.

IV. Evangelical justification defined §4.17.3

4.17.3IV. Union with God through faith is followed by EVANGELICAL JUSTIFICATION: an act of free grace by which God absolves the sinner from guilt and reckons him righteous solely for Christ's merit apprehended by faith.

In the act of justification one's own merit and working are opposed.

Notabilia on grace, faith alone, duration of justification §4.17.4

4.17.41. The grace by which we are justified is not an infused inherent quality but God's mercy and favor in Christ. 2. That grace is not utterly absolute but determined to Christ's merit.

3. Faith, though never alone but accompanied by good works as fruits, nevertheless alone justifies. Justification of the converted lasts as long as life and faith. The righteousness of faith is Christ's own righteousness and God's inexhaustible grace—the only true consolation.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN follows, On sanctification and good works.

Chapter 18: Sanctification and good works: definition §4.18.1

4.18.1CHAPTER EIGHTEEN. On sanctification and good works.

Sanctification or renewal of believers and GOOD WORKS are actions of the converted performed by the Holy Spirit's operation from true faith according to the norm of divine law, by which sin is continually mortified in them and God's image renewed unto obedience and honor to God.

Renewal differs from regeneration: by regeneration we are made God's children; by renewal we are declared such. The one changes state; the other qualities.

Causes: Spirit principal; faith secondary; form = conformity to law §4.18.2

4.18.2The principal efficient cause is the Holy Spirit; the proximate secondary cause is true faith working through love.

The form of good works lies in conformity to God's law—sin is lawlessness, a good work is law-keeping. Yet because believers' works are imperfect, defects are supplied through faith in Christ, and Christ apprehended by faith makes His righteousness ours so that the works please God.

Ends: God, self, neighbor; necessity of good works §4.18.3

4.18.3Ends: toward God—obedience and honor; toward ourselves—confirming our calling; toward the neighbor—relieving by love's duties and avoiding scandal.

On necessity: good works are not necessary to justification as a cause, but are necessary in the justified as fruit and the Christian way of life—against those who thrust them into justification itself.

Perfection and imperfection of saints' works §4.18.4

4.18.4VII–VIII. On perfection: we assert that the saints' good works in this life are not perfect by the law's measure. That imperfection appears often as to parts, always as to degrees.

Daily remission is needed; no one first gave to God so as to be repaid. Condign and congruent merit are to be rejected; God crowns His own gifts in us, not our merits.

Notabilia: self-denial; law as canon §4.18.5

4.18.51. Zeal for good works necessarily includes self-denial and bearing the cross. 2. What Christians must do, God's law perfectly shows as divine rule and canon; Christ is the pattern. Without true knowledge of God they cannot be borne.

CHAPTER NINETEEN follows, On Christian liberty.

Chapter 19: Christian liberty: definition §4.19.1

4.19.1CHAPTER NINETEEN. On Christian liberty.

Christian liberty is the fruit of the fullness of grace and truth that came through Christ, by which believers, freed from bondage to sin, the condemning law, and Mosaic ceremonies, called into the liberty of God's children, freely use things that do not matter for building up.

Freedom from sin and from the law's curse §4.19.2

4.19.2Freedom from sin's bondage is regeneration and sanctification, so that sin does not reign (Rom. 6). Freedom from the law is from its curse and rigorous right as to justification—not from the moral norm.

Mosaic ceremonies are abrogated in Christ; forensic determinations of Jewish particular law do not bind Christians insofar as they are particular.

Indifferent things; abuse; magistrate and Mosaic forensics §4.19.3

4.19.3In indifferent things liberty does not extend to scandalizing the weak nor to fastening a worship of necessity on adiaphora. Those err most gravely who attach necessary worship to indifferent things, or pretend things are indifferent that are not.

Christians are not bound by Moses' forensic laws as particular right; what is moral in them remains. Carlstadt and Müntzer are rejected for binding the Christian magistrate to Moses' particular forensic laws.

Consequences: sonship; Spirit of adoption §4.19.4

4.19.4X. A consequence of liberty from sin and law—to which peace of conscience is annexed—is both the right of God's children and the sending of the Spirit of adoption into believers' hearts.

XI–XII. The right of sons is that they are heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ, including the body's liberation from vanity; the Spirit of adoption assures us of coming glory.

CHAPTER TWENTY follows, On Christian warfare and the cross.

Chapter 20: Christian warfare: enemies §4.20.1

4.20.1CHAPTER TWENTY. On Christian warfare and the cross.

Christian warfare is believers' spiritual fight against the enemies of salvation under Christ the captain.

God's enemies to be distinguished: Satan from the beginning; the world following its prince and hating God and His friends; our flesh opposed to God and His Spirit.

Christ the captain; victory applied in members §4.20.2

4.20.2VI–VII. Though Satan tried to hinder God's counsel of salvation, the Father sent the Son to save what was lost and destroy the devil's works. Christ the captain assaulted and conquered the enemy in the cross and death.

VIII. The victory accomplished bodily by Christ the Head in the days of His flesh is applied and continued spiritually in Christian members through faith and the Spirit.

Armor; novitiate; prize §4.20.3

4.20.3X. The Apostle sets out the armor (Eph. 6)—breastplate of righteousness, shield of faith, helmet of salvation, sword of the Spirit.

XI–XII. Recruits fight both open works of the flesh and hidden heart-wickedness. XVII. The prize prepared for conquerors is the tree of life, the crown of life, the new name.

The cross: school of life; medicine; heaviest conflict §4.20.4

4.20.4On the believers' cross: 1. The school of the cross is the school of light. 2. Though believers' sins deserve the cross as punishment, God turns it into medicine.

3. The heaviest cross is when the faithful soul is engaged with God Himself as if an enemy—the trial of forsakenness—yet conquered by faith.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE follows, On prayer.

Chapter 21: On prayer: definition §4.21.1

4.21.1CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE. On prayer.

Prayer is an exercise of piety and Christian warfare by which believers, by the Spirit's prompting and in Jesus Christ's name, address God the Father by petition and thanksgiving concerning goods to be given or already given, and evils to be averted or already averted.

It is also called invocation or adoration; metaphorically sacrifice, incense, calves of the lips. In the regenerate it is nearly a compendium of all good works.

Impulsive causes; ends; object of petition §4.21.2

4.21.2IV. Three impulsive causes: God's will, our need, and the examples of Christ and the saints. The end: God's glory, union and communion with God, increase of faith.

What we ask for is personal (for ourselves and others) or real (spiritual and temporal goods). Ask in Christ's name; God alone is to be religiously adored.

Practical theorems 1–5 §4.21.3

4.21.3XIV. Corollaries: 1. Prayers should be born in the heart and formed with the mouth. 2. Christians are invited to continual prayer by command, promises, and needs.

3. No creature but God alone is to be religiously adored. 4. Even when we distinctly invoke Father, Son, and Spirit, one God is adored. 5. Spiritual goods are to be sought without condition insofar as they concern God's glory and salvation; temporal goods with the condition if God wills.

Theorems 6–10 §4.21.4

4.21.46–7. Faith, mother of true invocation, begets trust of certain hearing, humility, and custody of conscience.

8. Even when God does not always grant what is desired but denies or delays, by praying we are led to union with God. 9–10. Some goods may piously be prayed against; evils likewise deprecated.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO. On peace of conscience.

Chapter 22: Peace of conscience: definition §4.22.1

4.22.1CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO. On peace of conscience.

PEACE OF CONSCIENCE is tranquillity of soul in one who believes in Christ, such that he is neither disturbed by the law's threatenings nor broken by adversities, but according to the divine promise surely expects and at last obtains glorious liberation from all that troubles this life.

It arises from faith in reconciliation with God through our Lord Jesus Christ (Rom. 5:1); it is fostered by hope that does not put to shame; it is kept by zeal for a good conscience.

From justification; sweetness of the heart at peace §4.22.2

4.22.2This is the peace the angels wished the shepherds at Christ's birth. Whoever is truly illumined by word and Spirit and believes Christ acquired salvation by passion and death and applied it in baptism can have a tranquil conscience.

The whole heart is seasoned with heavenly peace's sweetness; even sensing remaining sin in the flesh, he rejoices in the Lord, knowing the Savior took his sins and made satisfaction.

Against wrath; self-examination; Chrysostom on daily audit §4.22.3

4.22.3The smoke of God's wrath held forth by the law does not terrify the one at peace: where there is no sin, there is no wrath as wages; a father's chastening does not remove the peace of knowledge.

Chrysostom urges a daily tribunal of conscience: let the mind sit as judge over the soul; search out faults; accuse your own vices not others'; before the day, call conscience to account for words, works, and thoughts.

Absolution and the word; Luther against seeking peace by experience alone §4.22.4

4.22.4Let the one being absolved take every care not to doubt that his sins are remitted before God. He is bound to stand by another's judgment not because of the prelate but because of Christ's word: Whatever you loose on earth. Faith in that word will make peace of conscience.

Whoever seeks peace another way—say by inward experience—seems to tempt God. You will have as much peace as you believe the word. Luther: even if absolved a thousand times by the pope himself, one who does not believe the word will never be at rest.

Consummation: eternal life §4.22.5

4.22.5X. The consummation of peace of conscience and the harbor of true tranquillity, into which our Theology desires to penetrate, is ETERNAL LIFE—the absolutely highest end of man.

Therefore we too, surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, casting aside every weight and sin, must run the race with endurance, looking to Jesus the pioneer and perfecter of faith.

From Via Patrum: https://viapatrum.org/works/crocius-syntagma/. Licence: CC BY 4.0. Credit: Via Patrum.